In July, Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, a wartime deal that ensured the safety of Ukrainian vessels passing through the sea shared by both nations. The collapse of the deal thwarted Ukraine’s ability to export its grains without fear of Russian retaliation.<\/p>\n
Yet, in September, two vessels safely arrived<\/a> in Ukraine’s ports without any response, violent or otherwise, from Moscow.<\/p>\n Now, even more ships are headed towards Ukraine, despite the looming threat that Russia might intervene with missiles at any time.<\/p>\n On October 4, Ukraine\u2019s navy announced that they expected 12 more cargo vessels to arrive at Ukrainian ports. These ships are utilizing a new maritime corridor set up by Ukraine after Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s withdrawal from the grain initiative didn\u2019t come as a surprise, as Putin had voiced discontent with it for months prior. But now that Ukraine has found a way to circumvent Moscow\u2019s attempts to hinder their exports, new questions arise. Is this a new phase of the war? How will Putin react to the unsanctioned corridor? Scholars at Princeton University suggest it signals Putin\u2019s resolve to wage a more aggressive trade war, and that it\u2019s only a matter of time before Moscow forcibly puts an end to the new corridor.<\/p>\n History of the grain deal<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n The Black Sea Grain Initiative, formally known as the \u201cInitiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports,\u201d was an agreement brokered by the United Nations and Turkey between Ukraine and Russia in July of 2022. The deal guaranteed Ukraine a corridor in the Black Sea to continue exporting their grains across the world despite the war.<\/p>\n The deal highlighted a positive development in the war and proved a rare moment of consensus in an enduring conflict. The initiative stabilized grain prices worldwide and was lauded as a \u201cbeacon of hope\u201d by the UN Secretary-General Ant\u00f3nio Guterres.<\/a> It also provided Putin with the leverage to negotiate Russia\u2019s uninterrupted exportation of agricultural goods and fertilizer. Putin expressed that he felt<\/a> this part of the deal wasn\u2019t being upheld by the West, and despite Guterres\u2019 efforts to meet his demands, the deal fell apart. Notably, levels of Russian exports of food are higher than they were last year, and the amount of agriculture and fertilizer exports are also significant, in contrast to Moscow\u2019s stated grievances.<\/p>\n Now that Ukraine has established a new corridor for exporting their grains without Russia\u2019s assistance or approval, it raises the question: how will Russia react? Putin\u2019s track record of flagrant disregard for the rules of war<\/a> probably won\u2019t stop in light of this new corridor. Especially since his withdrawal from the grain deal can be thought of as both a manner of \u201cinfluenc[ing] international policy\u201d and of \u201cblackmail[ing] the rest of the world to get what they want,\u201d according to Yana Prymachenko, a Ukrainian research scholar in Princeton University\u2019s Department of History.<\/p>\n This new corridor deal between Ukraine, Romania, and Turkey is in strict opposition to Putin\u2019s two likely reasons for denying the corridor: establishing international influence and blackmail. Additionally, Russia itself is an exporter of grains, making it more likely that Putin will try to put a stop to this corridor.<\/p>\n Why a new grain corridor is important<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Ukraine has long been known as the \u2018breadbasket of the world.\u2019 The renewed export of Ukraine\u2019s grains is imperative for not only domestic economic stability, but also worldwide famine relief.<\/p>\n \u201cIt\u2019s quite an interesting position\u2026 on the one hand you possess this great resource. But on the other hand, it puts you at the center of a lot of mass violence,\u201d says Luliia Skubytska, an associate research scholar in the program of Judaic Studies at Princeton University.<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s crops<\/a> account for 30% of the world\u2019s supply of sunflower oil and 4% of the world\u2019s wheat. Some countries are even more dependent, like Libya<\/a>, where 44% of their wheat originates from Ukraine. Such dependence has been the source of conflict in not just Russia-Ukraine, but historically, in World War I and World War II, according to Skubytska. Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 made wheat prices soar globally, and the same thing happened again when Russia withdrew from the grain initiative in July 2023.<\/p>\n Although many celebrated its creation, some Ukrainians were more critical of the grain deal, believing it to be a \u201cvery colonial approach from the West,\u201d explained Prymachenko. To its critics, the grain deal merely signaled how quickly Western powers could resolve a problem (two days, in this instance) when it directly affected their own economic interests. In the Ukrainian perspective, people wonder, \u201cWhy couldn\u2019t the war end in two days?\u201d said Prymachenko.<\/p>\n A new kind of war, a trade war<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n Although the grain deal did benefit Putin in that it allowed Russia to export agricultural goods despite Western sanctions, it was probably not his sole motive for the deal, according to Prymachenko. Turkey served as the orchestrator and moderator between Ukraine and Russia on this grain deal. During this time, there also happened to be an election underway in Turkey.<\/p>\n Many observers believe that Putin signed this deal to support the presidential campaign of Turkey\u2019s Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Once these votes were in, Putin reasoned it was okay to back out of the deal, says Prymachenko. Erdogan is a \u201cconvenient partner\u201d for Putin because of his similarly authoritarian politics, Prymachenko explained.<\/p>\n Alternatively, Putin may have initially signed the deal to appease Western powers and avoid burning any bridges, according to Prymachenko. The outcome of the war was \u201cnot so obvious\u201d in July 2022, says Prymachenko. Once Putin decided to change his course on the war, he leaned into a trade war. When the West didn\u2019t meet his expectations, he essentially used the grain corridor, or lack thereof, as provoked, and therefore justified, blackmail, says Prymachenko.<\/p>\n Observers point to the arrival of unharmed vessels in Ukraine\u2019s ports as a sign of a positive development in the nation\u2019s counteroffensive, and that Ukraine\u2019s offensive is stronger than previously thought.<\/p>\n However, it might not be that Putin doesn\u2019t want to do anything about these vessels, but rather that he can\u2019t just yet, explained Skubytska. Several artillery bases in Crimea have been destroyed<\/a> by Ukrainian special forces, effectively wiping out the long-range missiles Russia needs to attack these vessels in the new corridor.<\/p>\n \u201cThe question is, how long will it take Russia to replace these things [missiles]?\u201d says Skubytska.<\/p>\n Until Russia has replenished their long-range missiles, restoring their ability to impede the routes of these vessels through the new grain corridor, it may be too early to say whether the corridor is truly a success or not.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In July, Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, a wartime deal that ensured the safety of Ukrainian vessels passing through the sea shared by both nations. The collapse of the deal thwarted Ukraine’s ability to export its grains without fear of Russian retaliation. Yet, in September, two vessels safely arrived in Ukraine’s ports<\/p>\n