Meditations on a Hobby Horse
or the Roots of Artistic Form

The subject of this article is a very ordinary hobby horse. It is neither metaphorical nor purely imaginary, at least not more so than the broomstick on which Swift wrote his meditations. It is usually content with its place in the corner of the nursery and it has no aesthetic ambitions. Indeed it abhors frills. It is satisfied with its broomstick body and its crudely carved head which just marks the upper end and serves as holder for the reins. How should we address it? Should we describe it as an 'image of a horse'? The compilers of the Pocket Oxford Dictionary would hardly have agreed. They defined image as 'imitation of object's external form' and the 'external form' of a horse is surely not 'imitated' here. So much the worse, we might say, for the 'external form', that elusive remnant of the Greek philosophical tradition which has dominated our aesthetic language for so long. Luckily there is another word in the Dictionary which might prove more accommodating: representation. To represent, we read, can be used in the sense of 'call up by description or portrayal or imagination, figure, place likeness of before mind or senses, serve or be meant as likeness of... stand for, be specimen of, fill place of, be substitute for'. A portrayal of a horse? Surely not. A substitute for a horse? Yes. That it is. Perhaps there is more in this formula than meets the eye.

Let us first ride our wooden steed into battle against a number of ghosts which still haunt the language of art criticism. One of them we even found entrenched in the Oxford Dictionary. The implication of its definition of an image is that the artist 'imitates' the 'external form' of the object in front of him, and the beholder, in his turn, recognizes the 'subject' of the work of art by this 'form'. This is what might be called the traditional view of representation. Its corollary is that a work of art will either be a faithful copy, in fact a complete replica, of the object represented, or will involve some degree of 'abstraction'. The artist, we read, abstracts the 'form' from the object he sees. The sculptor usually abstracts the three-dimensional form, and abstracts from colour; the painter abstracts contours and colours, and from the third dimension. In this context one hears it said that the draughtsman's line is a 'tremendous feat of abstraction' because it does not 'occur in nature'. A modern sculptor of Brancusi's persuasion may be praised or blamed for

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'carrying abstraction to its logical extreme'. Finally the label of 'abstract art' for the creation of 'pure' forms carries with it a similar implication. Yet we need only look at our hobby horse to see that the very idea of abstraction as a complicated mental act lands us in curious absurdities. There is an old music hall joke describing a drunkard who politely lifts his hat to every lamp-post he passes. Should we say that the liquor has so increased his power of abstraction that he is now able to isolate the formal quality of uprightness from both lamp-post and the human figure? Our mind, of course, works by differentiation rather than by generalization, and the child will for long call all four-footers of a certain size 'gee-gee' before it learns to distinguish breeds and 'forms'!

II

Then there is that age-old problem of universals as applied to art. It has received its classical formulation in the Platonizing theories of the Academician. 'A history-painter,' says Reynolds, 'paints man in general; a portrait-painter a particular man, and therefore a defective model.' This, of course, is the theory of abstraction applied to one specific problem. The implications are that the portrait, being an exact copy of a man's 'external form' with all 'blemishes' and 'accidents', refers to the individual person exactly as does the proper name. The painter, however, who wants to 'elevate his style' disregards the particular and 'generalizes the forms'. Such a picture will no longer represent a particular man but rather the class or concept 'man'. There is a deceptive simplicity in this argument, but it makes at least one unwarranted assumption: that every image of this kind necessarily refers to something outside itself—be it individual or class. But nothing of the kind need be implied when we point to an image and say 'this is a man'. Strictly speaking that statement may be interpreted to mean that the image itself is a member of the class 'man'. Nor is that interpretation as farfetched as it may sound. In fact our hobby horse would submit to no other interpretation. By the logic of Reynolds's reasoning it would have to represent the most generalized idea of horseness. But if the child calls a stick a horse it obviously means nothing of the kind. The stick is neither a sign signifying the concept horse nor is it a portrait of an individual horse. By its capacity to serve as a 'substitute' the stick becomes a horse in its own right, it belongs in the class of 'gee-gees' and may even merit a proper name of its own.

