TAKING CARE OF YOUTH AND THE GENERATIONS

Bernard Stiegler
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To my parents
with my most affectionate gratitude
To the memory of Gabriel Mehrenberger
Sapere aude! [Dare to know!] Have courage to use your own understanding. That is the motto of enlightenment.


Master of a knowledge whose ingenious resources
Transcend all hopes,
He can thus take the path of evil or of good.

—Sophocles, Antigone

I take . . . the risk of trying to ground the fundamental significance of the “normal” in a philosophical analysis of life, understood as the activity of opposing inertia and indifference. Life tries to win over death, in all senses of the word “win” and, first of all, in the sense in which the victory is through play. Life plays against a growing entropy.

—Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological

The fact that I am still alive and that I have returned unscathed attests above all, I’d say, to chance. Pre-existent factors, such as my impulse for the life of the mountains and my trade as a chemist, which gave me certain privileges in the last months in the camp, played only a minor rôle. Perhaps I also found support in my never-diminished interest in the human soul, and in the will not only to survive (the objective among many of us), but to survive with the specific goal of recounting what we had participated in and what we had undergone. Finally, what had perhaps also played itself out was the will I had tenaciously maintained, even in the darkest hours, always to see, in my comrades and myself, human beings and not things, thus avoiding that humiliation, that total demoralization that for many led to spiritual shipwreck.

—Primo Levi, If This Is a Man
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Abbreviations

PR  Winnicott, Playing and Reality
Pre  Heraclitus, Les Présocratiques
Prof Agamben, Profanations
Prop Bernays, Propaganda
PS  Sloterdijk, Règles pour le parc humain
Qt/2 Heidegger, Questions I et II
Q3/4 Heidegger, Questions III et IV
QL  Mendelssohn and Kant, Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?
Quarto Foucault, “L’Écriture de soi”
RE  Kant, Réflexions sur l’éducation
Rifkin Rifkin, The Age of Access
RM  Stiegler, Réenchanter le monde
Robin Robin, Platon
Ross Ross, May ’68 and Its Afterlives
RQ  Queneau, Bâtons, chiffres et lettres
RTG Auroux, La Révolution technologique de la grammatisation
Scil Lacan, Scilicet 1/1
SE  Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises
SP  Noyer, Proceedings of a conference at the Théâtre de la Colline, 5 November 2005
TCD Stiegler, La Télécratie contre la démocratie
Tehran Foucault, “Tehran: Faith Against the Shah”
TT1  Stiegler, Technics and Time 1
TT2  Stiegler, Technics and Time 2
TT3  Stiegler, Technics and Time 3
WA  Agamben, What Is an Apparatus?
WE  Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?”
WEK Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?”
Zim1 Zimmerman and Christakis, “Early Television Exposure and Subsequent Attentional Problems in Children”
Zim2 Zimmerman and Christakis, “Television and DVD/Video Viewing in Children Younger Than 2 Years”
§ 1  Destruction of the Juvenile Psychic Apparatus

1. Regarding what children deserve

Henceforth in France, juveniles who commit certain crimes, and juvenile recidivists, will no longer be tried as minors: the same laws will apply to them as to their parents. This important change has been made because the legal definition of the age of criminal responsibility, which determines the law’s treatment of minors (those “below voting age”), was seen as inducing a sense of impunity encouraging delinquent youths to repeat their criminal behavior.

The problematic result of this change in the law is that there is now no clearly defined age of responsibility. In fact, this change in the law is a dilution of responsibility, since “responsibility” is:

1. socially established by and founded on reaching the age of maturity,
2. before all else, the adult responsibility of taking care of the young, very much including adolescents going through various “vulnerabilities,” as François Dolto calls them: it is before all others the adult responsibility to take care of them precisely because they are minors.

Questioning the minority status of delinquent children simultaneously means questioning the status of adults as well, finally relieving adults of the very responsibility that gives them their status as adults. It also relieves adult society of its responsibility, displacing that responsibility onto minors themselves. In attenuating the difference between minority and majority, this change in the law, simultaneously redefining both minority and majority, also obscures both that responsibility is a learned social competency and that society is responsible for transmitting it to children.
and adolescents. They are called “minors” specifically because adult society is required to take care of their successful transition to adulthood—but first of all, and most especially, to their education: education is our name for transmitting the social competency that produces responsibility; that is, that leads to “maturity.”

The recent change in French law obfuscates this transmission of responsibility’s vital and obligatory nature, through which minors become adults, occludes its meaning in the minds of both adults and minors (both younger children and adolescents), and is a powerful indication of the weakness of a society that has become structurally incapable of educating its children, in being incapable of distinguishing minority from majority.

This distinction is not merely erased by the new French law: undermining the difference between minors and adults is at the very heart of contemporary consumer culture, which systematically defines consumers—minors and adults alike—as being fundamentally, structurally irresponsible.

It could be objected here that such concerns, or at least the philosophy behind them, are too “formal,” too theoretical: that in terms of results (from the perspective of the security that our society, suffering from ever-increasing juvenile delinquency, justifiably wants), one must be a realist. But compounding the repression of delinquency’s legal definition is not at all “realistic”; Jacques Hintzy has shown that “countries that, like the United States, over the greatest length of time most heavily penalized minority offenders are finding very negative outcomes from these measures.” In fact, denial of minority status to minors, and thus of responsibility to adults, only expands the divisions between what remains of adult (i.e., responsible) society, children, and minor adolescents, a denial that increasingly locks the young—and their parents—into a self-perpetuating irresponsibility that all evidence shows only translates into further delinquency, even criminality.

Authoritarianism, a particularly telling symptom of the change in the law defining minority status, is as symbolic as it is juridical, and in fact is always an indicator of the law’s weakening, precisely insofar as law emanates from the symbolic order—the order to which Antigone calls out in a language that is both ancient (Greek) and tragic (“divine law”): as in Antigone, all decisions made through impotent authoritarianism, in all genres, always result, sooner or later, in the worsening of the situation they are intended to “treat.”
Mildew, or a cockroach or lice infestation, can be “treated,” but law can never be protected by a “treatment”: it requires careful nurturance. This is the case because what guarantees respect for law is not its repressive apparatus, which is always improvisatory, but the feeling it can create when it has been culturally internalized. And this nurturance, this care, which alone can create this sense both of intimacy and of familiarity (as philia), is grounded in a shared responsibility—at least in a society of laws.

The real issue is knowing what minors—children and adolescents—deserve. In June 2007, while the new law was being debated, a French advertising campaign provided a partial but perfectly clear (and exceptionally symptomatic) answer to this: children deserve “better than that.”

“That” in the ad campaign refers to their parents and grandparents: children “deserve” Channel Y, the television channel specifically aimed at this vital segment of the television audience (i.e., those with “available brains”: minors).

This special “segment” is defined by dividing the various age groups into “slices,” which are then targeted as such (as in “target audiences”), and these “slices” or “segments,” because their ages are not specified, become instrumental within the channel’s audience-identification system: they become prescriptive, through a generational inversion that is only the most obvious sign of the destruction of education, to which consumer society’s televisual marketing techniques must inevitably lead. Through this generational inversion, the segment designated “minors” becomes prescriptive of the consumption habits of the segment that is ostensibly adult—but is in fact infantilized: adults become decreasingly responsible for their children’s behavior, and for their own. Structurally speaking, adults thus become minors, the result being that adulthood as such, judicial as well as democratic, appears to have vanished.

2. What “that” means

An “adult” human being is one recognized as socially adult and thus responsible. Responsibility is the adult’s defining trait; an adult who is irresponsible, stricto senso, loses both adult rights and duties. Such an adult might need supervision, such as elderly persons entering “second childhood” or adults who have become significantly mentally unbalanced (and “interned”), or at least do not have all of their mental faculties: responsibility is a mental characteristic and thus also a characteristic of human
intelligence as both psychic and social. I will return to this double dimension of intelligence in terms of a wider political discourse in which François Fillon, prime minister in the Nicolas Sarkozy government, defined—as his first priority—what he called the “battle of intelligence.”

Responsibility is a psychic, as much as a social, quality of adulthood, and since Freud it has been clear that formation of this responsibility, this becoming adult, develops from infancy through a relationship of identification with parents who educate the child. This is what Freud calls primary identification, about which he claims that

1. it is practically indelible and that it is in operation throughout the first five years of life,

2. it is the condition of access to the superego through which the adult transmits to the child being educated the capacity to internalize, the familiar name of which is “the law”: in identifying with the adult, the child identifies with what the adult identified with while being educated, and this is repeated from generation to generation; this repeated identification is thus what both distinguishes and links the generations.

This process of identification is precisely what the contemporary culture industry subverts, in diverting and capturing the attention of young minds in their time of “brain availability,” passive in the face of demands to consume but increasingly subject to attention problems generally accompanied by hyperactivity, to which I will return in Chapters 4 and 5.

Channel Y’s reprehensible advertising campaign brazenly exploits this situation: two different posters depict a father and grandfather, that is, adults, and representatives of adulthood, one with his child, the other with his grandchild—with the minors they are responsible for guiding to maturity; in their advertisements, this channel specifically designed for minors (“Channel Y” declares its “brain-available” target audience: Youth) ridicules the father and grandfather, denying them all responsibility.

In the background, mother and grandmother see nothing dangerous here; stereotypes (among them, repression) are used to short-circuit any parental authority. A blog responding to the campaign accurately portrays these paternal stereotypes as inverted and derided: the father and grandfather, trying to make the child laugh, are infantilized in an “inversion of values [that] is a typical strategy in advertising that confuses all normal references, dynamites traditional hierarchies, destroys culture and education.” The moral of these two advertisements, printed in large letters on
each poster, is that “our children deserve better than that”—“that” clearly indicating the father and grandfather.

The “that” is much more, however, since Freud’s The Ego and the Id of 1923 (Freud’s “second topic”), in which Freud defines a psychic system that the id [ça, “that”] forms with the ego [mot], linking consciousness, the preconscious,9 and the unconscious.10 The çà, “that,” the id, is not entirely coincident with the unconscious, since if the unconscious consists of repressed representations—repressed by the ego—then the ego (ostensibly in opposition to the unconscious and thus oriented toward consciousness) is itself not fully conscious. The repressive forces residing in the ego are not conscious forces: the ego itself cannot be consciously aware of the forces working to repress what is coming from the unconscious, though these repressive forces are part of the ego. In other words, the ego no longer entirely coincides with the consciousness, and the id no longer coincides entirely with the unconscious. The id, of which the unconscious is a part, extends into the ego as the system of unconscious repression, and in this sense, it is the id that connects the unconscious and the superego.

An organic and functional link between ego and id exists not only because the id “contains” the ego’s forces of repression but also, Freud tells us, because the id learns something of the world through the ego’s mediation. The ego, as the seat of consciousness and thus also of attention, is the repository of what Husserl calls “primary retentions”—what occurs in the conscious flow of time.11 But these primary retentions, which are essentially perceptions, then become secondary retentions—“memories” in the traditional sense—that can themselves become either preconscious (latent) or actually repressed (unconscious).12

As repressed perceptions, these psychic phenomena, as representations, provide the material for the drives emanating from the unconscious (in conjunction with the id), in so doing setting the stage for the pleasure principle, which searches through the unconscious for immediate gratification of all drives; “immediate” here meaning without passing through the reality principle, the social mediation encompassing all media as, to some extent, the medium (and the feeling) of pleasure.

The pleasure principle, as it is satisfied (i.e., not deferred or deflected by the reality principle) is what produces jouissance.13 But jouissance is what vanishes, “dies” [s’éteint] through the very fact of being achieved
which is why it is also called the “little death”: jouissance is defined by its transitoriness, which differentiates it from desire as well as from kinds of pleasure only achievable insofar as they differ from jouissance, such that when they are attained, they reappear as différence, maintaining their objects as objects of desire. But that presupposes a supplementarity, as Derrida indicates. And as we will see, this supplementarity, which is also a pharmakon, poison and remedy simultaneously, is the condition of all systems of care.

3. Sedimentation of the symbolic intergenerational environment as the condition of attention formation

The unconscious, with the id as its base, nonetheless contains inherited psychic representations not initially lived as conscious, primary retentions that were then repressed but that were transmitted through a symbolic medium, such as language, and through symbolic means in general: objects, icons, and the myriad memory supports of which the human world consists from its very inception, since symbolic materials are inherently part of that world and belong there; these are tertiary memories (“supplements”), social or cultural memories subsequently materialized—both socially materialized and materially socialized (even through ephemeral states of matter such as words, as vibrations in air).

Tertiary retentions are the sedimentations that accumulate across generations and that are central to the process of creating collective individuation, internalized through both consciousness and the unconscious during the development of the psychic apparatus. Freud theorizes the intergenerational transmission of inherited psychic traits in Moses and Monotheism (1939), where he attempts to conceptualize what he calls “the dream language of myths” through which, according to Freud, humans inherit the Oedipus Complex. But I suggest that Freud fails.

How can or should the significance of dream symbols be properly understood? Freud asks this question in A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis in 1916: “this understanding comes to us from many sources: fairy tales and myths, jokes and simple folktales; that is, from the study of morés, usages, proverbs, and songs of diverse peoples, as well as from the poetic language of their common tongue” (GIP, 151). Thus, Jean-Bertrand Pontalis can say that “when one analyzes what Freud did indeed discover . . . , one is led inexorably to connect the unconscious to a trans-individual
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realty. . . . To Freud, the unconscious is in no case reducible to an invisible storehouse unique to each person.” 18 Freud asks how this “dream language of myths” (GIP, 151) might be transmitted and where it is preserved. This is a matter of a curious phylogenesis about which Freud later writes, in Moses and Monotheism, that even if biology

rejects the idea of acquired qualities being transmitted to descendants, . . . we cannot au fond imagine one without the other. . . . If we accept the continued existence of such memory traces in our archaic inheritance, then we have bridged the gap between individual and mass psychology and can treat peoples as we do the individual neurotic; . . . It is bold, but inevitable. (MM, 128)

If Freud here condemns himself to neo-Lamarckism, it is because he does not take tertiary retentions, the basis of epiphylogenesis, into account19—nor, in fact, technics in general. Yet they are of supreme importance since memory’s epiphylogenetic structure uniquely inculcates a process of psychic and collective individuation governed by what I have suggested should be formalized as a general organology,20 in which the psychic apparatus is continuously reconfigured by technical and technological apparatuses and social structures.21

Only by thinking the evolution of the psychic apparatus organologically (i.e., as a cerebral organ interacting with other vital organs, forming a body), in relation to both evolving social structures (qua social organ-izations) and the technical and technological configurations constructing tertiary retention (qua artificial organs), can the psyche’s process of inherited internalization—which is called education—be properly assessed.

However, as the internalization of the heritage of previous generations, only possible because of memory’s organological (tertiary) nature, this transmission itself presupposes a close intergenerational relationship that can be achieved only as education through a relationship linking the child, as a minor with no access to the reality principle, with living ancestors. These living ancestors then serve as transmitters of experience accumulated across many generations, connecting the child with dead ancestors; this transmission process is the very formulation and formalizing of the reality principle in its many forms of knowledge (knowing how to live, knowing what to do, knowing how to think [savoir-vivre, savoir-faire, savoir-théorique]). Such transmissions are precisely the pleasure principle’s objects and media—the objects and media of sublimation.
In this sense, adults’ primary responsibility is the transmission of the reality principle as a formalized and encoded accumulation of intergenerational experience. And as the internalization of these inherited symbolic representations, bequeathed by ancestors and transmitted by parents and other adults, this intergenerational relationship constitutes the formation of attention, constructed of retentions, which then create protentions, that is, the expectations without which attention is impossible; we will explore this further in the following chapter.

4. What the “that” makes laugh. Construction and destruction of the psychic apparatus

Conceived as such a combination of differing types of retentions—conscious, preconscious, unconscious—experienced consciously or inherited without having been directly lived, the ego and the id form the system constituting the psychic apparatus and in which

the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world through the medium of the Pept.-Cs. [Preconscious-Conscious]. . . . [T]he ego seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavors to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id. (Ego, 15)

When a father, grandfather, or some other adult plays or “clowns around” with children to make them laugh, since children have often not learned the reality principle and are (were) thus minors before the law (juridically not yet responsible), these adults are actually playing with their own unconscious through “jokes and stunts”; that is, through the id’s connecting the unconscious and the ego. And at the same time they are “playing” with their own desire, which is not simply the pleasure principle but how it is inscribed in the Real as much as in the Symbolic, through ancestral intermediation. In their efforts to make children laugh, they act through the unconscious Freud shows us as being expressed in that laughter, thus following a trajectory that is not simply repressive authority nor reality principle but the comprehensive and collusive authority of fantasy (the fruit of the imagination, phantasia)—of which “the dream language of myth” is part.

Yet laughter is an essential element in the construction of the psychic apparatus, produced socially through rituals and festivals or privately as
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in parent-child play; we call that [ça] “gentle persuasion [l'autorité de tendresse].” Channel Y’s advertising campaign attempts to liquidate that complex tenderness, that complicity originating in the unconscious, and since it implicates many generations in its desire, finally it is the id itself that must be controlled—short-circuited—and somehow censored. This requires replacing the transgenerational superego, by which one reaches the id (in 1955 Marcuse saw television becoming an “automatic superego”), with an attentional control—that in fact, unfortunately, creates only channel surfing and loss of all authority, of any generalized individuation on the psychic or social level, simultaneously provoking inappropriate and sometimes extremely violent reactions from the overcensured id—for example, through delinquent, even criminal acts in minors, acts society had thought it could contain through mechanical repression, stripped of all symbolic authority.

In other words, Channel Y (along with the exploiters of the “available” brains of other juveniles, adults, and many elderly or impaired—those who are thus made irresponsible and thus relegated to structural immaturity), in simultaneously diverting primary identification and capturing the attention of young minds, purely and simply destroys the psychic apparatus’s resistance to the pleasure principle, since if the psyche is properly formed, it is not reducible to consciousness or the ego but is, rather, inscribed in a process of psychic and collective individuation in which attention, both psychic and social, can be produced only as an intergenerational relationship.

“To capture the attention of young minds” in this sense means to capture the attention of the systems formed by those minds, as ego with id, such that consciousness is, according to Freud, responsible for teaching the that, the id, to compromise with the reality principle, but equally in which young minds “resonate” in their relation to the id, respond to it, thus responding to their ancestors, fathers, grandfathers, and their ancestors, if it is true that “responsibility” means responding to what one is given.

5. How Jesus became the son of God even before being born

The law is first of all the relationship between the generations, as Antigone says, but it is also the sense of the genealogies resonating
throughout the Bible, evident in the Gospel of St. Matthew but beginning in Genesis through the descendants of Abel’s murderer, Cain, who strays far from the face of Yhwh:

Then Cain went away from the presence of the LORD
And dwelt in the land of Nod, East of Eden.
Cain knew his wife, and she conceived and bore Enoch;
and he built a city, and called the name of the city after the name of his son, Enoch.
To Enoch was born Irad; and Irad was the father of Me-hu’ja-el,
and Me-hu’ja-el the father of Me-thu’sha-el, and Me-thu’sha-el the father of Lamech. (Gen. 4:16–18)

Then Adam returns and Eve gives birth to Adam’s third son:

And Adam knew his wife again, and she bore a son and called his name Seth, for she said, “God has appointed for me another child instead of Abel, for Cain slew him."
To Seth also a son was born, and he called his name Enoch.
At that time men began to call upon the name of the LORD.
This is the book of the generations of Adam.
When God created man, he made him in the likeness of God.
Male and female he created them, and he blessed them and named them Man when they were created.
When Adam had lived a hundred and thirty years, he became the father of a son in his own likeness, after his image, and named him Seth.
The days of Adam after he became the father of Seth were eight hundred years; and he had other sons and daughters. (Gen. 4:25, 5:1–4)

Then, in Genesis 6:1,

When men began to multiply on the face of the earth, and daughters were born to them,
The sons of God saw that the daughters of men were fair; and they took to wife such of them as they chose.

The multitudes issuing from Adam and Eve desired. Later in Genesis many other genealogies appear, of Shem, Abraham, Jacob, and so on, followed by others in Numbers. And then Matthew’s Gospel, the “Book of the generations of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham,” begins:
The son of Abraham was Isaac,
and the son of Isaac was Jacob,
and the sons of Jacob were Judah and his brothers,
and the sons of Judah were Perez and Zerah by Tamar,
and the son of Perez was Hezron,
and the son of Hezron was Ram,

[etc.] (Matt. 1:2–3)

In Matthew 1:17,

So all the generations from Abraham to David are fourteen generations,
and from David to the taking away to Babylon
fourteen generations,
and from the taking away to Babylon to the coming of Christ
fourteen generations.
Now the birth of Jesus Christ was in this way.
When his mother Mary was going to be married to Joseph,
before they came together the discovery was made that she was with child by
the Holy Spirit;
and Joseph her husband, being an upright man and unwilling to put her to
shame, had a mind to put her away privately.23

This is the scene—Joseph’s renunciation of Mary—with which Pasolini begins The Gospel According to St. Matthew. Joseph repudiates his wife, the descendant of Adam and Eve, who is carrying a child—which is not his—in her pregnant belly. Then an angel appears to him—and Joseph adopts this child who is not his: Joseph becomes responsible for the child, recognizing him as his own and caring for him. The child becomes the son of God.

