Slide 1: Population Demographics

This slide provides an overview of the unique demographics of New York’s Thirteenth Congressional District and the changes that have taken place over the past decade. We use 2017 estimates as the most recently available ACS data; to demonstrate demographic change we show percentage point differences from 2012 and 2007. It is important to note, however, that the 2007 comparison is drawn from the then-Fifteenth District. Before redistricting, over 80 percent of the current area of the 13^th district was part of the 15^th, however we recognize that these comparisons are not exact and that some margin of error must be taken into account.

Despite this, there are several inferences we can make. The first is that over the past decade, both white and black elements of the population have been replaced by new racial groups, including Asians, those of mixed race, and those not identifying with any of the above. At the same time, the district, already one of the most Hispanic in the nation, has become steadily more so. These effects, however, have either slowed in the last five years or are attributable to the 2011 redistricting. More confidently, we can observe a slow replacement of the native population with those of foreign origin, and a foreign population that is politically integrated, as evidenced by the fact that the foreign-born naturalized percentage is growing at nearly the same rate that the native population is shrinking. Taken together, these facts show a district undergoing demographic change, though some effects are stronger than other. We will analyze the implications of these demographics in the following slides.

Slide 2: Selected Scholarship

The effects of immigrant populations on various societal outcomes has been hotly debated in past scholarship. Research by de Graauw and Vermeulen (2016) has demonstrated that the proportion of immigrants among the electorate and their relative population levels are significant predictors of their social and political integration at the local level. Along the same lines, we can predict from research by Branton and Dunaway (2009) as well as Abrajano and Singh (2009) that media coverage will become more favorable to immigrants as their levels rise, as it increasingly considers their interests due to their rising consumer power.

In the battleground of public opinion, there are those who argue that increased levels of immigrants will provoke a sense of “racial threat” and aggravate negative feelings toward immigrants and immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). On the other hand, many have observed opposite or no effects, leading some to conclude that there is more at play. According to one such theory, Hopkins (2010) argues that it is only the interaction of sudden change with national immigration salience that sparks backlash. The relevance of these theories to our district will be addressed in the next slide.

Slide 3: Predicted Effects

Given the demographic makeup of our district, we suggest three predictions about the effects of recent developments. We expect that the population changes caused by the immigrant growth rate, while perhaps of relevance to local leaders, are not sudden or significant enough to meet the threshold described by Hopkins and others to trigger local opposition or backlash. Second, we predict that immigrants will continue to integrate themselves into society, following the example of the large numbers presently doing so in the local context. Third, although already significant enough within the district to merit favorable media coverage, we expect that as the immigrant demographic continues to grow, the media will continue to see them as an important economic constituency, thus supporting further coverage of their interests.

Slide 4: Research Proposal

To further the research the effects of district population demographics and their changes, we propose a research project consisting of qualitative interviews with local political figures and non-profit immigrant advocacy organizations. We aim to examine if changing demographics have led to backlash toward immigrants, placing the results of our research in conversation with theories of racial threat as well as the contact hypothesis. To this end, we will ask questions seeking evidence of ethnic tension and racial resentment within the district. This will hopefully allow us to determine the impact of demographic change and the accuracy of our prediction that the local experience will be better for immigrants today than ten years ago.

This slide shows three charts which show population demographics of TX-23 today, in 2009, and how they have changed in the past ten years. Overall, the shifts in racial, ethnic, and foreign-born populations were fairly insignificant. The greatest changes were in the White (white alone), Hispanic, and foreign-born populations. There was as slight increase in Hispanic and foreign-born populations and a decrease in the White population. This is not very surprising considering that increases in minority populations have, in the past, lead to white citizens leaving an area. Considering that the total population of TX-23 decreased by only a little over 35,000 it is not surprising that demographics did not experience great changes. TX-23 has not been redistricted since 2003, its economy is fairly stable, and its socio-economic traits have not shown notable change in about fifteen years. This means that many people are not moving and staying in their homes, so demographics are not likely to change.

