Author: Lena Hu

Asian Immigrant Political and Economic Integration in CA 33: Interview-Based Research

Slide 1: Evidence-Based Hypotheses

My research is inspired by the work of researcher Sofya Aptekar (2008), which assesses the political integration of Asian immigrants in Edison, NJ. My research question is: to what degree, and in what ways, are Asian immigrants and Asian Americans politically and economically integrated in CA 33? I predict that there will be high levels of economic integration because Asians are viewed as non-threatening to White people and thus can assimilate into White communities with more ease than other minorities (Junn 2007) and because the US systematically favors Asians for work visas over other races (Wong 2017). However, based on Aptekar’s findings that larger Asian populations do not translate to more political weight, I predict low levels of political mobilization through civic engagement activities like voter registration drives, public advocacy, protests, and voter turnout. Similarly to Mayor Choi in Edison, I expect Representative Lieu will not make immigration policy a top priority, especially because it’s costly to reach out immigrant groups that are less likely to vote (de Graauw 2008). Overall, I predict Asians in CA 33 will be highly economically integrated, but not very politically integrated. I further predict Representative Lieu will be anti-restrictionism but not actively pro-immigration.

Slide 2: Methodology

I conduct interview-based research by setting up phone calls with individuals who work in Asian organizations and nonprofits in CA 33. I begin by developing my interview questions. I reached out to Professor Sofya Aptekar at the University of Massachusetts Boston for the questionnaire she used in her research on Asian immigrant integration in Edison. She referred me to Professor Karthick Ramakrishnan at the University of California Riverside who developed the original questionnaire—Aptekar previously worked for Ramakrishnan as a research assistant and actually adapted his original questionnaire for her research in Edison. Professor Ramakrishnan kindly shared the original questionnaire he used to interview staff at immigrant nonprofit organizations, and I adjusted it to focus on Asian immigration in District 33. The final questionnaire I used is linked HERE (it is too long to insert directly). To recruit interview subjects, I googled “Asian nonprofit,” “Asian cultural organization,” and “Asian community organization” in California District 33 and emailed 22 organizations that turned up. Seven organizations responded with a staff contact for me to interview:

  1. The UCLA Asian American Studies Center
  2. The Asia Society of Southern California LA Chapter
  3. The National Association of Asian American Professionals LA Chapter
  4. The Korean Cultural Center of Los Angeles
  5. The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council
  6. The Center for Asian Americans United for Self Empowerment (CAUSE)
  7. The Chinese American Museum of LA

All but two, the Asia Society of Southern California and the UCLA Asian American Studies Center, subsequently cancelled. My final three interviewees were:

  1. Jonathan Karp, Executive Director of the Asia Society of Southern California
  2. Miriam Jordan, National Immigration Reporter for the New York Times
    1. Coincidentally, Jonathan Karp’s wife happened to be the National Immigration Reporter for the New York Times; they live together in CA 33. I was able to conduct a joint interview with Karp and Jordan.
  3. Recent Former Staffer in Representative Ted Lieu’s Office (Name redacted)
    1. Referred by the UCLA Asian American Studies Center
    2. This top staffer covered Lieu’s immigration and Asian/Pacific Islander outreach portfolios for two years before leaving his office for another job.
    3. This contact requested their name be redacted due to a continuing professional relationship with Representative Lieu.

 

Slide 3: Findings

Based on my two 45-minute phone interviews with my contacts, I discovered that Asians (both immigrant and non-immigrant) are not considered a sizeable portion of the CA 33 population, especially compared to other districts in Southern California. As a result, immigration policy and Asian community outreach are not top priorities for Representative Lieu. My interviewees agreed that Asian immigrants are not a strong political force in the district. They all stated that the most politically influential ethnic groups in the district are Jews, who make up about a third of the population, followed by Persians. District 33’s previous Representative, Henry Waxman, was Jewish and in office for forty years before voluntarily retiring. When Waxman retired, he endorsed Representative Lieu. According to Lieu’s former staff member, he certainly puts more effort into maintaining constructive relations with the Jewish community than the immigrant or Asian communities. My interviewees also emphasized that CA 33 is deeply shaped by its enormous wealth—it is the fourth richest district in the country. Because the cost of living is so high, undocumented immigrants are, for the most part, priced out of the area. The small undocumented population is mostly composed of students attending universities in the district (UCLA, Pepperdine, community colleges). Consistent with research conducted by Branton and Dunaway (2009), it appears the perceived immigrant threat is lower in wealthier communities. Lieu’s former staffer added that the undocumented immigration is a very “out of sight” issue for the wealthy, and the spatial separation from undocumented individuals makes it easier for residents to claim they support immigration. As long as isn’t an issue that is proximate to their communities, they can comfortably denounce restrictionism with the knowledge that low-income immigrants can’t afford to live in their neighborhoods anyways.