When Pygmalion blocked out a figure from his marble he did not at first represent a 'generalized' human form, and then gradually a particular woman. For as he chipped away and made it more lifelike the block was not turned into a portrait—not even in the unlikely case that he used a live model. So when his prayers were heard and the statue came to life she was Galatea and no one else—and that regardless of what style. The question whether Nature does or whether we misunderstand the artist 'coincidences of commonplace' sense of being so mighty, takes the court deception. There is another to save our a motif in the a primitive and n whole number o
ABSTRACT ART' for we need only a complicated joke describing Should we say is now able to end the human generalization, ‘gee’ before it

It has received as ‘A history- a particular of abstraction rait, being an ‘idents’, refers ter, however, es the forms’. r the class or it makes at essarily refers he kind need speaking that member of the. In fact our f Reynolds’s reness. But d. The stick n individual se in its own name of its ‘st represent . For as he a portrait—rayers were —and that

regardless of whether she had been fashioned in an archaic, idealistic, or naturalistic style. The question of reference, in fact, is totally independent of the degree of differentiation. The witch who made a ‘generalized’ wax dummy of an enemy may have meant it to refer to someone in particular. She would then pronounce the right spell to establish this link—much as we may write a caption under a generalized picture to do the same. But even those proverbial replicas of nature, Madame Tussaud’s effigies, need the same treatment. Those in the galleries which are labelled are ‘portraits of the great’. The figure on the staircase made to hoax the visitor simply represents ‘an’ attendant, one member of a class. It stands there as a ‘substitute’ for the expected guard—but it is not more ‘generalized’ in Reynolds’s sense.

III

THE idea that art is ‘creation’ rather than ‘imitation’ is sufficiently familiar. It has been proclaimed in various forms from the time of Leonardo, who insisted that the painter is ‘Lord of all Things’; to that of Klee, who wanted to create as Nature does. But the more solemn overtones of metaphysical power disappear when we leave art for toys. The child ‘makes’ a train either of a few blocks or with pencil on paper. Surrounded as we are by posters and newspapers carrying illustrations of commodities or events, we find it difficult to rid ourselves of the prejudice that all images should be ‘read’ as referring to some imaginary or actual reality. Only the historian knows how hard it is to look at Pygmalion’s work without comparing it with nature. But recently we have been made aware how thoroughly we misunderstand primitive or Egyptian art whenever we make the assumption that the artist ‘distorts’ his motif or that he even wants us to see in his work the record of any specific experience. In many cases these images ‘represent’ in the sense of being substitutes. The clay horse or servant, buried in the tomb of the mighty, takes the place of the living. The idol takes the place of the god. The question whether it represents the ‘external form’ of the particular divinity or, for that matter, of a class of demons is quite inappropriate. The idol serves as the substitute of the God in worship and ritual—it is a man-made god in precisely the sense that the hobby horse is a man-made horse; to question it further means to court deception.

There is another misunderstanding to be guarded against. We often try instinctively to save our idea of ‘representation’ by shifting it to another plane. Where we cannot refer the image to a motif in the outer world we take it to be a portrayal of a motif in the artist’s inner world. Much critical (and uncritical) writing on both primitive and modern art betrays this assumption. But to apply the naturalistic idea of portrayal to dreams and visions—let alone to unconscious images—begs a whole number of questions. The hobby horse does not portray our idea of a horse.
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The fearsome monster or funny face we may doodle on our blotting pad is not projected out of our mind as paint is 'ex-pressed' out of a paint tube. Of course any image will be in some way symptomatic of its maker, but to think of it as of a photograph of a pre-existing reality is to misunderstand the whole process of image-making.

IV

Can our substitute take us further? Perhaps, if we consider how it could become a substitute. The 'first' hobby horse (to use eighteenth-century language) was probably no image at all. Just a stick which qualified as a horse because one could ride on it (Fig. 1). The tertium comparationis, the common factor, was function rather than form. Or, more precisely, that formal aspect which fulfilled the minimum requirement for the performance of the function—for any 'ridable' object could serve as a horse. If that is true we may be enabled to cross a boundary which is usually regarded as closed and sealed. For in this sense 'substitutes' reach deep into biological functions that are common to man and animal. The cat runs after the ball as if it were a mouse. The baby sucks its thumb as if it were the breast. In a sense the ball 'represents' a mouse to the cat, the thumb a breast to the baby. But here too 'representation' does not depend on formal similarities, beyond the minimum requirements of function. The ball has nothing in common with the mouse except that it is chasable. The thumb nothing with the breast except that it is suckable. As 'substitutes' they fulfill certain demands of the organism. They are keys which happen to fit into biological or psychological locks, or counterfeit coins which make the machine work when dropped into the slot.