According to Thomas Mann as well as to Freud, it was Moses, as an adopted child—an Egyptian adopted by the Jews—through whom Yahveh is revealed as “the God of the Fathers”:

Thus Amran and Jochebed became Moses’ parents before men, and Aaron
was his brother. Amran had fields and herds, and Jochebed was the daughter
of a stone-mason. They did not know what to call the unlikely little lad; in
the end they gave him a half-Egyptian name, or rather half of an Egyptian
name. For the sons of the land were often named Ptah-mose, Amen-mose, or
Ra-mose: in other words, sons of those gods. Amran and Jochebed preferred
to leave out the god-name and simply call the boy Mose, or just “son.” The
question was, whose?24
Then, in the “Book of the generations of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham,” the Gospel of St. Matthew, in which God’s messenger says to Joseph:

Joseph, son of David, have no fear of taking Mary as your wife; because that which is in her body is of the Holy Spirit. And she will give birth to a son; and you will give him the name Jesus; for he will give his people salvation from their sins. . . .

And Joseph did as the angel of the Lord had said to him, and took her as his wife. And he had no connection with her until she had given birth to a son; and he gave him the name of Jesus. (Matt. 1:20–25)

Thus even before he was born, Jesus had become the son of God, the symbol of the fathers of the Church and the institution of the Church, which Kant, defining the Enlightenment as maturity—adulthood—calls the Symbol.25

6. The fruits of desire, psychopower, and the minoritization of the masses

The writer of the blog *Antipub—Décryptage du désenchantement* [Anti-Ads—Deciphering Disenchantment] correctly understands what is at stake in Channel Y’s advertising campaign: reversal of generational hierarchy, destruction of generational differences, and the restructuring of that confusion. I would assert, on the other hand, that this strategy is not obliging adults to submit to their children’s desires;26 the apparatus of attention control is aimed at soliciting and exciting not only desires but drives. The goal is the stimulation of immature drives, making them prescriptive for adults as well by inverting intergenerational relations, the result of which is organized mass regression, cultural minoritization, and (even through legislation, now) the imposing of premature maturation.

Desire is in fact not at all Channel Y’s target. On the contrary: desire unfolds and is defined socially as circuits of transindividuation across the generations, circuits on which the transindividual’s identity and signification are formed; that is, through the production of the psychic, as well as the social, object of attention. Such a production process connects the generations spiritually, culturally, and communally. But desire can also generate ancestry through filiation, the creating of families, and taking on
the obligation to educate children by transmitting to them the fruits of desire: a sense of culture and community.

Short-circuiting generational inheritance effaces both what differentiates children, parents, grandparents, and, at the same time, cultural memory, consciousness, and attention to what is passed down through the myriad human experiences accumulated as secondary and tertiary retentions underlying cultural knowledge.27 Systems of sliced and segmented audience capture such as Channel Y replace the psychic apparatus that should be constructing both ego and id (as well as the transindividualization circuits in which the transindividual is worked out as the objects and fruits of desire28) with a psychotechnical apparatus that controls attention yet no longer deals with desire but rather with drives, short-circuiting past (and present) experience by foregrounding future experience (i.e., any future as experience) in advance.

These psychotechnological systems of psychopower constitute the biopower Michel Foucault has analyzed so thoroughly. But that operation entails the possible creation of control-oriented and “modular” societies in which marketing becomes the central function of social development,29 replacing traditional social regulation. Channel Y’s ad campaign clearly shows attention control made possible by psychotechnological systems (the key technologies of societies of control), short-circuiting the psychic system for the production of desire, which is inherently intergenerational.

This short-circuiting is consistent with “job skills” and “life skills” [des savoir-faire et des savoir-vivre], chief characteristics of hyperindustrial, service societies that lead to consumers not being in charge of their very existence. But this deprivation, which is also a deprivation of the responsibility that defines human existence, also short-circuits the psychic links between the generations—and of the psyche itself, which metamorphoses from the status of “consciousness” to that of “brain”; when controlled by the audiovisual cultural industries, psychopower destroys the transmission and education of philia, the intimate connection among the generations.

The fundamental problem, and the crippling limit of this attention-control apparatus, is that it destroys attention itself, along with the ability to concentrate on an object of attention, which is a social faculty; the construction of such objects is in fact the construction of society itself, as civil space founded on [cultural] knowledge including social graces, expertise, and critical thinking (i.e., contemplation). This destruction leads directly to an increase in juvenile misconduct, but by putting children
and adolescents on trial and imposing a premature, potentially penal maturity on them, we do no more than divert public attention from what creates attention in the first place: adult attention toward minors and of minors' developing attention.

In other words, at the same time that we make children into the infantilizing definers of adults, we cast them in the role of scapegoat—in Greek, pharmakon (which means both “poison” and “remedy”). The juvenile delinquent, who may have been a victimizer, also serves here as the expiatory victim discharged from his own crimes. But for the Greeks, the fact that the scapegoat was a pharmakon meant that such attention diversion could only be an expediter, in the long term only increasing the evil it should immediately and forcefully have ameliorated.

What do these children deserve; what do “our” children deserve; what do children deserve, who(so)ever they are? Do they not deserve, at least, to have fathers, grandfathers, and a family (which is fundamentally always adoptive) within which they can play, and through doing so learn to respect, that is, to love, and not merely to fear? What does it mean to play with one's daughter or grandson? It means to laugh and to “forget about time” with them—to give them one's time, and to give it not merely to their brains but to the formation of their nascent attention by concentrating one's adult attention on their juvenility—as imagination.

To play with a child is to take care of the child, opening the paths by which transitional spaces are created, paths that stimulate the origins of art, culture, and ultimately of everything that forms the symbolic order and the “dream language of myths,” such as the aura Winnicott so subtly theorizes through observing and analyzing a mother nurturing her baby:

Transitional objects and transitional phenomena belong to the realm of illusion which is at the basis of initiation of experience. This early stage in development is made possible by the mother's special capacity for adapting to the needs of her infant, thus allowing the infant the illusion that what he or she creates really exists.

This intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner or external (shared) reality, constitutes the greater part of the infant's experience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work.

Giving children this time for amusement and laughter from earliest childhood means giving access to the Muses, to the imagination, which alone
can lead to the child’s enchantment and which grounds the imaginative life, the source of art, science, and all forms of cultural connection.

On the other hand, allowing psychotechnologies to take control of the child’s developing attention means letting the culture industry destroy those transitional spaces—and the transitional objects, the first forms of tertiary retentions,\(^3\) that can appear only through them; such spaces form the basis of all systems of care and nurturance: a transitional space is first and foremost a system of caring.

Fantasy, created through phantasia (i.e., through the imagination’s formation of symbolic mediations), is humanity’s most precious gift: it engenders the very spirit of human culture, including science, since as Bachelard shows, science results from imaginative play in the specific form of attention we call contemplation (theoria), which then results in a mode of observation in which pleasure and reality seem to coincide: the reality principle does not oppose the pleasure principle here, but rather is its product.

Enchantment through fantasy, without which the symbolic order cannot be formed (not even in the language of science), uncontrolled cultural industrialization activates the psychopower of attentional control, which then constrains fantasy (having become “entertainment”) to the role of capturing its audience through the most archaic drives, then compelling it to construct a consciousness reduced to simple, reflex cerebral functions, which is always disenchanted and always “available.” Care is completely destroyed, since the diversion of attention occurs before the formation of any other definition of attention can be passed, through symbolic regimes and their bequeathed transindividual significations, transferred as education, from adult ancestors to their minor descendants. This lost care is also the reciprocal recognition of ancestors by their descendants, which is also vital to the formation of proper attention.

Channel Y’s publicity campaign, focusing as it does on the youth “segment” or “slice” of the television audience, is the perfect manifestation of this destruction of proper care as attention and recognition, by both adults and minors. It is quite ironic that Channel Y, through an advertising agency similar to that of TF1 (and only a few years after TF1, through its former CEO, Patrick Le Lay)\(^33\) had felt the need to confess to its crime\(^34\)—and it is indeed a crime if it is criminal to attack the public order at its very foundation by appealing to the drives, and if it is true that the first of these foundations is knowledge as an intergenerational legacy; I will return to this, with Kant, in the next chapter. In this sense, it
is a scandal that neither the French Audiovisual Council nor the agencies responsible for the approval and verification of television advertising felt the need to control these central, extreme forms of incivility that could result only in the *systematic* spread of incivility throughout the culture.

The fact that these television channels no longer hesitate to claim that they systematically use attention-seizing audiovisual mechanisms to bring about—and specifically—adulthood's regression to childhood indicates that this psychotechnological destruction is also aimed at the very social structure that led, with time, to the Enlightenment—to what Frederick II's German subjects called *Aufklärung*. Kant shows us that *Aufklärung* is historically what defines "adulthood" as collective individuation and, within the *social sphere*, a developmental stage of the psyche instructed and instrumentalized by the book as psychotechnics, and thus the critical ground of knowledge.\(^{35}\)

Yet we are now in the midst of a revolution in cultural and cognitive technologies, and in the very foundations of knowledge in which, as François Fillon stated in 2007, we are engaged in the "battle of intelligence."\(^{36}\) In the context of such an ambitious and appropriate project, what lessons might we learn from the Enlightenment, which Kant also calls "the century of Frederick," and which he presents to us as the victory of adulthood?
§ 2 The Battle of Intelligence for Maturity

7. General principles for attention formation—assuming that there is a technique for its acquisition

The psychotechnological age is an inversion of the psychotechnical, which is also nootechnological, consisting of mental techniques of which writing, as the foundation of “the republic of letters” characteristic of the public space during the Enlightenment, is the most essential: as hypomnēmaton, writing was the basis of government for both the self and other, as Michel Foucault shows more and more systematically in his later works, and as the practicing of melētê and epimēleia by the Stoics and the Epicureans—but also by the early Christians and the monastics. “The book” is the psychotechnique for attention formation lying as much behind Jewish monotheism as Greek philosophy, science, and literature; the synthesis of these religions and philosophies of the book lead directly to Christianity.

In other words, strategies for concentrating attention are not unique to our time: to concentrate or capture attention is to form it. Reciprocally, to form attention is to capture it, as every teacher knows. Attention formation—which Moses Mendelssohn, explaining the nature of Aufklärung, called Bildung (encompassing both Kultur and Aufklärung)—is a fundamental aspect of all human society and of the process of individuation that is both psychic and collective; and since it is indissociably both psychic and social, attention formation is also what Gilbert Simondon calls the “transindividual,” a term Pontalis also uses, as we have seen, but to designate the unconscious.
The formation of attention always consists of the psychotechnical accumulation of retentions and protentions. Attention is the flow of consciousness, which is temporal and, as such, is created initially by what Husserl analyzes as “primary” retentions—“primary” because they consist of apparent (present) objects whose shapes I retain as though they were themselves present. This retention, called “primary” precisely because it occurs in perception, is then “conditioned” by “secondary” retentions, as the past of the attentive consciousness—as its “experience.” Linking certain primary retentions with secondary retentions, consciousness projects protentions, as anticipation. The constitution of attention results from accumulation of both primary and secondary retentions, and the projection of protentions as anticipation.

Yet the formation of attention is always already simultaneously a psychic and a social faculty, to the extent that its concentration channels primary retentions according to the individual’s secondary psychic retentions, while inscribing them in collective secondary retentions that symbolize and support “tertiary” retentions. Collective individuation consists of collective retentions, linked with those psychically co-individ-ualized only through sharing a common retentional base; this retentional base, forming what Simondon calls “the pre-individual milieu” in which transindividuation occurs, consists of objects that are also the objective recollections of epiphylogenetic memory—technics. As Plato shows, it is only within this epiphylogenetic setting that properly mnemotechnical objects, hypomnēmata (Greek for attention-capture psychotechnologies), can appear, which, as tertiary retentions, form the material basis of psychotechnics.

Thus, materially and spatially projected onto psychotechnical supports—rendered tertiary—collective secondary retentions can be internalized by those who have not actually experienced them directly but who project onto them their own lived secondary retentions. This is what Freud himself refers to as projection. As the basis of the adoptive process, this projective mechanism also allows for the creation of the transindividual: attention formation through its social accumulation (i.e., education) is the path by which individual psyches become not only co-individual but trans-individual, even at the unconscious level, about which in this respect one might say, as Lacan does, that it is “structured like a language.”

In the course of human history many attention-forming techniques have been conceived and practiced; in their great variety they all alter the
psychic machinery’s organization, not merely the organization of society: this is a particularly important example of the objects and processes a general organology helps us understand. And we will see how current brain imaging allows us to observe ways in which synaptogenesis is profoundly modified by contemporary media, which create an environment that Katherine Hayles has described as one in which the brains of the youngest children, living in a numeric world of “rich media,” are structured differently from those of the preceding generation. And more specifically, these young brains are having increasing difficulty reaching what Hayles calls “deep attention.”

The generation preceding these preadult brains currently in formation at the synaptic level (one of the neurophysiological bases for the stabilization of their general attentional capacity), that generation whose brains are structured differently from mediatized children’s—we are that generation: the readers as well as the author of this very text—we can and must hope that some of those youthful consciousnesses whose synaptogenesis is in process as I write this in 2007 will themselves one day read it. To be capable, to be compelled, to want, above all to know this belief and this hope, these are the infinitives of adulthood, and of our current responsibility to the next generations.

Whatever a given society’s form may be, one of its most distinctive features is the way in which it forms attention, thereby configuring the psyche as well as social structures and conceiving the various attention-forming techniques created in tertiary retention. Among these psychotechniques, the sacred writing of the Book produces the formulation of a dogmatic attention characterized by creation of a Law, as moral as it is juridical, and the foundation of the kingdom of Judea; then, later, as an evangelical gloss on the Dogma, as a symbolic institutional body, the Roman Church, which Kant simply calls the Symbol.

There is, then, dogmatic attention, which is not a pejorative qualification since “religion” does not exist without “dogma,” and no adoptive process exists that does not involve the adoption of a dogma (religious or laic) for what is adopted, whether it be the Roman family, official history, or so on. Indeed, monotheistic religion is a major stage in the history of attention formation as a process unifying collective individuation according to a certain concept of genealogy, that is, of intergenerational relationships, affirming the grounding principles of unification whose juridico-moral basis is the Ten Commandments.
8. The adult minor’s malignancy and the mind’s pharmacology

Kant teaches us that during the Aufklärung, the secular book [le livre profane] allows for the critique of dogma—not only allows for it but requires it as the successful psychic and social achievement of maturity, defined as the power to think and the will to know; with the secular book, Kant says, majority is a critical faculty presupposing the ability to read and write: these are the proper usages of a reasoning public “as a scholar before the literate world” (WEK). For Kant, adulthood is reserved for the savant, for those who would today be called “experts.” Yet in fact the opposite is true, with the exception that “maturity” is indeed reserved for “savants” in the sense that everyone is destined to become a savant and that savants are destined to become adults: to dare and to want to know [oser et vouloir savoir], in this sense meaning that they make use of their understanding and thus the need, the will, and the knowledge to critique and, as a result, to move beyond minority status, whatever they may then be: generally they achieve adulthood [majoritairement accéder à la majorité], leaving minority status behind.

This is the “battle of intelligence,” and it is precisely that: a battle of a mind that claims in principle that the democratic (i.e., collective) majority is founded on an adulthood understood as “courage and will” resulting from individual knowledge: “Sapere aude! Dare to know! Have courage to use your own understanding—that is the motto of enlightenment” (WEK). Aufklärung, adulthood, which is “humanity’s departure from minority as the inability to use its understanding—its power to think—without external direction” (WEK), requires the courage and the will to know. But against what does this courage and this will to know for oneself, not to depend on old ideas, the dogmas spread and maintained by those who pretend to think for us, the learned ones and experts we seem unable to do without—against what must we place our adult character traits, the struggle of our courage and our will? Against our tendency toward the laziness and cowardice characterizing adult minority, a tendency haunting the mind as the malignant spirit of voluntary constraint:

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a proportion of men, long after nature has released them from alien guidance (natura-liter maiorennes), nonetheless gladly remain in lifelong immaturity, and why it is so easy for others to establish themselves as their guardians. It is so easy to be
immature. If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. (WEK)

In other words, if Aufklärung (adulthood; the affirmation of courage and will against laziness and cowardice) presupposes this psychotechnique of attention formation—that is, writing (and simultaneously reading, if the nootechnics of the book’s hypomnēmaton is the constitutive condition of a critical public space, a “republic of letters”)—then this pharmakon, the book, must not take the place of understanding.

The remedy for the mind’s weakness, the book, as a psychotechnique of attention formation and the basis of monotheism and philosophy, is thus also the mind’s fatal poison, as Plato said when he reproached the Sophists for what he calls their logography, and for substituting for dialectic as thought itself (as dialogue or dianoia) a rhetorical technique for fabricating a prêt-à-penser by the psychotechnical powers of the logographic hypomnēsis, the power of the book.

Kant’s issue here is the mind’s pharmacology, and maturity as the pharmaka’s proper end; this is also the philosophical question’s instigation as such. The fact that the Sophists had already raised the issue through philosophical critique means that it was also the question of money and of its role in the life of the mind. The adult minor, lazy and cowardly, says, “I need not think if only I can pay; others will readily undertake the irksome work for me” (WEK).

According to Plato, the Sophists had already offered young Athenians—for a fee—the reduction (the short-circuiting) of the time required for a dialectical education by accelerating the process of attention formation—but as the power to capture the attention of others, through acquisition of the techniques of the pithanon, persuasion as the method of controlling others’ attention, making them accept any suggested viewpoint. The rhetorical persuader is like a sleight-of-hand artist, thaumaturge to the Greeks; that is, a person with no regard for the truth nor even for the viewpoint he is espousing; by extension, no regard for the quality of work required to constitute the transindividual—nor for the significance of the dialogue (with another or with oneself as another) at the heart of the dialectic, a significance Plato calls “the idea.”

But the work of constituting the transindividual involves the formulation of a transindividuation process that cares not just for language but for
things, allowing us not just to designate them but to think them, to make them appear, and finally to give them their place—by giving them meaning. This is the careful, meticulous work Plato calls “dialectic,” a term Kant maintains in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But short-circuiting this dialectical process through sophistical attention formation results in mental *deformation* and, in the end, the destruction of attention (as cynicism).

Kant tells us that as an adult minor defined by laziness and cowardice, I can always avoid the dialectical responsibility of thinking *at all*, and thus of knowing what I should “serve.” From the Sophists to twenty-first-century *service industries*, steering clear of what Kant calls the “tutors” of the Enlightenment, I can satisfy my laziness and cowardice at the expense of my courage and my will to know and think (my individual responsibility), avoiding what amounts to a constant battle of and for intelligence. This situation is characteristic of sophistics, but if we remember that Kant defines Enlightenment thinkers as a social order *organizing* the battle of and for intelligence (in Prussia, under Frederick II’s direction, for Kant), it is equally characteristic of our current hyperindustrial service economies, in which, however, it has now exceeded all limits. This unprecedented destruction of attention imposes entirely new responsibilities on *our* economic and political leaders, and more generally on the “tutors” of contemporary society.

Today, attention control via cultural and cognitive technologies (“technologies of the *esprit*,” those malignant spirits haunting the adult minor as apparatuses for capturing, forming, and deforming attention), has become the very heart of hyperindustrial society; however, it no longer relies on psychotechnics but on psychotechnological apparatuses whose devastation we see on TF1, Channel Y, and so on. Here and now, at the very moment when the worldwide “battle of intelligence” on which François Fillon wants to focus his political energies must be engaged, it is all the more urgent to read what Kant writes “as a scholar before the literate world”—a public we still are and thus, as adults, have the responsibility of acting in a manner that will permit following generations to assume adult responsibilities as well; it is more than urgent to read Kant on maturity as responsibility—individual and collective—in this battle of intelligence against the inherent laziness and cowardice that also characterize essentially fallible beings.
9. Public attention as critical attention and as the historical formation of maturity during the Enlightenment

The condition of adult immaturity, Kant writes, is a kind of crime in the face of which enlightenment, as the moment of departure from immaturity, confronts adult men and women with their responsibility, defined as the free and public use of reason. However, adult infantilization, systematically pursued by today’s cultural industries and resulting in the premature maturation of children and adolescents, whose psychic apparatus has purely and simply been destroyed by the psychotechnical systems of those same cultural industries—this infantilization is being manifested in an unprecedented regression. Reading Kant closely, we see that to think through and understand this contemporary state of affairs require us to fight against it, as scholars before the literate world. And of course we must also interpret Kant’s text relative to the current situation. In 1983, Michel Foucault taught a course on Kant’s text in France, then published a second reading of the text in the United States in 1984; in these two texts, Foucault emphasizes the uniqueness of the event itself and of the connections between topicality and historical thinking that Kant, as a “modern” thinker, inaugurates. And Foucault emphasizes the fact that Kant sees maturity, as both departure and outcome, as the very meaning of the Enlightenment.

However, Foucault never mentions the place Kant reserves for reading and writing in the formation of this process—even though “The Writing of the Self” (included in DE4) is from the same period. My effort here will be to show that at the conclusion of “The Writing of the Self,” Foucault’s analysis of the enhanced role of the historical in Western society is also an occultation of writing, as psychotechnique and nootechnique, at once juridical, administrative, and epistemological, and that this occultation leads Foucault into major contradictions that obstruct both his rereading of Kant’s text and the possibility of combating our current regression.

