Курица не птица: Alexander Savinsky’s Diplomacy in Bulgaria, 1913-1915
Later my career carried me abroad, where I took a very active part in a political drama which so far has never been given an authorized or competent explanation either in Russia or to the public at large: I allude to the abnormal and disastrous rupture which took place in 1915 between Bulgaria and her ‘Liberator.’
– Alexander Alexandrovich Savinsky
Introduction
In 1878, Bulgaria was grateful to Russia, her Maika Osvoboditelka – Mother Liberator. Russia liberated Bulgaria from centuries of Ottoman rule, along with Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Reversing the territorial losses from the Crimean War twenty-two years prior and re-establishing a foothold in the Black Sea, Russia was regaining its former prestige. Russia was returning to great-power status by the calculus of realist power politics, and was also the undisputed leader of the Slavic and Orthodox world. With the support of Russia, Bulgaria was an independent state – granted, under Ottoman suzerainty – for the first time in almost five hundred years. But by 1913, Bulgaria was almost entirely aligned with Germany and Austria-Hungary against the Entente. When Bulgaria declared war on Serbia in 1915, Russia, along with France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, declared war on Bulgaria.
Considerable scholarship has studied how Russian diplomatic culture and the foreign policy apparatus contributed to, or failed to prevent, this breakdown of relations. Rekun and others argue that Russian diplomats of the late 19th century were simply tactless and thereby unnecessarily antagonized local parties, neither accounting for local interests nor connecting their actions on the ground to greater Russian strategy. Kocho-Williams has studied tsarist Russian “old diplomacy” based on nepotism and rooted in social graces and politesse, rather than merit and actual ability to prosecute Russian foreign policy objectives. This was partially due to the structure of the Russian diplomatic service prior to the 20th century: many diplomats were simply politically appointed aristocrats with little training or instruction, and with no clear policy line issued for them to follow. Lavitskaya argues that what coherent policy line that did exist was rooted in Panslavic ideology; Russia-Bulgaria relations were built on this framework following the liberation from the Ottomans. However, as she notes, Bulgarian independence and the growing Bulgarian national movement did not have a place in this ideology, adding to the annoyance and perception of arrogance that many Bulgarians held of their Russian counterparts.
Less attention has been paid to Russia’s diplomacy with Bulgaria in the early 20th century, especially following the Balkan Wars in which Russia’s hopes of a unified Balkan League were squandered. Though relations were already fragile before 1913, the literature generally treats the period preceding Russia’s declaration of war on Bulgaria in October 1915 as a continuation and an inevitable consequence of the previous years. Much of the diplomatic history written therefore takes its endpoint with the Russian diplomatic failure to mediate a settlement between Bulgaria and Serbia and the subsequent Second Balkan War. However, this perspective therefore neglects the execution of crisis diplomacy in the immediate period before World War I. It also therefore ignores how Russian policy and thought on relations with Bulgaria shifted, after realizing that the initial strategy of balancing between Bulgaria and Serbia on the Macedonian question would not work and a Balkan League was not destined.
There also exist extensive and detailed writings from key Russian diplomatic figures in the 1913-1915 period that have not been reviewed in the literature in more than a referential sense. Alexander Alexandrovich Savinsky, the Russian ambassador to Sofia from 1913 to 1915, as well as his predecessor Anatoly Vasilyevich Neklyudov from 1912 to 1913, both left comprehensive memoirs of their time in the foreign service. A large collection of Savinsky’s notes are also preserved in the Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bazili collection at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives. These papers have some overlap with Savinsky’s published memoirs – one can find verbatim passages in common between the two – but also contain more in-depth notes on how he and other Russian officials assessed and conceived of the geopolitical situation. This archive has not been referenced in histories of this period thus far. The memoirs and notes of Savinsky and his contemporaries illuminate the final years of the breakdown of the Russia-Bulgaria relationship. A review of these writings shows that Russia’s self-perceived righteousness as Bulgaria’s liberator, rooted in lingering pan-Slav ideology, constrained Savinsky’s abilities to respond effectively and pragmatically to geopolitical challenges and develop alternative coercive mechanisms, both on the Macedonian question and in countering Germany and Austria. This righteousness and sense of betrayal was also the political justification, with a realist thesis, of Savinsky’s proposed pivot in Russian strategy in 1915 towards a strategic destabilization and military intervention in Bulgaria. Finally, this paper also hopes to provide a coherent, interesting and detailed history of how diplomatic relations with Bulgaria were prosecuted on the eve of World War I – including how scandal, intrigue, and individual personalities shaped the practice, and failures, of diplomacy.
