Introduction
In a letter to George Peel, the secretary of the Gold Standard Association, British Prime Minister William Gladstone described “all efforts towards bimetallism as a passing humor of the hour, doomed to nullity.” [1] Sergei Witte, Russia’s Finance Minister, seemed to espouse a similar view when he announced his monetary reforms to put Russia on a gold standard in 1897, refusing to revive the silver ruble.[2] However, Gladstone’s shrewd discreditation of bimetallism also conceals the system’s revival in the United States during the period 1894-95[3] and the polarization of public debate on the issue of currency. The Great Panic of 1873 pushed many to believe that the gold standard was too rigid to deal with times of crisis – an idea met with strong opposition among supporters of the gold standard. Tensions between the two groups came to a head in 1896 during the Presidential election which opposed William McKinley – supporter of the gold standard – and Willian J. Bryan, a purveyor of bimetallism. In this context of public debate and uncertainty, American newspapers closely followed Witte’s policies. As his reforms grew more drastic – and more successful – newspapers in the West began to craft a narrative of Russia’s road to gold, using it to symbolize the triumph of gold over silver. To do so, American newspapers deployed a range of narrative techniques; they painted a genesis of the Russian gold reform, lamenting Russia’s struggles under silver, set up a cast of characters central to the gold reforms, and ultimately cast gold as an indicator of civilization and tool of international trade.
The significance of the Russian reforms in shaping public opinion in the West illuminates the extent to which the 19th century was marked by trade, global cooperation, and a desire for economic cohesion among the world’s greatest powers. Monetary reform was as much a national concern as it was a stepping stone to a world order. The constant dialogue between Russian events and American coverage thereof is in and of itself a sign that the world was becoming more multilateral. For the United States, to write about Russia was a way of writing its own story and confirming its choice to move forward with gold. Moreover, Russia’s impact on the American press and public opinion reveals that it did not merely follow the Western move towards gold, or blindly adopt the British model. Instead, it crafted monetary reform into its own tool of imperial aggrandizement, sending ripples across the global economy.
Using a range of historical newspaper articles spanning the period 1895-1910, this paper will seek to answer the question: how did the American press use the experience of Russia’s gold reforms to cement public opinion against silver in the West? Articles will be seen through two lenses; first, as a window into the public opinion and common disposition of the time, and second, as a tool for controlling and shaping those opinions. In order to reflect an evolution in public opinion, analysis will focus on multiple sources at a time, bringing them into conversation with each other to gather a holistic view of attitudes towards gold and silver. Additionally, analysis will focus specifically on how the media seized and instrumentalized Russian monetary reforms to produce a narrative that favored the gold standard and disparaged silver and bimetallism.
Russia and Silver: a Cautionary Tale
Even prior to the announcement of Witte’s reforms in 1896, many American newspapers portrayed Russia’s experience with silver as a cautionary tale of economic instability and precarity. Indeed, the Russian economy suffered from the fluctuations of silver and consequently struggled to establish itself as a global economic power. In the 1870s, the value of silver fell around the world due to its demonetisation in the USA, Germany and other Western powers. This was exacerbated in 1893 when the British government suspended the free coinage of silver in India, further dropping the price of silver by 20%.[4] The Baltimore Sun reports that in 1891 the Russian currency reached 28 per cent, and in 1892, 9.6 per cent.[5] This was a major problem for Russia; as a silver standard nation where gold, silver, and credit notes circulated at par, a wildly fluctuating currency disincentivized foreign investment and unsettled its relation with trade partners. The reporting of precise statistics in American newspapers like The Baltimore Sun bears witness to the careful attention America paid to Russia’s struggles. Not long after Witte announced the gold reform in 1896, a more bodied narrative of silver as Russia’s affliction began to emerge. In 1898, The New York Times traced four decades of Russia’s experience with silver, writing that the suspension of the exchange of notes for coin following the Crimean war brought to Russia “all of the evils of an inconvertible currency” and “arrest[ed] its economic development.”[6] In describing silver and an objective “evil,” this article cast the silver standard as an economic plight with an amoral dimension. The paper’s readership is invited to embrace – rather than nuance – this view, as the journalist’s partisan choice of words leaves little room for argument. The almost hyperbolic language castigates and rejects not only the silver standard, but the very use of silver as currency. This is reinforced by the narrative that silver “arrested” Russia’s economic development. By suggesting that silver impedes growth and slows down countries, this article plays on the common fears of its time. For a century marked by industrialization, growth, and increased international trade, an arrested economic development would be a sign of defeat and economic failure. The very word “arrested” suggests Russia’s economy ground to a halt – yet another hyperbole which conceals the more nuanced reality of Russia’s economic history, which ebbed and flowed under the influence of many reforms. Note that “inconvertible” further reinforces the feeling that Russia was stuck, unable to move away from silver – the American reader is almost invited to think of silver currency as a trap. The article goes on to say that through Witte’s gold reforms Russia was “delivered”[7] from silver – the metaphor of imprisonment celebrates Russia’s newly acquired freedom through the gold reform and casts the silver standard as a form of servitude to one’s currency. In painting this starkly negative image of silver, and by setting up a contrast between Russia’s present freedom under gold and its instability under silver, the article clearly seeks to sway public opinion against silver and bimetallism. In doing so, it sets up Russia’s case as a cautionary tale – something that grows increasingly important when we consider the context of public monetary debate in which the article was published.
