In the quest for influence, power, and resources, the great powers of the 20th century played a delicate hand in the chess game that was the world of geopolitics. The balance of power between two of the world’s greatest powers, Britain and Russia, is best exemplified in the dynamics of the Great Game. Tibet was one of the primary interests in the Great Game. Throughout its history, Tibet had been an independent country that was under the influence of the Mongols, Manchus, and Indians. Nevertheless, Tibet had always maintained its internal sovereignty, and the region was isolated from the debacles of global imperialism, only maintaining strong connections with other Himalayan Kingdoms, India, the Mongols, and Qing China. The significance of Tibet is not merely because I am from Tibet, but I believe that Russia’s advances in this country outline in great detail Russia’s Far East policy, consolidation of Central Asian lands, and the strategic value of Tibet. To the Russian government, Tibet was seen as the final piece to secure their cultural and strategic foothold in Central and Northern Asia. Tibet presents an interesting balance between political and cultural signifiances especially in a time of an expansionist Russia and China. This paper’s analysis allows audiences to better understand the policies and objectives of present-day Russia and China, which are both seeking to consolidate their control in Central Asia and the Far East. On a wider note, Russia’s advances into Tibet are an insightful case study for the entry of imperial powers into contested regions.
This essay will focus on evaluating four letters (No.36, No.66, No.73, No. 141) within the British Government’s file, “East India (Tibet) Papers Relating to Tibet”. As a secondary source, this essay will refer to “Tibet, the Great Game and Tsarist Russia” by Tatiana Shaumian to provide better context into British attitudes towards Russian policy in Tibet. The primary sources offer insight into the machinery of the British government, as they looked to understand and react to Russian dealings in Tibet. The first source, No.36, is a letter from Charles Scott, British ambassador to Russia, to the Marques of Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affiars, providing context into the Tibetan Mission which visited Russia in 1901. It references source No.33, which includes an extract from the ‘Odesskia Novosti’ explaining how the mission is headed by Agvan Dorjieff, a central figure who will be discussed later. Source No.36 explains that a core reason for the Russian government’s interest in Tibet is that the Dalai Lama, the leader of Tibet, holds significant influence amongst Russian Buddhists. Additionally, source No.66, a letter from the government of India to the King’s secretary for India, allows the audience to understand British thoughts on Russia’s dealings in Tibet. No.66 outlines how the Britsh are wary of the Russians attempting to change the status quo in Tibet, which could pose a threat to British India’s frontiers. Since the Chinese’s hold on Tibet is “constitutional fiction” (162, Darling & Son), the British believe that they must be the ones to fill the power vacuum and open direct communications with the Tibetan government to ensure that Russia doesn’t. Additionally, No.73 shows the reactions that the Marques of Lansdowne had to hearing of rumors that had Tibet become a protectorate of the Russian Empire. Finally, source No.141 shows the thoughts of the Marques of Lansdowne to Secretary Spring-Rice (acting ambassador to Russia) after discussions with Count Beckendorff, the Russian ambassador to the United Kingdom. The letter highlights how the Marques believed that the Tibetan question was a more pressing matter for the British than the Russians. These primary sources provide insight into how the British were wary and anxious about Russia’s meddling in Tibet and were focused on ensuring that the status quo was not disturbed in Tibet. Although they may be limited with foresight, as the British were not aware of the full extent of Russia’s designs of Tibet , they do provide important insights of the British government’s attitudes towards developments in relations between Tibet and Russia. “Tibet, the Great Game and Tsarist Russia” provides context to the inter dynamics between Russia, Tibet, and Britain. The book shows that the British were wary of Russia’s advances into Tibet and believed it was part of their expansionist strategy. This essay will seek to evaluate how the British responded to Russia and it will argue that the British government believed that Russia was interested in Tibet for political and cultural reasons. Furthermore, the British presumed that Russia was not only interested in Tibet for its strategic value, but it was the central piece needed to establish control over Central and Northern Asia. Since the Dalai Lama was seen as the leader of Buddhists in Russia, Tsar Nicholas believed that if the Dalai Lama would defer to him, creating a patron-priest relationship, all Russian Buddhists would defer to him as well. However, because of the unstable nature of Russia in the early 20th century, Russia could not provide the proper support for direct relations with Tibet. Ultimately, Russia acknowledged the immense benefit that Tibet would bring politically and culturally to their empire, but prioritized relations with Britain in the face of Germany’s rise and potentially destabilizing effects that the Dalai Lama’s influence could have on Russian Buddhists.