Discussion
The breakdown in Russo-Bulgarian relations and Russia’s inability to keep Bulgaria under its influence was not entirely or necessarily due to diplomatic failures. No longer solely under Ottoman control, the Balkans presented a new arena of competition for European great powers, with a range of governors loyal to different empires. At the recommendation of Tsar Alexander II, his nephew Alexander Battenberg was elected the first prince of the Principality of Bulgaria in 1879, but soon came at odds with Russia over policies perceived to be too liberal. Russia was therefore opposed to the Bulgarian unification of 1885, which saw the autonomous Ottoman province of Eastern Rumelia incorporated into Bulgaria, and the pro-Russian governor deposed. Alexander Battenberg abdicated the throne following an 1886 coup by pro-Russian officers. The new prince elected, Ferdinand I, was the “Austrian choice” and similarly distrusted by Russia.
Without clear borders, the Balkans also presented a host of nearly impossible geopolitical challenges negotiated both between the new states and the empires vying for influence. The 1878 Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and the Ottomans proposed the statehood and consolidation of Bulgaria, still perceived to be a stronghold of Russian power, that alarmed Britain and Austria-Hungary. The Treaty of Berlin later that year, from which Russia insisted Bulgaria was excluded, created the states of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Territorial disputes stoked tensions: Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria all claimed parts of Macedonia, and there was also the question of Albanian statehood. In the First Balkan War, the Balkan states briefly united to expel the Ottomans from Europe, succeeding with the exception of Eastern Thrace. In 1913, the Second Balkan War began when Bulgaria, unhappy with the settlement on Macedonia, declared war on Serbia. The other Balkan states and Ottomans subsequently joined the war against Bulgaria. The war ended disastrously for Bulgaria and greatly undermined the Russian position in Bulgaria, which will be discussed further in the following sections.
Characterizing Savinsky
Relative to his influence at the time in political and diplomatic circles, Alexander Alexandrovich Savinsky is a little-studied figure in the literature. Savinsky was a product of the somewhat-reformed diplomatic service, a trained diplomat and veteran of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than solely a political appointee. In his early life he showed an appreciation for travel, culture, and history. He entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1891 and rapidly climbed the ranks, becoming Director of the Chancellery in 1905. In 1902 and 1903, even before his post in Bulgaria, he took part in Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorf’s negotiations on the Macedonian question in Vienna, Belgrade, and Sofia. He was especially close to Lamsdorf at the Ministry, working under him on various issues. A derisive account by Yevgeny Nikolaevich de Schelking, another competent career diplomat, remembered Savinsky as “a man whom the Emperor himself had dubbed ‘The Countess Lamsdorff.’” Lamsdorf was not held in especially high regard by his peers: de Schelking describes him as untraveled and writes that “Lamsdorff was popularly known as a rubber cushion such as invalids use in an inflated form.” Nevertheless, regardless of his perceived relationship with Lamsdorf, Savinsky became renowned for his abilities as a negotiator after working on the rapprochement between Italy and Russia.
Savinsky was appointed Ambassador to Sweden in 1912, and then became Ambassador to Bulgaria in 1913 in something of a mild scandal. Following the events of 1913, the position of the Russian ambassador in Sofia at the time – Anatoly Vasilyevich Neklyudov – became untenable. Meanwhile in Stockholm, the young Grand-Duchess Marie, Russian by descent, had divorced Prince William of Sweden – and Savinsky was her close confidant. The Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov therefore decided to switch the posts of Neklyudov and Savinsky.