“Public,” during the Enlightenment—and in Was ist Aufklärung?—means “the literate world”; that is, a public capable of reaching that specific form of attention shared by the book and its author, assuming that the book has captured the writer’s attention during the process of writing:
writing is already an “auto-capturing” of attention and as such forms the basis of what Foucault calls “the technique of the self.”

Kant’s scholar and reading public have achieved maturity, given that reading, being read, and being capable of writing what they have read—either to develop their writing skills in the work in progress, in the case of the writer, or in order to write another book, article, report, review, or commentary on a text, in the case of the reader (who could be, for example, a high school or college student, a teacher, a civil servant, a priest, etc.)—in this scenario they have both successfully reached the critical form of attention. It is nonetheless extremely important to remember that the book can just as likely suspend the reader in immaturity—starting with the writer as first reader—to “replace understanding,” in which case the auto-capture of attention can become auto-alienation of the writer by the book itself, which writes him. Kant does not expressly emphasize this alternative reading, but it is clearly supported by his reasoning; thus, maturity and immaturity are two possibilities of the same pharmakon: of that hypomnēśia Plato confronted, faced with the sophistic minoritization of Greek citizenry.

The use of reason, which creates public access to critique as the mode of transition from minority to maturity, is also the use of the book through which psychotechnics leads not to the re- or dis-placement of understanding but rather to a nootechnics opening onto a kind of understanding that is always and intrinsically public. It is the critical exercise of being exposed to critique, as Kant himself was in 1784 before all the Prussians, including Frederick II, his enlightened monarch, in the Berlinische Monatsschrift. Kant’s short discourse on Aufklärung is thus also a discourse on that journal’s noetic sense and on its role as a “spiritual” or intellectual instrument in what Kant already defines as a battle of and for intelligence. For Kant, reason’s private usage, very different from its public usage, is nonetheless always coordinated with the social mechanisms without which society could not function; this coordination reveals responsibility’s flip side: responsibility as the need for obedience:

Now in many affairs conducted in the interests of a community, a certain mechanism is required by means of which some of its members must conduct themselves in an entirely passive manner so that through an artificial unanimity the government may guide them toward public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying such ends. Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey. (WEK)
Public use of reason is not that of collective, social, and disciplined action but of individual thought manifested in the process of collective individuation within the critical space of publication; this is why Kant invokes the public use of reason, since reason’s private use, though certainly not blind (if it were, it would not be a use of reason), remains passive. This means that it is obedient, obedience being a form and dimension of care that puts reason to work in service to society as a kind of machine regulated by its various usages, the “private” being only a single element: “one must obey.”

However, this private usage is still reason in the strict sense that it must be capable of being critiqued by this very reason, but uniquely through its public usage. And in this sense, in becoming public, private reason must be capable of being individualized both psychically and collectively, as the re-forming of community affairs. Reason’s public usage “takes care of” the other form or dimension of care, its private or adult dimension, which shows care both through producing attention to what within the larger system of care (the social apparatus), and through reason’s private usage, caring for the social within the system of care that it forms. It can, however, lead to wrong outcomes in community affairs since it is a kind of pharmacological machine, a collection of all sorts of artifacts that constitute Kultur and whose union with Aufklärung forms Bildung, as Moses Mendelssohn indicates.

To make public use of reason, as a scholar before the literate world, Kant insists, is to write—“as a scholar who speaks through his writings” (WEK), to practice the psychotechnics of writing’s becoming nootechnics, grounding reason’s public usage before a reading public that thus also can write. Making public use of reason means addressing oneself to precisely that literate public as a power, a will, and a critical knowledge through the nootechnics that, as the formation of a specific kind of attention (now called “public opinion”), opens up an associated psychotechnical space. ¹⁵ A psychotechnical milieu can become nootechnical insofar as it also becomes associatively symbolic; a symbolic milieu is “associated” when those receiving its symbols are able and apt to individualize them through what Husserl calls the communitization of knowledge, without which it is neither knowledge nor intelligence (acquisition of both of which is always a battle—what both Plato and Kant call a dialectic). And we will see, with Foucault, how and why Seneca proposes just such a reci-
procity as the necessary condition for the writing of the self through the epistolary dialectic (DE4, 420, and Section 44 in Chapter 9).

The transformation of psychotechnics into nootechnics requires the organization of social structures into what the Greeks called the *polis*, in which the *grammataristès* (i.e., the teacher, quickly enough becoming the sophist) taught alphabets and grammatical form to citizens, thus shaping their psychic *and* social attention, which, for the Greeks, constituted their *political* attention, resulting in *doxa*—opinion, in turn transforming the psyche into what the Greeks called the logical *organon*, a special form of attention capture and organization constructed on *logos*—the associated symbolic medium, which they saw as a specific method of making literal public use [*à la lettre*] not simply of reason (the *psychê* as *logos*) but of language (*glossa* as *logos*). This is precisely what Plato calls dialectic.

Readers, as the receivers of reason’s public exercise (as literate usage before the literate world, and who are also—at least ostensibly—writers), through the circulation of various writings such as exchanges of letters, gazettes, reviews, books, and so on, were exposed to the formation of a particular attention that, in Kant’s Enlightenment, was addressed to *all*, to “the people,” “the literate world.” Even if they were serfs, no more than slaves, all of the monarch’s subjects, being equal before their Father as God’s creatures, were potentially eligible. This attention formation, fostered by an increasingly literate social environment that extended further and further beyond the print shop, forcefully encouraged their maturation process in the battle to emerge from immaturity, like butterflies emerging from the cocoon: adulthood was assumed to be tantamount to the becoming-adult of society itself through the process of education—the battle of and for intelligence that Kant and others addressed, fearing Frederick II the Great’s death, but which utilized mental (spiritual) weapons produced through the elevation of psychotechnics to nootechnics.

By the same token, making only private, passive use of reason, as being a “part of the machine” (WEK) that is the social structure, however, can and must also be seen as making public use of it, since the social apparatus is always capable of being improved upon and can thus always acknowledge its flaws and stop them—even if they become detrimental, like the *pharmakon* that as remedy can always and suddenly become poisonous; the person who makes only private use of reason, as an element of the social machine that can be arrested, can and even absolutely must
as a member of the community as a whole, or even of the world community, as a consequence, address the public in the role of a scholar, in the proper sense of that term; he can most certainly argue, without thereby harming the affairs for which as a passive member he is partly responsible. Thus it would be disastrous if an officer on duty who was given a command by his superior were to question the appropriateness or utility of the order. He must obey. But as a scholar he cannot be justly constrained from making comments about errors in military service, or from placing them before the public for its judgment. (WEK)

Not only can he defend doing so; it is his most absolute duty. And what is true of the soldier is also true of the priest, as educator, nurturer of consciousness, who officiates in the very specific symbolic environment of the “Symbol of the Church”:

Likewise a pastor is bound to instruct his catechumens and congregation in accordance with the symbol of the church he serves, for he was appointed on that condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, indeed even the calling, to impart to the public all of his carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts concerning mistaken aspects of that symbol. (WEK; emphasis added)

What is true of sacred dogma is obviously at its most powerful in the profane dogmas on which the machinic social apparatus rests. Even if we can distinguish two usages of reason, they must interrelate [composer] ceaselessly, or else they are not reason: reason is a unity with two faces:

1. It implies obedience to the social and the symbolic order, as law, but also as heritage and transmission of myths, dogmas, “illusions,” and ways of life involving the more or less congenial fantasies of a people who constitute the unity of a social body as support for philia, and what Kant calls “the private use of reason.”

2. It also implies, by the same movement, but one that has become a movement of historical conquest, the public usage of reason, presupposing the capacity to critique the social order, to identify its weaknesses, and, finally, to expand the frontiers of knowledge.

But this public use of reason requires that the psychotechnique of critical attention underlying textual hypomnēsis has been socially instrumentalized as nootechnique, that is, through the formation of a public attention through which Kultur becomes Bildung. This means that the
historical movement called Aufklärung is a stage within a genealogy of the mind that is itself only thinkable as a general organology (as a genealogy of mental instruments, as “phenomenotechniques” of the spirit [phénomé-
otechnique de l’esprit]).

In Chapters 7 and 8 we will explore how Foucault correlates the fundamental elements of this organology of the mind/spirit, itself predicated on a particular theory of attention and a history of its formation through attention-capture techniques forming it into a “psychosocial apparatus”—at the very historical moment when these psychotechnical systems (technologies of control), as constituted through the intermediary of psycho-power, are destroying the psychic, as well as the social, apparatus.

10. The organology of maturity and the battle of intelligence for and against it

The public attention defining Aufklärung is the basic condition required for constituting what since the Enlightenment we have called “public opinion,” print media’s transformation of doxa as the Greeks had formulated it. The publicness (and thus the publishing) of opinion in the latter part of the eighteenth century is the full fruition of the “republic of letters,” of printed books beginning in the early sixteenth century, and of the establishment of postal networks, whose arrival meant the ability to write and to circulate the effects of one’s reading in the private, and then public, libraries then appearing throughout society, then to gazettes, then reviews; reading relationships could be established not merely with enlightened monarchs and philosophers but with anyone who, as the embodied image of the “honest man” that had emerged in the seventeenth century, formed the “literate world”—and who in France would soon become revolutionaries and bourgeois “enthusiasts.” The daily broadsheets [journaux] of that period become the daily press of the nineteenth century.

Foucault emphasizes that Kant defines Aufklärung as a “historical process” centrally implicating humanity, thus making Kant a modern philosopher. But this historicity is organological (political as well as noetic and aesthetic), which, as Kant himself indicates (without directly referring to it), is essential to the process: this organology of adulthood must pass through the socialization of reading and printed writing. Foucault will himself become interested in this “organology of the esprit” when, long
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after The Order of Things, which had already given the classical epistēmē a constitutive role in creating images of the world [tableaux du monde],¹⁸ he lights upon what he calls the “techniques of the self”—which for Foucault are related to manuscript writing.

According to Kant, adult or mature society is the “society of the century of Frederick,” the literate public. This society, resting on the increasingly general ability to read and write brought about by the circulation of books, manuscripts, gazettes, reviews, and a new kind of psychic and collective individuation (echoes of Martin Luther and Ignatius Loyola [OT, 321]): this historical form of individuation is an illumination [éclairement], by Enlightenment thinkers, and an explanation [éclaircissement]—Aufklärung in its fullest sense. This is the context for Diderot’s 1751 publication of the Encyclopaedia, a new kind of technical individuation. And in 1798 Kant wrote to Friedrich Nicolaï that “the writing of books is not an insignificant profession in a society that is already very advanced in matters of civilization, and in which the ability to read has become a nearly irrepressible and universal need” (WEK).¹⁹ An “organology of intelligence” such as this requires a new kind of social organization in which scholarly institutions become the impetus for the educational formation of society itself, leading directly to the position taken by Condorcet,²⁰ which nearly a century after Kant’s article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift will result in the institution of mandatory public education as the systematic internalization of this form of attention, by means of attention-capture techniques defined during the Enlightenment with the clear intention of establishing maturity, which Jules Ferry as well calls the transformation from minority to individual adulthood, and thus to the collective expression of “mature” public opinion through the democratic process.

The “battle of intelligence,” which is concomitant with the history of humanity, is also the history of psychotechnics that as it develops into nootechnics transforms both the psychic and social: it is a process of psychic individuation, collective and technical. Consequently, if there is a contemporary history of this battle of intelligence that for the first time is defined economically,²¹ it can only be written about politically and economically if it is inscribed in this older history, which thus bestows upon it the means of specifying the original nature of the techniques and technologies through which this battle finally arrives at the debut of the twenty-first century—which is also the one in which,
for centuries France, along with other rare nations, politically and economically “dominated” the world, . . . nonetheless, the world has awakened and taken its revenge on history. Entire continents are on a quest for progress. Their population is young, gifted, terribly motivated. As we struggle to preserve our heritage, they fight to constitute theirs.22

The divergent forms of attention that constitute the history of the battle for, and the conquest that is, intelligence always consist of pharmaka that can just as easily arm this attention as alienate it (that is, according to Enlightenment prescriptions, destroy or sterilize it by demolishing its determination to reach majority), and this is precisely why intelligence must wage a battle for intelligence: intelligence must fight for itself, and perhaps even against what, within itself, is bestial.

II. The psychopower of stupidity and the industrial politics of intelligence

To engage in the battle of and for intelligence means posing three preliminary questions.

1. The first requires asking oneself about the intelligence that is required to ask about intelligence. This is called reflectivity: intelligence reflecting on itself in its auto-intelligence. Reflection is necessary in order to gain true intelligence regarding what intelligence is and what is at work in the very moment of reflection, insofar as it is itself an individual intelligence caught up in a process of which it is only a part, a process of collective intelligence. Intelligence regarding what is intelligence is a requisite for any engagement in the battle of and for intelligence—along with the fact that a history of intelligence exists, as Kant shows, and that intelligence evolves [devient]. My thesis is that this history is organological; indeed that intelligence regarding intelligence is organological intelligence.

2. The second consists of knowing why it is necessary to engage in the battle for intelligence. Why can’t one just “be” intelligent? This question can be understood in many ways. The first way, appropriate to our epoch, is the one behind François Fillon’s statement that intelligence could become a major factor in our economic struggles. Bacon had already suggested this relative to power in general, and to the struggle for political power in particular, for example, the current power of President Sarkozy and his prime minister and the fights in which they engage: Knowledge is
power. Yet from the outset, within the context of the twenty-first century in France and as François Fillon’s general political discourse, this is a matter of economic power.

Yet it is necessary to know what one is fighting for in this economic battle that though also a battle for intelligence is nonetheless certainly not identical to the struggle for intelligence, and may sometimes be entirely its opposite. The economic battle could in principle be only a “means” of attaining the goal of intelligence. But in the course of this battle a certain reversal seems to appear, such that what might be only “means” becomes “end,” and the end the means. And it further appears that what seemed an economic battle of intelligence, by intelligence, produces its opposite, stupidity, the destruction of attention, then irresponsibility, incivility, “the degree zero of thinking” (TCD, 44).

But perhaps this is a matter of transcending the idea of the “means,” or rather, in order not to simplistically oppose ends and means and to replace thinking in terms of means by thinking in terms of media—by a thinking in terms of an ecology of ends. In fact, a medium—which is not an end—is also not a means to an end: it engenders ends that it is not: it engenders ends in those who finalize—those who desire—through it, in it, and by it. And the technical medium is no more a means than the symbolic medium: this is the place of the life of the spirit, which engenders both the symbolic milieu and the psychic and collective individuation, produced as transindividual, as spirit, but that can also asphyxiate the spirit in forms evolving over time, since this medium, like all technical media, can become toxic.

Consequently, if an organological history of intelligence exists, the reason is that there are also historical and organological forms of stupidity. And clearly, to work toward intelligence is to struggle against stupidity. But in order to accomplish that, in our age, it is necessary to think the organological forms of stupidity of our age, and that requires transcending the gross metaphysical stupidity consisting in believing that technics is a milieu in service to an end that could not itself be technical, that could not itself be organologically constituted and determined. It is this stupidity that makes us think, that forces us to think, as Deleuze says, and this stupidity, which makes us think according to a specific modality of paying attention, is in a fundamental relationship with shame, the shame of being human. But this shame and the thought it causes are constituted by psychotechnical media and are thus symbolic wherever they occur.
In the face of stupidity I am ashamed, and this shame makes me think: it forces me to think—makes me pay attention in a very specific way (called thought), releasing a particular force. (Which? This force, resembling what Kant calls the moral law, is not, however, reduced to it.) But this stupidity cannot make me feel ashamed, and thus makes me pay attention to what is stupid, leading me to wrest intelligence from stupidity, which I know is initially my own: it can only affect me, this stupidity, because it reminds me that I also, I am (organologically) stupid, and that, as children say, in the language of the minor that is nonetheless not stupid (a language that is also that of literature, beginning with the literature called "minor"), 

"he who says it is it."

In other words, before struggling against other intelligences, including against (and through) economic intelligence, which before all else is a form of espionage, and before the question of knowing how to fight with the other forms of intelligence that develop within the framework of economic warfare, in another country, for example, in Asia, the United States, Saudi Arabia, to Abu Dhabi or elsewhere, it is necessary first to begin by battling against one's own lack of intelligence (insofar as it is, organologically, stupidity).  

The battle of intelligence is the battle for intelligent being. How is one to be intelligent and, in particular, how is one to be more intelligent, or at least as intelligent as those who are already very intelligent, and who are "young, gifted, and very motivated"? One should begin by becoming more intelligent than one already is: this begins by advancing one's intelligence, which is also called upbringing, but also to raise the general level of intelligence, most notably in bringing children up, and in ensuring that children raise the level of collective intelligence, including that of their own parents: in ensuring that their parents are adults, as Kant tells us, but also in ensuring that they can distinguish between the majority and minority before the minority of their children who are historically and thus organologically on the way to majority.

To distinguish maturity from minority status for a literate public within the psychotechnology called literature is also to distinguish between production of the mature and the immature mind through the book, and further, what can reinforce maturity or perpetuate minority. And to distinguish maturity from minority requires an understanding of what this elevation means and of enhancing an understanding of this knowledge as the individual and collective battle against stupidity in this sense, as minority, perhaps brought about by pharmaka, themselves the very conditions
of maturity formation: of a maturity both historically and organologically advancing.

3. All of this leads us back to the third and last requirement for any contemporary battle of and for intelligence in the struggle of and with technologies of intelligence, in which psychotechnologies that might produce stupidity by destroying attention transform into the technologies of an individual and collective intelligence whose aim is to constitute a social (political) apparatus unifying all social apparatuses, the economic, juridical, educational, scientific, artistic, and cultural (as well as the medical), and those focusing on society's protection, such as internal and external security, and so on. All of these elements must then be reconfigured according to instrumental conditions surrounding current psychotechnologies for attention capture.

12. Psychotechnologies of stupidity and the new formation of maturity

Any such battle must begin in recognition of the fact that there are instruments of intelligence that are also weapons in a war for minds. These perpetually evolving weapons are concretized today as cultural and cognitive technologies; they have emerged through mutations taking place in numerization. Today's battle for intelligence is in fact one for control of the industrial politics of these technologies, a politics of attention formation, and thus of mature intelligence as "the public use of one's own reason... as a scholar... before the entire literate world." But such a politics must be carried out with an understanding of the consequences of the fact that reading and writing are not what they once were: they have become numeric, hypermediated, and collaborative. These new technologies reject the industrial model based on the producer/consumer opposition (and its link to the professional/amateur opposition): producers and consumers are historically created and opposed by machine-tool industrialization—and the age of grammatization. "New media" technologies call these oppositions into question and constitute the core of hyperindustrial societies, and thus the contemporary industrial economy (which has become cultural capitalism), and they fundamentally restructure the intergenerational connection constituting intelligence as the structuring and restructuring of the retentions and protentions from which attention is constructed.
As a result, the battle over technological development requires intelligence about technology, and intelligence about intelligence in its connection to technology, both of which are currently entirely reconfiguring the intergenerational relationship. The organological conditions required for the formation of individual and collective intelligence are radically changing, particularly given that “individual intelligence” is never individual: individual intelligence does not exist.

If maturity consists of the ability to think for oneself, such thinking is only thinking insofar as it takes place before the entire literate world (the sole basis for democratic majority—in both senses) as the circulation of thought that is always surpassing itself, thought for the other and through the other (through the other as thinker). Thought and intelligence are always already collective: both are part of a process of individuation that is actually a metastabilizing co-individuation of the transindividual, where a circulating intelligence, as interlegere, forms an organological milieu linking minors and adults, parents and children, ancestors and descendants, and the generations containing mind and spirit: pneuma, ruah, spiritus.

Intelligence leads to knowledge, and the battle for intelligence today is what might be called the battle between consciousness industries and societies of knowledge [des industries de la connaissance et des sociétés de savoir]. But any such society requires a social intelligence within which it is possible to live intelligently. This kind of intelligence speaks of accord, of good understanding, and in this regard, the political and economic challenge becomes that of the possible appropriation and control of the technologies of intelligence and their emergence as hegemonic devices for the control of collective behavior and its being kept in a state of structural minority, as what must then be called technologies of stupidity: poisoning by pharmaka as hypomnēmata, which are just as much in service to anamnesis as to hypomnēsis and capable of creating both short-circuits and the long circuits of transindividuation.33

Hypomnesic forms have today become the very heart of an industrial system consisting of psychotechnologies that are in the process of refining somatotechnologies into microtechnologies that have actually begun to modify the very structure of the body, including body shape, and of reproductive—procreative—technologies, as well as the invention of new kinds of bodies and of living beings, genetic modifications, cloning, and so on. The issue of intelligence is more than ever that of pharmaka, and of methods of taking care, of oneself and others, within the new, intrinsically pharmacological context in which we must see ourselves.34
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Intelligence is first and foremost a taking care, of pharmaka through the careful use of pharmaka against the perverse effects of pharmaka. Living intelligently in society means taking care of the social in such a way that the social cares for the individual as individual. Intelligence means articulation of the individual and society in order to overcome their apparent contradiction through a politics of the pharmaka and, more than ever today, through a psychotechnological industrial politics creating a de facto economic psychopower that imposes a psychopolitics of law nurturing this economy and transforming it into a true ecology—an ecology of the spirit.

