Decker, Clinton, 1918-1919. “#40 Jack boarding train”. Princeton University’s Special Collection
Introduction: Why the Russia Transportation Problem
In 1914, Petr Durnovo advised the tsar that “the network of strategic railways is inadequate. The railways possess a rolling stock sufficient perhaps for normal traffic, but not commensurate with the colossal demand that will be made upon them in the event of a European war” (Verndasky 795). Durnovo’s prediction will soon become the reality of Russia’s transportation system as WWI progresses.
Russia has long depended on exports from other European countries east of them, especially their long-time trading partner Germany. However, with the start of the war, its eastern supply line was drastically affected by the German blockade. Along with the rapid urbanization and demand for factory production, more men than ever were living in the cities. Cities with millions of inhabitants depended entirely on transporting wheat and other food supplies from the countryside. Therefore, it is no surprise that the February revolution was started in the bread line in Petrograd (Pethybridge 381). The problem of transportation was also obvious in the overall production of machinery for the military. There was a distinct lack of fuel and coals, which was in part due to labor disputes, lack of mining equipment, and inability to move coals from production regions. This furthered the food crisis by raising the cost of other necessities and exacerbated the divide between the rural population who are much less incentivized to sell to the city and led to grain hoarding and the government’s inability to enforce an effective monopoly (386). Lack of supply is also felt on the front line, where the lack of rifles and clothes hurts an already demoralized military force (389). Railway during the pre and revolution period was an intersection of civilian, military, economic, and technological activity that both mirrored the sentiment of the country with labor strikes and inflation but also showed the downward spiral of the Russian military machine.
The central primary source of this paper will be the personal and business correspondence of Clinton A. Decker (1893-1952), held in Princeton’s special collection. When President Wilson entered the United States into WWI, the provisional government of Russia requested the US to send a team of railway experts to aid in the efficiency of Russia’s railway system. Decker joined as a stenographer/secretary to the newly established American Railway Mission to Russia led by John F. Stevens, the civil engineer who built the Great Northern Railway and chief engineer of the Panama Canal. Decker would spend June 1917 to Nov 1917 traveling within Russia, staying for a period of time in Petrograd and Moscow before settling in Harbin after the Bolsheviks took control of eastern Russia. The majority of his letters are to his Fiancée Gertrude O’Obrien where he describes the events of his inspection and his day-to-day life with tremendous details. Decker provided commentary on the mood of the people and noted down significant quantitative data points. He also provided more technical information on railway operation with business acquittance such as Mr. Cook of the Erie railroad. Along with Decker’s account, the collection also had hundreds of photos, most of which were taken after the scope of this paper in Harbin in 1918-1919, but there were many train and railway specific images (Decker). The paper is also supplemented by a first-person account of Stevens. To contextualize these first-person accounts, secondary sources on Russia’s transportation system before the 1917 revolution were used (Wolff) along with analytical sources on the interconnectedness between the supply problem and the Russian Revolution of 1917 by Professor Pethybridge of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at University College, Swansea. Data from a combination of both primary and secondary sources are used to better understand railroad construction before the revolution (Ames)
This paper will look to combine a first-person account of railway inspection that happened during the revolution along with research conducted later on the state of transportation before and during 1917. Some specific focus will be how the railway came to be and the buildup to a transportation problem long before 1917; the problems observed by the commission in 1917 and their attempts to mitigate it; and the direct repercussions of the transportation problems both in the military and civilian sphere.
How the railway got here and the state of it in 1917
The woe of Russia’s transportation problems started long before the invention of railroads. With most of Russia’s waterways being private property, the maintenance and cost of passage for the waterways have long been a problem. Rivers like the “Volga carries large volumes of grain, oil, and timber” but it is run on a completely private basis (Ames, 379). It wasn’t until 1916 did the river became government-controlled. Same as the rest of Russia, riverboat crew were also quitting because of low wages and poor conditions. The road system also had its own problems, with the big one being the lack of horses to travel on the roads due to requisition by the military (380).
The railway also faced similar problems of private control and lack of continuous planning. In 1878, almost all Russian railroads were privately owned, but over the next 30 years, the government purchased and built enough railroads so two-thirds of Russia’s railways were publicly owned right before the revolution. WWI was a major period of construction for the railroad. The lines include the line to Murmansk, the Modern Trans-Siberian line, and the Siberian lines to the Kuznetsk Basin coal deposit.