Russian Strategy in Bulgaria, Before and After 1913
A sense of profound moral righteousness in Russia’s role as Bulgaria’s Maika Osvoboditeka motivated their pre-1913 geopolitical strategy. In the early 1900s Russia hoped to create a unified Balkan League to ensure its power in southeast Europe. A bloc consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria would be an important counterbalance to Austria-Hungary and Germany, and creating this bloc was Sazonov’s priority. However, the dispute over Macedonia between Serbia and Bulgaria prevented this, as well as a Bulgarian government and tsar that were not as Russophile as St. Petersburg would have liked. Outside of a purely realist calculus, Russia’s self-conceived role as the leader of the Slavic world and Bulgaria’s liberator motivated and underlay this goal of a Russian-aligned Balkan bloc. An uncooperative Bulgaria is described in Neklyudov’s memoirs as “a spoilt and naughty child sometimes sulks with its own mother.” Neklyudov also seems convinced that the Bulgarian people would naturally and rightfully align with Russia: “Ferdinand had never been popular in Bulgaria, and one of the causes of this unpopularity lay in the people’s deep conviction that this ‘Swabio-Latin’ could not rejoice in the sympathies of the ‘Great Mother Liberator.’ … the Bulgarians by that self-same fact became one with their dismal master and were inclined to submit to the direction that Ferdinand henceforth sought to give to Bulgarian policy.” If Bulgaria took a different opinion, it was out of the natural order of things. Popular rhetoric was extremely emotional: when Bulgaria eventually entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, Russian press described it as the “Great Betrayal,” calling it the “traitor country” and “ungrateful.”
Prior to the second war in 1913, both Bulgaria and Serbia appealed to Russia for support over the Macedonian question and each hoped that Russia would resolve it in their favor. Instead, Russia hedged their position with both Slavic states, hoping that one would concede without intervention from St. Petersburg. Throughout Neklyudov and Savinsky’s tenures Sazonov offered certain concessions, but not enough for Sofia to accept. Labauri found that Russian diplomats generally recommended further concessions to Bulgaria, but Tsar Nicholas II was not willing to alienate Serbia. And it seemed almost immoral and inconceivable that two “brother” Slavic nations, both with close ties to the Maika, could go to war: this was seen as a fratricidal conflict. The Russo-Bulgarian convention of 1902 outlined a legal basis for Russian support for Bulgaria in the case of a dispute with Serbia or Romania. In attempting to appease both Bulgaria and Serbia, Russia reneged on the 1902 terms, further derogating any goodwill that might have existed between the two and drawing closer to Serbia. Amidst this turmoil, the pro-Austria, pro-German, anti-Russian Vasil Radoslavov came to power as Prime Minister in 1913 and impressed Ferdinand – now the tsar, after Bulgaria’s declaration of independence – with these views.
After 1913, realizing that appeasing both Bulgaria and Serbia and forming a Slavic Balkan League was not possible, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore no longer had a clear policy line for Bulgaria that Savinsky could execute. In Savinsky’s appointment, the Ministry seemed to revert to the ways of “old diplomacy,” in allowing the diplomat a relatively free hand with no clear strategy from St. Petersburg. Given the complexity of the political relationship and its rapidly changing nature, Sazonov issued no written instructions to Savinsky. As Savinsky wrote in his memoir, “The verbal directions that were given to me amounted to the following: ‘I was to stand aloof from the Radoslavoff Government and to wait for its downfall; if I could manage to assist in its overthrow without any risk of exposure, that would be still better; after that negotiations with the Bulgarians could be resumed again.’”
Russian strategy was therefore relegated to waiting for a more favorable cabinet to replace Radoslavov’s and engaging in the “old diplomacy” ways of currying favor and relationship-building. Savinsky’s main task was to build rapport with Tsar Ferdinand and encouraging his pan-Slav sentiment, while waiting out Radoslavov’s government. Despite Savinsky’s recent indiscretions in Sweden, Sazonov and St. Petersburg were optimistic that Savinsky would be able engage Ferdinand, where Neklyudov was less successful. From his previous work in the Balkans at the Ministry, Savinsky was already familiar with Ferdinand. Neklyudov writes that “[Ferdinand] had always liked him and paid him marked attention.” Further, he mockingly reflects that “There were people in our country who were convinced that Savinsky would be able to accomplish what I had not been able to do, that is to acquire the confidence and the sympathies of Ferdinand, and to lead him, and naturally all his people with him, back into the path of obedience and devotion to Russia. A truly childish notion, but it was upheld by certain influential persons in M. Sazonoff’s set!” Despite Neklyudov’s tone, this is an accurate portrayal of what Sazonov and the Ministry hoped to accomplish in Savinsky’s appointment. Russian strategy would not account or adapt to an anti-Russian Bulgaria, simply hoping and waiting for a change of attitudes and a government that could more easily be persuaded towards Russian interests. To the extent possible, Savinsky was largely successful in this. In his own memoirs Savinsky seems to have felt that he was able to build rapport with Ferdinand in initial meetings: “the King said that…he had never been able to talk open-heartedly with the representative of Russia. He expressed his pleasure at having once more someone he could speak to with confidence.” At least initially Savinsky was able to reassure Ferdinand that Russia was morally and traditionally the friend of Bulgaria, regardless of present affairs.