There is nothing inevitable requiring that time (attention) be captured and monopolized in young brains by marketing, nor that this process should result in the systematic deprivation of consciousness, to the point that it might become literally impossible to (re)educate those organologically conditioned brains that have become prone to incivility and delinquency. Nor is it inevitable that older brains, subject to the same conditions, should find themselves deprived of all responsibility; that is, of their capacity to oppose such conditions. The fact that the United States suffers so massively from attention deficit disorder, that there are a million otaku children in Japan, that China has had to take action against the effects of video games—but alternatively that the battle of and for intelligence has also resulted in the creation of universities with global outreach, in such places as Saudi Arabia, result from the same psychotechnological system of global psychopower formation.

While we wait (though we must not wait contentedly) for such a global outreach system to arrive for all the generations, above all for the children and adolescents worldwide, communicating on SMS networks that are neither postal nor national but electronic and global,35 potentially extraordinarily dangerous for the future as symbolic and actual deprivation created by the instigation of general irresponsibility in a time requiring the fostering of responsibility more than any previous one. But this new phenomenon could also be the pharmacological and organological condition for a new individual and collective intelligence, a new maturity, and a new critique. If we are to carry out a battle for intelligence, that is where we must begin: we must organologically reform the Bildung, reconstituting and re-forming psychosocial attention in the face of these psychotechnologies of globalized psychopower.
§ 3 Mysteries and Drives from *Aufklärung* to Psychopower

13. Psychotechniques and the mystagogy of pharmacological minds (intelligence as a whole)

Well before the advent of psychotechnologies, there were nonetheless both psychotechniques and attention-capture techniques for maintaining capture in a minoritized adult, but capturing children's attention began long before such efforts with adults.¹ Since ancient times, these techniques have been applied in early childhood as lullabies, counting rhymes, fairy tales, oral storytelling, then written, including forms such as comic strips and graphic novels—and now, as “children's programming,” DVDs, video games, MP3s, and targeted youth Web sites such as MySpace and Facebook.

All of these techniques are aimed at attracting and retaining attention, in order to produce *retentions*. Additionally, technologies of the body—somatotechnologies—such as dances, rites, and practices involving physical possession, as well as gymnastics, exercise regimens, and techniques for walking and running—are all echoes of what the Greeks called *epiméleia*, self-care, all either individual or collective techniques for channeling, and frequently for capturing, attention.²

Such techniques resulted not only in the Enlightenment thinkers; they are also, and perhaps most frequently, the basis of mystagogic (if not of all
obscurantist) practices and behaviors. And it is important to remember that the use of attention-capture techniques to construct critical maturity is both very rare (initially limited to tiny ancient Greece and only among “free men”) and quite recent, such as the Enlightenment program for critical maturity in which we [nous] is constituted as everyone [tous], though this does not occur until well after the French Revolution when the spread of public education created “modern society” as such. It is no accident that both “modern art” and Constantin Guys, as Baudelaire notes, arrive along with public education.

In most cases, however, such techniques aim at controlling attention not in order to motivate the courage and will “to know,” to gain knowledge, but on the contrary, to maintain a minoritized-adult condition.

The guardians who have so benevolently taken over the supervision of men . . . having first made their domestic livestock dumb, and having carefully made sure that these docile creatures will not take a single step without the go-cart to which they are harnessed, these guardians then show them the danger that threatens them, should they attempt to walk alone. (WEK)

In the Republic Plato himself uses—and says that aièdes and rhapsodes should use—poetic storytelling techniques to “educate our heroes,” creating citizens’ minds as children’s and thus no longer a threat to the formation of the philosophical mind; this is the reason that Plato, through the dialectic, focuses on having done with the always more or less mystagogic stories and myths of the pre-Socratics in addition to being rid of the kinds of rhetorical “magic” constructed by Sophists.

But on the other hand, Plato also says that such techniques are indispensable for governing the polis by those same philosophers who understand how to take care of it, and who, as what Heidegger will call the “guardians of being,” consequently know how to accede to the Ideas by which the city’s affairs may be appropriately conducted; such techniques will thus be necessary to them, Plato says, in permitting the synchronization (and the unification) of the diachronic (and manifold) bodily and mental activities constituting the polis, such as music and choreography—what Peter Sloterdijk (referring to Plato’s Politics) calls a set of “rules” for managing a “human park.”

I will come back to this last quick point later, since it seems to me that Sloterdijk neglects the fact that there is today no longer any need for directions by “guardians” and that any direction now given is no longer
political: the process of capturing public attention is handled by service industries, cultural industries, and programs synchronizing individuals’ activities into mass behaviors motivated by business plans. In other words, I will claim that Sloterdijk neglects the specificity and the originality of psychopower.

Service industries that utilize psychopower no longer sell anything to a population that thus no longer needs to pay anything: people, having abdicated their majority without being conscious of it, “give themselves” to these industries, or rather, the industries capture them as “available brain time” psychopower enterprises to sell young audiences on the market: minors beneath the legal age of responsibility thus prematurely become adults before the law—that is, before the ça, the id. This is all evidence of our inherent laziness and cowardice, fallible, pharmacological beings that we are.

This is the complex issue of techniques as pharmaka, and of systems of care perpetually readdressing, just as philosophy reiterates itself from Plato to Kant and beyond, the “battle for intelligence” the French government made its priority in 2007. But to manage this battle successfully, we must remember that pharmacological human minds are never satisfied in the state of domestication leading to what Peter Sloterdijk calls “anthropotechnics.” On the contrary, they always need to create fantasies of escape from that control, lying in the shadowy place of mysteries at the heart of those crypts to which, as Heraclitus says, physis (“being” for the mystagogue Heidegger) lovers (philein) to withdraw (kruptestai), where there is light, or fire, or at least warmth—the very crypt before which Heraclitus wants to place his Laws.7

To say it differently, beyond or behind Enlightenment maturity are the intellectual Motivés (even more obscure but no less necessary, encrypting the unconsciousness); and the id, unifying the ego, as the machine of repression and thus of obedience, with the unconscious, which despite everything provides its motives for action, and unifying Kultur (culture as cults, which are always mystagogic in some way—even the most republican ones) with the Enlightenment as the critique of that mystagogy. This is the unity Moses Mendelssohn and Kant call Bildung, which I am calling attention formation, which is an attente, a waiting, and a critical waiting. And I submit that formation of such a waiting could not occur without a pharmacological artifice.
The social practices associated with any attention-capture technique, even those that, like philosophy (which operates through dialectic as an attention-capture technique extracted from the transindividual by means of a maieutic operation that “numbs the mind” confined within a collective retention, anamnesis⁸), are the results of analytic thinking, and of critique (thus of Heidegger’s Existential Analytic, which opens the questions of ontological difference and the History of Being), these social practices, prephilosophical as well as philosophical, are always more or less mystagogic, because all critique is grounded in an economy of desire whose object is intrinsically mysterious—and to that extent desirable (always a disproportion, impossible to measure) desirable. This is Plato’s subject in the Symposium.

This structure of desire and its economy, though through a pathway other than that of critique, generally facilitates both social controls, specifically subjecting minoritized adults to guardianship, and our pharmacological minds’ psychic and collective individuation: the other pathway is that of the idea of Kultur a nation acquires, Mendelssohn asserts, “through social commerce, i.e. through poetry and rhetoric” (QL, 32), which is also the origin of what Freud calls the oneiric language of myths, folklore, and so on, all those fantasies of the imaginary that are simultaneously at the origin of science itself, forming intelligence as a social process of “being-together,” “living in good intelligence,” interlegere. For this reason, pharmacological beings cannot be domesticated for long: deprived of access to fantasy that also instructs, such beings become ineluctably enraged, potentially even savage.

At the same time, certain instructional tendencies are always already present in the working out of these mystagogic psychotechniques of attention capture, which, though they are as powerful as the tendencies toward “laziness and cowardice,” are still not critique. This is what Romanticism discovered in opposition to Kant. Such mystagogic and pharmacological forces do not produce only domestication; on the contrary, the very heritage of this Kultur produced through cults and other mysteries also feeds a desire for “high-mindedness” such that “if only they refrain from inventing artifices to keep themselves in [domestication], men will gradually raise themselves from barbarism” (WEK), and to keep them there over time by instrumentalizing this heritage—for example, as pseudo-identity.⁹
Like Kant, I believe not only that all human beings want to become adults, to the extent that they do not persist in maintaining themselves in their laziness and cowardice, but that at the very moment when the planet has been poisoned by humanity itself, that is, by all of the remedies and poisons that humans have become, its pharmaka, humanity’s future depends on this adulthood for everyone: on a critical maturity’s becoming politically and economically mature, and on the development of responsibility as the concrete form of intelligence that, through the invention of a new industrial model, is the only credible possibility for, as Fillon says, “rethinking the French model from top to bottom.”

It is also my belief, once again with Kant, that even in an age of psychopower, in which the guardians are no longer what they were,

even among the entrenched guardians of the great masses a few will always think for themselves, a few who, after having themselves thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread the spirit of a rational appreciation for both their own worth and for each person’s calling to think for himself. (WEK)

In Kant’s world, this exceptional human being was called an enlightened despot. The powerful themselves, the best among them, the truly powerful among them, grew tired of a power that merely disempowered their subjects (or their clients), a power that allowed them to feel it only through the impotence they imposed on others by locking them into the servitude of minoritization; they themselves (and their descendants) were diminished through the diminishing of those over whom they had power, becoming in a sense the minoritized powerful, reigning merely over impotence, over the unpowerful.

We are, however, no longer in an age of despots, benevolent or otherwise, but of industrial democracies, as Henry Guaino has recently reminded us. The issue is now not the despot’s power, nor even that of a laic head of state, republican or democratic, but of a psychopower manifested through psychotechnologies not concerned any longer even with adopting some mystagogy: they have replaced the power of mystery with that of drives. This means that we must return to the primary concern in the battle for intelligence, which emerges well before that of universality.
14. The organization of juvenile nihilism; irresponsibility as nihilism's achievement

In the age of the television spotlight, the slogan of the channel specifically targeting juvenile consciousness is “Channel Y: television completely turned on [la télé complètement allumée].” To be “turned on” is to be a bit crazy—to be a fantasist to the point of “going too far”: to transgress. What Channel Y channels, and provokes into going too far—for those who define the symbolic order, knowledge of which is transmitted by teachers, through mystagogy, dogma, or criticism—is the drive toward the unconscious. But those forces of the unconscious must then be pressed into the service of destroying the id, short-circuiting the intergenerational play through which such transgression has constructed the id, that is, the construction of care. This is undoubtedly the first time that a psychotechnics of attention, having transformed into a psychotechnology, has not served care, but has rather implemented an attitude of “I don't give a damn” that is not just uttered but strongly asserted—and perfectly cynically.

Channel Y’s milieu is thus performative nihilism as the state of the juvenile mind. And now, the premature maturing of minor delinquents occurs within the (resultant) context of the law’s loss of authority, whose only possible outcome is a correlative, systematic adult infantilization and their becoming-irresponsible; the becoming-prematurely-adult of children is the mirror image of the protracted retardation of their older siblings’ and parents’ minoritization, the loss of their exemplarity. All of this leads to an asymptotic tendency to crystallize a strict psychic and social incapacity to achieve responsibility, as maturity; the new French law regarding juvenile delinquency translates this sad fact into the stone tablets of the law, inscribing it as legal recognition and thus legitimized destruction of the difference between minority and maturity.

This organization of juvenile nihilism results, inevitably, in an aggravated juvenile delinquency—but equally inevitable as a direct consequence of the correlative adult regression is aggravation of larger environmental problems, since delinquency destroys the social environment, often further leading to a degradation of the family environment. Consumer irresponsibility, of juveniles as well as adults—the former prescribing the behaviors of the latter more and more frequently—degrades the familial (and social) environment by both destroying intergenerational
links and weakening laws. But such irresponsibility also, and as a consequence, degrades the natural environment by normalizing waste and “disposability”: nonattachment to things as such. The generational confusion inherent in consumerism destroys any shared concern for taking care of the world and of oneself, self-care as opposed to a consumption resulting in obesity and other “sedentary” problems (such as cardiovascular pathologies): addiction, cognitive overflow syndrome, attention deficit disorder, depression, impotence, and, finally, the collapse of desire.

The current, growing crisis of environmental imbalance, of which global warming is a major part, became the first priority of the French government in 2007, according to Nicolas Sarkozy’s somewhat surprising commitment addressed to the United States on the evening of his election, then including in his first government a Ministry of State for Ecology, Development, and Long-Term Planning. This announcement, a major political act, placed renewed weight on the issue of responsibility, and indeed of shared responsibility among politicians, economic advisors, and technological, developmental, and marketing researchers, and the reformation of the social structure in general, in particular national education and the audiovisual media—and, finally, the people themselves, especially as parents and educators.

Sarkozy’s declaration affirmed the current need to place the issue of care at the very heart of political and economic life as a matter of nothing less than human survival. Suspension of authorizations for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in France corroborates the seriousness of this politics. But the central question is still that of care: carbon dioxide-producing engines, the GMO question, nuclear energy, nanostructures—all require the construction of a new form of attention at the level of psychic, social, and technical (i.e., industrial) apparatuses that by all indications amount to an entirely new social necessity—based on a new form of intelligence: being-together, interlegere.

Still, implementation of psychotechnologies through marketing psychopower amounts to a colossal historic regression creating massive irresponsibility and adult infantilization, through the liquidation of circuits of primary identification with ancestors and generational confusion exacerbated by a constant increase in consumption calamitous on all environmental levels and destructive of the metastability of the entire “human ecosystem” from the infantilized psychic apparatus to the climate system—which are intimately connected by the many kinds of
pharmaka that make up the human world. This regression is mistakenly called “growth”; mistaken because “growth” in this context means merely what becomes larger—whereas irresponsibility is the reduction of what should be larger: esprit—individual and collective mind/spirit, whose modern form is critical consciousness.20

Those acceding to irresponsibility cannot take its consequence seriously, having become unconscious of it. They are stripped not merely of critical consciousness but of consciousness itself: they become nothing more than a brain. As consumers generally, we are becoming systematically unconscious, mocking the consequences of our behaviors while living in a structural I-don’t-give-a-damn-ism that completely privileges the short term and systematically penalizes the long term, whether it be the long term of ancestors (as the authority of the law, whether or not the direct reference is to the Law, and whether or not it is divine in Antigone’s or the biblical sense as Moses—the Egyptian adopted by the Jews—understood it) or of descendants, in the form of the “growth” that gives rise to the multitude, and as responsibility passed on indefinitely (and potentially infinitely) from parent to child.

In the first chapter I introduced the vital idea, also addressed by Hans Jonas in The Imperative of Responsibility, the question of our responsibility, for the first time, of the very existence of succeeding generations, within the specific context of the industrial world. In the second volume of Taking Care, I will show how such a discourse, resting on what Hans Jonas calls a “heuristic of fear,” will simply not permit any response to the challenge of forming a radical new social organization of attention and of care, which would be the only way for world citizens at the beginning of the twenty-first century to take the French government’s message seriously.21

The dangers here are obvious; but it is equally obvious that knowing this is not enough: one must first know what is at stake, what any such danger actually threatens. It must not be constituted by fear;22 rather, it must first be capable of desiring—desiring an object. Yet the fundamental ontology of Sorgefrage, Heidegger’s “care” that then catalyzes all of Hans Jonas’s analysis, entirely ignores the question of desire, without which it is impossible to formulate attention as care if it is true that the object of attention is first and foremost the object of desire.23

An increasingly juvenile (potentially criminal) acting out is now the pathological aspect of desire through which nihilism appears, catalyzed
by degraded social organization mesmerized by a version of “the law of consumption” urging parents to abandon their families to attention-capture apparatuses that destroy in their children the very attention they themselves have abandoned; sadly, all of this takes place far afield of “the sensory.” This (re)organization is a direct and immediate contradiction of the attention any generation is capable of when it is encouraged to take responsibility for transmitting attention—for responsibility itself—and it operates all the more perversely on the young in that it seems to have been prescribed by the older generation itself, as a kind of countercurrent.

Thus, a law prematurely “majoritizing” delinquent minors serves only to ratify, in terms of the legal system itself, a long-term penalization that is of deep concern to Hans Jonas, though Jonas himself does not think of it as such—as a function of the time of preoccupation and care, of what Heidegger calls Besorgen, at the core of which (and only at the core of which) the possibility of Sorge arises, as concern and care of what, in time and as time, transcends all time and becomes a mystagogy.

Heidegger refers to this process as “the hermeneutic circle”; however, what this mystagogy excludes, and what Jonas is incapable of thinking in his dogmatic adherence to ontological difference, is precisely that the time of consciousness, and beyond that the time of existence itself, within which consciousness is formed, is organologically configured by psychotechnologies. We will see through reading Foucault in Chapter 5 that this Heideggerian exclusion follows a motif introduced in Plato’s privileging of consciousness (as gnôthi seauton) over care (as epimêlesthai seautou)—that is, over Sorge.

The organological project of psychotechnics is one in which it is equally possible to care for oneself and others as to delude oneself and to minoritize others, but this is precisely what Hans Jonas does not consider in any way, and this omission prevents his accounting for the genesis of irresponsibility that is his central issue, what he calls the “imperative of responsibility.” At the same time Jonas simply ignores the current regression toward minority and the generational confusion so clearly characteristic of contemporary industrial society, just as he ignores the problematics of attention formation in the absence of which there quite simply can be no responsibility. In so doing, Jonas replicates Heidegger, defining human technicity as the very principle of decline. But Jonas goes further, ignoring Heidegger’s famous citation of Hölderlin in which danger itself
becomes the principle of a salut, a welcome (this is a matter, however, that I believe Heidegger's philosophy never allows itself to face).24

My effort in this chapter has been to demonstrate that in the modern world of interest to Hans Jonas, responsibility is indeed the “age of attention” Kant calls “maturity.” As such, and as achievement of a victory, responsibility is not simply a psychic process, even if it presupposes the individual’s psychic transformation: responsibility is a historic process of Aufklärung. Access to maturity in the Kantian sense requires formation of critical attention that analyzes the law—and can recognize it as a crisis, an evolutionary process that, out of the Enlightenment and throughout the nineteenth century, we have called “progress.” This would mean that maturity, as the historic time of attention, constitutes a specific, systematic kind of care in which the law is a necessary element but could never be sufficient in itself. In the modern age, the law’s authority, which must be respected and which can only be obeyed insofar as it is respected, simultaneously contains two forms of care:

1. Men and women are capable of caring for one another independent of all written laws but within an intergenerational framework of ancestors and descendants; more specifically, we are capable of taking care of children, both our own and all children, precisely as children, as actual minors: absent such care, a function of time and thus incarnated in the generations as a succession of births and deaths—care that is not Kant’s idea of maturity—the law can in no case be imposed as the authority to be obeyed when at the same time the maturity Kant does speak of is not present. Freud found this aspect of care, as the litany of monotheism, to be grounded in the unconscious.

2. Mature adults have the capacity to critique the law precisely because they respect it, and in their critique, they take care of the law in a mature way, affirming the possibility of altering it and conferring new authority on it: that of modernity. But in the spirit of Kant as well as Freud’s theory of desire, since the law is irreducibly intergenerational, it must be inscribed in a transindividual process—configuring what I have called elsewhere a plane of consistency (distinguishing rights that ex-ist from justice that con-sists but does not ex-ist,25 a structure with certain links to what Heidegger calls ontological difference). This second dimension, as a critique of care, is the time of the superego that, as the unconscious force of repression situated in the ego, Freud says links consciousness and the unconscious in what after 1923 he calls the id.
The simultaneous liquidation of these two dimensions of the only authority that could be acknowledged by a maturity constituted within authority, responsible for identifying and taking care of immaturity and attempting to move it toward maturity, amounts to nothing less than the triumph of nihilism and the destruction of desire (of which Heidegger says nothing, but which was already Nietzsche’s central concern). This liquidation takes place as what Max Weber calls disenchantment with modernity (which had already worried Moses Mendelssohn26) reaches its culmination, no longer producing enchantment even for very young children prematurely matured by psychotechnological drives so effectively and systematically targeted as to make them prescribers of their own parents.

15. Disenchantment as loss of the meaning of critique, and the three limits of contemporary industrial development

Enlightenment thinkers’ “modernity,” as Aufklärung—as the expansion of “clarification”—is a rationalization process that, as Max Weber shows, is necessarily also a process of disenchantment, against which Sturm und Drang is an early reaction, according to Cyril Morana (CM, 44); Weber closely analyzes the “sermons” of Benjamin Franklin, the American representative to Enlightenment Europe (who also published in the Berlinische Monatsschrift), to show how the capitalism formed by Calvinistic socialization transforms all beliefs into intrinsically calculable—and thus rationalizable—credit, where “reason” exclusively means ratio and no longer motive;27 “confidence” has replaced “belief.” In such a rationalization process, tradition and all of its dogmas, all of the authority figures it should produce, all of its values are reversed; inevitably, the “enlightened monarch” (and with him, God) must be declared dead.