This shows the conclusions of previous research on three effects of population characteristics: immigrants experiences, media coverage on immigration, and public opinion on immigration. Rene R. Rocha’s “Ethnic Context and Immigration Policy Preferences Among Latinos and Anglos” explains that higher concentration of Latino populations influence greater Latino solidarity and liberal policymaking. Regina Branton and Johanna Dunaway argue in “Spatial Proximity to the U.S.-Mexico Border and Newspaper Coverage of Immigration Issues” that the closer a district is to the US-Mexico border, as well as higher Latino populations, the more negative immigration coverage it will experience from the media. This would lead to more negative media coverage of immigration because it would be seen as a more present, high-risk issue, not to mention that districts closer to the border are more likely to have larger Latino populations. Abrajano and Hajnal discuss populations’ influence on public opinion in White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics. They argue that higher populations of Latino citizens will lead to greater immigration opposition. This is true because of the threat narrative. White citizens will be more likely to fear immigration issues if the ‘threat’ seems more present. Similarly, Daniel Hopkins explains in “”Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition” that changes in immigrant demographics increase immigration opposition, especially if there is an increase in immigrant populations. Like high Latino populations, this presents a more prominent idea of a threat, as if immigrant populations are taking over a district.      

Based on prior research presented in the previous slide, one could predict that the large Latino population in TX-23 would experience more unity, solidarity, and immigrant-friendly politics. This would make for a more positive, welcoming immigrant experience. However, this may not be applicable to TX-23 because even though they have high Latino populations, they also have high white populations, which would increase the fear of immigration and Latinos and anti-immigrant attitudes. Media coverage on immigration in this area will most likely be negative because of its proximity to the US-Mexico border. TX-23 shares a large portion of the border with Mexico, so the media would be more likely to show immigration in a negative light because there is much easier access for immigration along the border of this district. The fact that this district already has high Latino populations increases its chances to experience negative media coverage of immigration. Public opinions of immigration are likely to be low in TX-23. They have high Latino populations and have experienced a slight increase in immigration in the past ten years. These factors, in addition to the negative influence on the media, will result in more negative views of immigration in TX-23 because the ‘threat’ to the community is more prominent.

Examining immigrant experiences can be done through qualitative interviews. There are a great number of immigration interest groups in Southern Texas. Leaders of these organizations would be good candidates to interviews because they could give details on immigrant integration in the community. They would be fairly easy to get in touch with through their contact information provided on their websites. They could also provide ways to get in touch with immigrants in the community who might be willing to provide information on their own personal experiences. Questions could be asked about lifestyle, community involvement, and community solidarity. For example, some of these questions could include “Do you find that issues like the government shutdown or family separation crisis have had a positive or negative impact on solidarity within the Latino community?”  or “Have changes in local demographics had an impact on local policies and interests?” These would show not only how populations influence immigrant experiences, but also how reactions to local politics change immigrant welcomeness and reception.

Title Slide: The images in this title slide are meant to introduce the viewer to the district’s demographics. One image is of protestors holding signs written in Spanish, the next is of White and Asian “techies” at a conference, and the third is of Asian runners participating in a race.

Slide 1: From 2007 to 2017, CA-19, or its corresponding geographical area, has remained almost evenly split between Asians (30%), Hispanics/Latinx (40%), and Whites (30%). Changes to this population have been small: the Asian population shrunk by one percentage point post-redistricting and grew by two percentage points five years after that. The Hispanic/Latinx population, meanwhile, grew and then shrunk again by one percentage point in the span of a decade. The only notable trend is that Whites have shrunk by 1.5 percentage points over the course of the decade, which, though consistent, is still very small. Before redistricting occurred in 2012, CA-19, or what was then CA-16, was around 60% foreign-born and 40% native-born. Post redistricting, the foreign-born population grew by 4.6 percentage points, but shrunk again by one percentage point. In general, however, CA-19 is notable for its large foreign-born, Latinx, and Asian populations, shrinking White population, and overall consistency, with little demographic change in the last ten years.

