While many of this week’s readings focus on the AfD’s hostility toward migrants in general, I kept coming back to the group the party treats differently. CNN reports that the AfD’s Saxony-Anhalt manifesto aims “remigration” at Ukrainian refugees, while also calling for an end to sanctions on Russia and for free Russian-language instruction. Meanwhile, the party has made no comparable push for benefit cuts or deportations aimed at Russian nationals or the Russlanddeutsche, the ethnic German returnees from the former Soviet Union.<\/p>\n
One might expect that a party focused on opposing immigration would sort migrants by how culturally or ethnically different it considers them, which would put Ukrainians among the more “acceptable” groups. Instead, the line seems to follow the party’s foreign policy. I’m not sure whether that reflects sympathy for (or influence from) Russia, the importance of Russian-German voters in the east, or something else. I’d like to know how Ukrainian refugees in places like Saxony-Anhalt read the AfD’s position, and whether Russian-Germans there see themselves as part of the party’s base.<\/p>\n
The German government’s record is harder to read. Berlin has been one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters, yet Ukrainians who arrived after April 1, 2025 were downgraded from B\u00fcrgergeld to the asylum seekers’ rate, and this summer’s \u201cGrundsicherung\u201d reform added stricter sanctions on top of that. The Interior Ministry frames these changes as a push towards employment, which could seem reasonable on its own. But Ukrainians were the one group never required to take German classes, so tying benefits more closely to finding work seems to penalize them for a gap the government’s policies helped create. My interview with Anastasiia for the news piece also raised questions for me about how individual German employers may be raising their typical standards for Ukrainian applicants. I wondered whether anyone in the ministry made that connection, or whether the cuts were mostly a response to political pressure to cut Ukraine assistance.<\/p>\n
Given the frequent comparisons with MAGA, I’m also curious whether the AfD’s position overlaps with skepticism toward Ukraine aid on the American right, and whether the two movements influence each other on this.<\/p>\n
For me, the Ukraine case shows that a refugee’s status can depend on politics far removed from their own situation. Ukrainians arrived in Germany under more generous terms than any other group. If German support for Ukraine weakens, or the AfD gains more power, their position could change regardless of anything they have done. That seems like an interesting question to explore in Berlin, especially in conversations with Ukrainians who have had different experiences with German government assistance and private employment opportunities.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
While many of this week’s readings focus on the AfD’s hostility toward migrants in general, I kept coming back to the group the party treats differently. CNN reports that the AfD’s Saxony-Anhalt manifesto aims “remigration” at Ukrainian refugees, while also calling for an end to sanctions on Russia and for free Russian-language instruction. Meanwhile, the<\/p>\n