Unlike the radial network of the French railway or the multimodal system of the Germans, the Russian system is a combination of nodal systems along with major transcontinental lines cutting across the country. The railroad system as a whole has been described as “several types of network, each superimposed upon the other…each type of network was designed for one or more specific purposes” (Ames, 64). The railroad system is classified into six principal classes: military significance, stimulating export trade, supporting single industrial complexes, connecting existing industrial complexes, opening undeveloped areas, and developing regional lines along the main transit route. The original trans-Siberian railroad provided vital supplies for the Russian armies during the Russo—Japanese war by moving material eastward. It is a line that’s built and administered in sections. The modern route was only completed in 1916, and it was vital for handling foreign trade through Pacific ports. It also allowed industries to develop and permanent populations to settle in undeveloped areas in Siberia and the Far East. Between 1897 and 1902, 1.1 billion rubles in government funds were given for the development of the Russian Far East (Wolff 98). The export class did not play a major role during the revolution, but the lines within and between the existing industrial complex were a major player in the leadup of the revolution. These lines were built within the radial Moscow industrial region, and the resource-rich area such as the Urals, and the Ukraine (Ames 67). At the same time, these lines were also connected to each other. The volumes on the popular St. Petersburg-Moscow line far exceeded the 200,000 tons of freight and 120,000 passengers per year estimated. By 1913, 4.4 million tons of freight and 3.4 million passengers were being transported annually (68).
Despite the early success of the wide railroad network, St. Petersburg has always been vulnerable to material dependency such as coal and ferrous metals from the Ukraine. Ames listed how before 1904, all transport was through Moscow. But even with the Dnonovosokolniki line, two more lines will be built over the next 20 years, demonstrating the high demand for routes from Ukraine directly to St. Petersburg (69). Another important resource Ukraine provided was grain, and multiple lines were built toward Moscow for the supply of it. However, despite the number of lines from north Urals connecting to Moscow and Petrograd, South Urals, a predominantly agricultural area was left out of the network (63). The necessity of this connection was shown by new lines being put into operation in 1918 and 1920.
While the railway, like most transportation systems, had efficiency problems, there were also signs of revolution trouble as early as the 1905 revolution. As the urban factory workers went on strikes, the railroad workers also had their own strikes across the country. The railway battalion was employed to sit on the interaction between civilian workers and the military. However, this caused authority problems on where does head of the railway rests on the military hierarchy, along with a hybridization of military and technical officers leading to extensive abuse of powers by too many people giving orders (Wolff 103). The brigade follows the guiding rule that “In war—all for the railroad, satisfying the need for the active army; in peace all to prepare for this” (103). However, as they moved further east, the soldiers identified more and more with the railwayman and showed strong sympathies to the striking workers. Colonel of the Manchurian command noted how when asked to replace the striking workers, the railroad battalion and telegraph worker joined the railway worker, disrupting train service and communication. In Chita, soldiers from the reserve railroad battalion joined in the workers’ meeting, and resolutions began to be signed by both the workers and soldiers, leading to a successful demobilization of the reserve. On the Trans-Baikal railway, the Battalion also helped workers by allowing them to seize firepower. The cooperation between soldiers and workers popped up across Siberia and foreshadowed a tumulus railway labor problem in times of war and revolution (107).
Firsthand account of Decker and Stevens
- Survey of the railroad and background information
According to Stevens, the lead engineer on the commission of railway experts sent from the United States to Russia, their mission is to “aid in rehabilitation and conduct of its railways which had become demoralized and broken down and unable to function in any degree of efficiency.” The real motive, however, was the desire of the provisional government to properly supply its army on the front so as to prevent the breakup which occurred later. Stevens would later describe the mission after knowing all that happened in 1917, “the action was taken at least a year too late”. The overall impression of the Russian railway system by the Americans was there was a distinct lack of executive ability, loyalty, and cooperation among its workers. People treated the railway with apathy and indifference (Decker 188). The Americans had high hopes and expectations for their trip. Decker remarks on August 1917 “What we are able to do in the next couple of months, I am sure, will have a direct bearing on keeping this country in the war”. It is very much true the initial goal of the Americans was to keep Russia in the war to beat the Germans. By deliberately focusing on the railway system, in their mind, it would ensure Russia’s continuous military success. However, a lot of their work was also to optimize supply for the civilian population in part because they recognized the danger of civil unrest. In 1917, Russia’s allies were only able to send supplies in two ways, one was through Archangel which is often frozen, and the rail is far from complete. The other would be the 5450 miles of Siberian system which is inundated with inefficiency (188).