“Modernity” is thus no longer critique as critical caretaking, the ceaseless submitting of its (dogmatically inherited) basic values to the judgments of a maturity understood evolving from minority, a critically formed attention maturely responsible for the social legacy of the “scholar before the entire literate world” through “the public use of one’s reason,” but rather critique as the discerning of discrete unities, discrete in the arithmetic or algorithmic sense: as calculable unities. Critique becomes “mastery through calculation,” which will culminate in the late twentieth century in various cognitivist models.
The rapid spread of the *Polizeiwissenschaft*, in which Michel Foucault locates the origin of the implementing of political technologies of biopower characteristic of the nineteenth-century bourgeois state, "biopolitics," is the inevitable result. But these power technologies require a grammatisation process that Foucault leaves entirely in the shadows, but that is also pharmacological in that it develops directly from the conditions of care that are now based on calculability, its shortcomings and its poisonous effects, which prevent it from ever becoming a psychopower. This new, fundamental calculability must be applied to *all objects*, very much including objects of desire, which then become increasingly undesirable; eventually they disappear as objects of desire, and along with them a sense of the world's future—if not the world itself.

I have tried throughout a series of works to show that this generalized critique-as-calculability, rationalization, and disenchantment has pushed capitalism to face its *two primary limits:*

1. That the arrival of Enlightenment thought and its translation not only into the French Revolution but into the Industrial Revolution and its establishing of systematized capitalist production are *simultaneously* the pursuit of a grammatisation process of what I call psychotechnics, through apparatuses of behavior control that, as machine tools, allow for the liquidation of workers' skills and thus individual workers' realization of huge gains in productivity and development of a new kind of prosperity. This process, beyond the misery it creates in the working class, inevitably comes up against the limit Marx analyzes as the tendency toward profit reduction.

2. That in the struggle against this limitation on capitalist development, "The American Way of Life" has invented the figure of the consumer whose libido is systematically enticed toward *over*production, socially concretizing the tendency to reductions in profit. This channeling of the libido, operated through attention capture, leads directly to the liquidation of consumers' skills and the massive development of service industries alienating consumers from their existences: their responsibilities as mature adults. In the end, this leads to the liquidation of their desire and that of their children in that they can no longer identify with them, both because parents no longer "know anything" and are no longer responsible for anything (having become big children) and because the primary process of identification is short-circuited by psychopower, through psychotechnologies. This destruction of desire (and of attention
and care) is a new limit encountered by capitalism, not only as a mode of production but as a mode of consumption (as a *mode de vie*, a way of life).

3. But here, as in future works moving on from this one, I am working to define a *third limit*, by which the development of the industrial way of life inherited from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has become toxic not only for the *esprit* and the libido but also geophysically and biologically, and that this limit can be overcome only through the invention of a new way of life that takes care of and pays attention to the world by inventing techniques, technologies, and social structures of attention formation corresponding to the organological specificities of our times, and by developing an industrial system that functions *endogenously* as a system of care: *making care its “value chain”—its economy*.

The pursuit of industrial development will not occur simply through the planetary extension of the way of life found in the West and in modern Japan and South Korea; contrary to the pretenses of dogmatic neoliberalism, through the exportation of the technologies required for their modes of production, Western societies have created industrial competitors and launched a global economic war, the context within which François Fillon made his sweeping political declaration. And this new competition has resulted in destruction of the complex equilibrium that has permitted capitalism’s development to be the simultaneous *social* development of industrial democracies, through a Keynesian organization of distribution under the authority of the welfare state; it is in the context of this war that marketing has become “the instrument of social control” within societies of control, and that the reduction of libidinal energy has suddenly been accentuated.

Capitalism has, then, lost its mission, what Weber calls its “spirit.” This demotivation is a major phenomenon; Weber shows that this “spirit” produced the motivation that made the long-term functioning of capitalism possible. In terms of consumption, the capitalist way of life has become an addictive process characterized by diminishing long-term satisfaction, which has engendered a significant malaise pervading consumption, a malaise that has “replaced culture”—that is, care—if indeed “culture” originates in cults, in attachments to objects constituting a system of care; on the production side there is an ever-increasing sense of “suffering from work,” today translating into worker, as well as executive, suicides.

The neodogmatists—ideologues of neoliberal dogma—respond that these symptoms are merely the epiphenomenological malaise of a
civilization under too much stress, somehow saturated with comforts driving the Old West, in particular Old Europe (and within Europe, Old France, which along with England and Germany is the home of the Enlightenment), to a mortal listlessness in the face of the extraordinary dynamism of the newer industrial countries providing renewed opportunities for the contemporary world: globalization could bring them to a renewed energy of entrepreneurship and labor, allowing capitalism to triumph once again and overcome its limits of profit reduction and declining libidinal energy.

This reasoning, however, neglects a significant fact: any such new world capitalism is utterly incapable of being developed by reproducing the production and consumption modes of the Western industrial democracies, including Japan and South Korea, since the broader exportation of this way of life also means increasing the production of all kinds of toxins for the vast majority of the planet’s population, and in the end can only lead, literally, to the end of humanity—far beyond the “mere” destruction of the psychic apparatus, which is itself occurring at such a pace that this fatal “growth” only continues to spread further. The new global capitalism can in fact renew energies only by inventing a new logics and objects of investment—and this word, investment, must be understood in its widest sense: in terms of both the industrial and the libidinal economy.

16. Democracy as the political organization of care, and the new responsibility of public power faced with declining growth

Not only entrepreneurs and financiers but also producers invest and are invested in industrial systems of production in which they are shaped (and that shape their attention to work itself) through an accumulation of experience marking out a long circuit through which transindividuation is inscribed in the world—in that these producers are not completely proletarianized and/or rendered unstable. For consumers, things are different: they are structurally inscribed on the short-circuit of obsolescence [jetabilité] and of deinvestment in objects of consumption that also amounts to a loss of their knowing how to live—a new form of proletarianization.34

Investment, always attached to its object and therefore long term, is the precise opposite of consumption. When consumption functions for and by
itself, as is the case today, it is propelled by drives that, unlike desires, demand immediate satisfaction. Functioning for and by itself, consumption destroys the desire connecting it to its objects and, as a result, is always investment.

Given the wide variety of systemic environmental disorders that feed each other and are nothing more than the consequences of the destruction of caretaking systems, we face a situation that must be changed, and the consumer is the central factor in this system of autodestruction. The figure of the consumer, the pharmacological being who has been rendered structurally irresponsible and infantile (dependent), must be transcended; that is, taught once again to cultivate care and attention, through the structure of an industrial organization that must be reinvented.

This recuperation must be the task for a new design, conceiving a new industrial intelligence—the true stakes of the battle for intelligence: to reconstitute maturity (responsibility), in the Kantian sense. But this reinvention of maturity must be the responsibility of the industrial age and must take into account

1. the fact that maturity is a historic victory, in the sense that it originates in a developmental stage of an organological medium (and within this organological medium, one of grammatisation) whose core is human life, which never stops evolving and which, with regard to the psychic apparatus viewed through psychotechnics and its ambiguous pharmacological structure, is always susceptible to a reversal of its effects;

2. the fact that the mind is not simply consciousness nor indeed presupposes an unconscious; the mind is a process of production of libidinal energy in which consciousness is a sublimated form (a superego-différence-apparatus), translating into the second major Freudian motif: the psychic apparatus is the id articulating the ego and the unconscious.

Any reinvention of maturity must take these facts into account, for two reasons:

1. On the one hand, the historic conquest of maturity is organological because libidinal economy itself, like the psychic apparatus it forms, is pharmacological—tertiary retentions being at once what underpin the transindividual and what allow for its destruction, that is, through new forms of hypomnémata as psychotechnologies: it is in this limited sense that maturity, the critical attention of consciousness (the critical age of the superego), is itself pharmacologically constructed.
2. On the other hand, the repression of adults and the generalized spread of irresponsibility rely on the destruction of the id by intergenerational confusion, the short-circuiting of primary identification, and liquidation of systems of care as traditional spaces for culture formation. Such are the effects of the destruction of the psychic apparatus by psychotechnological devices of psychopower as pharmaka.

To reinvent maturity is to struggle against the psychopower of new “guardians” who misuse these pharmaka and for whom new “subjects” (in the Kantian sense) are consumers. Any such struggle must be a transformation of the psychotechnologies of attention control into nootechnologies, forming a new kind of critical attention (as responsibility): a transformation of psychotechnologies into nootechnologies forming a social apparatus of collective individuality, just as much as a psychic one, and as widely distributed and shared as possible.

According to Kant, laziness and cowardice are the causes of minoritization that must be conquered if maturity and responsibility are to be achieved. Kant’s challenge is currently taking place within a context of environmental crises compounding psychic and physical pressures unimaginable in Kant’s time, in large part created through the hegemonic abuse of psychotechnologies that, as functions of misbelief, systematically encourage irresponsibility, as well as laziness and cowardice, by methods that are no longer those of political or religious guardians but of marketing (responding to a “return to religion” that is itself deeply regressive). It is in this new context that the battle for intelligence must be reengaged in order to counteract this new form of irresponsible minoritization, as organized regression.

But further, this battle must reengage a politics of the mind and spirit—a noopolitics—that, in this age of psychotechnologies, must also be an industrial politics focusing on technologies of the spirit; these are the conditions without which any necessary reform of our educational institutions will be made entirely in vain, if it really is a battle to take intelligence to a higher level—and individual and collective responsibility along with it—not just to overdevelop, in the framework of economic war, an industrial model that merely creates a frustrating “growth” that has become malignant [méroissance] and is increasingly perceived to be a cancerous excrescence [excroissance].

In their time, Jules Ferry’s politics were a politics of the spirit and a transformation of the psychic apparatus, through interiorization of a
psychotechnique for critical attention formation, and thus of maturity not only in Kant’s sense but in Condorcet’s (as “suffrage”41) as well. Ferry was not confronted by industrial psychopower: current psychotechnologies and the marketing strategies that have become their instruments did not yet exist. What Ferry argued against was not the diverting of attention by the industrial economy and the libido through a process of desublimation, but rather the power of the Church over “souls”—a religious psychopower presenting itself as a noopower of sublimation, the spiritual power of the spirit over temporal spirits (esprits, i.e., minds as well),42 the power of the Saint-Esprit, the Holy Spirit.

In other words, for Jules Ferry it was a matter of substituting laic sublimation for religious sublimation. Such a politics would have to be that of attention formation as historic consciousness as well as critical consciousness; along with public education, which inscribed the principles and the consequences of evolutionism into education in general, the idea of a genesis, and of genealogies created out of a divine origin for the world, gave way to a historical consciousness of humanity’s situation, a consciousness of humanity’s transformation process by itself through its various forms of knowledge such as life skills, technical skills, and theoretical knowledge constituting various disciplinary attention formations as well as basic conditions of human freedom, establishing a universal sense of the first two types of knowledge within both geoanthropological space and prehistoric, protohistoric, and historic time.

“Authority” thus became knowledge grounded in rules for the establishment of a sense of truth no longer proceeding from revelation, that is, not from a kind of family romance broadened to encompass the entire human species but from an interiorization of that Greek invention: logos as a specific type of symbolic medium, a critical medium as critical space and critical time whose literate-ization made the classical age possible; with the spread of the alphabetics, eventually supported by publishing engendered by the arrival of the printing press and, by the nineteenth century, making printed matter accessible to all, constructing the base for modern democracies and industries.

But the public education systems and training programs instituted in the 1880s have been slowly but irresistibly ruined by mass media and the programming industries, in particular by television in the second half of the twentieth century. Today, this state of affairs has taken its calamitous effects to such extremes as Patrick Le Lay and Channel Y, to the point at
which one has to wonder if these industries have not been self-lobotomized, driven to the destruction of public opinion and its replacement by "the audience."

The result has been the transformation of democracy into telecracy, psychopower's economico-political concretization and the ruining of all sense of responsibility, given its increasingly disastrous effects, chiefly on children and intergenerational connections—in the very name of authority. It has become extremely difficult to imagine how any public authority could arbitrate the conflict between psychopower and the attention diversion, on the one hand, and attention formation as the psychic and social faculty of responsibility, on the other.

Just as any idea of a "democracy" of collective maturity embodying Condorcet's concept of suffrage would require the creation of mature individuals, in the sense in which Kant, Condorcet, and other Enlightenment thinkers conceived of constructing a political system of care called democracy, in the very same way a general destruction of systems of care, specifically destruction through psychotechnological attention diversion of the modern political organization of care called democracy, leads directly to the liquidation of "democratic maturity" and "democratic responsibility," that is, to populism.

That is to say: in the face of the care-less-ness of generalized irresponsibility, a new responsibility of public power arises, first and foremost instilling and protecting attention in children and adolescents, but inscribed within the broader challenge of reconstituting systems of care in civil and civilized societies in which political systems can potentially save democracy by reinventing it through organological evolutions and psychotechnologies themselves. Such a struggle could be based only on our having no further doubts about the program's first priority: the battle for intelligence.
§ 4 The Synaptogenesis of Attention's Destruction

17. Attention deficit disorder and the industrial destruction of consciousness

If the battle for intelligence could find renewed energy in the university, which would obviously mean that primary and secondary schools would themselves have to appreciably raise the level of their students, the precondition for any renewal of the educational system would be that the symbolic industrial milieu in which children, adolescents, young adults, their teachers, and their parents live today must no longer be a systematic obstacle to the construction of skills and knowledge through rational and critical attention.

A (re)formation such as this itself would require the regulated interiorization of psychotechnics and psychotechnologies, according to rational criteria by which they can become nootechniques and nootechnologies. These criteria must in turn be framed by mental disciplines encompassing objects of attention through which nootechniques and nootechnologies can produce long circuits of transindividuation and can fight against the short-circuiting of transindividuation—minoritization in the Kantian sense: as laziness and cowardice.

The current destruction of attention as a psychosocial faculty, for example, as destruction of intergenerational relations and their replacements, is at the same time the destruction of that form of institutionally constructed attention called consciousness, con-scientia being the capacity to form long circuits of reason, the basis of reflective consciousness.¹ In
other words, consciousness is destroyed by industrial psychotechnologies in two senses:

1. as the authority that in conjunction with the unconscious and the preconscious forms the Freudian psychic apparatus, focused in the ego;

2. in the sense that for both Enlightenment thinkers and public education, consciousness is formed as a \textit{historical} configuring of the \textit{id}, in which the critical consciousness typical of the mature individual and producing both long transindividuationals circuits as such (i.e., producing them theoretically, in terms of causality) and historical, individual, and collective consciousness formation. This works as an articulating of both the universal history of humanity as a \textit{we}—as a very long circuit—and as the individual history of an \textit{I}; this double structure then becomes a new basis for attention formation as the \textit{political} structure producing modern industrial democracy in the nineteenth century.

But industrial psychopower's destruction of consciousness during the current historical era, in which no form of teaching worthy of the name is possible—not elementary, secondary, nor higher—is also the contemporary destruction of the democratic system of care by a force that by definition does not and cannot \textit{take care}. This force is financial speculation, which has made care-less-ness the central mechanism of its dynamic—a dynamic of malignant growth, a \textit{negative} dynamic: the "dynamism of the worst"\footnote{synaptogenesis}—in that it systematically privileges the very short term and the inevitable psychic, social, financial, and other such short-circuits that result. Replacing capital investment in apparatuses of industrial production with speculation destroys businesses by depriving them of the opportunity to project and plan their own futures, and subjects them to deadly (speculative) competition, a war without mercy and without \textit{rules} that locks them into short circuits.

The ultraspeculative organization of this kind of financial capitalism, as public powers completely deterritorialized and thus completely careless of all local conditions—including social structures—has now significantly taken control of its consumer audience (including journalists and all others addressing the public, literate or not, as scholars or not—scientists, philosophers, professors, writers, artists, etc.), which must adapt to this production apparatus. Ultraspeculation has universalized the telecracy's reign over democratic organizations of care; it is thus the greatest obstacle to the development of an intelligence fitting the requirements of our age,
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for both the encouragement and facilitation of production and innovation—chiefly for the innovative development of durable goods—and the development of a responsible collective consciousness.

In privileging short-term, immediate satisfaction over investment, this drive-oriented organization of speculative capitalism also destroys all the forms of individual investment in a responsible consciousness, thus instigating an “industrial populism” that is all the more antagonistic to educational, familial, and national missions in that its current highest-priority goal is the massive capture of children’s attention from the earliest age,3 provoking widespread organological disorders and the literal destruction of children’s affective and intellectual capacities—and further, provoking dramatic increases in attention deficit disorder through the premature structuring and irreversible modeling of their synaptogenetic circuits, the neural bases of transindividuation and the site of attention’s organology. This system has developed to the point that in Europe currently, “between 1/3 and 2/3 of children now have a television in their bedrooms, according to country and social class (nearly 75% in the lower classes in England). These figures apply to children between 0 and 3 years of age.”4 In the United States, at the age of three months 40% of babies regularly watch television, DVDs, or videos. The percentage passes 90% for two-year-olds, according to a 2007 study done by Frederic Zimmerman and Dimitri Christakis.5 This confirms the results of their 2004 study, which had found that one- to three-year-old children’s exposure to television measurably heightened the risk of developing attention deficit disorder before the age of seven. Reminding us that very young children’s synapses develop as a function of their environment, Zimmerman and Christakis had suggested in 2004 that television could cause significant attentional problems in the course of the development of the psychic apparatus:

It is widely known that the newborn brain continues to develop rapidly through the first few years of life and that considerable plasticity exists during this period. Considerable evidence also exists that environmental exposures, including types and degrees of stimulation, affect the number and the density of neuronal synapses. The types and intensity of visual and auditory experiences that children have early in life therefore may have profound influences on brain development. . . . We hypothesized that very early exposure to television during the critical periods of synaptic development would be associated with subsequent attentional problems.6
Their hypothesis is confirmed by the 2007 results, as in a recent article in *Le Monde* also citing the Aid to Dependent Children office (*Caisse nationale d’allocations familiales*), emphasizing that “an adolescent who watches more than three hours of television per day cuts the chances of succeeding in higher levels of education to half of what someone watching less than one hour per day will achieve.” Without doubt, these are major stakes in the battle for intelligence.

In September 2005, Inserm prepared the results of a study on attention problems and their resultant effects on conduct, for example, on what the study called “oppositional behavior with provocation.” But before it could be published they discovered that in the course of the entire study almost no attention had been given to the detrimental effects of the televisual and audiovisual industries on the study’s young subjects. Inserm had hypothesized that these social and cultural factors were genetically based, so the institute recommended tracking children from the age of three who were supposedly genetically predisposed to antisocial behavior. The amended study, published in the *Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine* in 2007, confirms that antisocial behavior directly linked to attentional deficits developed in association with televisual media is, on the contrary, a significant catalyst of the care-less-ness within social structures that have become detrimental to the life of the mind, in that it undermines consciousness, in particular that of the very young and thus most impressionable: those who need the most care and the greatest attention devoted to their education. This study conclusively showed that the televisual industry destroys education and engenders “the zero degree of thought” (TCD, 44ff.).

Yet television is of course now present in every corner of the globe, and the psychosocial state of the world is equally ubiquitously—in the United States, Europe, China, India, and so on—being overtaken by a colossal deficit of attention, an immense neglect in the form of a *global attention deficit disorder*, stemming directly from the proliferation of psychotechnologies that no political power can now control. Perhaps worse, this situation has been transferred to the professional adult world as the *cognitive overflow syndrome*, the cause of a *regression* of intelligence, and proliferation of modes of consumption that are increasingly destructive to the planet’s future.
Education, psychotechnologies, and referential individuation

My effort in *La Télécratie contre la démocratie* [Telecracy Versus Democracy] is to demonstrate that the current educational system is a nineteenth-century institution of behavior-control programs (TCD, 162) and that it is now time to complete its project, adding to it the instituting of scholastic programs aimed at forming mature attention, through a historical configuration of the *adoption* process that is fundamental in the process of human psychic and collective individuation (see TT3, 138), in which an individuating collectivity's horizons perpetually expand and, ideally, become universal; this historical configuration of adoption is closely connected to historical Enlightenment thought. The adoption process, as individuation, in general captures, formulates, and interiorizes a socially configured system of care as the kind of attention developed in nineteenth-century industrial democracies. In schools this system's psychosocial configuration of care, like the interiorization of the capacity for rational attention (i.e., critique), develops through various disciplines that are all configured by the same psychotechnique: writing.

In the twentieth century, chiefly following World War II and with the development of electronic technologies, the educational system and audiovisual—that is, programming—industries have worked together to capture children's attention through psychotechnologies. By the end of the twentieth century, under immense pressure from marketing—and in the context of the emerging energy crisis, the then-powerful "conservative revolution," and globalization as world economic warfare—this partnership had precipitated a set of conflicting forces, *attentional deficiencies* brought about by psychotechnical attention capture, whose current result is an immense psychological, affective, cultural, economic, and social disaster, and has led to the weakening and increasing fragility of social linkages that at this point are capable only of engendering generalized insecurity and immense doubts about the future condition of all intergenerational relations.