Witte’s Monetary Reforms Become Russia’s Gilded Salvation
While silver was vilified in the American press, the Russian gold reform – and the gold standard itself – were cast as Russia’s salvation and celebrated as a resounding success. On January 21st 1898, The New York Times published a statement by Witte praising the “stability of the reform.”[8] The term “stability” is overwhelmingly positive when considered in the context of Russia’s history with an unstable and fluctuating currency. This description also harkens back to the classic idea of gold as a symbol of economic austerity, signal of financial rectitude, and a “good housekeeping seal of approval.”[9] In the context of the 1873 crisis which reignited the Free Silver movement, this is also a rebuke to the bimetallist idea that a combination of silver and gold can stabilize the economy by expanding the monetary reserves.[10] The American media asserted that gold alone could provide that economic security. In order to further push the line that the gold standard was a success, many newspapers focused on the success of Witte’s drastic reforms. One metric of success The New York Times put forward was the circulation of gold coins. The article compares 1896 and 1897: the number of gold rubles in circulation grew from 37,000 to 155,000. This growth rate of 318.9% is staggering, and shows the success of Witte’s gold reform as gold becomes more common and more present in the Russian economy. The article also points out that the gold in the treasury rose by 109,000,000 rubles. This writes itself into Russia’s by then longstanding practice of accumulating gold. In October 1892, the Russian government reported to the European press that the combined funds in gold of the State Bank and the State Treasury amounted to 604.5 gold rubles, exceeding the combined stocks of the Bank of France and the Bank of England.[11] By highlighting this metric and showing that the gold in Russia’s reserves keeps growing, this article aimed to show that Russia’s success and power are in the ascendant. The more gold Russia accumulated, the richer it seemed, the more successful and stable its reforms – something that the American public was invited to pay close attention to. However, perhaps the most striking element of this article is the title: “Gold Standard Helps Russia.” Openly biased and deliberately supportive of the gold standard, this article symbolizes the extent to which U.S. media sought to use the Russian case to sway the American public. Throughout the text, the gold standard is celebrated as a cure for Russia’s past troubles, while any shortcomings of the gold reform are glossed over.
Sergei De Witte becomes a celebrated protagonist of the American narrative
Having set up Russia’s past struggles under a silver standard, and its successes under gold, the American press shifted its attention to the actors involved in the reforms. As with any narrative, to tell the story of Russia’s road to gold American newspapers had to produce a colorful cast of characters that illustrated the ideological tensions between the gold standard and bimetallism. On the gold side of the debate, the Russian Finance Minister Sergei de Witte emerged as a hero figure that captured the American imagination. In 1901, The New York Times published an article containing a profusely laudatory description of Witte: “At all events, M. de Witte’s star is evidently in the ascendant. His love of peace, his determination to improve Russia’s internal resources, and his pronounced American sympathies are sufficient reasons why the world, and especially America, can congratulate Russia.”[12] The hyperbolic language conveys a great sense of admiration for de Witte, with the metaphor of the “star” giving it near cosmic proportions. This sentiment is echoed in a The Washington Post article published a few days prior, which wrote that Witte had “penetrating, yet benevolent eyes,”[13] depicting him as a well-meaning, wise figure. Throughout the 1890s, and especially in The New York Times, Witte is associated with unequivocally positive traits that relate to national prosperity and global cooperation: “love of peace,”[14] improvement of “internal resources,”[15] and his “American sympathies.”[16] He is painted as an ally of America – the very reason “why the world … can congratulate Russia.”[17] This touches on a subtle yet important point: Witte’s gold reforms reintegrated Russia into the global economy, and as such cast Witte himself as an early champion of multilateralism. This overwhelmingly positive portrait of Witte in the American media can be interpreted as an attempt to garner support for the gold reforms. As Russian affairs acquired a global scope and Witte’s persona grew in popularity, the perception of the gold standard among the American public may have become more positive.