In the language of the nursery the psychological function of 'representation' is still recognized. The child will reject a perfectly naturalistic doll in favour of some monstrously 'abstract' dummy which is 'cuddly'. It may even dispose of the element of 'form' altogether and take to a blanket or an eiderdown as its partner—a substitute on which to bestow its love. Later in life, as the psychoanalysts tell us, it may bestow this same love on a worthy or unworthy living substitute. A teacher may 'take the place' of the mother, a dictator or even an enemy may come to 'represent' the father. Once more the common denominator between the symbol and the thing symbolized is not the 'external form' but the function; the mother symbol would be lovable, the father-imago fearful, or whatever the case may be.

Now this psychological concept of symbolization seems to lead so very far away from the more precise meaning which the word 'representation' has acquired in the figurative arts. Can there be any gain in throwing all these meanings together? Possibly: for anything seems worth trying, to get the function of symbolizing out of its isolation.

The 'origin of the horse may be a mood—and who that finally he we could have passed. Now there are the idea of the communication show his horse to along—though which it 'represents' the moral of this and creation contested. If it can, origin of language vestigated from the language in imitation, were to theory postulating and making the :eating—being joi phantasm of food
The 'origin of art' has ceased to be a popular topic. But the origin of the hobby horse may be a permitted subject for speculation. Let us assume that the owner of the stick on which he proudly rode through the land decided in a playful or magic mood—and who could always distinguish between the two?—to fix 'real' reins and that finally he was even tempted to 'give' it two eyes near the top end. Some grass could have passed for a mane. Thus our inventor 'had a horse'. He had made one. Now there are two things about this fictitious event which have some bearing on the idea of the figurative arts. One is that, contrary to what is sometimes said, communication need not come into this process at all. He may not have wanted to show his horse to anyone. It just served as a focus for his fantasies as he galloped along—though more likely than not it fulfilled this same function for a tribe to which it 'represented' some horse-demon of fertility and power. We may sum up the moral of this 'Just So Story' by saying that substitution may precede portrayal, and creation communication. It remains to be seen how such a general theory can be tested. If it can, it may really throw light on some concrete questions. Even the origin of language, that notorious problem of speculative history, might be investigated from this angle. For what if the 'pow-wow' theory, which sees the root of language in imitation, and the 'pooh-pooh' theory, which sees it in emotive interjection, were to be joined by yet another? We might term it the 'niam-niam' theory postulating the primitive hunter lying awake through hungry winter nights and making the sound of eating, not for communication but as a substitute for eating—being joined, perhaps, by a ritualistic chorus trying to conjure up the phantasm of food.

There is one sphere in which the investigation of the 'representational' function of forms has made considerable progress of late, that of animal psychology. Pliny, and innumerable writers after him, have regarded it as the greatest triumph of naturalistic art for a painter to have deceived sparrows or horses. The implication of these anecdotes is that a human beholder easily recognizes a bunch of grapes in a painting because for him recognition is an intellectual act. But for the birds to fly at the painting is a sign of a complete 'objective' illusion. It is a plausible idea, but a wrong one. The merest outline of a cow seems sufficient for a tsetse trap, for somehow it sets the apparatus of attraction in motion and 'deceives' the fly. To the fly, we might say, the crude trap has the 'significant' form—biologically significant, that is. It appears that visual stimuli of this kind play an important part in the animal world. By varying the shapes of 'dummies' to which animals were seen to respond, the 'minimum image' that still sufficed to release a specific reaction has been ascertained. Thus little birds will open their beak when they see the feeding pad is not...
parent approaching the nest, but they will also do so when they are shown two
darkish roundels of different size, the silhouette of the head and body of the bird
‘represented’ in its most ‘generalized’ form. Certain young fishes can even be
deceived by two simple dots arranged horizontally, which they take to be the eyes
of the mother fish, in whose mouth they are accustomed to shelter against danger.
The fame of Zeuxis will have to rest on other achievements than his deception of
birds.