Slide 4: Conclusions

The findings from my interviews confirm my hypotheses and add missing mechanisms behind my predictions. First, I received explicit confirmation from Lieu’s former staffer that immigration isn’t a top priority for the Congressman and the district. I learned this is in part because there aren’t that many undocumented immigrants in the district due to the high cost of living. I was also told that Representative Lieu really doesn’t emphasize his Asian immigrant heritage when he presents himself. Instead, he focuses on his airforce service and commitment to strong foreign policy and veterans’ welfare (the largest VA in the country is located in the district). I received further confirmation of my hypothesis that Asians immigrants are highly economically integrated into white collar professions and higher education, but they are not very politically integrated and engaged. The types of political activity they do selectively participate in is far more discreet than visible. It takes the form of voting, donating, and meeting with officials rather than publically protesting, demonstrating, or advocating for certain policies. Lastly, I confirmed my hypothesis that the district is broadly against restrictionism. However, I discovered this is not just because of its democratic partisanship, but also because the perceived immigrant threat is lower in wealthy communities with low undocumented populations. In other words, it could be the case that residents would not support a pathway to citizenship if the naturalized citizens they theoretically support were capable of moving into, rather than being priced out of, their district’s wildly expensive neighborhoods.

Immigrant Experiences and Media Analyses of CA 33 (Rep. Ted Lieu)

Immigrant Experiences, Media, and Public Opinion Analyses of CA District 33 (Rep. Ted Lieu)

Lena Hu

 

Slide 1: District 33 Population Demographics

California District 33 is mostly White (~64%), Asian (~15%), and Hispanic (~13%). Although it has a sizeable immigrant population (~23%), this population has been slowly declining over time. The immigrant population is also predominantly Asian (52%) and European (22%) rather than Latin American (18%). The 13% Hispanic population overall is low compared to the US (17.6% Hispanic) and especially low compared to California as a whole (39% Hispanic). This district is notable for its extreme affluence (the median income is $105,000) and its high education levels due to the presence of a well-resourced public school system and universities including UCLA, Pepperdine University, Santa Monica College, and others. Although California was redistricted in 2010, the redistricting did not significantly affect the racial breakdown of the district; it remained predominantly White with a significant Asian population and comparatively smaller Hispanic and Black populations. Overall, California District 33 has a low Hispanic population, a declining immigration population, and slow Hispanic and Asian population growth (less than 2 pp per group over the past 5 years).

 

Slide 2: Existing Immigration Research

(a) In terms of immigrant experiences, existing research finds that increasing Hispanic immigration at a time of high national immigration salience increases hostility towards immigrants (Hopkins 2010). Some scholars have found a similar, but weaker effect for Asian immigrants (Hopkins 2010), while others find that only Latino immigration is correlated with decreased support for immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Although a high Asian population may result in the formation of Asian American civic organizations, this does not mean Asian Americans have more political influence even in cases where an Asian American has been elected to public office (Aptekar 2008). (b) In terms of media coverage, national media overall covers immigration in a negative way, disproportionately covers illegal immigration, and primarily uses images of men and boys that reinforce the Latino Threat Narrative (Farris and Silber Mohamed 2018). News organizations closer to the Mexican border run more stories on illegal and Latino immigration and focus on more negative aspects of immigration (Branton and Dunaway 2009). On the other hand, exclusively Spanish news outlets are more likely to highlight positive aspects of immigration than English or English-Spanish news outlets (Abrajano and Singh 2009). (c) In terms of public opinion, rapid Hispanic population growth, defined as greater than 7% growth in 10 years, is correlated with higher support for restrictionism (Adida et al., 2018). In fact a large Latino population alone (without rapid growth) is correlated with White populations seeing immigration as a serious problem, being more concerned about welfare, and switching to the Republican party (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Finally, the perceived immigrant threat is weaker in richer communities (Branton and Dunaway 2009) and in predominantly Democratic areas (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015).

