{"id":278,"date":"2025-10-06T16:17:25","date_gmt":"2025-10-06T20:17:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/commons.princeton.edu\/migration-reporting2025\/?p=278"},"modified":"2025-11-07T15:43:21","modified_gmt":"2025-11-07T20:43:21","slug":"germany-delayed-its-decision-on-eu-sanctions-but-will-it-cross-the-line","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/commons.princeton.edu\/migration-reporting2025\/germany-delayed-its-decision-on-eu-sanctions-but-will-it-cross-the-line\/","title":{"rendered":"Germany delayed its decision on EU sanctions. But will it cross the line?\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"

Last week, German Chancellor Fredrich Merz <\/span>delayed<\/span><\/a> his government\u2019s decision on whether to approve a package of EU sanctions on Israel. Merz said earlier this month that he would present his coalition\u2019s joint position at an Oct. 1 summit of EU leaders in Copenhagen. But Merz\u2019s delay makes it unclear when or whether Germany will reach a firm decision.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cThe history of German support [for Israel] is so great that going for EU-wide sanctions is against the history of the relationship,\u201d said Daniel Marwecki, a lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong whose research focuses on German-Israeli relations. \u201cGermany is not going much farther than it already has.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The sanction package, <\/span>introduced<\/span><\/a> by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in mid-September, would impose tariffs on an estimated \u00a35.8 billion of imported goods from Israel, while also sanctioning two far-right members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu\u2019s government. The Commission also <\/span>proposed<\/span><\/a> sanctions on 10 Hamas members. To pass, the proposal requires approval by a <\/span>qualified majority<\/span><\/a> ruling.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One reason for the Merz administration\u2019s stalling may be the <\/span>agreement<\/span><\/a> reached on Monday between U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the Israel-Hamas war, according to Marwecki. Though it is yet uncertain whether Hamas will accept all of the conditions in the Trump administration\u2019s 20-point peace plan, many are optimistic that a ceasefire is finally on the horizon.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cFor Germany, the ideal outcome would be an acceptance of that plan, and that would allow the government to get out of the current predicament of having to find a tougher, more European stance,\u201d Marwecki explained. In recent months, many other European countries have <\/span>faltered<\/span><\/a> in their support of Israel, citing human rights violations.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But Germany has taken a hard-line pro-Israel stance since just after World War II. What would it take for that to change?<\/span><\/p>\n

Germany faces pressure to change its Israel approach<\/b><\/p>\n

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Germany has faced increasing internal and external pressure to revise its stalwart stance. Hundreds of thousands of Germans have <\/span>taken<\/span><\/a> to the streets to protest their government\u2019s military support of Israel.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

According to a <\/span>poll<\/span><\/a> by public broadcaster ZDF, 76 percent of German voters believe that Israel\u2019s military action in the Gaza Strip is unjustified. A YouGov poll released this week <\/span>showed<\/span><\/a> that 62 percent of German voters believe Israel\u2019s actions in Gaza constitute genocide.<\/span><\/p>\n

But public sentiment and foreign policy are often misaligned. Dr. Naama Lutz, an Israeli scholar of migration at the Social Science Center in Berlin, has watched public sentiment shift since the start of the war and seen the pro-Palestinian protest movement bloom. \u201cBut it just kind of feels like a drop in the ocean,\u201d she said. \u201cThe core of Germany\u2019s foreign policy is pretty unwavering in its support of Israel.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

The country is also facing external pressure, growing isolated among its Western allies, many of whom have recently <\/span>recognized<\/span><\/a> a Palestinian state. Germany has not taken this step, and has thus far avoided applying the term \u201cgenocide\u201d to Israel\u2019s actions in Gaza.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There has been at least one significant policy shift. In August, Germany said it would no longer issue licenses for weapons \u201cclearly usable in Gaza.\u201d According to reporting by Politico, this language suggested that other types of weapons would still move forward, which they recently did \u2014 last week, Germany approved a batch of arms exports to Israel again.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Still, Germany\u2019s history is not easily shaken off, nor is its national identity easily disentangled from that of Israel.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Germany\u2019s reason of state<\/b><\/p>\n

After World War II, Germany needed to regain standing in the eyes of the international community. Supporting Israel as a Jewish state was an obvious way for Germany to symbolically and materially absolve its guilt.<\/span><\/p>\n

Marwecki explained that Germany\u2019s very \u201cstaatsraison\u201d \u2014 or, reason for statehood \u2014 was formed via the way it used Israeli nationalism to create its own, making Germany the only country whose \u201cstaatsraison\u201d is another country\u2019s \u201cstaatsraison.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Lutz noted that even today, the German citizenship test \u2014 which she herself took in June \u2014 requires applicants to check two boxes: one denouncing antisemitism, and the other accepting the legitimacy of Israeli statehood.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cEveryone has to check this box,\u201d she explained. <\/span>\u201cThis is a very core principle of who [Germany] is. It\u2019s very open and straightforward.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

According to Marwecki, when Germany supported Israel industrially and militarily after World War II, it was born not out of a true moral reckoning, but rather out of a self-serving need for rehabilitation and reintegration into the Western block.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer hinted at this on German television in 1965, when he said, \u201cWe had done the Jews so much injustice, committed such crimes against them, that somehow this had to be expiated or repaired if somehow we were to regain our international standing.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, Germany’s aid was instrumental both in establishing Israeli statehood and re-establishing its own. The irony is that the formation of Israel led to a massive Palestinian refugee crisis in 1948. According to Marwecki, some say this renders the \u201cPalestinian problem\u201d also a German problem.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Nowadays in Berlin, a <\/span>common<\/span><\/a> protest sign reads, \u201cFree Palestine from German Guilt.\u201d Activists argue that Germany\u2019s longstanding support of Israel and commitment to preventing future atrocities after the Holocaust should give it even greater reason to support Palestinians in this conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n

This leaves Germany at a crossroads. \u201cThey know what\u2019s happening in Gaza can\u2019t go on, and now they have to wash their hands clean,\u201d Marwecki said.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But with a ceasefire deal on the table and an enduring staatsraison, this may not be an area in which Germany feels it can afford to budge, including on the EU sanctions. \u201cWhen it comes to anything that sanctions Israel or targets the economy as a whole,\u201d Marwecki said, \u201cI just don\u2019t think Germany will support that.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Last week, German Chancellor Fredrich Merz delayed his government\u2019s decision on whether to approve a package of EU sanctions on Israel. Merz said earlier this month that he would present his coalition\u2019s joint position at an Oct. 1 summit of EU leaders in Copenhagen. But Merz\u2019s delay makes it unclear when or whether Germany will<\/p>\n

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