- Efficiency Problems
The overarching problem observed by the American Commission was inefficiency. One of the first places the commission visited was Vladivostok, the terminus of the trans-Siberian railway and an important port of Russia in the Pacific Sea. There they observed a large buildup of freight. By June of 1917, there were 650,000 tons of freight piled up but only 100 cars per day were leaving. The cars are small four-wheel cars so the pile-up was not decreasing. (Based on a separate source on page 108, the average capacity of freight cars is 16 tons, and these would have been on the smaller end). The freight is mainly “ammunition, guns, barbed wire, machinery, etc.”, all badly needed equipment for the front, where the soldiers were missing one-third of the necessary guns (Pethybridge 389). These freights have all arrived from the United States and have sat there for up to two years, waiting to be transported (Decker 103).
Decker listed some contributing factors to such a backlog of freight in Vladivostok. In particular, the trans-Siberian’s “main trouble seems to be a shortage of equipment, a large percentage of what they have is in bad order; poor shop facilities; no modern facilities for handling engines; inefficient operation and poor labor.” And even when they do have the equipment such as “a number of large American box cars…most of the lines which go to make up the Trans-Siberian, the power is so bad, they are only able to haul ten of those American loaded cars in a train” (88). Overall, Decker painted a grim picture of a slowly falling apart railway system mainly due to poor maintenance and lack of modernization. These railway problems were not isolated to the trans-Siberian line, as he also remarked “The same methods of operation used on the Trans-Siberian are followed on most of the railways in the south. Problem includes short engine runs, no facilities at the division and no turning points for handling engines quickly, such as hot water boiler washers, drop and ash pits, coal chute, turntable motors. Etc.” (76) Staffing and telephone communication is another issue that consistently comes up, where the rail system uses “one or two so-called train dispatchers for a whole railroad” (76).
While these problems seem extremely complicated and require long-term infrastructure, in just a few months, there were significant improvements. By October, the backlog in Vladivostok is reduced to about 200,000 tons. This is due to diverting some freight to another line that will be loaded into the river streamer, and new locomotives and cars being built. With American companies shipping in materials and machinery, 3 locomotives were built every 2 days, and 12 plus cars were made in Vladivostok. They predicted an outward movement of 400 cars per day to the west by December, 4 times the original efficiency (134). It is not clear if this number was ever reached in the aftermath of the October Revolution, although the commission did not foresee any trouble even with the government evacuating to Moscow. This is just one case of rapid improvement both by direct order from Kerensky and by imports from Allied forces. However, this improvement came too late for the Allies, as by the time any of these supplies would have arrived and other railroad improvements came to be, the Bolsheviks had already controlled the government and Russia was pulling out of the war.
- Food, Labor, and Supply Problems
A consistent theme throughout literature about the Russian Revolution is the skyrocketing food prices and the inability to get bread. But in the same literature, there are mentions of grain abundance in the countryside. The same men who talk about the long breadline in Petrograd visited the Urals a few weeks before the February revolution and described food being plentiful and “could be obtained at almost prewar prices, transport being the only difficulty to be overcome” (Pethybridge 382). Decker joked in his letter home that “If there is any danger of our going hungry, the Commission will beat it into the country where there is plenty or get it in here some way” (102). He later summarized the situation as, “food situation in the large cities, particularly in Petrograd, is very bad, and is undoubtedly growing worse. There is a large crop of cereals in the South, but they are unable to distribute the food where it is needed with the present transportation facilities (108). While how much grain existed in Russia in 1917 and whether it was enough to feed the whole country if transportation had not been an issue is debatable, the grain definitely would have mitigated food shortage in cities like Petrograd. The same year, the commission was able to arrange the transport of 6,000,000 bushels of wheat to Moscow and other cities in the west (190). On the other hand, grain hoarding was rampant and would not have been easily solved. Peasants would much prefer to sell their crops to the army to follow their son at the front or to keep the grain themselves than to sell at a set low price imposed by the government(Pethybridge 383). Decker observed while some villages have no grain reserve, “Other places there seemed to be plenty of wheat and other grains, they told us the peasants refuse to sell it as they have plenty of money or don’t want money in exchange for their product. The thing required by them, shoes for instance, can’t be obtained even with money” (Decker 164). So, although the transportation problem contributed to the lack of food for non-producing areas, a variety of other socioeconomic factors contributed to the food shortage.