 

Slide 3: Predictions

(c) Since CA 33 has a low Hispanic population, slow Hispanic and Asian population growth (less than 2 percentage points over the past five years), and a slowly declining immigrant population, existing research would predict that public opinion on immigration will be supportive rather than restrictionist. People will probably not think immigration is a serious issue. Given that the immigrant population is over 50% Asian and less than 15% Hispanic, the White majority will not feel as threatened as they would in an area with mostly Hispanic immigrants. The high income and education levels, combined with the strong and consistent Democratic partisanship, also predict less negative public opinion of immigrants. (b) The low Hispanic population, slow immigrant growth, and distance from the border suggest that media coverage of immigration in CA 33 will not be disproportionately more negative than it already is. It will still have the predominantly negative spin that national media on immigration exhibits across the country. Given the low Hispanic population, it is unlikely that there will be many exclusively Spanish news outlets, which are known to have more positive coverage of immigration. (a) All of these characteristics combine to suggest that immigrant experiences will be positive, with low levels of public hostility and facilitated social and economic integration. This does not mean immigrants will have political influence; research has shown that even areas with high immigrant densities and elected immigrant officials have often blocked immigrants out of the political process (Aptekar 2008). Therefore, even though Representative Lieu is a Taiwanese-American immigrant, this does not suggest that Asian Americans will be strongly politically incorporated in other ways.

 

Slide 4: Basic Research Plan

I plan to run a descriptive, interview-based study similar to Aptekar (2008) to gauge levels of Asian civic engagement and political incorporation. Given the high Asian population in this district and the especially high young adult Asian population at UCLA, I predict that there will be a moderate to high amount of Asian American civic engagement compared to the rest of the United States. I also predict high levels of Asian American economic integration into the skilled workforce. However, I predict low Asian American political incorporation, measured in terms of government outreach to and support for immigrants; political mobilization such as voter registration drives, public advocacy, and protests; and voter turnout. My research plan begins with identifying all the Asian and Asian American nonprofits and civic organizations through District 33 via internet searches, newspaper searches, and asking informants. A cursory Google search already returned a number of organizations, including the National Association of Asian American Professionals, the Asia Society of Southern California, and the Chinese American Museum. I will then create a list of questions about immigrant political incorporation to ask organization leaders and staff. I have reached out to Dr. Aptekar to see if she would share the questions from her study with me, and if she does, I will use questions based on her study. Preliminary questions that I have brainstormed include: “Could you describe the types of Asian American political participation in your region?” and “Do you think immigration is a serious political issue in your region?” I will reach out to the organizations via email and/or phone, both of which are publicly listed on most of the organizations’ websites. I will qualitatively describe and analyze the responses in a report similar to Aptekar (2008) to either confirm or reject my hypothesis, making sure to address the significance of Taiwanese-American Representative Lieu the way Aptekar did with Mayor Choi of Edison.

 

Immigration Policy Analysis of Representative Ted Lieu (CA 33)

Immigration Policy Analysis of Representative Ted Lieu (CA 33)

Lena Hu

 

 

Slide 1: Election Results 2008-2018

California’s 33rd District, notable for its affluence and celebrity residents, has reliably elected a Democratic representative for the last 26 years, the last 10 of which are displayed on this slide. Current Representative Ted Lieu, a Taiwanese immigrant and American Air Force veteran, is in his third term and fifth year in Congress. After winning by 18% in 2014, his margins have only widened in the last two years — he won by 40% in the 2018 midterms. The winning margins for the 2010 and 2008 elections were even larger for Karen Bass and Diane Watson, the first two African-American women to represent the district. The closest election in the last 10 years was in 2012, when an independent ran against a Democrat. The district’s last Republican representative was elected almost 30 years ago in 1990.

 

 

Slide 2: Existing Research

Research shows that the strongest and most consistent predictor of a congressperson’s vote on immigration policy is their political party affiliation: Republicans are more likely to vote for restrictionist policies (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010, Casellas and Leal 2013), while Democrats are more likely to vote against such policies. There is also strong evidence that larger counties are more likely to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement through the 287(g) training program (Wong 2012), and that Senators from poor states are more likely to respond to poverty by opposing restrictionist policies (Casellas and Leal 2013). There is mixed evidence (differing and sometimes contradictory scholarly findings) on the effects of the Hispanic population on voting. Wong (2014) finds a large Hispanic population is related to decreased support for restrictionist policies, even for Republicans. However, in class, we discussed how this is not due to the nature of race, but rather due to the partisanship of Hispanics: 67% are Democrats. Casellas and Leal (2013) find the Latino population is a significant predictor in the House, but not in the Senate. Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) add nuance by arguing that it is specifically the growth in the Hispanic population that increases support for restrictionism. Across all class readings, there has been insufficient evidence to support the hypotheses that Black and White wage competition, the size of the Asian population, the spatial concentration of immigrants, linguistic balkanisation, and various other demographic factors are drivers of immigration policy voting in Congress.

