

Chirac Strays From Assailing a Nuclear Iran

By Elaine Sciolino and Katrin Bennhold

PARIS, Jan. 31 — President Jacques Chirac said this week that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a big danger, and that if Iran were to launch a nuclear weapon against a country like Israel, it would lead to the immediate destruction of Tehran.

The remarks, made in an interview on Monday with *The New York Times*, *The International Herald Tribune* and *Le Nouvel Observateur*, a weekly magazine, were vastly different from stated French policy and what Mr. Chirac has often said.

On Tuesday, Mr. Chirac summoned the same journalists back to Élysée Palace to retract many of his remarks.

Mr. Chirac said repeatedly during the second interview that he had spoken casually and quickly the day before because he believed he had been talking about Iran off the record.

“I should rather have paid attention to what I was saying and understood that perhaps I was on the record,” he said.

The tape-recorded, on-the-record interview was conducted under an agreement that it would not be published until Thursday, when *Le Nouvel Observateur* appears on newsstands.

On Monday, Mr. Chirac began by describing as “very dangerous” Iran’s refusal to stop producing enriched uranium, which can be used to produce electricity or to make nuclear weapons. Then he made his remarks about a nuclear-armed Iran.

“I would say that what is dangerous about this situation is not the fact of having a nuclear bomb,” he said. “Having one or perhaps a second bomb a little later, well, that’s not very dangerous.

“But what is very dangerous is proliferation. This means that if Iran continues in the direction it has taken and totally masters nuclear-generated electricity, the danger does not lie in the bomb it will have, and which will be of no use to it.”

Mr. Chirac said it would be an act of self-destruction for Iran to use a nuclear weapon against another country.

“Where will it drop it, this bomb? On Israel?” Mr. Chirac asked. “It would not have gone 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed.”

It was unclear whether Mr. Chirac’s initial remarks reflected what he truly believes. If so, it suggests a growing divide with American policy, which places the highest priority on stopping Iran from gaining the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chirac has privately expressed the view occasionally in the past year that a nuclear-armed Iran might be inevitable and that it could try to sell the technology to other countries. But publicly the policy has been very different. In fact, Élysée Palace prepared a heavily edited 19-page transcript of the Monday interview that excluded Mr. Chirac's assessment of a nuclear-armed Iran.

The transcript even inserted a line that Mr. Chirac had not said that read, "I do not see what type of scenario could justify Iran's recourse to an atomic bomb."

There are divisions within the French government — and between Europe and the United States — about how much Iran should be punished for behavior that the outside world might not be able to change. Some French officials worry that the more aggressive course of action by the United States toward Iran will lead to a confrontation like the Iraq war, which France opposed.

In noting the sanctions against Iran that were imposed last month by the Security Council, Mr. Chirac warned Tuesday that escalation of the conflict by both sides was unwise. "Of course we can go further and further, or higher and higher up the scale in the reactions from both sides," he said. "This is certainly not our thinking nor our intention."

In the Monday interview, Mr. Chirac argued that Iran's possession of a nuclear weapon was less important than the arms race that would ensue.

"It is really very tempting for other countries in the region that have large financial resources to say: 'Well, we too are going to do that; we're going to help others do it,' " he said. "Why wouldn't Saudi Arabia do it? Why wouldn't it help Egypt to do so as well? That is the real danger."

Earlier this month, Mr. Chirac had planned to send his foreign minister to Iran to help resolve the crisis in Lebanon. The venture collapsed after Saudi Arabia and Egypt opposed the trip and members of his own government said it would fail.

Mr. Chirac, who is 74 and months away from ending his second term as president, suffered a neurological episode in 2005 and is said by French officials to have become much less precise in conversation.

Mr. Chirac spent much of the second interview refining his remarks of the previous day. He retracted, for example, his comment that Tehran would be destroyed if Iran launched a nuclear weapon. "I retract it, of course, when I said, 'One is going to raze Tehran,' " he said. He added that any number of third countries would stop an Iranian bomb from ever reaching its target. "It is obvious that this bomb, at the moment it was launched, obviously would be destroyed immediately," Mr. Chirac said. "We have the means — several countries have the means to destroy a bomb."