Slide 2: In terms of existing literature, it is clear that the size and growth of various immigrant populations impact public opinion, local media coverage, and their own lived experience in different ways. In terms of public opinion, Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) find that once the Latinx population reaches a certain size, support for immigration decreases; if an Asian population is significant, however, support for immigration increases. Enos (2014) builds upon that literature by suggesting that short-term contact with Hispanic populations increases hostility towards immigrants in general. Other literature focuses not on size of the immigration population, but on growth, which Abrajano and Hajnal (2015) suggest is weakly related to attitudes towards immigration. Hopkins (2010), Newman (2018) and Adida et al. (2018) all find that the rapid growth of Latinx populations increases hostility towards immigrants. Hopkins’ “politicized places” theory, for instance, argues that when communities are undergoing large growth in Latinx populations at the same time that salient national rhetoric politicizes immigration, hostility towards immigrants will increase (Hopkins, 2010). Adida et al. (2018), meanwhile, argues that large growth in Latinx populations results in increased support for restrictionist immigration policies; Newman (2018) argues that when communities undergo the lived experience of Latinx population growth, their attitudes towards Latinx immigrants interact with Trump’s rhetoric and become more hostile and adversarial. Rapid growth of an Asian population, meanwhile, may also induce hostility against immigrants: Hopkins (2010) finds that when an Asian population expands quickly, attitudes towards the population also become more negative. When taken together, the literature seems to suggest that largeness of, close contact with, and fast growth of a Latinx population increases general hostility towards immigrants. A large Asian population decreases hostility towards immigrants, but if the Asian population grows very quickly, that effect quickly mimics the trajectory of the Latinx experience. In terms of media coverage, Abrajano and Singh (2009) suggest that national news coverage of immigration tends to focus on Latinx immigration, using a very negative tone. When compared to news published in English, however, Spanish news are seen to be more positive about immigration as a whole and use more positive language. Therefore, an area with large quantities of news published in Spanish may see more positive media coverage of immigration as compared to the national average. Finally, in terms of the overall immigrant experience, the literature varies. The literature previously discussed in terms of public opinion applies here: Latinx populations, large or growing in size, face hostile attitudes towards them and towards immigrants in general from the communities that they join. Professor Fernandez-Kelly (2018), however, argues that large immigrant communities can help facilitate integration, by providing immigrants with a support system for societal integration. This applies, in particular, to Hispanic/Latinx populations in various parts of New Jersey. In terms of the Asian population, Aptekar (2008) argues that though Asians are more readily integrated into society, even in places where they are prominent, they find difficulty being represented or integrating in politics. The literature suggests, therefore, that Latinx populations may or may not have a difficult time integrating into society and politics, depending on their reception by the native population and by their immigrant peers. Asian immigrants may integrate into society, but face difficulty achieving political integration.

Slide 3: This literature can allow us to make predictions about CA-19. First, in terms of public opinion, the  largeness of the Hispanic/Latinx population and the close contact that White residents will have with them indicates that there will be hostility towards immigrants as a whole. The largeness of the Asian population, however, as a non-threat to White populations, may mitigate that general ill-will. Meanwhile, as described before, CA-19 has seen very little change in either its Latinx or its Asian populations in the last decade; therefore, though growth of both Latinx and Asian populations may play a role in increasing hostile attitudes regarding immigration, the effects may not manifest in CA-19. The overall prediction, therefore, is that based on size of population alone, public opinion of immigration will be lukewarm: cold towards the size and proximity of Latinx populations, but warm towards the size of Asian populations. Second, in terms of media coverage, 40% of CA-19 is either Spanish-speaking or Latinx. CA-19 is likely to have numerous Spanish-speaking news outlets, and as Spanish new outlets tend to be more positive towards immigration than a national news outlet, CA-19 is likely to see more positive local media coverage of immigration, especially as compared to national media coverage. Third, in terms of the overall immigrant experience, CA-19 is, while very largely Latinx and Asian, also fairly White. Latinx immigrants thus may find it easy to integrate thanks to robust immigrant communities (40%), or may face backlash and hostility from the White native population. Asian immigrants, meanwhile, may find it easy to integrate into CA-19, given the robust size of the Asian population (30%), but still may not be adequately represented in or allowed to participate in politics, be it at the local, state, or federal level.