 

 

Slide 3: Policy Predictions for Rep. Lieu

Based on the partisanship hypothesis in the existing literature, I predict Representative Lieu will vote against restrictionist immigration policies because he is a Democrat. California District 33 does not have a sizeable Hispanic population (11% Hispanic compared to the 17% national average), so I do not think the size of the Hispanic constituency will affect Lieu’s votes. Furthermore, the district is not particularly large, so I don’t predict size will pressure Lieu to partner with the federal government through the 287(g) program. Finally, because Lieu is a Representative of a rich district, the research about Senators from poor districts does not apply to this case and can be disregarded even though it could provide strong evidence in other situations.

 

 

Slide 4: Rep. Lieu’s Voting Record, Twitter, and Website Content

Immigration is not one of Lieu’s bill sponsorship priorities, but in line with the partisanship hypothesis, he has voted against eight of nine major restrictionist bills and abstained from the ninth. Furthermore, he does make public statements in response to big national immigration news topics like the National Emergency declaration, the border wall, and the mistreatment of asylum seekers at the border. Zero of his 71 sponsored bills (2015-2019) have focused on immigration, just 13% of his tweets from 2019 refer to immigration, and he only has 7 pages on immigration on his website compared to 19 on environmental issues and 10 on veteran affairs. That said, the tweets and statements he does make are strongly critical of restrictionism and Trump’s policies. He makes frank, biting comments on the National Emergency and the border wall, frequently using the hashtag “#FakeWall” and clearly stating there is no legitimate national emergency. He also repeatedly fact checks the President by pointing out that border apprehensions have decreased. Overall, Representative Lieu does not write immigration bills, but he votes against restrictionist ones and makes it clear that he is staunchly against Trump’s immigration policies.

The Partisan Fight over Border Wall Funding

This week, our readings and lectures highlight that partisanship is the driving force behind immigration policymaking in Congress. Casellas & Leal (2013) and Wong (2014) find that the key determinant of voting pattern is party affiliation: Republicans consistently vote for anti-immigration policies; Democrats consistently vote against such measures. Professor Massey’s lecture extends this partisanship to the executive branch, specifically to President Trump, who has just declared a national emergency to secure $8 billion in border wall funding. Given the overwhelming evidence that a wall is ineffective, Massey posits that the wall is a white nationalist political statement feeding into the Latino Threat Narrative.

The aggravated fight between Congress and President Trump over the National Emergency is a prime example of partisanship driving immigration policy (See USA Today article linked below). Amidst his sharp criticism of Trump’s wall obsession, Professor Massey highlighted a silver lining: the declaration sparks a discussion in Congress and forces Republican senators clearly choose whether to vote partisan or not.

Bipartisan opposition can occur when immigration policies are perceived as “too far right” (Wong 2014). If Congress votes to override the National Emergency, it will be a litmus test for whether Trump’s policies are seen as extreme enough to transcend the partisanship that typically determines Congressional voting outcomes (See 538 article linked below). A vote to override the emergency will pass the House, forcing Senate Republicans to decide whether to vote with their party or against it. At least eight Republican senators have already stated opposition to the emergency declaration. A Senate vote would be a real-world example of whether the strictly partisan camp of scholarship holds or whether Wong’s added nuance of rare, but possible, bipartisan agreement occurs.

 

Discussion Questions

  1. Do you think the National Emergency Declaration is “far right” enough to push more moderate Republicans to vote against their party to override it?
  2. Professor Massey thinks the solution is to legalize the 11 million undocumented currently in America and then process border arrivals as refugees and asylum seekers. Do you agree or disagree with this solution, and why?

 

News Articles:

Hayes, Christal, and John Fritze. 2019. “Trump Declared a National Emergency over a Border Wall. What Happens next?” USA Today. February 16, 2019. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/16/donald-trump-national-emergency-border-wall-fight/2876668002/.

Bacon, Perry, and Nate Silver. 2019. “Could Congress Block Trump’s Emergency Declaration?” FiveThirtyEight. February 18, 2019. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/could-congress-block-trumps-emergency-declaration/.

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