Mr. Chirac also retracted his prediction that a nuclear Iran could encourage Saudi Arabia and Egypt to follow suit.

"I drifted — because I thought we were off the record — to say that, for example, Saudi Arabia or Egypt could be tempted to follow this example," he said. "I retract it, of course, since neither Saudi

Arabia nor Egypt has made the slightest declaration on these subjects, so it is not up to me to make them.”

As for his suggestion in the first interview that Israel could be a target of an Iranian attack and could retaliate, Mr. Chirac said: “I don’t think I spoke about Israel yesterday. Maybe I did so but I don’t think so. I have no recollection of that.”

There were other clarifications. In the initial interview, for example, Mr. Chirac referred to the Iranian Islamic Republic as “a bit fragile.” In the subsequent interview, he called Iran “a great country” with a “very old culture” that “has an important role to play in the region” as a force for stability.

Mr. Chirac’s initial comments contradicted long-held French policy, which holds that Iran must not go nuclear. The thinking is that a nuclear-armed Iran would give Iran the ability to project power throughout the region and threaten its neighbors — as well as encourage others in the region to seek the bomb.

Under Mr. Chirac’s presidency, France has joined the United States and other countries in moving to punish Iran for refusing to stop enriching uranium, as demanded by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council.

Iran insists that the purpose of its uranium enrichment program is to produce energy; France, along with many other countries, including the United States, is convinced that the program is part of a nuclear weapons project.

The purpose of the initial interview was for Mr. Chirac to talk about climate change and an international conference in Paris later this week that parallels a United Nations conference on the global environment.

The question about Iran followed a comment by Mr. Chirac on the importance of developing nuclear energy programs that are transparent, safe and secure.

In the midst of his initial remarks on Iran, Mr. Chirac’s spokesman passed him a handwritten note, which Mr. Chirac read aloud. “Yes, he’s telling me that we have to go back to the environment,” Mr. Chirac said. He then continued a discussion of Shiite Muslims, who are by far the majority in Iran but a minority in the Muslim world.

“Shiites do not have the reaction of the Sunnis or of Europeans,” said Mr. Chirac, who over the years in private meetings has expressed distrust of Shiite Muslims.

The president had a different demeanor during the two encounters.

In the first interview, which took place in the late morning, he appeared distracted at times, grasping for names and dates and relying on advisers to fill in the blanks. His hands shook slightly. When he spoke about climate change, he read from prepared talking points printed in large letters and highlighted in yellow and pink.

By contrast, in the second interview, which came just after lunch, he appeared both confident and comfortable with the subject matter.

The attempt by Élysée Palace to change the president's remarks in a formal text is not unusual. It is a long-held tradition in French journalism for interview subjects — from the president to business and cultural figures — to be given the opportunity to edit the texts of question-and-answer interviews before publication.

Chirac's First Interview on Iran

Feb. 1, 2007

Following are excerpts from an interview by President Jacques Chirac of France with The New York Times, The International Herald Tribune and Le Nouvel Observateur on Jan. 29, 2007. The interview was conducted in French and recorded and translated by The New York Times.

Q: Mr. President, you spoke earlier about nuclear energy. What are the possibilities for nuclear energy in the future, especially for emerging countries, a country like Iran, for example?

A: I would like to tell you there are first of all two different problems: nuclear power for electricity and nuclear technology for military purposes. What worries us in Iran, it's not electro-nuclear (nuclear energy) as such but uranium enrichment. That's what worries us. It is the refusal of Iran to accept the constraints of the I.A.E.A. [International Atomic Energy Agency] and so to stop enriching uranium. It's very dangerous. It's very dangerous. One has to pay careful attention to that. I would say that what is dangerous about this situation is not the fact of having a nuclear bomb — having one, maybe a second one a little later, well, that's not very dangerous. But what is very dangerous is proliferation. This means that if Iran continues in the direction it has taken and totally masters nuclear generated electricity, the danger does not lie in the bomb it will have, and which will be of no use to it. Where will it drop it, this bomb? On Israel? It would not have gone 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed to the ground. What is dangerous is proliferation. It is really very tempting for other countries in the region that have large financial resources, to say: "Well, we too, we're going to do it. We're going to help out others to do it." Why wouldn't Saudi Arabia do it? Why wouldn't it help Egypt to do so as well? That is the danger. So one has to find a way to settle this problem. That, then, is the military nuclear issue.