Slide 4: I plan to gauge Asian immigrant integration into politics and society through qualitative interview data collection. As already mentioned, I predict that the large size of CA-19’s Asian population will allow Asian members of the community to be fully integrated into society, be it through educational attainment, employment status, or income attainment, to name just a few measures of integration. Despite their social integration, however, I predict that Asians in CA-19 will not be fully politically integrated or represented on multiple levels of government. In order to look at both societal and political integration, I plan to interview a number of immigrant advocacy groups, which will give me insight into both. Immigrant advocacy groups, as argued by authors like DeGraauw (2013), work alongside both the immigrants that serve as their clients and government officials that want to use the knowledge that advocacy groups possess to better serve immigrants’ interests. These groups will therefore be one of the most reliable sources to draw upon in understanding the integration of immigrants into societal and political life in CA-19. Some groups that I would get in contact with for interviews include Asian Americans for Community Involvement (AACI), San Jose National Association of Asian American Professionals (NAAAP), or the Asian Law Alliance. Preliminary general questions for these organizations include “What facilitates integration into society for Asian immigrants? How does that differ for different Asian groups?” or “Are Asian immigrants integrated into politics? Why or why not?” I would also want to differentiate between different service providers by asking specific questions like “How has your organization served to integrate Asian immigrants into either society or politics, or both?” Upon completing my qualitative interviews with immigrant advocacy groups, I would compile the data and gauge the accuracy of my predictions in a written report.

While much of the literature in class thus far has focused on areas where there are large or rapidly growing immigrant populations, LA-3 has remained stagnant, at least in the past 10 years. Across all ethnic categories, the largest change between 2007 and 2017 was ~4 percentage points (decrease in Black population). Our populations of interest experienced even less change, with the Latino population growing only 1.1 percentage points. As a point of comparison, the White population actually grew twice as many percentage points, so it is safe to assume that LA-3 is not a district where minorities are threatening the existing ingroup, at least not by force of numbers. This is particularly true when we examine the size of the Latino population, which is just 3.8% of the district as of 2017. The numbers for immigrants are similarly small and constant, composing just 3.13% of the population, and growing 0.73 percentage points. Thus, in context of immigration, the most salient characteristics of LA-3 are that populations of interest (Latinos and immigrants) are small and relatively unchanging.

With respect to public opinion, most research on immigrants has centered on how demographics lead to hostility or backlash against outgroups. For instance, in White Backlash, Abrajano and Hajnal describe a theory of racial threat, where a large outgroup begins to take the resources (political, material, etc.) of the ingroup, thus sparking retaliation (2015). Notably, the ingroup must be aware of the outgroup, which requires some proximity/contact between the groups. The American public tends to conflate Latinos with immigrants in general, so this racial threat mindset against Latinos would effectively result in the same treatment of immigrants in general, at least according to the authors. Hopkins actually disagrees with the application of racial threat to immigrants, and instead explains hostile attitudes towards immigrants as the result of intersecting national salience and demographic shifts (2010). For instance, immediately after 9/11, fear of immigrants was at an extreme high; any observed growth in immigrant populations at this time would result in retaliation against immigrants. For the purposes of this analysis, its worth noting that national salience has probably been high since the beginnings of the Trump campaign, and thus analysis of present-day attitudes surrounding immigration probably will depend primarily on demographic shifts. Under this assumption, Abrajano and Hajnal and Hopkins lead to the same conclusion: large and/or fast-growing Latino/immigrant populations will be met with backlash. While this backlash is almost certainly linked to the experiences of immigrants, I choose to focus on two more measurable areas of study. In multiple papers, Wong examines the effect of constituency composition on voting patterns in Congress. One paper examines the effect of Latino population size on Congressional votes for a policy of interior enforcement (287(g) of the IRIRA), finding that Latino population size negatively correlates with votes for greater enforcement (2014). Another paper finds that having a large foreign-born population correlates with votes for expansionist policies, so this correlation seems to work in both directions (2017). On a more micro-level, Fernandez-Kelly’s study of immigrant youths in New Jersey and their ability to cope with adverse conditions examines some of the factors that determine whether immigrants can integrate successfully into new environments (2018). One factor that Fernandez-Kelly emphasizes is the importance of the local context of reception, and in particular the presence of an existing community. While this can take many forms (e.g. joining either an existing Latino community or merging with the local Black community), the point remains that context of reception can affect outcome regardless of what material resources may or may not be present. Finally, in the realm of media coverage, Abrajano and Singh examine the skews observable in Spanish and English-language media, on the topic of immigration (2009). The authors find that, somewhat unsurprisingly, Spanish-language media is more sympathetic to pro-immigration causes and legislation. Thus, with the combination of these factors, we can begin to predict how the immigration landscape in LA-3 might look.