Section A: Political
The letters from the British government draw light on how the British believed that Russia was interested in Tibet for political reasons. Firstly it is important to note that “London only broadly determined the policy of Great Britain in Central Asia” (13, Shaumian). Through the power bestowed upon Lord Cuzron, the viceroy of India, he effectively dictated British policy towards Russia and Tibet. Cuzron increasingly began to perpetuate the theory that “the conquest of India was Russia’s principal objective, and Central Asia was a springboard for attacking that British colony” (14, Shaumian). Due to its high elevation, Tibet was known as the roof of the world. Additionally, Tibet controlled the sources of water for billions of people in India, China and the rest of Asia. Adding Tibet to the Russian Empire would allow Russia to be in a strategically dominant position. Britain viewed Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, and Tibet as a buffer between India, Russia, and China. Maintaining this buffer was a principal objective for Britain and they were worried that Russia sought to erode this buffer by increasing its influence in Tibet. Tibet was a land that possessed important trading routes between Central, East and South Asia. Additionally, Tibet was very wealthy in resources and “only 3% of the land was cultivated” (2, Shaumian). Both Great Britain and Russia saw Tibet as a valuable strategic location to make inroads into South and Central Asia, “its favorable strategic position in the heart of Central Asia” (2, Shaumian) and as it was the “geographical, historical, economic and religious center of the Himalayan region” (10, Shaumian). The British believed that Russia’s Far East and Central Asian policy needed Tibet and this was clear from Russia’s previous actions at the end of the 19th century.
Firstly, with regards to Central Asia, Russia had entrenched itself in Turkestan and had also made inroads into Chinese Turkestan. From these two regions, Russian merchants had already reached Tibet and had started trading in Leh and Gartok. Britain was understandably wary of these advances as they noticed similar Russian policies in other parts of Asia. In source No.141, the Marques of Lansdowne, remarks to Secretary Spring-Rice, how Russia “has never hesitated to encroach upon its neighbors” (299, Darling & Son). He adds that if Russia is upset about Britain’s interest in Tibet, then Britain likewise should be entitled to a say in Russia’s interferences in Manchuria, Turkestan, and Persia. This is a prelude to how Britain believes that Tibet is playing a wider role in Russia’s actions in central Asia and foreshadows the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention which resolves their disputes across all of these territories. Furthermore, the British were also aware of many Russians who held influence in the court such as PA Badmayev, a Buriat doctor. Badmayev had set up a trading company that was supported and funded by Sergi Witte who believed “that establishing relations with Lhasa through Badmayev’s trading company would be of great political significance” (20, Shaumian). This trading company played the role of scouting operations on Tibet’s northern borderlands with Mongolia and was the first step in preparing the groundwork for a potential invasion of Mongolia and Tibet.
In addition to Russia’s policy in Central Asia, Britain was strongly aware of Russia’s Far East policies. In the late 19th century, Russia had completed the building of the trans-siberian railway, set up a Russo-Chinese bank, and even infiltrated Manchuria after the first Sino-Japanese War. Their actions in the Far East took on a greater role with the British being distracted, “Activization of Russia’s policy in the Far East and the establishment of its direct contacts with Tibet became possible because of Britain’s engagement in the Anglo-Boer war of 1900-01 and the people’s uprising in China” (86, Shaumian). This increasingly put Russia in direct competition with Japan, a British ally. Russia, foreseeing a victory over Japan, began to distribute plans across their consulates in Northern Asia to prepare the next stage of their Far East policies. Russia believed that their victory over Japan in the Russo-Japanese War would put them in even greater contention with Britain. Paul Lessar, Russian ambassador to China, is quoted as saying, “When the superiority of our forces over the Japanese becomes evident, we, on the contrary, will need to create in Mongolia our party, and then the Dalai Lama could certainly be useful” (89, Shaumian). Lessar envisioned Russia getting greater influence in Tibet, and Mongolia by extension. Additionally, the Russian government understood that although China was weak at this time, they could be quite useful in Mongolia, where they still held some influence, unlike in Tibet. After the British invasion of Tibet in 1904, the Dalai Lama fled to Mongolia to be closer to the Russians. The Chinese wanted the Dalai Lama to move to Xining because they didn’t want relations between Tibet and Russia to grow. However, Russia wanted to keep the Dalai Lama in Mongolia because it could lead to “serious unrest among the lamaists [in Russia] which might impel Russia to take remedial measures” (91, Shaumian). Irolutev, the head of the Siberian Buddhists, wanted to bring the Dalai Lama to Siberia. However, Russia rejected this proposal because they “had to make sure their far east was stable to “maintain tranquil and friendly relations with China’” (94, Shaumian) which could be disturbed by the Dalai Lama’s presence.