Q: How far can the West go in threatening sanctions against Iran without risking reprisals, in particular on Lebanon?

A: This is not quite the topic of our interview. You know about my feelings about Lebanon, and there is no mystery about them. The question is, how can we impose sufficiently strong constraints on Iran. This is a difficult issue. One has to know what Iran can withstand or not. Iran has a regime that is still a bit fragile, a bit fragile. The last elections proved in particular that the president did not have all the authority one could have expected. This somewhat fragile regime is afraid. Afraid of what? Afraid of being contested. What does it want? It wants to maintain the regime of the mullahs. To maintain the regime of the mullahs, it needs to not be contested or threatened by the international community. And the international community, who is it? It's the United States. So

how much of Iran's reaction is about wanting to control military nuclear technology, and how much is a desire to be recognized and respected by the international community and in particular the United States so as to avoid bad surprises that could at one moment or another destabilize the regime of the mullahs? This is a difficult question, because the Shiites are very particular people. Yes, he [Jérôme Bonnafont, spokesman of the Elysée] is telling me we have to go back to the environment. The Shiites are very particular people. The Shiites, since the beginning, are people who have a culture of minorities. They are minorities, they have a culture of minorities. They do not react like the Sunnis or the Europeans.[...]

Q: But is there a fundamental dilemma in this world where we are at a moment where we, at a moment where we have to reduce carbon emissions, so electro-nuclear energy is very important especially for such powers such as India or China, but at the same time we live in a world where terrorism and proliferation are a major worry.

A: ...No expert will claim there is a connection between electro-nuclear technology and the nuclear bomb. These are two things, two completely different technologies. Our entire problem with Iran that we evoked earlier, it is because Iran wants, through the enrichment of uranium, to make a nuclear bomb. But with electro-nuclear (nuclear energy), you have no way to get to a bomb. There is no risk. There is the I.A.E.A. that monitors this. There is control. There is no risk.

Q: There is no risk?

A: None, absolutely none. You cannot take an electrical nuclear plant and make a bomb. It just doesn't work.

Q: So the question the technology of uranium enrichment...

A: It is uranium enrichment, in fact under very special conditions that are controlled by the I.A.E.A. The I.A.E.A. checks all the time to verify that they are not doing secret enrichment. But enrichment is of no use for electro-nuclear technology. No, there is no link between the two.

Chirac's Second Interview on Iran

Feb. 1, 2007

Following are excerpts from an interview by President Jacques Chirac of France with The New York Times, The International Herald Tribune and Le Nouvel Observateur on Jan. 30, 2007. The interview was conducted in French and recorded and translated by The New York Times.

President Chirac: I wanted to say a little about how I really see the Iran problem. Iran has started a process that the I.A.E.A. [International Atomic Energy Agency] thinks could lead to control over military nuclear technology, which as you know is against Iran's commitments as a signatory of the N.P.T. The N.P.T. is the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran has signed it. So Iran is going back on its commitments, which is why the I.A.E.A. has been working on this and observed that uranium enrichment was likely to lead to military nuclear technology. As a consequence, this was neither normal nor acceptable. From this point on, major countries consulted, especially the six comprising the three European countries — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — and the United