Application of literature on public reception to LA-3 is somewhat complicated by the fact that the literature focuses on locales with either large Latino or immigrant populations or rapidly growing ones. However, LA-3 is neither of these. Instead, we can try to make inferences by applying the inverses of these authors’ conclusions. For instance, Abrajano and Hajnal and Hopkins see either large or fast-growing populations as a predictor of backlash. Since LA-3 features neither of these, we can instead predict that there will be minimal hostility towards immigrants, as they pose no threat to the ingroup. Making predictions about the immigrant experience is somewhat easier: based on Wong’s findings, we can easily predict that the small foreign born and Latino populations of LA-3 will enable representatives to vote for restrictionist policies. Similarly, the tiny Latino/immigrant population and relatively small Black and Asian populations offer little opportunity for solidarity, predicting poor mental health among Latino immigrants. Media coverage requires one further step: first we assume (admittedly without evidence) that the small Latino population would be inadequate to support a Spanish-language media outlet in LA-3. If we take this to be true, then we would predict news coverage to generally be negative towards immigration, as per Abrajano and Singh, as only English-language sources would exist.

Researching any aspect of immigration in LA-3 is a challenge, as the small population of immigrants doesn’t seem to attract much attention. With this limitation in mind, I chose to further examine my prediction about mental health in immigrants, as a relatively small number of interviews would suffice for a qualitative description. While there are not many immigrant advocacy groups, I was able to find two within LA-3. I plan to contact these organizations to find interviewees. Even if these organizations are unable to provide interviewees directly, I am hoping that they can provide a snowball sample of sorts, as both organizations offer referrals to other organizations for immigrants; if I can track down other organizations that serve immigrants, my odds of finding enough interviewees should be adequate. While I would love to additionally research what material supports are available to immigrants, research thus far has been unfruitful. Instead, I will try to get as much information about the local context from the interviewees. The questions I ask will aim to examine many of the same areas as Fernandez-Kelly’s study, including outcomes (such as educational attainment, or categorization as achievers, stayers, insurgents, and skidders), outlook, sense of belonging (to their own culture, as well as their geographic locale), and public reception. Once I have collected enough interviews, I will try to code responses in these main categories to establish the general orientation of outlook, outcome, community, and public reception and report on any surprising or expected features.

CA-53 and the San Diego region as a whole have been experiencing demographic shifts over the last twenty years in response to economic push/pull, urban sprawl leading to the expansion of downtown, and immigration. As seen in the table, the White population has sharply declined in the last ten years and are being replaced by small growths in minority populations. 1.7 percentage points of this growth are Hispanic or Latino residents, which is a small change in comparison to the White decline but a large change in comparison to more stable districts. This small increase is accompanied by a small immigrant increase, a sizeable decrease in undocumented immigrant presence, and a growth in non-English speaking households. The juxtaposition between CA-53 being very well educated and having a large percentage of non-English speaking households serves as evidence of the strong immigrant population base that exists in the district.

The current research on the topics is plentiful, and the more relevant conclusions for my scope fall under media and public opinion. For immigrant experience, I use Enos’ “Causal effect of intergroup contact on exclusionary attitudes.” Media coverage is represented by Abrajano and Hajnal’s White Backlash and Branton et al.’s “Slated Newspaper Coverage of Immigration: The Importance of Economics and Geography.” Public opinion is represented by Newman et al.s’  “Race, Place, and Building a Base: Latino Population Growth and the Nascent Trump Campaign for President,” Hopkins’ “Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition” and Adida et al.’s “Ebola, elections, and immigration: how politicizing an epidemic can shape public attitudes.” When compiling this slide, I noticed a potential disconnect between restrictionist sentiments drawn out by increases in Hispanic, Latino or immigrant communities and the increase in Spanish language news that likely follows them there. I focus on this potential disconnect in my research proposal but it is worth noting here because the directionality of the predictions are opposite for the same changes in the same data.