However, the first major geopolitical challenge that Savinsky faced as ambassador was solely a question of hard power, rather than an issue that could be negotiated in the moral language of Slavic brotherhood. Bulgaria, in difficult financial straits following its defeat, sought a major loan and was close to accepting one from Germany with significant coercive conditions. It was also recognized by the empires vying for power in the Balkans that this loan had significant implications for geopolitical influence. Unfortunately, due to Sazonov’s purposeful lack of guidance, Savinsky’s hands were largely tied in how he could respond. One can sense Savinsky’s frustration with the Ministry on this issue: “I sent a series of most alarming letters and telegrams…I insistently requested my Government not to let the Germans triumph, and to arrange for Bulgaria a Franco-Russian loan at less severe conditions. I spent three months warning the Government against the impending danger and suggesting different modes of procedure.” In the meantime, Savinsky attempted to cool relations between Bulgaria and Serbia, speaking to Ferdinand at an opportune “psychological moment.” This conversation with Ferdinand disguised his real purpose – compromising with Serbia – between less important requests, such as dedicating the Nevsky cathedral in Sofia.
Among these different modes of procedure, Savinsky essentially proposed a new strategy, more pragmatic and not rooted in a sense of righteousness as the Liberator. “We were ourselves slowly but surely wasting the enormous moral capital we had accumulated,” he writes, seemingly irritated by his government’s unwillingness to engage with Radoslavov. Writing to Sazonov and St. Petersburg, he recommended a variety of measures for balancing and competing with Germany and Austria in Bulgaria, attempting to demonstrate Russia’s commitment to Bulgaria. Economically, Savinsky suggested reviving trade with Bulgaria and “the creation of Russian financial and credit institutions throughout the country as the main agents of Russian influence.” He also advocated for culture exchange based in “mutual scientific and instructional support to youth, scientists and other military congresses, exhibitions, scientific and popular lectures, theaters, etc., revival of our book trade in Bulgaria.” These recommendations are notable in extending beyond the typical rhetorical invocations of pan-Slavism unaccompanied by action or assistance; Savinsky thought in broader terms of geostrategic competition and the exertion of national power.
It is not clear how Savinsky’s suggestions were received in St. Petersburg, but Russia was ultimately dealt a loss on the loan issue. In March 1914 the Entente eventually offered a loan of 500 million francs from French banks, with Russia as the guarantor, including the condition that Bulgaria would not seek a loan from Germany. Unfortunately, it was too late to appease Bulgaria, which in July 1914 accepted a German loan of the same value but with worse conditions after lobbying in the National Assembly. Russia could not conceive of a Bulgaria that was not Russophile and was unable to devise alternative coercive mechanisms for a pro-Triple Alliance government.
A New Orientation
Feeling slighted by Bulgaria once again and observing the staying power of Radoslavov’s government, an alternative thread of Russian policy emerged: strategically destabilizing the region and a potential military strike on Bulgaria. Given its sensitivity and interventionist nature, Savinsky does not discuss this openly in his memoir; a discussion only appears in Savinsky’s archival notes. In his early conversations with Ferdinand in 1913, Savinsky writes in his memoir that “I replied to the King that nobody in Russia even thought of a coup d’etat in Bulgaria; but that, indeed, the present Bulgarian Government did not inspire in us any confidence…I had no intention whatever to interfere with the internal affairs of Bulgaria and her people.” Whether or not he was being fully honest with Ferdinand, Savinsky had entirely reversed upon this opinion by 1915.
In a set of papers entitled Notes on the Bulgarian Question, Savinsky lays out three pillars for a new Russian orientation against an increasingly hostile Bulgaria: 1) possession of the straits and Constantinople, 2) the danger of strong states forming on the Balkan peninsula, 3) a possible military annexation of Bulgaria. Savinsky calls for a “new orientation” defined by the “benefits of the moment” and “strategic meaning,” a more dynamic and flexible approach than the rather static policy that had stalemated negotiations. He criticizes the prior approaches towards diplomacy with Bulgaria. “That consideration of feeling should not play a role in politics – this is an axiom,” Savinsky writes. He refers to previous relations with Bulgaria as “impractical,” while also warning that it would be impractical to be carried in the other direction and adhere solely to realpolitik considerations. Still, these recommendations represent a significant escalation in Russia’s policy line, in attempting to destabilize the Balkans to keep states weak and begin a kinetic incursion.