States, and then Russia and China. The aim was to explain to Iran that it was putting itself in a situation in which it was breaking international law and that it should therefore stop nuclear enrichment and everything to do with nuclear-based military technology. Iran is still a great nation and an important nation that matters.... We explained to Iran that it could not put itself into this situation, and that therefore we had to discuss, negotiate to obtain the suspension of uranium enrichment, which is the symbol in a way, the core of military nuclear technology. What we thought would happen is that we would be able to discuss this. I would remind you that France also made an open proposal to Iran that did not criticize Iran's authority but said, "You yourselves are going to take a decision in your own way to provisionally stop enriching uranium, and the six countries will in exchange agree to stop the sanction procedure in the U.N. Security Council." I honestly believe that this was an acceptable position, in the sense that we were telling Iran, "The day you decide to start up again, you resume and we will resume the sanction procedures. We shall start implementing the sanction procedures." Each side was taking a step towards the other, and we thought that we had an acceptable process given Iran's demands. Actually the Iranians did not accept this process. They did not agree to interrupt their uranium enrichment work, and as a consequence the six continued their action in the Security Council.... This led to sanctions that initially involve in fact the supply, import or export of military nuclear equipment to Iran, so these sanctions were imposed in Security Council Resolution 1737. From this point on, we find ourselves in a situation that is rather confused. So of course we can go further and further, higher and higher up the scale in our reactions on both sides. This is certainly not our thinking and our intention. What we wanted was to reach a result, as I mentioned earlier, that would comply with both N.P.T. obligations and I.A.E.A. controls. In the present state of affairs, we have not received any positive responses from Iran, so I said — in a rather short-hand way — that "In the end when you think about Iran, what use would it have for a bomb?" If indeed their real goal is to build a nuclear capacity — in other words a nuclear bomb — it is obvious that that this bomb, the moment it was launched, obviously would be destroyed immediately. We have the means, several countries have the means to destroy a bomb, once they see a bomb-carrying rocket launch. So it is hard to see what advantage Iran could find for dropping a bomb. The bomb would naturally be destroyed as soon as the rocket was launched. It is an important aspect of the issue.

Q: It would be destroyed, the bomb?

A: The bomb would be destroyed, yes.

Q: And what would the repercussions be for Iran?

A: Well the repercussions for Iran would have to be examined, naturally. I spoke quickly and I retract it, of course, when I said, "One is going to raze Tehran." It was of course a manner of speaking in my mind. I don't imagine that we could raze Tehran. But it is obvious that if an undeniably aggressive act, which is to say sending a bomb payload on a launch rocket, took place and this bomb would be — I repeat — automatically destroyed without even having left the Iranian soil or at least the Iranian airspace, it is obvious there would be without a doubt measures of coercion, measures of retaliation, of course. It is part of nuclear deterrence.... Saying one would destroy Tehran is meaningless but what is meaningful is that in nuclear deterrence, there are initiatives taken in case of a nuclear attack which are to be examined, to be negotiated and which are up to the authority of the countries that consider themselves, with good reason or not, attacked.

Q: Including a retaliation of a nuclear type?

A: Everything is possible.... It is deterrence that allows attacking, counter-attacking a nuclear attacker that would have manifested itself. So that's the first problem. The second problem of course concerns proliferation. The great danger of this plan of Iran is proliferation. Everyone knows that some countries have already reached the nuclear level and that have undeniably taken part in the development of proliferation. I won't name any country. It's useless but we know it, even Iran benefited from the expertise, the knowledge of the technology of some countries in the nuclear sector. So proliferation is a dangerous thing, starting from the moment when Iran would be able to access military nuclear technology, it would become ipso facto a potential center of proliferation that would be extremely dangerous for the entire region. I drifted, because I thought we were "off the record," to say that, for example, Saudi Arabia or Egypt could be tempted to follow this example, I retract it of course since neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt have made the slightest declaration on these subjects so it is not up to me to make them....What is certain is that such a process leads to an arm race that could lead a number of countries to participate in this arm race. I don't want to name any countries naturally, even though I did so yesterday, I shouldn't have done so....

Q: In the region?

A: In the region and maybe beyond it....There is a second risk that is also extremely serious which is the risk of proliferation because even without using a bomb they would have made, they can transfer to other countries for political reasons technologies that would allow these other countries to gain access to military nuclear technology.... Iran is still a great country. It's a country with a tradition. It's a complex country, which has a very old culture.... Iran has necessarily an important role to play in the Middle East region. This region was traumatized by the Iraq affair. The Iraq affair shifted red lines, in fact, in the region and it has created a new situation. It has become dangerous, this region, more vulnerable, and therefore, Iran undeniably has an important role — taking into account its history, its tradition, its philosophy — an important role to play in the region under the condition of course to do so in a peaceful and cordial way. I was a bit quick yesterday.... The current problem, in my view, is the environment. About Iran, we unfortunately will most likely have many more occasions to talk about it....

Q: Yesterday, frankly, you could have given the impression, at least it could have led to confusion, in that you were also saying that Iran could possess its first bomb, and maybe a second one. For you it was a way of saying that the problem is proliferation. You have evoked the possibility that it [Iran] may attack Israel, which seemed almost a bit secondary.