The current research fits my district rather well because the Hispanic and Latino populations grew, the immigrant population grew, and the White population declined. Although the magnitude of the change is not large, the presence of the increase in minority populations primes the predictions to lean towards restrictionist predictions. The consensus of the ‘Immigrant Experience’ and ‘Public Opinion’ columns is that these changes will produce more restrictionist and conservative sentiments in CA-53; however, both articles under ‘Media Coverage’ expect more pro-immigrant rhetoric to spread. 

Notably, the research on immigrant experience and public opinion predict negative outcomes in terms of immigrant interests in CA-53, but media content still indicates positive sentiments about immigration. It is economically prudent for news outlets to appeal to the views of their consumers, so I predict that CA-53’s media content around the government shutdown — when special national attention was placed on immigration — will be largely negative across both Spanish and English news outlets. I am making a large assumption that CA-53’s large Spanish-speaking population translates into a large Spanish-news consuming population so that the results can be discussed as representative of CA-53. An obstacle I mention in the slide is that online databases, Lexis-Nexis included, do not carry any local news sources for the region below LA. The local Spanish papers — La Prensa, El Latino, and El Sol de San Diego — do not provide access to online archives of past issues. Currently I am looking at the San Diego Union Tribune, which publishes mostly in English but to a lesser extent in Spanish. I will account for the differences in sample size before I perform any tests or comparisons between the two languages. I have performed textual tone analysis using R in the past and could recreate that for the purposes of this project, or use one of the services available online; however, my concern with using a prebuilt system is its potential inability to handle Spanish. Another element I am considering is supplementing the results with a tone analysis of articles more explicitly about the migrant caravan, which had a huge impact on local communities. My logic is that the local salience of the migrant caravan will elicit a more direct response in local papers than the more broad concepts of the border/immigration/Trump.

From 2007 to 2017, New Jersey’s 11th Congressional District did not experience significant demographic changes. In both years, white residents made up about three-quarters of the population and overall minority populations remained low. The next largest segment of the population identified as Hispanic / Latino, followed by Asian citizens and black citizens. Since the estimated Pacific Islander population for both 2007 and 2017 was 0%, I did not include it in my table. Asian residents had the largest change out of any minority, which was 2.2 percentage points. Although white residents actually saw a 5.4 percentage-point decrease in their proportion of the district’s total population, I doubt this change will be significant because of the district’s large population. The foreign-born population experienced an increase of 0.4 percentage points from 2009 to 2019, which is the second-smallest change of any of the groups mentioned. Since the total proportion of the population that is foreign-born is larger than each individual minority group for both years, I believe that they as a whole will have a greater impact on white Americans’ perceptions of immigration issues.

Existing literature suggests that the historical, racial, and socioeconomic status of a geographic area shape its relationship with immigration. McDermott notes that immigrants moving to the rural Midwest and South, where most of the population is native-born, have not been warmly welcomed. Immigrants do not always fit into the black-white racial divide characterizing these regions’ history, so their presence may heighten racial identities on each side and make the native-born less interested in interacting with them. Similarly, Enos’s social experiment demonstrated that these interactions in majority-white areas negatively impact immigrant experiences. Abrajano and Hajnal find an opposite reason for these exclusionary attitudes, as their statistical analysis in Ch.4 showed that white Americans in states with large Latino populations were more likely to view immigration as the country’s worst problem (133). They mention that living near a large outgroup can represent a threat to the in-group, so in this case white Americans living near large immigrant populations may overestimate the extent to which immigrants compete with them for jobs and political offices. On a more positive note, Branton finds that districts with a high socioeconomic status are less likely to have any sort of media coverage on immigration. The media often sensationalizes the economic threats of immigration in order to cater to its viewers, but college-educated people (which tend to be richer) are less likely to be worried about threats to their economic status. This narrative aligns more closely with the reality of people who are not financially secure or work in low-skilled jobs, which explains why Hopkin’s analysis finds an opposite relationship between areas with a lower socioeconomic status and support of anti-immigrant proposals.