An ‘image’ in this biological sense is not an imitation of an object’s external form
but an imitation of certain privileged or relevant aspects. It is here that a wide
field of investigation would seem to open. For man is not exempt from this type of
reaction.14 The artist who goes out to represent the visible world is not simply faced
with a neutral medley of forms he seeks to ‘imitate’. Ours is a structured universe
whose main lines of force are still bent and fashioned by our biological and psycho­
logical needs, however much they may be overlaid by cultural influences. We know
that there are certain privileged motifs in our world to which we respond almost too
easily. The human face may be outstanding among them. Whether by instinct or
by very early training, we are certainly ever disposed to single out the expressive
features of a face from the chaos of sensations that surrounds it, and to respond to
its slightest variations with fear or joy. Our whole perceptual apparatus is somehow
hypersensitized in this direction of physiognomic vision14 and the merest hint
suffices for us to create an expressive physiognomy that ‘looks’ at us with surprising
intensity. In a heightened state of emotion, in the dark, or in a feverish spell, the
looseness of this trigger may assume pathological forms. We may see faces in the
pattern of a wallpaper, and three apples arranged on a plate may stare at us like two
eyes and a clownish nose. What wonder that it is so easy to ‘make’ a face with two
dots and a stroke even though their geometrical constellation may be greatly at
variance with the ‘external form’ of a real head? The well-known graphic joke of
the ‘reversible face’ might well be taken as a model for experiments which could
still be made in this direction (Fig. 2). It shows to what extent the group of shapes
that can be read as a physiognomy has priority over all other readings. It turns the
side which is the right way up into a convincing face and disintegrates the one that
is upside down into a mere jumble of forms which is accepted as a strange head­
gear.15 In good pictures of this kind it needs a real effort to see both faces at the same
time, and perhaps we never quite succeed. Our automatic response is stronger than
our intellectual awareness.

Seen in the light of the biological examples discussed above there is nothing
surprising in this observation. We may venture the guess that this type of automatic
recognition is dependent on the two factors of resemblance and biological relevance,
and that the two may stand in some kind of inverse ratio. The greater the biological
relevance an object has for us the more will we be attuned to its recognition—and

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the more tolerant will therefore be our standards of formal correspondence. In an erotically charged atmosphere the merest hint of formal similarity with sexual functions creates the desired response and the same is true of the dream symbols investigated by Freud. The hungry man will be similarly attuned to the discovery of food—he will scan the world for the slightest promise of nourishment. The starving may even project food into all sorts of dissimilar objects—as Chaplin does in Gold Rush when his huge companion suddenly appears to him as a chicken. Can it have been some such experience which stimulated our 'niam-niam' chanting hunters to see their longed-for prey in the patches and irregular shapes on the dark cave walls? Could they perhaps gradually have sought this experience in the deep mysterious recesses of the rocks, much as Leonardo sought out crumbling walls to aid his visual fantasies? Could they, finally, have been prompted to fill in such 'readable' outlines with coloured earth—to have at least something 'spearable' at hand which might 'represent' the eatable in some magic fashion? There is no way of testing such a theory, but if it is true that cave artists often 'exploited' the natural formations of the rocks, this, together with the 'eidetic' character of their works, would at least not contradict our fantasy. The great naturalism of cave paintings may after all be a very late flower. It may correspond to our late, derivative, and naturalistic hobby horse.

VI

T needed two conditions, then, to turn a stick into our hobby horse: first, that its form made it just possible to ride on it; secondly—and perhaps decisively—that riding mattered. Fortunately it still needs no great effort of the imagination to understand how the horse could become such a focus of desires and aspirations, for our language still carries the metaphors moulded by a feudal past when to be chivalrous was to be horsy. The same stick that had to represent a horse in such a setting would have become the substitute of something else in another. It might have become a sword, sceptre, or—in the context of ancestor worship—a fetish representing a dead chieftain. Seen from the point of view of 'abstraction', such a convergence of meanings onto one shape offers considerable difficulties, but from that of psychological 'projection' of meanings it becomes more easily intelligible. After all a whole diagnostic technique has been built up on the assumption that the meanings read into identical forms by different people tell us more about the readers than about the forms. In the sphere of art it has been shown that the same triangular shape which is the favourite pattern of many adjoining American Indian tribes is given different meanings reflecting the main preoccupations of the peoples concerned. To the student of styles this discovery that one basic form can be made to represent a variety of objects may still become significant. For while the idea of
realistic pictures being deliberately ‘stylized’ seems hard to swallow, the opposite idea of a limited vocabulary of simple shapes being used for the building up of different representations would fit much better into what we know of primitive art.