The goal of the programming industries, as the armed wing of the telecracy, is complete control of the behavior-formation programs regulating social groups, indeed their removal from the public education system and their adaptation to immediate market needs. The goal entails their engaging in a struggle with both families and the programming
institutions that since the origins of Western culture have been responsible for transforming psychoethnic programming into the psychopolitical; as Jules Ferry emphasizes, these programming institutions are responsible for laic maturity, beyond inheritance of a tradition or transmission of a revelatory dogma. The founding of mandatory public education, as an institution, is in effect an alteration of the referential individuation process that had previously been the basis of Western society. This systematized care regulating human society became the new configurer of a referential individuation system (TCD, 112): a social group’s formation requires that, within the diverse processes of secondary identification by which a psychic individual can connect with various processes of collective individuation, a dominant referential individuation laying the basis for all others must be present, arbitrating among them and thus forming the basis of the law. This referential individuation is interiorized—adopted—as the superego, transmitted from one generation to another through the course of a primary identification process. But this primary psychic identification is doubled and reinforced by a collective and social primary identification. Systems of care form this primary social identification—for example, as such programming institutions as mandatory public education. Any social group’s unity requires this identification—which on the other hand never produces identity, a central point to which I will return.11

Taking control of such adoption processes means also taking control of the formation of all the criteria necessary for referential individuation. According to Enlightenment thought, in industrial democracies these criteria must be grounded in Kant’s and Condorcet’s sense of maturity; through programming industries and psychotechnologies, however, they have permutated into the intensification of consumption via attention capture, at the price of widespread irresponsibility: they have become the opposite of the criteria inherited from the Enlightenment.

In La Télératie et la démocratie I analyze the general spreading of new kinds of “artificial crowds” and regressive identification processes (50) engendered by the psychotechnologies on which I am focusing here, as well as the institutional dissemination of sociopolitical programs countering the regressive identification processes that for Jules Ferry had already become major motivations for action in a time when “progress” was already engendering resistances that were often archaistic, and when the struggle between the Church and the Republic was at its height.
Writing, as hypomnēsis, the first institutional psychotechnique and the inventor of public space and time, allowed the writer to take control of transindividuation and to make it functional (and conversely, through rhetorical psychotechniques and “logographs,” to create the regressive processes of identification that result in transindividuational short-circuits). The sophistical hypomnēsis critiqued by philosophy places hypomnesic practice in the service of anamnesis, as it was in fact practiced in Plato’s Academy as the foundation of Western rationality. Instructional disciplines in contemporary schools, as critical attention formation, can form long transindividuational circuits on which students can be “inscribed” in the struggle against short-circuiting (i.e., irrationality), constructing a process of referential psychic and collective individuation—in Jules Ferry’s time called “the nation.”

As a general rule and as a process of adoption, individuation brings about a permanent change in the world. This particular individuation, suddenly accelerated by the Industrial Revolution, required an elevated level of both individual and collective responsibility, a “revolution of intelligence” concretized institutionally as public education. But the power exercised by the programming industries’ psychotechnologies today ruins all the benefits of this revolution of (inherited) intelligence, which lasted in France from the Enlightenment through the Third Republic.¹²

Any system of care is a social pedagogy whose goal is to reground primary psychic identification as primary collective and social referential identification, as a function of its organological changes. Attention, always at the base of any care system, is formed in schools, but as a rational discipline of adoption inculcated into the psyche of the student-as-scholar (i.e., rationally adopting a knowledge or skill) before the entire literate world (initially, classmates). This form of adoption, called “reason,” is an education and the simultaneous transmission of long circuits of “human experience” and formation of new long circuits: autonomous individuals dedicated to becoming mature and therefore critical—and before all else self-critical, capable of fighting off the “inherent” laziness and cowardice that persistently arise, but also capable of ever-renewed dedication to the knowledge required in this struggle.

Transmission of these long circuits constituting human experience molds the process of primary collective identification, which is also the base for the process of referential individuation in modern society. But this role is today fundamentally threatened by the telecracy of industrial
populism, which constantly attempts to insinuate itself as a new process of referential individuation intrinsically archaic and gregarious, and which systematically appeals to the very mechanisms Freud describes as regressive processes of identification. Meanwhile, it is national/social group unity that is disturbed: unity is not and never was identity.\textsuperscript{13}

19. The phantasm of national identity

Primary psychic and collective identification is not what leads to identity but on the contrary alterity, singularity that can never be self-identical, is always beyond itself, in excess of itself—more than one, as Simondon says (IPC, 13); this is precisely why new transindividuation long circuits must be formed: individuation is always a “battle of and for intelligence.”

The issue of a national identity (and more generally that of all human groups) is a phantasm occluding the true issue: unity (national, collective, social) itself. A social group—ethnic, national, a union of states—is a unification process constantly transformed by the integration of external elements: food, materials, merchandise, techniques, human beings, symbols, ideas, and so on. Leroi-Gourhan thoroughly analyzes this in L'Homme et la matière,\textsuperscript{14} demonstrating that the “ethnic cell” is pervaded by technical tendencies that alter but do not disintegrate it—in fact, they further integrate it, and the integrations by which this process continuously redefines and metastabilizes its integral unity, as the concretizing of the intelligence it fights for, are ceaselessly raised to ever-higher levels of transcendence through production and projection of a telos, and by reason.

This telos, or outcome, is “the future” as projected by desire. In a democratic society (i.e., a political society), governed by a res publica (in the form of the collective written law), only the future projected by desire can allow for what comes from outside it to be integrated in the best possible manner, as a perpetually renewed manufacturing of unity; this is intelligence (interlegere). The identification process, psychic or collective, primary or secondary, constructs both the psychic and the social reality of what Simondon describes as a never-completed, never-identified, process of individuation (or, rather, completed only when it is terminated: in death) that never produces identity but, rather, unity.

The problematics of thinking through these processes result from what might necessarily be the consequence of such an identity, were identity to occur. But the actual situation is precisely the opposite: identification is
endless because the individual (psychic as well as collective) never stops changing (this is called “existence”). Thus, primary identification’s function, as opposed to secondary identification, is to provide a system and a set of criteria for the arbitration of inevitable conflicts among secondary identifications occurring in a psychic system as it matures. This arbiter, transmitted first by the parental imago, allows the individual to adopt successive personalities as functions of the telos being projected from primary identification—but which never provides even the least shred of “identity”; once again, on the contrary, this power to alter identity is the very “poetry” of the human being who can always say “je est un autre,” Rimbaud’s declaration echoing Pindar, which Nietzsche turns into a maxim: “become what you are!”

Secondary identifications, then, form the “fabric of alterations” through which patterns are drawn on the historic loom of the always both psychic and collective individual, who can “become what he is” only through integrating the new—and who, if he should reject this need, is condemned to disappear. That identification can never be fully integrated, transforming what it integrates by submitting it to the primary identification’s arbitration (by “unindividuating” it); it is a fact that must be specifically analyzed, particularly since it is collective primary identification calling up a referential process of individuation, fully understanding that the issue to be explored relates to referential individuation’s transformation. But this transformation is precisely the battle for intelligence, and thus a matter of skill and knowledge to the extent that they are capable of forming a system of care. My undertaking here is to offer an introduction to this problem: that referential individuation is always organologically conditioned.

In our disrupted age, amid the confusion and negligence catalyzed by the psychotechnological destruction of attention, it is difficult to remain dispassionate: regressive identification processes lead to “crowd psychology,” archaic processes resulting in identity drives that are poison to unification, yet these regressive phenomena have now worked through the telecracy to become dominant. In such circumstances, children are encouraged to construct themselves as referential individuations (but having neither authority nor intelligence), resulting in identification not with parents, nation, or any idealized object but with merchandise and brand names.

Telecratic devices destroy the referential individuation process toward which Jules Ferry was already struggling in his confrontation with a new
adoption process produced by industrialization (which is itself both a vast organological revolution and the appearance of new stages of grammatization; TCD, 160); the Industrial Revolution imposed new responsibilities on human beings (whatever they were) aimed at the necessity of their finding themselves relentlessly challenged to adopt, and to have adopted, such new objects and techniques. In this constantly changing context, adoption came to be experienced as endless becoming (in which ontotheology, what today might be called disenchantment, fell into neglect).

But when capitalism encountered its first limit—the tendency toward lower profit levels and simultaneously the invention of the image of “the consumer”—the programming industries, whose mission was to reprogram public behavior, substituted this consumer image for programming institutions in an effort to impose another process of adoption, but at the price of what led to the destruction of the entire system of care. By the end of the twentieth century, the consumer had become an increasingly addictive and irresponsible pharmacological being, which in turn has led to a confrontation with capitalism’s second limit, the tendency toward lower libidinal energy, while experiencing what Marcuse analyzes, through the emergence of television, as a process of desublimation.

20. Organology of the education system

Jules Ferry’s educational system developed alongside the industrial transformation of editorial practice: the first great editors appeared in the later nineteenth century, and newspaper presses brought about the possibility of daily papers with enormous readerships. The technical infrastructure necessary for the formation of a mature reading public, in both Kant’s and Condorcet’s sense, was in place. And this convergence made Ferry’s undertaking possible; the printing of scholarly financial manuals by public institutions became economically conceivable, and the programs being regularly redefined by an official known as the inspector general could be updated and republished while the very transformations created by the acceleration of the adoption process became industrialized.

Also, the nineteenth century was already producing devices (photographic, phonographic, cinematographic) that would become the basis of psychotechnologies by which the programming industries could in the twentieth century take control of the process. These conditions united to create the programming industries’ psychopower, to overturn
the educational system’s role as the principal social apparatus for the systematic formation of care as shared responsibilities and the construction of maturity. Now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, in an organological context in which numerization functionally and instrumentally articulates both cognitive (of information) and cultural (of communication) technologies, a new coordination of programming industries and programming institutions must be carefully thought through, instituted, and regulated according to organological criteria.

Such an approach to (educational) programming institutions must presuppose that

1. in a democratic political society, the education system is also what instrumentalizes citizens as a literate public (that has knowledge: i.e., can read and write);

2. citizenship is psychic and collective, conforming to a process of referential individuation grounded in shared knowledge;

3. individuation connects and articulates the synchronicity forming the we with the diachronicity creating the I; this articulated connection then forms idiomatic reality: all idiom, in fact, is just such a structure, and the individuation, informed and knowledgeable, that education creates is the language of instructional disciplines, formal idioms, constructed through the idiomatic individuation.

Formal idioms are those whose rules are in principle articulatable and that are capable of being made diachronic (forming “schools of thought”) only through strictly controlled procedures: conforming to standards of testability, scientific discovery, establishment of proofs, noncontradictory presentation, and so on—all on an axiomatic basis that is still always mystagogic without being dogmatic: a provisional, hermeneutic mystagogoy, infinitely soluble, consisting of knowledge that is endlessly open to new interpretations. The same is true of the kind of reason inscribed in the laws of psychosocial individuation, knowing that individuation, properly understood, is its modification—and is therefore both temporally and factually impossible or, in other words, only possible as the infinite.

Training in disciplinary idiomatics in the course of an education, then, constructs a we in the Husserlian sense; for example, the we of the geometricians, but equally a political we, in which the educational system articulates a logic of formal idioms (of which what we call “formal logic” is but one case), disciplinary idioms emerging from the logic of attention formation—once again, the condition for maturity. Systematic education
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is by definition the location of the formation and the interiorization of both a political organology and an organology of rational knowledge; this double dimension, political and epistemological, constitutes the we that,\(^\text{23}\) as the basis of communal life constructed through referential individuation, is the system of care we call “industrial democracy,” which we must remember was created through and on a “battle for intelligence.”

However, any organology thus interiorized is first and foremost the product of a hypomnesic exteriorization that has conferred all its pharmacological powers on hypomnesia—the good and the bad ones, those forming short-circuits within transindividuation as well as those weaving themselves into long circuits. As the transformation of psychotechnics into nootechnics, the education system gives rise to anamnesis derived from hypomnesia,\(^\text{24}\) through collective individuation understood as transindividuation forming long circuits.\(^\text{25}\) And that means that rational knowledge, and along with it the entire educational system, crafts new symbolic milieux linked to what initially produced, as the grammatization process, dissociated symbolic milieux.\(^\text{26}\) These are social vehicles in the process of desymbolizing and dissociating, the care-less-ness endemic to the West as, for instance, the philosophy/sophistics conflict, a conflict at the heart of rational knowledge.

A scholarly education, as the interiorization of organology, consists entirely of psychotechniques for capturing and fashioning attention, transforming it into nootechniques through the interiorization of disciplinary criteria. Embedded in these criteria are the rules governing the practice of any organology—such as the rules for rewriting in mathematics, as the anamnesis of the long circuits grounding those rules in reason (that is, by going back to axioms) transferred through the course work assigned by teachers and training programs. Certain organs—the eye, the hand, the brain—must be coordinated for reading and writing to take place, but the entire body must first be trained to sit for long periods of time. “Children are sent to school first of all not with the intention of learning something there but finally to be trained to remain quietly seated and to respond quickly to what they are ordered to do” (RE, 96). This observational apprenticeship, neutralizing children's motor functions (by capturing their attention) is the base on which an object (attention) can become the object of knowledge—a constructed object—through the anamnesis of transindividuation circuits (instruction) reconstituted by memorization and the mobilizing of the tertiary retentions consigned to schoolbooks.
and manuals. Then the student begins to produce these circuits himself or herself by interiorizing and remaking them through classroom assignments. Through this process the nervous system learns a wide variety of attentional attitudes, raising the level of concentration (attention span) born of synaptogenesis. Brain-imaging technology allows us today actually to watch this process in action.

Transindividuation circuitry is inscribed, and in some sense written, into the brain as synaptic connections. Insofar as social organization is a collective individuation metastabilizing the reified individual forms of symbolic media associated with individuation, supported by tertiary retentions (technical organs, mnemotechniques, and psychotechniques increasingly analytic and discrete as they are grammatized), it is engrammed into the individual brain’s cortical and subcortical zones and through them controls all physiological organs.

The education system, like all systems of care, is charged with clearing the way, transmitting, individuating, and transforming social organology’s technical and physiological circuitry, as the id’s intergenerational construction. And these are the very circuits psychotechnologies short-circuit and destroy, along with the education system (and democracy itself as a political system of care).

Somatotechniques and psychotechniques acquired through hypomnēmata linked to organs of the individual psyche aimed at forming a collective individual (i.e., a “course of study”) organize access of the group of young people—the generation—gathered together in the course (a word designating a process) to their otium, which is usually translated as “leisure”.” Somatotechniques and psychotechniques acquired through hypomnēmata linked to organs of the individual psyche aimed at forming a collective individual (i.e., a “course of study”) organize access of the group of young people—the generation—gathered together in the course (a word designating a process) to their otium, which is usually translated as “leisure”. Scholarly study is effectively the legal and even mandatory suspension of the requirement to do subsistence work; we pharmacological early twenty-first-century beings have long forgotten this fact, but in Jules Ferry’s time it was a great novelty. A scholarly education (then and now) ennobles children and youth thus (but only thus) able to enter the next generation, of mature adults whose maturity is precisely a nobility, a sovereignty, achieved in the struggle to pass beyond minority in the battle for intelligence that each person manages more or less alone.

In ancient Greece we would have spoken not of otium but skholē, “contemplation,” the privilege of citizenship (i.e., of nobility), reserved for those not needing to undertake menial tasks, as both Plato and Aristotle often emphasize. “Anamnesis,” as the product of dialectic, permitted those free of utilitarian constraints and of all personal interest—and
thus sovereign—to rise to the level of idealities, the objects proper to the skholē just as much as to the otium. Idealities are thus the objects proper to scholarship and to those who, even in English, we call scholars.

Anamnesis involves the interiorization not only of dialogue (which, as dialectic, is an attentional psychotechnique Socrates calls maieutic) but of its hypomnesic traces of transindividuation's long circuitry. Rational knowledge of this circuitry is what we call heritage (as a body of disciplines); anamnesis is the force generating the dialectic of thought with itself: dianoia. In this sense, dianoia is thought's freedom, its nobility organologically engaging the mental exercise of active reason: Kant's "maturity." But this freedom, spanning rational disciplines—the transindividuation creating all signification (ideas, axioms, theorems, theses, basic principles, the formalized content of all the genres of which academic courses and classroom lessons are abbreviations)—projects learners who are becoming scholars toward the plane of consistencies: of nonexistent objects. Nobility of mind provides the freedom to propel oneself beyond what exists and, a fortiori, beyond subsistence as the condition of what exists. Nobility of mind is reason seen as the faculty of projecting the objects of the desire for knowledge as infinite.

Reason as freedom, to critique, discern, analyze, and resynthesize after having analyzed—freedom to reinvent, the basic power of rational imagination—this reason is synthesized in its potential capacity to project ideal objects that do not ex-ist but con-sist, as protentions, and as the double desire for knowledge as such and the infinite expansion of ideal knowledge. Such protentions are created only by interiorized retentions in the form of long circuits of disciplinary transindividuation.

These are the objects at which the skholē and the otium aim; Plato calls them eidē, and they are the objects of eidetic analysis by which Husserl addresses what he calls "the nucleus of intentionality," unifying the retentions, protentions, and attentions formed as their manifestations. Within the disciplines and schools of philosophical thought now called "phenomenology," these "intentional nuclei" are the ideal objects projecting all rational knowledges. And these objects organize these knowledges into what Husserl calls "regional ontologies" (regions of the knowledge of what is).
21. Peer unity, reconstruction of collective intelligence, and the new organological connections

Protentions formed and projected by the mature being's reason as ideal objects, which do not exist and which will never exist, but which guide the rational existence of pharmacological beings such as we humans, are just as much the objects of desire as of rational sublimation, the fruits of fantasy (i.e., of the id) become science. Knowledge organizes inter-generational relations according to specific procedures that are organologically limited: there is nothing simple about the image of Plato seeing Parmenides as a father figure.

The education system retraces modes of access to these nonexistent objects, these idealities-as-consistencies, and this process is methodological: it is the reconstruction of the advances (methodos) traced by a society's ancestors and that is retraced by descendants who return to them again and are strengthened by the best among them. This track might be called science and knowledge, the path along which the generations become mutually reacquainted on a nonethnic, nonreligious basis, the only solid way to unite those in an industrial society, and what absolutely ruins the programming industries' attempts at organizing generational confusion, while in passing destroying consciousness and id, psychic and social apparatuses. Rather than critical mature consciousness they prefer archaic reactions fusing all parts into one.

Public mandatory, laic, national education can control the process of organizing adoption of hypomnesic psychotechniques, knowledges, foreign languages, immigrants, progress itself, incessant industrial novelty, the indeterminacy rising out of an always-accelerating future, and so on—and it can do so by authority of idealities through referential individuation, the common horizon of all desires. It need only allow for conflict arbitration among the diverse forms of individuation that citizens and groups of citizens adopt; the education system underpins the primary, collective process of republican identification. But that means that the education system must also prioritize the organization of access to these idealities (with regard to the organological context that in the next chapter we will see creates an attentional mutation that places new requirements on the education system).

Schools' fundamental mission is obviously not to produce anything like "national identity": on the contrary, it expands national difference and
alterity in that it intensifies the process of individuation psychically as well as collectively, always pushing it to new singularities. Individuation is never finished; it never exists as identity (as a stable state), but consists as process: individuation is always to come, and thus is always open only to a future. On the other hand, in projecting a future—and therefore a desire—individuation produces unity in the social body, at the national (and perhaps—tomorrow, one might hope—European) level.

As a tool in the process of referential individuation, the late twentieth-century education system entered into conflict with those cultural industries engaged in decomposing both the diachronic and the synchronic, replacing the I and the we with the one and thus confusing them, just as they confuse the generations by transforming associated symbolic milieux into dissociated and desymbolized (desublimated) ones. Moreover, these cultural industries then construct a symbolic medium in which we live; this development is inherent in any industrial society, let alone a hyper-industrial one.

But this is not a question of rejecting psychotechnologies or cultural industries but of transforming them into technologies of mind, into nootechnologies. It is a question of revolutionizing those industries that have become the organological infrastructure of the battle for intelligence—which is, of course, an economic battle, and such industries are the arsenal—submitting them to regulatory control that has been adapted to this situation, but also providing them with research and development sectors that have today been completely eradicated (particularly in Europe) and by supporting them through national and European research programs.

The final goal of such programs would need to be the creation of a new system of care, engaging families, elementary and secondary schools, and colleges and universities, on the one hand, and on the other, reengaging an editorial system that has transmuted into the principal impetus for cultural industries and programs; all of these must serve an industrial model rethought to produce an organological transformation in individual and collective intelligence. And all this must be accomplished in and through an industrial model that has moved beyond the consumer age. The great problem of the school today is initially that of knowing how in the future it will be possible organologically to design

1. educative structures (programming institutions), charged with constructing this intelligence as noēse through the critical interioriza-
tion of hypomnēmata, technologies of the mind that have now become psychotechnologies;

2. cultural industries (programming industries), just when a new associated technical medium has appeared, aid along with it both numeric transindividuation technologies revealing a new form of hypomnēmaton and a new figure, the “amateur” who is no longer anything like a consumer and who wants to know\textsuperscript{35}—to be individuated.