While pursuing an expansionist policy in Asia, Russia also had to consider the needs and demands of Tibet as well as the consequences of exacerbating tensions with Tibet. During his time in exile in Mongolia, the Dalai Lama told the Russian consul that “he had come there with the sole purpose to get advice and help from Russia” (92, Shaumian) with the ultimate goal of securing Russian patronage to support him “to create an independent Tibet that he believed could be guaranteed by Russia acting as a mediator in a solution of the controversy between Britain and Tibet” (102, Shaumian). This was a large reason why it took very long for the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet because it was essential for him that he did not leave Mongolia empty-handed and that he had one of the great powers on his side against the British. If he had returned to Tibet under British rule, this would have legitimized the British’s control over Tibet. The animosity between Tibet and Britain was quite evident in the early 20th century as the Dalai Lama wrote to the Tsar, “The Tibetan state…has suffered greatly at the hands of the outlanders the British…the Russians and Tibetans can join each other in peace and live in unity” (28, Shaumian). Tsar Nicholas replied back stating that, the “friendly and favorable attitude of Russia will prevent any threat to Tibet’s destiny and in future. I wish you good health and long life for the sake of the glorifying the faiths and prosperity of all human beings” (29, Shaumian). The Russians realized that if they failed to assist the Dalai Lama in his quest to return back to Tibet, “they [Tibet] would seek the assistance of France or Germany” (94, Shaumian), dealing a huge blow to their Central Asian and Far East policies. The British were well aware that Russia was developing relations with Tibet to strengthen their position in Central Asia and weaken their influence in Tibet. It was known in the British government that Witte’s government was seeking to usurp Britain’s influence in Tibet, “create the impression that British influence was receding and that of Russia making rapid advances” (181, Darling & Son). The Russian ambassador Count Beckensdorff even informed the British that their actions in Tibet would complicate their bilateral relations in Central Asia. The British became increasingly anxious about their position in Tibet when they learned that Tibet and Russia had already established relations while Britain was still struggling to do the same, Curzon believed that Britain needed to drive Russia out of Tibet, this could be done by establishing “direct relations with the Dalai Lama” (47, Shaumian). According to source No.73, the British also had proof that the Russians were intending to interfere in Tibet, “trustworthy sources reports..Russian protectorate over Tibet..intended to establish Russian agents…at Lhasa” (181, Darling & Son). Britain told Beckendorff and their own offices that they would “have to assume the initiative” (153, Darling & Son) to counteract foreign threats. To prepare for this, the British spread false information across British India that the Russians were on the cusp of invading, internally, British India believed that Russia would capture Lhasa by 1903. Once the conflict with the Boers ended and Britain refocused their attention back on Tibet, the British sent a memorandum to the Russians saying that if “no other power interfered in Tibetan affairs, Britain would make no attempt to annex it” (72, Shaumian). Younghusband’s invasion of Tibet in 1903 was done because the British wanted to assume the initiative while they had the advantage. They knew that Russia was distracted from their impending conflict with Japan and the Tibetans had a weak army. Therefore, to halt Russian expansion and secure British India’s ordered, the British invaded. These aspects signify how the British reacted to Russia being interested in Tibet for political reasons.
