This week’s reading had me thinking about “access” in political reporting, and how many reporters prioritize having these lines of connection above all else. In the U.S., for instance, many political reporters were excited for Trump to return to office in 2024 because he was unpredictable, made politics an exciting spectacle, and would pick up calls from any reporter (even the ones he repeatedly calls out in public as liars, like Maggie Haberman). As Panievsky points out, when this platforming becomes uncritical, like when journalists run statements from candidates without calling attention to the lies and distortions, reporting can fuel populism. The reading also made me think about how the coverage of political extremism is a potential example of “balance” leading us astray to “false balance” — by trying to get an accurate temperature check on the range of ideologies in a region, journalists can overestimate the salience of extremist viewpoints and inadvertently lend them credibility. This is commonly referenced in regards to the media’s coverage of anthropogenic global warming when the phenomenon was first being discussed by scientists, but after reading these chapters I can see why it’s also a useful framework to thinking about political extremism.
I’ve also been thinking about the reading in context of the White House’s announcement over the weekend that they would investigate the TV press pool for not covering Trump. Of course, this is remarkably ironic, given all of Trump’s criticism of the press and his actions to restrict reporters from the White House, but it also underlines a point Panievsky makes: for all the derision and hostility that populist leaders demonstrate toward the mainstream media, they still recognize its utility and its power in creating a mythology around populism. It reminds me, too, of what Jan-Werner Müller said in class last week: the far-right has never run out of scapegoats, and the media is one of the most low-risk, high-reward targets for any aspiring autocrat.
While Panievsky argues that we shouldn’t abandon objectivity and instead should “reinterpret it in ways that align with our normative expectations from them” (101), I don’t find that idea to be all too persuasive. For instance, I’m skeptical of the suggestion that media outlets should increase their usage of fact-checks — we’ve seen major outlets like the NYT embrace this approach, but for the most die-hard supporters of far-right movements, nothing their politicians say could be wrong. In fact, the NYT or another mainstream outlet calling it a lie would probably only embolden the idea that there is a deep-seated conspiracy to oust and shame their preferred candidate. I am in agreement with Panievsky that we still need rigorous, thoughtful reporting that aims to report the truth, but we seem to lack the necessary modes to make impact with reporting.