Savinsky’s most extreme recommendation – to which he devotes the most space – is for a sudden offensive (удар) against Bulgaria. He justifies this both in “moral” and “practical” terms. On a moral level, Savinsky acknowledges that a kinetic war with Bulgaria would be politically uanappealing, difficult to justify going to war with a country whom Russian officials had constantly referred to as their brothers. He argues, however, that Bulgaria was in betrayal of that brotherhood first and treasonous: “But, on the other side, the feeling of the Russian people, who have abundantly watered Pleva and Shipka with their blood and accustomed to considering the Bulgarian people as brothers, cannot be reconciled with treason.” As Neklyudov argued, Savinsky also writes here that the difference and disconnect between Ferdinand and the Bulgarian people were largely culpable for Bulgaria’s anti-Russian orientation. It is important to recognize that here Savinsky was writing to convince an audience of Sazonov and his colleagues in St. Petersburg. Previously, as with the issue of the German loan, Savinsky generally advocated for pragmatic policy over emotional pan-Slavic rhetoric; this is the most vehement language relating to the “Great Betrayal” that he uses in his writings.
Behind this rhetoric, however, lies Savinsky’s realist thesis that only a military offensive would be able to bring Bulgaria back into Russia’s orbit. Of course it would be optimal, Savinsky recognizes, if Bulgaria would voluntarily submit, but finds that unlikely after years of stalemated diplomacy. Now, diplomacy is only possible with military action first: any negotiations must be preceded by a “strong blow.”
“In view of considerations and circumstances, the need for a strike is beyond doubt, and the sooner it is launched, both from the south and from the north, the sooner we will approach Bulgaria, will become an ally and the conditions that the command requires will be realized.”
Savinsky was in communication with the High Military Command and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who appear to be in agreement on the necessity of a Russian offensive. Savinsky also seems to hope that such an invasion would bring about regime change and depose Ferdinand:
“Namely, if the conscious majority of the Bulgarians, seeing now the country of the politician Ferdinand and realizing that further persistence threatens its entire existence, decided to take measures themselves, which, on the one hand, would satisfy the offended feeling of the Russian people, and on the other would testify from the seriousness of the turn taking place in Bulgaria.”
Bulgaria could not be a trusted ally without military action first: as tensions escalated in the Balkans on the eve of World War I, Savinsky sensed that Bulgaria was at a tipping point and could no longer be persuaded back from Austria and Germany. This left only a single, suboptimal option.
Conclusions
Under Ferdinand and Radoslavov, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers when it declared war on Serbia in October 1915. Russia, along with the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, declared war on Bulgaria in return. Even as a smaller power, Bulgaria made significant contributions for the Central Powers, some against Serbia and Romania. Savinsky’s plan to destabilize Bulgaria never came to fruition: Ferdinand retained power in Sofia until it exited from the war, concluded in 1919 at Neuilly-sur-Seine.
The ”disastrous rupture” of relations was not solely due to any one factor. Neklyudov, Savinsky, and Sazonov faced an impossible task in their dealings in the Balkans. Nevertheless, Savinsky’s writings reveal the underlying conviction in Russia’s role as the “Mother Liberator” that most Russian officials were committed to in dealing with geopolitical challenges. Savinsky, not an especially impassioned pan-Slavist himself, prosecuted the given policy line adroitly in his interactions in Sofia, while recognizing opportunities for other action.
Works Cited
Primary
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Nekludoff, Anatoly Vasilyevich. Diplomatic Reminiscences: Before and During the World War, 1911-1917. Translated by Alexandra Paget. London: John Murray, 1920.
Savinsky, Alexander Alexandrovich. Наши отношенія съ Болгаріей съ Января 1914 г. до разрыва (21 Сент. 1915 г.). Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bazili Papers. Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford University. Palo Alto, CA. https://www-firstworldwar-amdigital-co-uk.ezproxy.princeton.edu/Documents/Details/hoover_65017_bx5_fl2.
Savinsky, Alexander Alexandrovich. Записка по Болгарскому вопросу. Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bazili Papers. Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford University. Palo Alto, CA. https://www-firstworldwar-amdigital-co-uk.ezproxy.princeton.edu/Documents/Details/hoover_65017_bx5_fl2.
Savinsky, Alexander Alexandrovich. Recollections of a Russian Diplomat. London: Hutchinson & Co., n.d.
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