While Witte emerged as a positive figure in the nineteenth century, the American media also sometimes provided the public with antagonistic figures by covering proponents of bimetallism. An interview with M. Leon Raffalovich, the President of the Bank of Commerce in St. Petersburg, reflects the subtle ways in which the American press turned against bimetallism in the context of the Russian gold reforms. While Raffalovich is in fact given a platform for his defense of the silver standard – the American press did not silence bimetallists – and he is allowed to outline his opinion on Russia’s monetary affairs (“We propose to cancel these notes and put silver roubles in their place”), it is the interviewer’s words and attitude that are most telling. Raffalovich is addressed with barely concealed skepticism, often through rhetorical questions or humorously discrediting statements. The interviewer tells Raffalovich: “Exactly what you contemplate doing [as part of your proposed silver reform], that is, so far as I know, a complete mystery”[18] The ornate statement and convoluted sentence structure reveal irony in the interviewer’s tone, and aim to reveal the inconsistencies in Raffalovich’s logic. The interviewer further unsettles and undermines Raffalovich’s argument in favor of the silver approach when he says: “Your statement is certainly most interesting and important; but may I ask you how you propose to buy this enormous amount of silver?”[19] The pandering tone and complimentary language (“most interesting,” “important”) rings false when juxtaposed with the question about the practicality of Raffalovich’s approach (“how you propose… ?”). By demanding details and a plan, the interviewer also implicitly reveals the inadequacy of the bimetallic dream in contrast to the very clear, actionable gold reforms which Witte had by then announced. Raffalovich’s answer, meak and vague, would only drive this point home for the readership of this article: “If, however, you ask me where we shall get this silver, I am not in a position to say.” [20]
Russia’s Alliance With Gold Casts the Gold Standard as a Civilisational Factor
Going beyond Russia’s direct experience with monetary reforms, the American press also situated Witte’s policies within a global context, using the Russian experience to cast the gold standard as an indicator of civilizational prowess in the West. For most of the period 1717 to 1931, Britain operated either a formal or de facto gold standard.[21] Other economically advanced countries, such as France, Germany, and the United States, completed the core powers of the gold standard.[22] These countries also spearheaded industrialisation in the 19th century, establishing themselves as the economic giants of Europe. So, when Russia became the last European great power to join the gold standard, American newspapers seized this opportunity to cement gold as a stepping stone of civilization, influence, and economic might. In an article detailing Russia’s role in the world’s record gold coinage output, The Baltimore Sun reported that “Throughout the world, among all peoples who are sufficiently civilized and ambitious to have international intercourse, there is a manifest desire to bring their own currency into definite and stable relations with the money of the peoples with whom they trade.” The language in this article is charged; gold is deemed the desire of countries “sufficiently civilized and ambitious to have international intercourse.” That is to say, the writer produces an amalgamation between power and the monetary system of a country, where “civilization” and “ambition” have hierarchical connotations. This shows how Russia joining the gold standard fed into the golden age mythology that gold stands for “prudence and rationality.” Especially since joining the gold standard helped Russia better integrate the global economy and trade – something this paper will examine in more detail later – American media painted the gold standard as a prerequisite for being a world power. As such, the article conceals a subtle attack on bimetallism and silver standard countries, as they are by implication deemed to be backwards and unambitious. Mexico and China were at the time deemed as commercially inferior in part because they were not on the gold standard. Other powers were deemed as second class because staying on the gold standard often exceeded their means, such as Brazil, Colombia, and Argentina.[23] Building on these ideas, the article proceeds to paint a picture of a world split in half between the world’s greatest industrial powers (“United States, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, Austria Hungary, France”) and countries not deemed important enough to even be named. As a result, the article implicitly casts Russia’s “preparations for monetary reform” as the tipping point for this new world – something the headline itself implies by speaking of record numbers of gold coinage.