VII

ONCE we get used to the idea of ‘representation’ as a two-way affair rooted in psychological dispositions we may be able to refine a concept which has proved quite indispensable to the historian of art and which is nevertheless rather unsatisfactory: that of the ‘conceptual image’. By this we mean the mode of representation which is more or less common to children’s drawings and to various forms of primitive and primitivist art. The remoteness of this type of imagery from any visual experience has often been described. The explanation of this fact which is most usually advanced is that the child (and the primitive) do not draw what they ‘see’ but what they ‘know’. According to this idea the typical children’s drawing of a manikin is really a graphic enumeration of those human features the child remembered. It represents the content of the childish ‘concept’ of man. But to speak of ‘knowledge’ or ‘intellectual realism’ (as the French do) brings us dangerously near to the fallacy of ‘abstraction’. So back to our hobby horse. Is it quite correct to say that it consists of features which make up the ‘concept’ of a horse or that it reflects the memory image of horses seen? No—because this formulation omits one factor: the stick. If we keep in mind that representation is originally the creation of substitutes out of given material we may reach safer ground. The greater the wish to ride, the fewer may be the features that will do for a horse. But at a certain stage it must have eyes—for how else could it see? At the most primitive level, then, the conceptual image might be identified with what we have called the minimum image—that minimum, that is, which will make it fit into a psychological lock. The form of the key depends on the material out of which it is fashioned, and on the lock. It would be a dangerous mistake, however, to equate the ‘conceptual image’ as we find it used in the historical styles with this psychologically grounded minimum image. On the contrary. One has the impression that the presence of these schemata is always felt but that they are as much avoided as exploited. We must reckon with the possibility of a ‘style’ being a set of conventions born out of complex tensions. The man-made image must be complete. The servant for the grave must have two hands and two feet. But he must not become a double under the artist’s hands. Image-making is beset with dangers. One false stroke and the rigid mask of the face may assume an evil leer. Strict adherence to conventions alone can guard against such dangers. And thus primitive art seems often to keep on that narrow ledge that lies between the lifeless and the uncanny. If the hobby horse became too lifelike it might gallop away on its own.
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VIII

THE contrast between primitive art and ‘naturalistic’ or ‘illusionist’ art can easily be overdrawn. All art is ‘image-making’ and all image-making is rooted in the creation of substitutes. Even the artist of an ‘illusionist’ persuasion must make the man-made, the ‘conceptual’ image of convention his starting point. Strange as it may seem he cannot simply ‘imitate an object’s external form’ without having first learned how to construct such a form. If it were otherwise there would be no need for the innumerable books on ‘how to draw the human figure’ or ‘how to draw ships’. Wolfflin once remarked that all pictures owe more to other pictures than they do to nature. It is a point which is familiar to the student of pictorial traditions but which is still insufficiently understood in its psychological implications. Perhaps the reason is that, contrary to the hopeful belief of many artists, the ‘innocent eye’ which should see the world afresh would not see it at all. It would smart under the painful impact of a chaotic medley of forms and colours. In this sense the conventional vocabulary of basic forms is still indispensable to the artist as a starting point, as a focus of organization.

How, then, should we interpret the great divide which runs through the history of art and sets off the few islands of illusionist styles, of Greece, of China, and of the Renaissance, from the vast ocean of ‘conceptual’ art?