Worker strikes also exacerbated the transportation problems. On July 14th, Decker got first-hand experience of a strike when the hotel he was staying at stopped serving meals. Strikes impacted the railway in two main ways. The first is interrupting the transportation of coal such as those in Tiaga mines near Tomsk that “necessitated the bringing of coal from a place called Cheremkova, a short distance west of Irkutsk, and an overhaul of 900 miles in the direction of heavy traffic” (106). This change also had cascading effects such as limiting the movement of other freight on the Tomsk railway to about 100 cars per day, which means Trans Baikal had a limit of 100 cars same as the Chinese Eastern/Ussuri Railway, resulting in 100 cars per day limit coming out of Vladivostok (106). The second impact on the transportation system is decreased productivity in the factory. Productivity is vital both for day-to-day necessities and for more material to construct and maintain the railway. Decker noted, “efficiency of the shops has dropped by 30 to 40 percent”. Of course, the strike could have even more directly impacted the railway by railway men striking, but the government did somewhat adjust people’s wages and there was momentary appeasement in December of 1917 (133). But even then, problems continued to arise such as when the railway men discharged over 200 officials of the Siberian Line (145), Not all is dire, as Decker noted how although the Krasnoyarsk mine is thought to be taken over by Maximilist and socialists, and declared itself a republic, in reality people are still working as usual, albeit “they may all be socialist” (123).
Beyond workers striking and delayed coal delivery, there was a consistent shortage of coal both as a delivered product but also as fuel for the very supply line. Decker reported, “The fuel question is one of great importance as they are short of coal all over Russia on account of the poor transportation facilities.” Instead of burning coal, the engines for the train have started to burn oil, and wood & coal. As noted by multiple sources, the largest coal deposits are in the Donets Basin in the southern part of Russia. Here Decker observed “They are moving about 350 cars of coal per day from there northward to Moscow and Petrograd. To take care of the requirements, they should be moving 1000 cars per day. They have 2,000,000 tons of coal on hand on the ground in this basin because of the inability of the railways to move it” (75).
- Administrative Problems
Starting with the February Revolution, there were extensive personnel changes within the government. Even without the government turmoil, many officials responsible for the railway did not see a point in improving it. In one of the meetings with the American Commission, a common remark by many Russian board members was quoted as “Yes, Mr. Stevens, these things which you propose to put into effect would better the service, move our trains, and result in economy, but what object is that to us. We have life positions, and if the railway made a profit, it goes to the government, and if a deficit, the national treasury makes it up” (186). On top of reluctance within the railway administration to address these long-standing transportation issues, it was worsened by the resignation of Minister Nekrasoff in July who was the commission’s point of contact. There is similar disorganization within frontline transportation. In conferences with General Brusilov’s staff, Stevens concluded “As far as railway transport to the front was concerned, not a member of the staff had any practical idea or even knowledge of the situation.” Even the general who was responsible for frontline transportation did not know if the most important line to Przemysl was single or double-tracked (187). During the commission’s visit to Moscow, they found 12,000 cars of supplies for the frontline sitting there, most of which had sat there for more than a year (190). These cases show incompetency and inefficiency further depleted an already resource-scarce country and frontline.