The article goes further in its attempt to shape public opinion, explicitly castigating countries that are not on a monometallic standard: “If each nation in ignorance or misled independence prefers an ‘independent system of its own … it constitutes a risk.” By associating a bimetallic or silver standard with “ignorance,” the article further leans into the portrait of “uncivilized” nations, while also setting up a hierarchy of nations and monetary systems. The author also brushes aside the argument of an independent monetary system, deeming it “misled” and naive. It’s also important to note the use of the word “risk” in the context of the American narrative about the silver standard being Russia’s economic plight. Thus, deeming an independent monetary system “risky” suggests to the reader that silver and bimetallism would precipitate a relapse into economic instability and a crisis on a global scale. In the reader’s mind, this is meant to create pressure and a sense of urgency to adopt the gold standard. Silver itself – whether as a standard of its own or in the context of bimetallism, is portrayed as a danger for Western civilisation.
Gold Standard as a Sign of Stability for Trade
Building on the notion that the gold standard brought together Western powers, American newspapers highlighted that Russia’s monetary reforms implicitly set a precedent for how trade should be conducted. The second half of the 19th century was marked by incredible economic growth – a “golden age” characterized by massive interregional flows of capital, labor, and goods.[24] As such, trade emerged as a defining characteristic of that time, and bound together the world’s powers. A common adherence to the gold standard was essential to ensuring this economic activity, as it linked the world together through a fixed exchange rate.[25] In Russia specifically, a switch to the gold standard revived trade and foreign direct investments: Russian securities ceased to serve abroad as an object of speculation, and began to pass into the more solid holding of rentiers.[26] In the American media, trade thus became synonymous with civilization and the gold standard. An article published in The New York Times, a journalist wrote that the free coinage of silver would “surrender [the United States’] place among first class nations and place the U.S. on the commercial level with Mexico and China.” This sentence explicitly sets up Mexico and China – neither of which were on the gold standard – as ‘second class’ nations. Gold, however, is a marker of “first class.” Russia emancipated itself from such a narrative through its monetary reforms, proving that it desires “stable relations with the money of the peoples with whom they trade.”[27] Once more, gold is painted as a channel for international cooperation which brings prosperity and influence to Russia, but also the United States. This early instance of multilateralism in the shape it would take during the 20th century shows Russia’s desire to trade and connect with other nations. As such, it is painted as a “stable” ally of the U.S. – something that eventually built up to Witte’s statement that, on many issues, going beyond the gold standard, “Russia and America are altogether of one mind.”[28]
Conclusion
Russia’s road to gold was long and arduous; from Witte’s announcement of the gold reform in 1896 to its realization at the turn of the century, Russia underwent a range of economic transformations. The gold reforms, which overhauled the Russian economy by pulling it away from notes and silver, were widely covered in the American media. The extensive news coverage of the reforms took place in a time of uncertainty and monetary debate, and so it served the purpose of swaying Western opinion; the Russian experience became a tool in the hands of American media to cement public attitudes against silver, and for gold. To achieve this, American newspapers deployed a wide range of narrative techniques. First, it portrayed the Russian experience under the silver standard as a cautionary tale of economic precarity and currency instability. In casting silver as Russia’s plight, and gold as its salvation, newspapers effectively turned the American public against alternatives to gold-backed currency. Silver was seen as a risk, a dangerous path which would lead economics to relapse of stumble. Not only were Russia’s gold reforms shown to have ‘delivered’ Russia from silver, but they were also painted as stepping stones towards greater civilizational might and economic integration into global trade. To round off this portrait of Russia’s gold reforms, American media positioned Witte as Russia’s hero and America’s benevolent ally. In contrast, they undermined and publicly questioned purveyors of bimetallism, allowing them to fill the role of antagonists. In retrospect, these techniques were effective. President William McKinley – the winner of the 1896 presidential election and a champion of gold – passed the Gold Standard Act which became effective on March 14ht, 1900. On the same day, Puck published a caricature titled “The Survival of the Fittest,” depicting a gold-faced warrior slaying its silver-faced opponent.[29]
References
Primary Sources
The Baltimore Sun. 1898. “GOLD COINAGE: The World’s Output in 1897 Was The Largest Ever Recorded.” November 25, 1898.