Section B: Cultural
Furthermore, the British believed that the Russians wanted to invade Tibet because of the immense cultural benefits that Tibet and the Dalai Lama would bring to the empire. In 1901, Tibet sent a mission to Russia to establish relations between the two states. This trip outlined how Russia was seeking to control their buddhist population through Tibet. The Russians believed that if the Dalai Lama would defer to the Tsar then all Russian Buddhists would also defer to the Tsar, securing central asia, the far east, and allowing Russia to pursue a more direct policy in the region. Creating a patron-priest relationship between the Tsar and the Dalai Lama would politically and religiously unify the two nations, solidifying Russia’s hold in Eurasia. The Tibetan mission included Russians like Agvan Dorzhiev, who held a “post of confidence in the Dalai Lama’s service” (117, Darling & Son). According to No.36, not only were the British aware of Russia’s relation to Tibet through information from Count Beckendorff, but they also received information from the press, “as the russian press has also announced that the envoys…were received…by the Emperor” (117, Darling & Son). The press documents are attached as references. The Odesskia Novosti reported that the objective of the mission is a “rapproachment and strengthening of good relations with Russia “ (114, Darling & Son) as the Russians believed that Tibet would be useful as the Dalai Lama’s “influence on the minds and hearts of buddhists is enormous” (114, Darling & Son). Russia, at this time, had over a 160,000 Buriats and 200,000 Kalmyks (majority of whom were Buddhists). Tibet was “the home of the lamaist religion head, the dalai lama” (2, Shaumian) attracting pilgrims from Mongolia and across Russia, “Scores of buryats are now rumoured go to tibet annually to worship the sacred objects” (17, Shaumian). Russia has had a history of integrating different religions within the Russian system. To deal with Muslims in the Caucasuses and Central Asia, Russia integrated religious law into the state system. For example, local laws ran in parallel to Sharia law in Turkestan, in fact, Russia sometimes preferred to use local ‘adat’ laws over Russian laws because it was easier to govern. Creating a similar system under the approval of the Dalai Lama would help secure Russia’s efforts to appease the Far East. Efforts had already been made for Russia to do just that; in 1741 the Lama Damba Zayayev from Trans-Baikal had gone to Tibet on a pigrimage. when he came back he was recieved by Catherine the Great, who gave him approval to create the “regulations on buddhist clergymen in east siberia” (16, Shaumian), spreading Buddhism throughut the region. The British believed that ultimately the Russians were were worried that a foreign power in Tibet “could influence the entire buddhist population of Russia” (71, Shaumian) against the Tsar. In Tibet, the “state system also reflects the united rule of the religion and the temporal powers” (2, Shaumian). This was similar to the system that Tsar Nicholas was hoping to create in Russia. He did not want to just be seen as the ruler to Christians, but also to Buddhist, Muslims and other minorities in his empire. Furthemore, the British were worried that buddhists in british India, Nepal and Sikkim would also look to Russia as an ally, which would further weaken British control in South Asia. The British were especially interested in the role that Agvan Dorzhiev had in achieving the goals of the Russians. Dorzhiev was a Buriat monk who had studied in Tibet and believed ties between Russia and Tibet would strengthen both nations and Buddhism. There is no doubt that while Dorzhiev cared deeply for the two nations, he also realized the personal influence he could gain – in the Trans-Baikal area, monks who had received their education in Tibet were held in high regard. The Russians believed that Dorzhiev could be a key person to advance their interests in Tibet. As a result, the British were interested and anxious about Dorzhiev’s role in diminishing British influence in Tibet. Realizing that “the principal member of the [Tibetan] mission…[was] Agvan Dorzhiev” (117, Darling & Son), the British believed that his influence alone could derail all their plans in Tibet. Ultimately, the British believed that because of Agvan Dorzhiev’s actions, the situation in Tibet would have to escalate in order to ensure Britain’s interests in the country, “Dorjieff’s missions served as a pretext for Lord Curzon to organize an armed expedition to Tibet” (34, Shaumian). Ultimately, Britain realized that Russia looked to create a patron-priest relationship with the Dalai Lama in Tibet. This would weaken British influence and allow Russia to extend its cultural influence across Asia.
Section C: Breakdown
With Russia and Britain in a bitter dispute over Tibet, it seemed destined that the two powers would escalate the situation into a larger, more direct, conflict over influence in Tibet. There are two central reasons why this ultimately did not occur.
The British were aware that Russia had too many problems for them to devote the resources to play a larger role in Tibet. This is evident as the British offered the Panchen Lama, the second most powerful high monk in Tibet, the Tibetan throne in place of the Dalai Lama. The Panchen Lama told the Dalai Lama that “the British told him that they were very well aware of Russia’s weakness and inability to help the Dalai Lama” (112, Shaumian). Japan’s surprising victory in the Russo-Japanese War meant that Russia was forced to end its Far East Policy which meant that Russia was unable to initiate its plans in Tibet and Mongolia. Furthermore, the Russians were increasingly worried about managing their minority populations in Asia. Although Russia was aware of the value that Tibet would bring to their empire, they were also wary of the potential destabilizing influence that the Dalai Lama could have on Buddhists across Russia. This is clear as it was mentioned before how Irolutev, head of the Buriat Buddhists traveled to Mongolia to ask His Holiness to travel to Siberia, which the Russians promptly rejected. Furthermore, the Russian Revolution of 1905 meant that Russia had to prioritize domestic issues before advancing its foreign policies.