The hypothetical school whose primary task would be organizing hypomnesic interiorization could only be possible through careful organological evolution. Today’s version of that school is generally industrial and technological, developing many devices as well as psychotechnological and cognitive networks leading to new kinds of behavior. But this careful evolution would require alteration of the entire knowledge-creation chain in this new instrumental instructional device for shaping the mind,\textsuperscript{36} aiming at not only shaping \textit{what is} but what is \textit{to come}.\textsuperscript{37}

In turn, that would mean providing the entire educational community (teachers and students) with a \textit{genealogical intelligence} aware of its hypomnesic base, in the form of analyses of the grammatization process leading to the transindividuation process and leaving that base’s most recent forms behind in order to return to an older one: a history of attention construction as the formation of disciplinary transindividuation circuits. Such instruction would have to teach strategies for \textit{paying attention to psychotechniques of attention formation}, paying attention to technological reflectivity.

Only a genealogical thinking about knowledge revealing this originally technological (hypomnesic) dimension could lead to an understanding of \textit{how} knowledge becomes technological in the modern sense (i.e., industrial); technoscientific knowledge is the central function of the current system of production and consumption. It then would become possible to critique this function and this system positively in terms of its future, of its \textit{intelligence}. Foucault provides a major point of departure in his project of defining just such a genealogy. At nearly the same moment at which he declared that it was conceivable to “develop an analysis of power that would not simply be a juridical, negative conception of power, but a conception of a technology of power” (1981),\textsuperscript{38} he opened the site for a study of hypomnesic knowledge techniques, analyzing psychotechnologies of attention in \textit{Techniques de soi} (1982) and \textit{Ecriture de soi} (1983), reintroducing the issues he had already sketched out in \textit{The Order of Things}. We
will come to see, however, that the biopolitical analysis dominating Foucault's last works is in some ways an obstacle to a possible psychopolitical thought, a critique of the to-come brought about by psychotechnologies. Before coming to these issues, however, we must define the context in and through which psychopolitical thought is relevant to us today—to those of us attempting not to regress to minority status (to the status of one). Thus, we must further explore the current state of the attention for two reasons:

1. Because of the classification of an attention deficit as a disorder widely prevalent in the United States, attention has now been thematized there in a number of ways, not only in the areas of cognitive psychology, psychiatry, pediatrics, and pedopsychiatry, but equally in education science, which thinks and carries out its battle for intelligence across the Atlantic, and completely organologically.

2. Ergonomics and cognitive economics are currently engaged in research programs applied to marketing and to the conception of the services and interfaces of information and cognition technologies, whose ambition is to construct an economy of attention.
§ 5 The Therapeutics and Pharmacology of Attention

22. Deep attention, hyperattention, and attention deficit disorder: A generational mutation

The studies conducted by Dimitri Christakis, Frederic Zimmerman, and others on whom we will call here clearly show that psychotechnologies, as the weapons of the programming industry in its struggle against programming institutions for control of the referential individuation process by short-circuiting the process of primary psychic and collective individuation through attention capture, point to the destruction of attention as such through attention deficit disorder.

What parents and educators (when they are themselves mature) patiently, slowly, from infancy, year after year pass on as the most valuable things civilization has accumulated, the audiovisual industries systematically destroy, every day, with the most brutal and vulgar techniques, while accusing the family and the education system of this disaster. This carelessness is the primary cause of the extreme attenuation of educational institutions—as well as the family structure.

In order to be made available to marketing imperatives, the brain must early on be literally deprived of consciousness in the sense that the creation of synaptic circuits responsible for the attention formation resulting in “consciousness” is blocked by the channeling of attention toward the programming industry’s objects. The young brain, having been treated in this way, disaffected—and which takes all the more risk of incurring an attention deficit (and failure at school) if it has been exposed early on to television programming, such as Channel Y—is that much more
available to the reconstruction of transindividual long circuits that have characterized knowledge throughout the course of human history.

This is precisely the knowledge that the education system and its intergenerational relations must transmit for a society as a system of care to form, and precisely what the programming industry, through its psychotechnologies, destroys. Yet it is only as a result of such psychotechnologies, activated by the programming industry and the cognitive technologies emerging from the recent numerization of communications, that one must think (and that it is possible to think) the future of teaching.

The organological mutation leading to psychotechnologies' appearance, particularly with the development of numeric media, has in turn led to what Katherine Hayles has analyzed as a cognitive change in the attention level, and thus to what she has described as a generational mutation: "we find ourselves in the midst of a generational mutation regarding cognitive behavior, one that poses serious challenges to every level of education, including universities." This mutation occurs through what Hayles calls hyperattention, which she opposes to deep attention. She characterizes deep attention as the capturing of attention by a single object, sustained over a long period of time; her example is reading a Dickens novel. Hyperattention, on the contrary,

is characterized by a rapid oscillation among different tasks, in the flux of multiple sources of information, in search of a heightened level of stimulation, and having a weak tolerance for boredom. . . . [D]eveloped societies have for a long time been capable of creating the kind of environment in which deep attention is possible. . . . A generational mutation has taken place, transforming deep attention into hyperattention. (GD)

If hyperattention is actually a "generational shift," as Hayles points out, we must explore the possibility of achieving a synthesis between these two types of attention.

A report from the Kaiser Family Foundation entitled Generation M: Media in the Lives of 8–18 Year-Olds, indicates that "the average young American spends six-and-a-half hours with media each day, including schooldays. But given that this time can be spent with multiple media, the average total is eight-and-a-half hours, per day." The report also finds that the reading of printed books "is the least practiced form of media by young people in their spare time." When the young Americans observed by the Kaiser Foundation do work assigned and required by teachers, they
do it while multitasking, remaining connected to various media, and as a result, their "desire for a higher stimulus level rises." But this research into stimulation, Katherine Hayles notes, is "also associated with Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)." Analyzing an attention deficit–hyperactivity disorder generation, Hayles also concludes that

high school and university students are taking Ritalin, Dexedrine, and other equivalent drugs in order to prepare for important exams, ... searching for cortical stimulants that will help them concentrate. ... Such compensatory tactics have been developed in order to conserve the benefits of deep attention by means of chemical intervention into cortical functioning. (GD)

Hayles, like Zimmerman and Christakis, then refers to synaptogenesis:4

Plasticity is a biological characteristic of the brain; humans are born with a nervous system ready to be re-configured as a function of their environment. ... The cerebral system of a new-born goes through a pruning process by which the neuronal connections that are activated are reinforced and strengthened, just as those that are not activated wither and disappear. ... Cerebral plasticity continues through infancy and adolescence, even in certain respects into adulthood. In contemporary developed societies, this plasticity means that the synaptic connections in the brain co-evolve with environments in which media consumption is a dominant factor. Children whose growth occurs in environments dominated by the media have brains that are wired differently from humans who have not reached maturity under these conditions. (GD)

That is to say, at least for certain among them, adulthood.

John Bruer, president of the James D. McDonnell Foundation, cites similar analyses in recommending a tight coordination among the neurosciences, the cognitive sciences, and education in further studies focusing on cerebral imagery, which can show "the correlations between observable actions that subjects are engaging in at the very moment the image is recorded, and, at the same time, the metabolic processes going on in the brain" (GD). Researchers at the Weill Medical College of Cornell University have thus observed, as a result of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), that six-year-olds playing video games show significant differences from a group simply watching videos. As a result of this study, which concluded that it is the brain's structure that "changes through playing video games
at a suitable age,” Katherine Hayles’s hypothesis is that “stimulation by media, if it is structured appropriately, can actually contribute to a synergic combination of hyperattention and deep attention, which could have interesting implications for pedagogy.”

23. Mature synaptogenesis

As Hayles reminds us, reading is itself a powerful technique for reconfiguring the brain’s active structures. When it is introduced at an early age, as is the case in developed societies, it is as though the process of learning to read—from beginner to experienced reader—contributed significantly to synaptogenesis. In environments dominated by the media, in which reading is a minor activity compared to other forms of media consumption, it might be expected that the synaptogenetic process would differ significantly from one resulting from environments in which reading is the primary activity. (GD)

Particularly clear here is the way in which synaptogenesis is a translation, at the psychic level, of the process of collective individuation supported by the technical process of individuation (especially psychotechniques) and a neurological process of individuation in the brain that itself, in turn, supports psychic individuation; as a translation and as this neuronal individuation, here synaptogenesis is Freud’s sense of “conscience” as the construction of an attentional apparatus capable of developing into critical consciousness in the Kantian sense of “maturity,” which is precisely the goal of the modern, democratic education system. But as Kant indicates, the condition here is that such a conscience can be “written” before, in, and through a public that reads, one that has developed a synaptogenesis forged by the specific psychotechnique that is always the basis of rational knowledge and that always “cabla” and “connecta” the central nervous systems of the intelligent ancestral generations.

As for the following generations, the Kaiser Foundation study found that they will read very little, and that at ever-earlier ages their attention will be splintered among many information streams with which they will “hook up” simultaneously. Thus, Katherine Hayles concludes that their synaptic circuitry could not possibly be the same as their ancestors’. And after having emphasized the fact that hyperattention can still be quite useful for numerous socialized activities (such as air traffic control), she
develops the thesis that a coordination of deep attention and hyperattention is both possible and necessary to the education system's evolution. She begins her support of this contention in referring to another study, done at the University of Rochester, demonstrating that one of the principal motivations of the generation characterized by hyperattention and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder for playing video games is that the games provide active and critical training in which the player is required to learn.

At the conclusion of her study, Hayles provides a number of examples of possible connections between the two kinds of attention, mentioning in particular the University of Southern California experiments involving a class that had been organologically reconfigured on the Internet to switch the roles of teacher and students who, having been invited throughout the study to participate in it, thus individually and collectively exploited resources available in real time—always within a multi-tasking context and an attentional methodology that was distributed if not dispersed. Other experiments have explored the possibility of augmenting deep attention's capacity, as opposed to hyperattention, to migrate toward objects of more traditional study, for example, in terms of what Katharine Hayles considers the proper work of teaching: creating the progressive links merging Facebook.com with The Education of Henry Adams, or going to the video game Riven through Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom!

Hayles argues that out of such examples a new conception of the devices supporting the educational environment can occur:

Along with the tendency toward hyperattention that is already evident in the universities, these questions become urgent ones. The numeric media are offering the resources to face these challenges, both in permitting the reconfiguration of the space in which courses are offered, and through the opportunities they present for establishing bridges between deep attention and hyperattention. (GD)

These propositions, which question in particularly propitious terms any organological consideration of the conception of the psychic—as well as the education—system, however, present many problems and call up, if not objections, at least some preconditioned remarks—remarks that specifically anticipate the biases that might appear in Hayles's thesis:

1. Qualification, by the superlative hyper, of cognitive behavior that she sees as a generational mutation as not in fact being one.
2. The question of the symbolic industrial milieu dissociated—desymbolizing and deindividuating (GD)—from its enormous influence, its legitimacy, and its objectives; of its regulation, and a fortiori of its prescription through public power; this question is never asked.

Yet it is incredible that the sole amelioration of the organological milieu as classroom suffices to fight against the programming industries for what remains, in every case, their principal motive: to take control of the process of referential individuation and, in order to do this, to short-circuit the education system and all intergenerational relations, be they familial or reconstituted through knowledge as *epistêmê*, in the Foucauldian sense, and as reason—particularly as the reason required to live together.

There is a great danger in suggesting an agreement between *deep attention* and *hyperattention* if this agreement does not consist essentially, structurally, and methodologically as a *critique* in the Kantian sense, an analysis of limits and of a regrounding of *hyperattention* as such. “In the Kantian sense” means not as denunciation but as thought, and through an attentive examination of all the evidence pertaining to the revelation of *deep attention*.

Were this not the case, the difference between the two types of attention, and insofar as only *deep attention* (produced through the necessary synaptogenesis) can lead to maturity, would not be rendered sensible or even thinkable for and through the “M generation” whose classroom, whatever its organological base, is charged with producing generational unity as a result of not being based on the consummation of objects and the flow of information but on the process of referential individuation (psychic and collective) from which knowledge is constructed; that is, on an intergenerational rapport underpinned by literary tertiary retentions.

24. Hypersolicitation of attention and attention deficit

To take these points further, we will have to go deeper into the question of knowledge itself and the point at which attention’s mutation leads to the appearance of a *hyperattention*, since rather than as a hyperattention, what Katherine Hayles analyzes presents itself from the outset as an attention not only distributed but dispersed, disseminated, undisciplined. And in the example of air traffic control as a possible use for this form of attention, what is of primary utility is connected to vigilance,
which is, strictly speaking, a form of attention without consciousness, a characteristic of wild animals.

The animal nervous system, whose priority is to provide a defense against predators in the fight for life and the instinct for survival, also "multitasks," or, more precisely, as informatics would have it, must be capable of managing "background tasks." A grazing animal, for example, a stag (a forest herbivore who will return in the second volume of *Taking Care*), is vigilant at the same time that it grazes, first with regard to the possible proximity of predators; it can, moreover, even while grazing and protecting itself, also protect its young, as well as its grazing mate, who is herself protecting her young.

What Katherine Hayles describes is obviously much more complex than a simple animal vigilance. But to address hyperattention is to use a superlative indicating that such cognitive behavior is concentrated on its object, if it is true that attention is always more or less a modality of concentration on an object. What Hayles calls hyperattention seems to me rather to suggest an intermediary situation between vigilance, as the nervous system's activity in aid of the survival instinct, and what is called, in psychoanalytic psychotechnics, floating listening.

These are the two forms almost paradoxically limiting concentration to the degree that the former (deep attention) is distributed between two centers, the one real (e.g., the grasses on which the stag grazes), the other possible (the feared predator), or perhaps the one real (the grass) or other "real"s that are "ex-centered" rather than "con-centered" by attention (the mate and her young), the other still possible and all the more important if it is in fact actually less real (the ephemeral predator that can nonetheless become terrifyingly real at any moment). Two centers constructing a double-focused concentration and, in some sense, an equivocal, elliptical concentration. More than two centers make a network, and many attentional configurations are certainly possible there, since synaptogenesis interiorizes a technicity allowing them to be discerned and retaining them; this technicity is not available to the stag.

In floating listening, which is equipped with an interwoven symbolic medium structured "like a language," two signifying chains are in play (that of the analysand who speaks associationally and that of the analyst who associates in parallel), interacting and activating the unconscious—but through an accidental logic. Thus, this kind of listening is called "floating": its "logic" is like that of a dream and the work of a dream, and
therefore perhaps connected with what Katherine Hayles describes as hyperattention, as the possibility of accidental connections.

In fact, there is a certain hesitation in these descriptions of hyperattention between, on the one hand, a solicitation of attention by many media, simultaneously, and, on the other, an absorption and nearly a drowning of attention in objects that are extremely captivating, indeed hyperstimulating. My suggestion of a cross between *Riven* with *Absalom, Absalom!* is a compound of these two situations: distribution of students’ attention between the video game and the Faulkner text. But this distribution is not in itself what stimulates but, on the contrary, what creates distance. And perhaps in the end it is important to distinguish between two associative modalities, between deep and hyperattention:

1. the one creating parallel circuits of transindividuation and provoking connections, one of whose principal interests is its accidental nature or, more precisely, the formation of a new contextuality for the textual objects of deep attention (we will return to this later);

2. the other aiming at eliciting from the objects of deep attention structural homologies more easily accessed in the objects of hyperattention, thus “bootstrapping” to form deep attention.\(^7\)

In her description of deep attention, Katherine Hayles does not mention concentration: she measures the force of this form of attention by its duration. It is true that duration can be ascribed to a single object, as the center of attention. Nonetheless, in Hayles’s description, it is not concentration that stabilizes the object as object of attention but the duration of its perception. Yet one can imagine an extended attention that cannot be properly called concentrated since it is merely captive, channeled, and in that sense passive; this is precisely the case with television’s channeling of attention—leading inevitably to channel surfing [zapping], already quite close to Hayles’s hyperattention. This relative minorization of concentration is clearly an effect inducted into her argument by the antithesis needing to be established between deep and hyperattention, a term expressing intensity—which is finally an effect of its brevity, not its duration: it is a kind of flashing forth.

The source of stimulus for hyperattention as it “surfs” [zappe], leaping from one object to another, dispersed and unfocused (just as one might refer to an “unfocused” or “inattentive” child), is what does not last; such stimuli switch from one data stream to another. There is a multiplicity of tasks because of that multiplicity of streams: channels, networks, Web
sites, and other programming industries that, like sharks, compete for attention; attention is, after all, merchandise and, as it happens, an audience, meaning that it is more “hypersolicited” than hyperattentive. And it is because of this hyperstimulation—but because it in turn produces *infra-attention*—that Hayles associates hyperattention and hyperactivity, as a complex form of attention deficit. But is it not paradoxical to associate hyperattention with attention deficit—even to what engenders this deficit?\(^8\)

Attention’s *depth* has less to do with duration than with the *length of the circuits of transindividuation* it activates, which can be very rapid even if duration is often a prerequisite, required precisely at the moment of learning, for this depth. Each circuit (and its length) consists of many connections that also form a network, as another constituent of depth, a kind of texture, and like some material, a resistant (even thick [*consistant]*) fabric. These connections operate according to rules that are also networks, forming “stitches” [*points*] in the sense of the word as it is used in knitting: when it is a matter of weaving a critical and rational attention, these stitches are the forms or motifs defining the rules of the transindividuation process that *construct the object* of attention, thus defining the rules of process by which this attention is constructed, but also that this attention constructs in return: by *paying attention*.\(^9\)

25. Grammatization of the attentional context

Concentrated attention, in Western culture, is an attention whose object is not simply the word but “letters”: it is constructed *literately*,\(^10\) forming a text through this object as described, analyzed, and resynthesized—rationally grounded. This object, which is also grammaticalized, can be a definition, a theorem, a demonstration, or an experiment whose protocols and results are then written down. However, such a weaving together of the object, which in some way confers its rational materiality on it, through its textualization, is never done outside a context.

Today, this context is itself heavily grammaticalized, and in nonliterary—or not only literary—forms: forms activated by the programming industries’ psychotechnologies that have become the instruments by which attention formation is entirely [*à la lettre*] liquidated, along with literary psychotechnologies and with the social machinery that has been constructed on them—and that have produced the deep attention that
leads to maturity. These new nonliterary forms of grammatization are also the basis of the symbolic milieu in which the younger generations' synaptogenesis originates. A text can never be produced outside a context (i.e., “taking care”: to take care of hypersolicited young people at risk to become infra-attentive is to activate this machinery into a new social machinery, which is what Katherine Hayles invites us to do).

As for the production of the connections that construct attention as the reactivation and perpetuation of a transindividuation circuit, distributed (hyper) attention creates a new milieu, and thus a new context, for deep attention. The Kaiser Foundation study of the habits of young Americans, such as being connected with more than one medium at a time—radio, television, Internet, and so on—seems to be cases of informational consumerism rather than configurations of distributed attention: they result in a loss of attention, that is, of individuation, an often hyperactive attentional deficit and, in the end, a desymbolization.

On the other hand, this situation becomes even more interesting if it is compared with that of Glenn Gould who, while playing a Mozart fugue, encountered the noise from a vacuum cleaner that interacted with his playing, producing accidental concurrences that filtered into his interpretation:

Gould uses noise like a prism. This allows him to interpose a series of screens or filters between the work and his interpretation, filters that act as processes of material destabilization (elimination of a segment of the sound spectrum) and sensorial dissociation (disconnection of the tactile and the sonorous). The work in turn can “take off,” to be projected ideally onto a purely mental surface: “what I learned in the fortuitous encounter of Mozart and the vacuum cleaner is that the internal ear of the imagination is a much more powerful stimulant than could come from exterior observation.”

In other words, the accidental filtering that initiates the transindividuation process, in this case performance as concentration on the score—and via this organon, the piano played by another organ: the hand directed by the eyes via synaptic brain circuitry, results from the concentration of attention on an object. One contextual element can emerge from another source and suddenly compose a sign by combining with the attentional process taking place.

I myself am often undisciplined in a time of distributed attention that basically leads, at least in part, to daydreaming. Something of this kind
occurs when one thinks like a businessperson, and most powerfully of all when one takes a walk, like Walter Benjamin in Paris. Walking, which is also an ambulatory technique, allows for concentration on an object in an organic relationship with the repetitive motion of one’s steps, in the same way that swimming and running or bicycling catalyzes many diverse effects, which are augmented during physical effort of any kind by the emission of dopamine in the brain; these effects combine with the accidental solicitation of, for example, the countryside, or some occurrence from the environment that suddenly causes one to think spontaneously, accidentally, which regular body movement, deambulation, like deambulatio, as an ego technique and the psychomotor organization of a distributed form of attention, makes necessary.

A similarly “necessary accident” occurs in the final part of Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time, Time Found Again, in the scene where Marcel’s foot catches on a paving stone. Such accidents initiate another kind of anamnesia than the one Plato theorizes as the pathway to consistencies. And when Proust describes the marketplace criers he can hear from his bedroom who instigate his daydreaming, he is also describing disseminated attention—which is certainly constructed by this dissemination, but only to the degree that it coordinates with Proust’s work in his writing chamber, where his sickbed is itself also an attentional device. It is no stretch of the imagination to think that engaging with the numeric media systematizes the possibility of this kind of anamnesis, or rather, in fact, of a third kind.12 That, however, requires an analysis of organological characteristics each time it is implemented.

In Technics and Time 2, Disorientation (39–41), I try to show that textualization of an object of attention gives it a différent identity, thus provoking a chain of interpretations through the fact that the text, which is recontextualized with each new reading, necessarily engenders readings that are always different; this différence is then put into practice through the formation of circuits of transindividuation. Katherine Hayles describes a mutation of general contextuality for objects of deep attention—essentially, attention applied to literatized (textual) objects that are phenomenologically overdetermined by their context, attention being precisely the scene of phenomena.