The New York Times. 1898. “Russia on a Gold Basis.” January 11, 1898.
The New York Times. 1898. “Gold Standard Helps Russia (Statement by Witte).” January 21, 1898.
The New York Times. 1901. “New Honors for De Witte?” January 15, 1901.
The North – China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette. 1896. “CURRENCY REFORM IN RUSSIA: INTERVIEW AT BUDAPEST. M. LEON RAFFALOVICH.” December 11, 1896.
The Washington Post. 1901. “THE CZAR IS OUR ALLY: America and Russia in Close Touch Throughout.” January 12, 1901.
Secondary Sources
“bimetallism | Monetary System, Currency Exchange Rates Definition.” n.d. Britannica. Accessed December 10, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/money/bimetallism.
Bordo, Michael, and Hugh Rockoff. 1996. “”The Gold Standard as a Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.”” The Journal of Economic History 56 (2): 389-428.
Dehn, Wladimir. 1898. “The Russian Currency Reform.” The Economic Journal 8 (30): 225-233.
Dehn, Wladimir. 1898. “The Russian Currency Reform.” The Economic Journal 8, no. 30 (June): 225-233.
Pravilova, Ekaterina. 2023. The Ruble: A Political History. N.p.: Oxford University Press.
Puck. 1900. “The Survival of the Fittest.” March 14, 1900.
Smith, Chris. 2020. “Bank of England: the gold standard – House of Lords Library.” House of Lords Library. https://lordslibrary.parliament
[1] “Gladstone’s Views Against Bimetallism”, The New York Times, September 13th, 1895
[2]Pravilova, Ekaterina. 2023. The Ruble: A Political History. p.183: Oxford University Press.
[3]Ibid
[4]Ibid, p.182
[5]GOLD COINAGE: The World’s Output in 1897 Was The Largest Ever Recorded The Baltimore Sun, Nov 25, 1898
[6]Russia on a Gold Basis, The New York Times, Jan 11, 1898
[7]Ibid
[8]Gold Standard Helps Russia (Statement by Witte) , The New York Times, Jan 21st, 1898
[9]Bordo, Michael D., and Hugh Rockoff. “The Gold Standard as a ‘Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.’” The Journal of Economic History 56, no. 2 (1996): 389–428.
[10]“bimetallism | Monetary System, Currency Exchange Rates Definition.” n.d. Britannica. Accessed December 10, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/money/bimetallism.
[11]Pravilova, Ekaterina. 2023. The Ruble: A Political History. p.162: Oxford University Press.
[12]New Honors for De Witte?, The New York Times, January 15, 1901
[13]THE CZAR IS OUR ALLY: America and Russia in Close Touch Throughout. The Washington Post, Jan 12, 1901
[14]Ibid
[15]Ibid
[16]Ibid
[17]Ibid
[18]CURRENCY REFORM IN RUSSIA: INTERVIEW AT BUDAPEST. M. LEON RAFFALOVICH, The North – China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette, December 11th 1896
[19]Ibid
[20]Ibid
[21] Smith, Chris. 2020. “Bank of England: the gold standard – House of Lords Library.” House of Lords Library. https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/bank-of-england-the-gold-standard/.
[22]Pravilova, Ekaterina. 2023. The Ruble: A Political History. p.163: Oxford University Press.
[23]Ibid
[24]Bordo, Michael D., and Hugh Rockoff. “The Gold Standard as a ‘Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.’” The Journal of Economic History 56, no. 2 (1996): 389–428.
[25]Ibid
[26]Dehn, Wladimir. “The Russian Currency Reform.” The Economic Journal 8, no. 30 (1898): 225–33.
[27]GOLD COINAGE: The World’s Output in 1897 Was The Largest Ever Recorded , The Baltimore Sun, Nov 25, 1898
[28]THE CZAR IS OUR ALLY: America and Russia in Close Touch Throughout. … The Washington Post (1877-1922), Jan 12, 1901
[29]Puck. 1900. “The Survival of the Fittest.” March 14, 1900.