I predict that immigrants’ experiences in NJ-11 will be positive. Although the majority of the district’s citizens are native-born, the historical presence of ethnic enclaves in and around the district means that residents there are already accustomed to immigrants’ presence. Thus, new immigrants will not be perceived as especially unusual by white residents and should not cause an increase in hostile attitudes. Similarly, the results of Enos’s study are not applicable to NJ-11 because the Latino population only increased by 1.9% over the last decade. The white Americans in his experiment developed negative attitudes after a sudden and noticeable demographic change, whereas the change in NJ-11’s Latino population took place over a much longer time period. Hispanics and Latinos also do not comprise a large majority of the district when compared to other minority groups, and according to White Backlash this should make white Americans less likely to view immigration negatively. Lastly, the district’s high proportion of college-educated adults and overall affluence predicts less media coverage on immigration. Since they are less likely to perceive immigration as a threat, news outlets would not profit by making it a salient issue in their coverage. For these same reasons, residents here will also be less likely to support policies that hurt immigrants’ ability to move up the economic ladder.

I plan to test my prediction about the effect of the high proportion of college-educated adults in NJ-11 on the salience of immigration in local news coverage. I will conduct an analysis of online news articles published between the start of the December 2018 government shutdown and one week after Trump’s State of the Union address. I chose to limit my search period to this date because of Trump’s references to illegal immigration in his address: since they were inflammatory, I believe that immigration news coverage would shift from the shutdown to his speech. The newspaper I will examine for NJ-11 is The Daily Record, which I chose because it is owned by the publicly traded Gannett Corporation. Since Branton’s study states that these organizations are more motivated by profit than privately owned newspapers, their coverage patterns should be more strongly influenced by population characteristics. My second newspaper is the Burlington County Times, which I chose so I could compare news coverage patterns across areas with different education levels (Burlington County is located in NJ-3). The district has a similar proportion of white and Hispanic/Latino residents (74.6% and 8.4%) and median household income of $82,301, which may minimize any extraneous effects of race and economic status on my dependent variable. I plan to use the term “shutdown” in conjunction with “border wall”, “immigration”, “Mexico”, and “Trump” for each news website. I will also categorize the articles based on whether they discuss the shutdown’s relationship to immigration, impact on government employees, or the conflict between President Trump and Democrats in Congress. I plan to compare the weekly and overall proportion of articles in each framing category since a high proportion of articles in the week of the shutdown followed by a decrease would be indicative of regular coverage (if it was a salient topic, the proportion of articles on it wouldn’t decrease as time passed). To compare immigration-related articles with a positive or negative tone, I will use this quantitative method as well as taking note of the imagery used.

Immigrant Experiences, Media, and Public Opinion Analyses of CA District 33 (Rep. Ted Lieu)

Lena Hu

Slide 1: District 33 Population Demographics

California District 33 is mostly White (~64%), Asian (~15%), and Hispanic (~13%). Although it has a sizeable immigrant population (~23%), this population has been slowly declining over time. The immigrant population is also predominantly Asian (52%) and European (22%) rather than Latin American (18%). The 13% Hispanic population overall is low compared to the US (17.6% Hispanic) and especially low compared to California as a whole (39% Hispanic). This district is notable for its extreme affluence (the median income is $105,000) and its high education levels due to the presence of a well-resourced public school system and universities including UCLA, Pepperdine University, Santa Monica College, and others. Although California was redistricted in 2010, the redistricting did not significantly affect the racial breakdown of the district; it remained predominantly White with a significant Asian population and comparatively smaller Hispanic and Black populations. Overall, California District 33 has a low Hispanic population, a declining immigration population, and slow Hispanic and Asian population growth (less than 2 pp per group over the past 5 years).