In addition, considering global geopolitics, Anglo-Russian rapprochement played a large factor in the lack of Russian intervention in Tibet. It is key to note that Britain and Russia maintained strong diplomatic links, as seen through our primary sources. Britain and Russia were both afraid of the potential consequences of escalation and didn’t want to disturb “the status quo” (151, Darling & Son). “The policy of exclusiveness to which the Tibetan government has during the last century become increasingly addicted has only been tolerated by us, because anomalous and unfriendly as it has been, it carried with it no element of political or military danger” (153, Darling & Son). If Russia and Britain continued to spread their influence in Tibet then this would create the political and military danger that Britain was anxious about. Simultaneously, the “Russian government didn’t want its relations with Britain to deteriorate on account of Tibet” (66, Shaumian) and the British believed if the outcome of British and Russian talks “ended that [their] rivalry, Russia would not seek to consolidate its links with Tibet” (132, Shaumian). Russia also realized that due to its geographical distance, it would be unable to leverage its diplomatic connections with Tibet to counter Britain when it invaded Tibet in 1903. By March 1906 the Russians were communicating with the British about plans in Tibet, showing Russia “was ready to stop pursuing individual policies in Tibet and would coordinate further actions in Tibet with the government of Great Britain” (118, Shaumian). Neither Russia nor Britain were in a position to pursue an active policy and began to align with each other in the face of Germany’s rise. Lord Curzon was dismissed in 1905 as “he was a vehement opponent of Anglo-Russian rapprochement” (127, Shaumian). The signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907, respected the status quo in Tibet, acknowledged that Great Britain has a special interest in Tibet. The convention also noted that British and Russian Buddhists would have the right to establish direct relations with Tibet, showing that while the agreement concluded all political dealings in Tibet, religious communications were not restricted. It is important to note that Tibetan delegates were not invited to this convention and never agreed to the decision. The convention also opened the opportunity for cross-discussions with other European powers. For example, Tsar Nicholas was talking with the French Ambassador in St Petersburg about the London talks on the Tibetan question, this testifies “importance that Russia gave to the achievement of an agreement with Great Britain on all questions of common interest, and also showed that the question of Tibet was one of these” (74, Shaumian).The Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 ended Britain and Russia’s disputes in Central Asia and set the seeds for the Triple Entente alliance which included France.
Conclusion
In navigating the intricate geopolitical maneuvers of the Great Game, where British and Russian interests intersected in the Himalayas over Tibet, a thorough examination of these sources unveils a nuanced tale of power dynamics, strategic calculations, and cultural influence. The meticulous response of the British government, evident in the “East India (Tibet) Papers,” signifies a strategic imperative to preserve the existing order in Tibet, acting as a protective buffer for British India’s frontiers. Concurrently, Russia’s pursuit of political dominance intricately wove with a cultural strategy, seeking a patron-priest relationship with the Dalai Lama, sheds light on the multifaceted motivations in play. The culmination of these imperial maneuvers, scrutinized in the breakdown section, lays bare the practical considerations and diplomatic complexities that steered clear of a broader conflict, ultimately resulting in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Within this framework, the British-Russian rivalry in Tibet encapsulates the broader nuances of the Great Game, presenting a captivating perspective to unravel the complex interplay of power dynamics, cultural diplomacy, and global geopolitics in the early 20th century.
Acknowledgements:
Dear Professor Pravilova,
I am writing to express my sincere gratitude for the invaluable learning experience through your fantastic course on the Russian Empire. Your expertise, passion, and dedication to teaching have played a pivotal role in deepening my understanding of the topic. Your engaging lectures, insightful discussions, and the enriching assignments have not only broadened my historical perspective but have also fueled my enthusiasm for the subject.
The exploration of the Russian Empire under your guidance has been a captivating journey, offering fascinating insights into the political, cultural, and social intricacies of this historical period. I appreciate the effort you have invested in creating a curriculum that is both comprehensive and thought-provoking.
It has been a privilege to be part of your class, and I am grateful for the opportunity to learn from a distinguished scholar such as yourself. Thank you for your dedication to fostering a stimulating academic environment that has enriched my understanding of the Russian Empire.
Best Regards,
Kunsel Subrahmanyam
Bibliography:
Primary: Darling & Son. “East India (Tibet). Papers Relating to Tibet.” Princeton University.
Secondary: Shaumian, Tatiana. Tibet: The Great Game and Tsarist Russia. Oxford University Press, 2001.