From July to October, the commission work stalled. Decker complained in his letter how in the 3 months they had been there, there were no changes in freight efficiency due to “The constant changing of men with whom it[the commission] was dealing made it impossible for the commission to get its recommendation put into effect”. It was only with the direct intervention of Kerensky did all the commission’s suggestions became implemented and there was a “difference in official spirit. They have become enthusiastic about the help promised from America” (106). Some of the key points were the establishment of a superintendent division, lengthening engine runs, and bringing over 250 Americans to “instruct the officials of American methods of operation and establish the division as recommended” and instruct the shopmen on American practices (105). While some suggestions were followed, which facilitated the positive result at Vladivostok, most of it was never followed through, such as bringing the American men as the commission was forced out of western Russia by the new Bolshevik government. (Although their work continued throughout Siberia and Manchuria). While it is hard to speculate how much the suggestion put in place would have helped the transportation problem, accomplishments in train dispatching, repair shops, and transportation resulted lasting impact on the Russian railway system. Stevens would later complain how “statements have appeared in the press that these improved modern methods of railroad management were conceived and put into effect by the Soviet government officials as part of its wonderful accomplishment. Such was not the case – they were the work of the American Railway men, and the Bolsheviks have simply trailed along and claimed the credit” (344).
Repercussion and Conclusion
The railroad’s impact reached into every facet of Russian life, especially during wartime. From transporting soldiers and refugees, to providing food and raw materials, millions of lives depended on trains carrying vital supplies. Despite an initial surplus from closing down exports (Ames 381), problems quickly followed. The increasingly dense city population far away from agriculture production combined with the need to supply one of the largest mobilized armies in history through complex terrain, transportation of resources became a growing difficulty. Demand by the military and civilians for goods of all types increased, but production struggled with such a significant portion of the population fighting in the war and other economic factors. In August of 1917, the provincial government report stated: “The food situation in the army and the country is extremely grave. The government supplies are constantly decreasing. Cities, entire guberniias, and even the front suffer an acute shortage of grain, although there is plenty of it in the country” (387). The price of manufactured goods has risen so much so, most peasants cannot afford it and they no longer want to sell grains for money. Raw material for production and transportation is also lacking, such as the coal problems described by Decker. Even with the production of coals, they were repeatedly bottlenecked by worker strikes and transportation capacity. Other materials for the frontline were scattered around. Thousands of tons of much-needed ammunition and weapons delivered from the United States were stuck in Vladivostok when the soldiers on the front desperately needed rifles. There was also gross incompetency within the railway administration and government which did not see a point in improving efficiency until it was too late. Professor Pethybridge argued “the state of supplies was chiefly responsible for the decline of morale in the army. Indeed, it may be argued that even if the tsarist regime had survived 1917, the Russian military machine would still have broken down” (391).
The cumulation of economic supply problems compounded with inefficient transportation directly led to the unrest and chaos that the revolution thrived on. Both using analytical sources after the fact and first-hand surveys of the situation in 1917, the Russian railway system simply was not efficiently managed before the war to be able to accommodate the increase in demand, nor was there a rapid enough response to address new issues. The American Commission viewed their work to be fundamental in keeping Russia in the war and defeating the Germans. Decker believed “A great deal probably depends on what the commission can do to increase the movement of traffic between now and the coming of winter. If they can make a good showing, it will serve to hearten the people as well as the men at the head of the government “(Decker 110). But no matter how impactful their work could have been, it undoubtedly was, in the words of John P. Stevens, “taken as least a year too late” (188).
Decker, Clinton, 1918-1919. “#38 Orloff’s men Harbin before start for Pogranichnaya”. Princeton University’s Special Collection
Works Cited
Primary Source:
Decker, Clinton. Mission to Russia: An American Journal. Edited by Charles Decker. Self-printed. 1994
*P185-191 are typed notes from John P. Stevens send by him in January 1931 to the Hoover Institute Archives at Stanford University in California for archival purposes
Vernadsky, George. “XVII:24 Durnovo’s Advice to the Tsar in February 1914”. A Source Book for Russian History v.1. 1972
Secondary Source:
Ames, Edward. “A Century of Russian Railroad Construction: 1837-1936.” American Slavic and East European Review, vol. 6, no. 3/4, 1947, pp. 57–74. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2491700.
Pethybridge, Roger. “Political Repercussions of the Supply Problem in the Russian Revolution of 1917.” The Russian Review, vol. 29, no. 4, 1970, pp. 379–402. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/127295.
WOLFF, DAVID. “BETWEEN WAR AND REVOLUTION: RAILWAY BRIGADES IN SIBERIA, 1905-1907.” Russian History, vol. 23, no. 1/4, 1996, pp. 95–111. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24660919.