One difference, undoubtedly, lies in a change of function. In a way the change is implicit in the emergence of the idea of the image as a ‘representation’ in our modern sense of the word. As soon as it is generally understood that an image need not exist in its own right, that it may refer to something outside itself and therefore be the record of a visual experience rather than the creation of a substitute, the basic rules of primitive art can be transgressed with impunity. No longer is there any need for that completeness of essentials which belongs to the conceptual style, no longer is there the fear of the casual which dominates the archaic conception of art. The picture of a man on a Greek vase no longer needs a hand or a foot in full view (Fig. 4). We know it is meant as a shadow, a mere record of what the artist saw or might see, and we are quite ready to join in the game and to supplement with our imagination what the real motif undoubtedly possessed. Once this idea of the picture suggesting something beyond what is really there is accepted in all its implications—and this certainly did not happen overnight—we are indeed forced to let our imagination play around it. We endow it with ‘space’ around its forms which is only another way of saying that we understand the reality which it evokes as three-dimensional, that the man could move and that even the aspect momentarily hidden ‘was there’. When medieval art broke away from that narrative conceptual symbolism into which the formulas of classical art had been frozen, Giotto made particular use of the figure seen from behind which stimulates our ‘spatial’ imagination by forcing us to imagine the other side (Fig. 5).
Thus the idea of the picture as a representation of a reality outside itself leads to an interesting paradox. On the one hand it compels us to refer every figure and every object shown to that imaginary reality which is 'meant'. This mental operation can only be completed if the picture allows us to infer not only the 'external form' of every object represented but also its relative size and position. It leads us to that 'rationalization of space' we call scientific perspective by which the picture plane becomes a window through which we look into the imaginary world the artist creates there for us. In theory, at least, painting is then conceived in terms of geometrical projection.\(^{14}\)

The paradox of the situation is that, once the whole picture is regarded as the representation of a slice of reality, a new context is created in which the conceptual image plays a different part. For the first consequence of the 'window' idea is that we cannot conceive of any spot on the panel which is not 'significant', which does not represent something. The empty patch thus easily comes to signify light, air, and atmosphere, and the vague form is interpreted as enveloped by air. It is this confidence in the representational context which is given by the very convention of the frame, which makes the development of impressionist methods possible. The artists who tried to rid themselves of their conceptual knowledge, who conscientiously became beholders of their own work and never ceased matching their created images against their impressions by stepping back and comparing the two—these artists could only achieve their aim by shifting something of the load of creation on to the beholder. For what else does it mean if we are enjoined to step back in turn and watch the coloured patches of an impressionist landscape 'spring to life'? It means that the painter relies on our readiness to take hints, to read contexts, and to call up our conceptual image under his guidance. The blob in the painting by Manet which stands for a horse is no more an imitation of its external form than is our hobby horse (Fig. 6). But he has so cleverly contrived it that it evokes the image in us—provided, of course, we collaborate.

Here there may be another field for independent investigation. For those 'privileged' objects which play their part in the earliest layers of image-making recur—as was to be expected—in that of image-reading. The more vital the feature that is indicated by the context and yet omitted, the more intense seems to be the process that is started off. On its lowest level this method of 'suggestive veiling' is familiar to erotic art. Not, of course, to its Pygmalion phase, but to its illusionist applications. What is here a crude exploitation of an obvious biological stimulus may have its parallel, for instance, in the representation of the human face. Leonardo achieved his greatest triumphs of lifelike expression by blurring precisely the features in which the expression resides, thus compelling us to complete the act of creation. Rembrandt could dare to leave the eyes of his most moving portraits in the shade because we are thus stimulated to supplement them\(^{17}\) (Fig. 7). The 'evocative' image, like its logical backgro
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image, like its ‘conceptual’ counterpart, should be studied against a wider psychological background.

IX

MY hobby horse is not art. At best it can claim the attention of iconology, that emerging branch of study which is to art criticism what linguistics is to the criticism of literature. But has not modern art experimented with the primitive image, with the ‘creation’ of forms, and the exploitation of deep-rooted psychological forces? It has. But whatever the nostalgic wish of their makers, the meaning of these forms can never be the same as that of their primitive models. For that strange precinct we call ‘art’ is like a hall of mirrors or a whispering gallery. Each form conjures up a thousand memories and after-images. No sooner is an image presented as art than, by this very act, a new frame of reference is created which it cannot escape. It becomes part of an institution as surely as does the toy in the nursery. If—as might be conceivable—a Picasso would turn from pottery to hobby horses and send the products of this whim to an exhibition, we might read them as demonstrations, as satirical symbols, as a declaration of faith in humble things or as self-irony—but one thing would be denied even to the greatest of contemporary artists: he could not make the hobby horse mean to us what it meant to its first creator. That way is barred by the angel with a flaming sword.