A: I cannot imagine this. I cannot imagine this. I repeat, the means of protection that exist around the world, in particular with the Americans but also with the Europeans, with a certain number of Europeans, are such that I don't imagine that a bomb, that a rocket carrying a [nuclear] bomb could be launched from Iran without our detecting it. And as a result, it would necessarily be destroyed. So I don't think I spoke about Israel yesterday. Maybe I did so but I don't think so. I have no recollection of that....

Q: Mr. President, there are a number of questions that we had asked you, and you didn't wish to answer, and you told us so, very nicely in fact.

A: Yes, but I didn't want to abuse your time nor mine. What you need to know is that France considers that Iran is an essential element in the stability of this entire region, an essential element and naturally this stability will depend on the policy that Iran will choose. I do not know exactly — there are right now in Iran talks, everybody knows that, among the Iranian authorities, to know exactly the policy that Iran must follow. It is not up to me to cast a judgment on this point. But it is a fact. There have even been elections that have shown — that have slightly put into question — the authority of President Ahmadinejad. One should say that the words — this I am telling you very much from the bottom of my heart — that this President Ahmadinejad had about Israel are in my view and in the view of France and in the view of the entire world are certainly totally unacceptable. In fact I have told the Iranians so. These are totally unacceptable words, and they cannot be tolerated. I simply hope that these were rather personal words and which do not correspond to the conception of things by the main Iranian leaders. I don't know, and I condemn them totally, and I have told the Iranians so in the clearest fashion. When I went to New York, President Ahmadinejad asked me for a meeting. I refused, on principle, because I could not agree to receive or to talk to someone who held these views on the Shoah in particular and on Israel in general. This, it was completely clear, and so I want to say so. But I repeat, Iran is a great nation historically, culturally, which matters in this region of the Middle East, and it is important to have a dialogue with this country to try and have stability in the Middle East.

Q: I wanted to thank you...

A: It is I who thank you for coming back. These are extremely delicate and dangerous subjects and which involve consequences that can be dramatic. So, everybody needs to take their responsibilities. So sometimes one can drift off, when one believes there are no consequences. I, I honestly believed that the questions aside from the environment were off the record....

Q:It is I who asked the question. But it was after your analysis about nuclear energy, so I asked a question honestly and politely. I am sorry if it gave you the impression that ...

A: My dear lady, no, I am not under this impression. It is I who was wrong. I don't want to contest it. I should rather have paid attention to what I was saying and to understand that perhaps we were "on the record." We had talked about environmental problems, nuclear problems.... It was I who should have paid attention and who should have said, "We are off the record," and I didn't say it.

Q: You said, "We must find a way to fix this problem." What are the ways to fix this problem?

A: I am going to tell you quickly that the way things are now, what ... Iran should wish for is the division of the international community. That is the reason why we think it is essential to maintain the cohesion of the international community. ...So there are the French, the Germans, the British who have a point of view that is almost identical. There are the Americans and then there are the Russians, who for reasons that are theirs, and the Chinese, who are not always exactly on the same line. So if we split, it's a great victory in a way for those in Iran who have the hardest line. If, on the contrary, we remain united, in particular within the resolutions of the Security Council, at least

on 1737, at this moment, we remained strong. And so I think that what is important is to make sure that there are no divisions of the international community and that the six countries in question remain united in the face of this problem which is a dangerous problem....

News Analysis

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Chirac's Iran Gaffe Reveals a Strategy: Containment

By Elaine Sciolino

PARIS, Feb. 2 – When President Jacques Chirac said this week that he would not be overly worried if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon, he inadvertently said aloud what some policy makers and arms control experts have been whispering: that the world may have to learn to live with a nuclear Iran. Mr. Chirac quickly retracted his words, and Élysée Palace reaffirmed France's commitment to preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapons state. But in veering from the prepared script and letting the veil of caution fall, he became the first Western leader to imply that containment of a nuclear Iran is preferable to other options, especially war.