Slide 2: Existing Immigration Research

(a) In terms of immigrant experiences, existing research finds that increasing Hispanic immigration at a time of high national immigration salience increases hostility towards immigrants (Hopkins 2010). Some scholars have found a similar, but weaker effect for Asian immigrants (Hopkins 2010), while others find that only Latino immigration is correlated with decreased support for immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Although a high Asian population may result in the formation of Asian American civic organizations, this does not mean Asian Americans have more political influence even in cases where an Asian American has been elected to public office (Aptekar 2008). (b) In terms of media coverage, national media overall covers immigration in a negative way, disproportionately covers illegal immigration, and primarily uses images of men and boys that reinforce the Latino Threat Narrative (Farris and Silber Mohamed 2018). News organizations closer to the Mexican border run more stories on illegal and Latino immigration and focus on more negative aspects of immigration (Branton and Dunaway 2009). On the other hand, exclusively Spanish news outlets are more likely to highlight positive aspects of immigration than English or English-Spanish news outlets (Abrajano and Singh 2009). (c) In terms of public opinion, rapid Hispanic population growth, defined as greater than 7% growth in 10 years, is correlated with higher support for restrictionism (Adida et al., 2018). In fact a large Latino population alone (without rapid growth) is correlated with White populations seeing immigration as a serious problem, being more concerned about welfare, and switching to the Republican party (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Finally, the perceived immigrant threat is weaker in richer communities (Branton and Dunaway 2009) and in predominantly Democratic areas (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015).

Slide 3: Predictions

(c) Since CA 33 has a low Hispanic population, slow Hispanic and Asian population growth (less than 2 percentage points over the past five years), and a slowly declining immigrant population, existing research would predict that public opinion on immigration will be supportive rather than restrictionist. People will probably not think immigration is a serious issue. Given that the immigrant population is over 50% Asian and less than 15% Hispanic, the White majority will not feel as threatened as they would in an area with mostly Hispanic immigrants. The high income and education levels, combined with the strong and consistent Democratic partisanship, also predict less negative public opinion of immigrants. (b) The low Hispanic population, slow immigrant growth, and distance from the border suggest that media coverage of immigration in CA 33 will not be disproportionately more negative than it already is. It will still have the predominantly negative spin that national media on immigration exhibits across the country. Given the low Hispanic population, it is unlikely that there will be many exclusively Spanish news outlets, which are known to have more positive coverage of immigration. (a) All of these characteristics combine to suggest that immigrant experiences will be positive, with low levels of public hostility and facilitated social and economic integration. This does not mean immigrants will have political influence; research has shown that even areas with high immigrant densities and elected immigrant officials have often blocked immigrants out of the political process (Aptekar 2008). Therefore, even though Representative Lieu is a Taiwanese-American immigrant, this does not suggest that Asian Americans will be strongly politically incorporated in other ways.

Slide 4: Basic Research Plan

I plan to run a descriptive, interview-based study similar to Aptekar (2008) to gauge levels of Asian civic engagement and political incorporation. Given the high Asian population in this district and the especially high young adult Asian population at UCLA, I predict that there will be a moderate to high amount of Asian American civic engagement compared to the rest of the United States. I also predict high levels of Asian American economic integration into the skilled workforce. However, I predict low Asian American political incorporation, measured in terms of government outreach to and support for immigrants; political mobilization such as voter registration drives, public advocacy, and protests; and voter turnout. My research plan begins with identifying all the Asian and Asian American nonprofits and civic organizations through District 33 via internet searches, newspaper searches, and asking informants. A cursory Google search already returned a number of organizations, including the National Association of Asian American Professionals, the Asia Society of Southern California, and the Chinese American Museum. I will then create a list of questions about immigrant political incorporation to ask organization leaders and staff. I have reached out to Dr. Aptekar to see if she would share the questions from her study with me, and if she does, I will use questions based on her study. Preliminary questions that I have brainstormed include: “Could you describe the types of Asian American political participation in your region?” and “Do you think immigration is a serious political issue in your region?” I will reach out to the organizations via email and/or phone, both of which are publicly listed on most of the organizations’ websites. I will qualitatively describe and analyze the responses in a report similar to Aptekar (2008) to either confirm or reject my hypothesis, making sure to address the significance of Taiwanese-American Representative Lieu the way Aptekar did with Mayor Choi of Edison.