“Jacques Chirac said things that many experts are saying around the world, even in the United States,” Hubert Védrine, foreign minister from 1997 to 2002, said on LCI television on Friday. “That is to say, that a country that possesses the bomb does not use it and automatically enters the system of deterrence and doesn't take absurd risks.”

The logic of the argument goes this way: Iran is making enriched uranium, which can be used either for making electricity or, with additional enrichment, nuclear weapons. If Iran masters that process for military purposes, it may be able to build a bomb or two in the next few years.

Under that thinking, the only realistic goal is to slow down the process as long as possible. But even if Iran has the bomb, it will be subject to the same classic doctrine of nuclear deterrence that restrained the nuclear powers during the cold war.

“There is a growing realization that the international community is failing to stop Iran from acquiring a uranium enrichment capability,” said Mark Fitzpatrick, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. “The U.S. government wouldn't accept it, but it's becoming a fait accompli. Can the next step - nuclear weapon - be prevented? Chirac skipped over that question and cut to the chase in saying, ‘We can live with a nuclear-armed Iran.’”

The Bush administration has made stopping an Iranian bomb the object of an increasingly aggressive policy. But administration officials are concerned that the Iranians have learned from North Korea – which ignored Washington's warnings and detonated a nuclear device last year. Iran, they fear, is on the same path.

So the administration is pressing reluctant European governments to curtail support for exports to Iran and to block transactions and freeze the assets of some Iranian companies. In Iraq, the administration has pursued Iranian agents it believes to be involved in attacks against American and allied forces.

Among the Europeans, there is an overwhelming consensus that the American-led war in Iraq has been a disaster and that Washington's Iran strategy could end in an even more destabilizing military confrontation.

It was Mr. Chirac who led Europe's opposition to the war in Iraq, and in an I-told-you-so speech last month he said that his predictions that the war would spread more chaos, regional instability and terrorism had come true.

In his remarks this week, he could have been speaking for most of Europe when he said that what he called "the Iraq affair" had "shifted red lines" and made the region dangerous.

Even inside the Bush administration, some officials have acknowledged over the past year that Iran eventually may get a nuclear weapon – or at least the technology and components to assemble one quickly. In the United States, the view that the world might have to coexist with a nuclear Iran was laid out in an ambitious study by two government-financed scholars at the National Defense University in 2005.

"Can the United States live with a nuclear-armed Iran?" the report asked. "Despite its rhetoric, it may have no choice." The report added that the costs of rolling back Iran's nuclear program "may be higher than the costs of deterring and containing a nuclear Iran."

In a sense, Mr. Chirac was trying to make just that point when he said in an interview with three publications, including The New York Times, that a bomb would do Iran little good because it would never be able to use it without facing swift retaliation.

Mr. Chirac also stressed his belief that Iran should not be completely humiliated and isolated, but encouraged to become a positive regional player. "How can we impose sufficiently strong constraints on Iran?" he asked in the Monday interview. Calling the Islamic Republic "a bit fragile," he said, "One has to know what Iran can withstand or not."

The following day, in retracting his statements about a nuclear Iran, he stressed the importance of having a "dialogue" with Iran, which he said had an important role to play in helping to stabilize the region.

In the past several years, Mr. Chirac has tried to navigate a middle course between the United States and Iran.

It was France, in the months after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, that conceived a diplomatic initiative joined by Britain and Germany in which Tehran would freeze its uranium enrichment activities in exchange for political, economic and technological incentives.

The European trio suspected that the United States was moving toward an open confrontation with Iran, much the way it did with Iraq.

But the initiative failed, even after the United States, Russia and China joined in. Sanctions, even in the unlikely eventuality that they can be tightened substantially, are not likely to be tough enough to change Iran's behavior.

Tehran insists that its nuclear program is for peaceful energy purposes. It views United Nations sanctions to punish it for enriching uranium as unjust and a violation of its rights as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It justifies its presence in Shiite-controlled Iraq as necessary to preserve its own national security interests and to protect itself should Iraq dissolve into chaos.

On Thursday, Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said that his nation was becoming a "superpower" and that the United Nations sanctions would not deter it from pursuing its nuclear program.

Indeed, the Iranians are well aware that possession of the bomb would immediately transform the country into the dominant power in the Middle East, give it even greater influence over Iraq and allow it to threaten and blackmail its enemies.