This mutation is due to the fact that now, in all geographical and historical contexts, networks of the “classic” (audiovisual) or “new” (numeric) programming industries multiply or even confuse these contexts,
then reground them in a fabric that has now become what we call “the Web,” since all forms of grammatization converge in numeric technology and are then distributed through all possible means of telecommunications technology. These have now not only become virtually impossible to count but are also currently the means for all of the new conditions of deambulatory mobility.

Text, as the principal support for deep attention, has become a new kind of contextuality: a contextuality that is itself thoroughly grammatized, as a result of which deep attention’s support is called upon to enter into relations with structured transindividualization well beyond the classroom, before and after schoolwork, and for all generations. But on the other hand, this process makes it possible to imagine new processes of transindividualization, and thus a new age of différance that must be both thought and practiced by the education system, since it confers—and we confer on it—nootechnical and nootechnological possibilities.

There are sedimented layers of grammatization that must be considered in any organological rethinking of the education system. Every kind of attentional device created by these varying grammatizational forms must be systematically indexed and defined in terms of its psychotechnical and psychotechnological effects, but also in terms of its possibilities for linkage with other older or more recent layers. And most important of all would be to identify various forms of attention according to the kinds of rettentional and protentional flux brought about in them by psychotechniques and psychotechnologies, each one of which is quite specific.

26. Organology of attention as stream of consciousness and as an element of politics

One of the central points in The Time of Cinema (TT3) is that the audiovisual object is the principal object with which the programming industry, transforming the minds of audiences deprived of consciousness through the flow of retentions and protentions, forms a kind of attention that captures this object (attention seen as the flow of channeled consciousness, concentrated on and captured by the flow of the temporal object); this audiovisual object and the efficacy of the attention capture it implements exist only because of the grammatization of the audiovisual, in which one no longer sees nor hears the world but rather its reproduction through various devices. These devices tightly control the flow of
consciousness where the time of consciousness is subverted by the time of psychotechnology.

Yet with the book—which also reproduces the world, literally, through a grammatization of speech that becomes *logos* but does not require any apparatus, since the equipment required for reading has already been interiorized in the form of synaptic circuits in the brain itself, which require that the reader can write as well as read—the time of the text, which is a spatial object, is controlled by the projection of the time of consciousness itself since text-time is produced by the time of consciousness that, without needing any mechanical control over the unfolding of a text or over consciousness itself, flows on throughout the course of a reading—which itself then forms deep consciousness.

With the eclipse of audiovisual temporal flux by numerization, which is nothing less than a new stage of grammatization and a major cause of the expansion of programming industries as well as of programming institutions—and which may open the era of their common future—today it is nonetheless possible to connect temporal objects with spatial ones, and thus to create new, organic functionality between the audiovisual temporal objects that in large part form the basis of hyperattention, in Katherine Hayles’s sense, and literate objects that form the historical base of deep attention, which is taught as such and engrammed into students’ cerebral organs.

I count the musical score among the number of spatial objects, since it places music outside time: written (diasthematic) notation enables musical temporality and its vocal and instrumental flow to transform into linearity, that is, spatiality, through the Guido d’Arezzo notation that, strictly speaking, brings music (which is also a psychotechnique of the first order) into “the age of composition.” But there are many other kinds of nonlinguistic textuality that are recognizable by their spatiality, such as the paintings registering the neoclassical episteme according to Foucault, the language and formulae of mathematics according to Derrida, and so on.

The writing down of speech, originally a purely temporal object in the course of which discourse is formed, spatializes this spoken temporality just as a musical score spatializes the time of music. The reader then re-temporalizes this spatiality, but this can take place only because it was detemporalized, that is, materialized, given the form of a tertiary retention. An audiovisual object, which is temporal and not spatial, is certainly also
capable of being a tertiary retention, and in this sense it is also spatial (e.g., a reel of film, a cassette, a DVD, etc.). But the projector or player that reads it, and without which it is inaccessible, retemporalizes it technologically, by short-circuiting the temporality of attentional consciousness of which it is the object, then conferring on it a temporality that is not at all simple: it can only show itself audiovisually as the incessant flow of retentions.

Obviously, I do not mean that an audiovisual temporal object does not allow for the creation of deep attention. On the contrary, I mean that as a pharmakon, it has characteristics that have currently, within the context of the programming industries, been put to the service of a set of attention-capture devices that are fundamentally destructive, like the hypersolicitation of attention that gives rise to attention deficit, even though by all evidence the cinema is indeed an art and that like all art it solicits and constructs deep attention and is thereby both poison and remedy. Because it can anamnesically retemporalize this temporal object, consciousness must understand it spatially, thus reconquering the motor machinery through which it is a function of time.

This is all a matter of pharmaka, and its basic issue is one of a therapeutics capable, with the aid of this pharmacopoeia, of treating its inherent poisons, since it is not prescribed by a care system that is also both an organized politico-industrial economy and yet care giving. In this regard, the situation Katherine Hayles describes is intrinsically ambiguous, which in turn imbues her own discourse with a certain ambiguity precisely in that she does not analyze this ambiguity.

The appearance of new, grammatized media, an unknown attentional context for objects of deep attention, within the organological history of humanity, is also an encounter at a veritable crossroads: newly grammatized symbolic media are a network of pharmaka that have become extremely toxic and whose toxicity is systematically exploited by the merchants of the time of brain-time divested of consciousness. But it is also the only first-aid kit that can possibly confront this care-less-ness, and it is full of remedies whose texts were, since the very origin of the city (and first for Plato), the prime example.

And this is not simply a question of the education system. It also concerns the political milieu constituted by the state of minds that are themselves nothing other than diversely structured attentional flux, more or less attentive and thoughtful, composing this milieu either as critical,
rational consciousness (maturity) or as an agglomeration of gregarious behaviors and the immature brains of minors, artificial crowds whose consciousness has been enucleated by a regressive process of identifica-
tion. This means that the matter of the ecology of mind is also that of the ecology of the political milieu, and the transformations in the political element—in the sense that water is the fish's element, just as the political element is integrally organological: there is no “natural element” of the political—“natural law” is a fiction.

One is tempted to ask whether the question is really one of knowledge if one wants to raise the general level of consciousness, and if that is possible; one is tempted to say to oneself that it is already too late and that it would be better to cultivate a difference between beings who are mature and thus organologically armed for the battle of intelligence, on the one hand, and the others, minors, under supervision and lost to this battle, on the other. Like beggars, just good enough to be cannon fodder, who can only march toward death (that of their consciousness) on the front line of this battle that will be won by others.

I absolutely do not believe in the truth of this second hypothesis (in fact, it seems intolerable to me). I do not believe that it is rational; I believe that it is pseudoreasoning that could be claimed only by an immature consciousness. I believe in the difference between maturity and immaturity, majority and minority, and that that difference will always be at the horizon of the humanity-to-come, since the pharmacological being that we have now become—and will increasingly become if we are really deprived of care, dignity, recognition, and the possibility of sublimation—will grow increasingly furious, thrown further and further into what I have called negative sublimation. And given the current state of the world, in their fury humans could begin to descend into all sorts of widely disseminated, massively fatal actions (what Leroi-Gourhan called megadeath), themselves also pharmaka.

Humans could do this to themselves, in such an intoxicated state, to others (for example, students against classmates), as has recently so often happened in American schools, or to perceived enemies seen as hegemonic oligarchies of Evil belonging to an “Axis of Evil.” It would thus be possible to pass from an economic war, in which a highly detrimental battle of intelligence against intelligence can already take place, to total war, having lost the battle for intelligence, believing that it might be possible to reserve intelligence for a few privileged individuals (still relying
on the services of what in Great Britain is called *The Intelligence Service*, in the United States the *Central Intelligence Agency*); that is, in having rejected the need to take care of the young. To counteract this tendency would require the need to frame the problem *rationally* in terms of the generations; this shift in the problem of care for youth has already begun to take place, however, but *violently*, massively, and very dangerously, throughout the world.

Many obstacles still stand in the way of correcting our course: in the first place, a veritable conspiracy of imbeciles against which, moreover, none among us—we weak, pharmacological beings, weak and imperfect—can really escape: we can never become *completely* mature, such as we are (“God alone can enjoy such a privilege”20). This conspiracy of inattention, sloth, and cowardice is not solely the product of short-sighted economic and industrial interests: it is also the combining of political, intellectual, and artistic elements, plus those of corporations and public services, and, more generally, the generations that were formed in the era of the book—*they (we)* have also tended to become indolent.

27. The age of ostriches and “the hidden department of world culture”

For a wide variety of reasons, virtually all of that group (those of us who are supposedly mature) reject, in one way or another, the very idea of engaging in an organological revolution of the life of the mind—simply because it would be too complex and painful. They—that is, all of us—prefer to delude ourselves into believing (1) that things are not so serious, (2) that better times—things “as they used to be”—are at hand, (3) that nothing can be done about it (that *we* are simply not—at least not *all of us*—perfectible) and that we must try to sidestep it all and to protect ourselves, forgetting all the rest. These are, of course, all attitudes (other than a melancholic moping around hating everyone and everything) that *pay no attention to the world*, immature attitudes that are called, in the language of immaturity, “making like an ostrich,” in the face of what in the final analysis is a looming colossal conflict between the generations. The irrefutable facts, however, are that the situation is now catastrophic, and that in the end all the ostriches know it. But we have interiorized the logic of TINA; *there is no alternative*,21 because all of us are more or less under
the influence of psychotechnologies that are destroying our maturity. In a study published in Quebec, Jacques Brodeur found that if

after decades of struggle in civil society, governments have been forced to regulate air pollution, food, and water, . . . few governments have shown themselves capable of regulating marketing practices targeting children.

This situation has left industry free to decide what children watch on television, what products they are offered in order to distract them, what strategies can be used to manipulate their wishes, desires, and values.22

And in order to explain how such care-less-ness has become possible, Brodeur cites George Gebner, dean of the Annenberg School of Communication: “[F]ewer than ten corporations control 85% of the world’s media. They have become the hidden department of world culture.” But the High Education Council of Quebec announced in February 2001 that “the number of children suffering from serious behavioral problems increased more than 300% between 1985 and 2000” (Brodeur). According to Brodeur, it is estimated that between 4% and 12% of American children suffer from either ADD or ADHD. The figures pertaining to juvenile delinquency in France are comparable: “in 2006, 23,200 minors were charged with aggravated assault, against 19,000 in 2005.”23 Christopher Soulez, head of the National Observatory on Delinquency at the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Security, has made the following comment:

Previously, we observed small increases, but not much difference from the prior year. . . . The same thing was true for aggravated assault, which rose 23% [in 2006], against 9% for adults. This violence is notable because in the great majority of cases it was not motivated by robbery. Violent assaults by young women rose by 30%.24

In comments on State violence by the United States in Iraq, Al Gore cites Robert Byrd, senator from West Virginia, who stated to the U.S. Senate shortly before the start of military operations in Iraq that

this chamber is almost totally silent—dangerously, terribly silent. There is no debate, no discussion, no attempt to share with the nation the arguments of those who are for and those who are against this war. There is nothing. We remain passively mute in the Senate of the United States.25

This could result, for better or for worse, in the kind of mutation Katherine Hayles identifies and analyzes in media-rich environments, in the
context of the new war over the capturing of attention through hypersolicitation. In the course of just three generations, this mutation has become literally colossal, an almost unimaginable worldwide change.

We must remember that until 1939, 55% of the French, now grandfathers and grandmothers who might now want to short-circuit Channel Y but who were then still young children with no access to a radio or a telephone, certainly not a television and obviously not video games and the Internet—the current numeric technologies before which parents who might want to short-circuit Channel Y, no longer know whether they are still young children. Can we really understand that in 1920 there was no radio, in 1895 no cinema, in 1870 no phonograph, in 1830 no photographs or daily newspapers? And above all, are we capable of conceiving the extraordinary uniqueness of our age—and, perhaps, of imagining a future?

If we are not capable of any of this, we will have to become capable. If we must change our behavior with a view to reducing the production of carbon dioxide, this will be possible only on condition that we quite spectacularly reevaluate the formation of attention, most notably through drawing the consequences from the effects of the media environment on synaptogenesis. Since ancient Greece, and in our own industrial societies thanks to public instruction, scholarly education has formed the base and the best guarantee of the kind of attention that Katherine Hayles calls “deep,” and that is a condition of the formation of critical attention through training in reading and writing, and of the likely synaptogenesis it creates in literate children, critical attention constituting the basis for maturity as responsibility.

Without any doubt, the new industrial model that will be needed in the fight against global warming will require immense investment in research and industrial innovation, as well as in fiscal politics, as Alain Juppé has suggested in his short tenure as the French prime minister.26 But such measures could never replace the formation of a wider attention in a world, which is its precondition—including support of new markets for those new industries. They require a battle for intelligence in the form of the invention of a new way of living.

These measures also rest on our remembering that the programming industries have significantly evolved over the past thirty years, and that there is no reason to think that they will not continue to do so or that they will always evolve in the same direction—which, for the moment, is the worst direction. Elizabeth Baton-Hervé, in a study done by the
office of Aid to Dependent Children,\textsuperscript{27} recalls that in France, “after the
dissolution of the ORTF in 1974, the three public channels were thrown
into competition. It thus became necessary for each of them to attract
an audience.” Then came the law of 29 July 1982, passed by the new So-
cialist government, that created “audiovisual liberalization,” meaning the
first private channels, Canal+, La Cinq, entrusted by François Mitter-
rand to Silvio Berlusconi, and M6. This period saw “the first children's
programs broadcast in the early morning.” The year 1987 saw the priva-
tization of TF1, the channel that then created youth programs that were
finally exclusively commercial (e.g., \textit{Le Club Dorothée}). Al Gore points out
that the television viewer receives but never sends anything; he insists on
the need to restore \textit{participation} in participatory democratic life without
which no true democracy can exist: political consumption—telecracy—is
fundamentally incompatible with democracy: “it is not simply a question
of better education but of the reconstitution of an authentic democratic
discourse in which individuals can participate in significant ways.” And
in order for that to occur, Gore concludes that numerization (i.e., the
Internet) constitutes a \textit{new new deal} with “the power to revitalize the role
played by the people within the framework of the Constitution. And just
as the American Founding Fathers vehemently defended the freedom and
independence of the press, we must now defend the freedom of the Inter-
net.” But this is a matter of defending against “\textit{the hidden department of
world culture},” the programming industries that \textit{make} ostriches—producing
ostrich behavior by putting their own heads in the ground and “auto-
cretinizing.” Their future is linked to that of the planet to which they
are a key factor. The problem Al Gore proposes is that of a new political
responsibility, a new way of sharing responsibility, first and foremost in
giving back, in making citizens more organologically responsible, faced
with what has deprived them of their responsibility, by depriving them of
consciousness.

But this is not a question simply of responsibility as it defines politics
in general—and democracy in particular—as the distribution of respon-
sibilities among all those called citizens. It is also and indeed first of all
a question of the responsibility of our political representatives, above all
those who are not simply political representatives but who have executive
power, and who today, in our care-less times, have really exceptional pow-
ers and obligations, new possibilities and constraints and thus also new
im\textit{possibilities}, both temporary and long term. In this regard, today it is
not simply a question of being able to see where there might be “wiggle room”; now it is not a matter of evolving our conditions but of revolutionizing them, generating what French president Nicholas Sarkozy, when he was a candidate for the office, called a “rupture.”

28. The therapeutics and pharmacology of attention

A “synaptic” analysis of attention construction clearly shows that pharmacology, which today means psychotechniques or psychotechnologies engaged in the human brain’s synaptogenesis, is badly in need of therapeutic care. This would entail first an understanding of all physiological, cerebral, and psychological stages of development socially transforming immaturity into maturity. When we read the label of a medical prescription, we often find that this or that ingredient beneficial to adults can be deadly to “children under the age of three,” for example, and we believe and respect this information, understanding that the prescription is part of system of care, a pharmakon, a therapeutics. We also know not to give alcohol to children—though we have not known this for very long; we know that giving alcohol to a child, let alone regularly, not only creates problems associated with various physical and mental deficiencies but can lead to dependence, abuse, and addiction as well.

These kinds of pharmacological and therapeutic issues must be faced at many levels and for all ages (since there are also medications that are bad for older people, other medications that are bad for adults suffering from various functional problems, etc.—and in fact, we all have physical and mental traits indicating that what may be good for others is not good for us, and conversely). These issues, addressed on behalf of physical and psychic criteria, must also be addressed to groups and societies, and for different localities in different eras: some eras are incapable of dealing with what might easily be handled in others, certain regions could be destroyed by what might make others quite productive, and so on.

But the pathogenesis of attention destruction across many forms, from the loss of adult responsibility to serious attentional disorders that are often seen in juvenile delinquents, does not result just from chemical pharmacology: counteracting it requires the regulating of psychotechnologies, and therefore a psychopolitics. Giving children Ritalin or Dexedrine in order to compensate for attention deficits, as Hayles shows, only adds more problems and the possibility of pharmaceutical dependence, which
can then lead to other nonchemical forms of dependence that can be just as dangerous, that can in fact act directly, adversely, and irreversibly on brain structure.

Since October 2007, the American television channel Babyfirst, aimed at babies and young children aged six months to three years, has been broadcast in France on the Web at Canalsat.fr. On the Babyfirst Web site, in the section aimed at parents, the following statement appears, perfectly illustrating the rhetoric of psychopower:

From the first hours of life, baby already has billions of neurons. But they are initially of little use to him since most of them are not yet inter-connected. In reality, to make these connections, the little one’s brain must be stimulated. Stimulated by sounds, by colors. Because baby’s daily environment is not always sufficiently rich to awaken the brain and to participate naturally in his development, television can be a powerful source of positive action for him. Pediatrician Lyonel Rossant emphasizes that “on the small screen, baby receives information one bit after another: one idea gives way to another, developing both the logical mind and the cortex’s musculature.” Through the small screen, baby comes to understand, for example, relationships among particular images, and little by little develops an understanding of the difference between “before” and “after.” This kind of stimulation leads him to be better structured mentally, better able to understand time and to give his memory more “muscle.” Images in motion, . . . the colors they stimulate: full of life, television has everything to fascinate the child. Pediatrician Edwige Antier says that “as soon as baby can do so physically, she takes control of the remote, which quickly becomes her preferred rattle. Then touch leads to sounds, then to people, and that is truly magic! The human being is first and foremost a communicator. Everything that enhances communication charms us.”

Only the establishment of a psychopolitics can constrain the ravages of these kinds of “innovations” in a world of psychopower, which becomes the public’s primary responsibility—notably in terms of the battle for intelligence but first as a matter of public health. It must be a politics of pharmaka, of psychotechniques and psychotechnologies. As the battle for intelligence, this psychopolitics must then be translated into a noopolitics, not only through the limitation and regulation of these psychotechnologies’ use, especially for the young, but through a transformation of poison into remedy. Things that can lead to dependency must become things that bring about departure from dependence. These pertain to the
environment, industrial politics, educational politics, regulations governing mass media, and the politics of new media: all of this constitutes one and the same challenge—the contemporary battle for intelligence, a battle of incomparable importance in all of human history.

And this is not just a matter of ecology (of the mind and, as a result, via natural environments in which we pharmacological beings are currently living) but of hygiene, that is, of care in the truly classic sense. And as such it is a matter that raises the issue of what Foucault calls biopolitics—but that also extends it, introducing into it a dimension closer to philosophy’s first questions as techniques of the self and the role of hypomnēmata in individual and collective existence, that is, “the governing of the self and others”; in Foucault’s study of them he lays out the first genealogy of psychotechnics, which will serve here as the basis for constructing a new critical apparatus for thinking through evolution of the epistēmē. Foucault will later call this apparatus an “archaeology”—mechanisms of tertiary retention.
Notes

Chapter I

1. [Trans.] Throughout the book, I have translated Stiegler’s *majorité* (as opposed to *minorité*) variously as “majority,” “the age of majority,” or “adulthood,” depending on the context.


3. [Trans.] *Philia* is central to Stiegler’s sense of both *esprit* and transindividuation. It is *philia* that distinguishes drives from desire and short-circuits from knowledge. As Stiegler says in *Réenchanter le monde*:

   Capitalism is a libidinal economy that, in making dissociation a general condition, destroys desire (that is, the libidos energy): it destroys the social as *philia*. *Philia*, as the libido’s most socially sublimated form and, as such, as organization and result of transindividuation as a communal effect, is what Aristotle calls what I am here calling the *association* from which the social milieu is produced. It could also be called *society* as such. (*Réenchanter le monde*, 60; henceforth RM)

4. [Trans.] “Les enfants mérite mieux que ça.” It is vital to the following discussion of Canal J and its strategy of infantilization to understand from the outset that *ça* has a very powerful “second” meaning in French: it is not only “that” but also the French word for the Freudian “id,” the home of preconscious drives. In the following, *ça* is generally translated as “id,” though in the French text each iteration maintains its lamination with “that,” as in the advertisement.

5. [Trans.] Stiegler’s Canal J appears here as Channel Y: the point is that this is a channel specifically for the young, for minors: in French, *les jeunes*; in English, “the young” or “youth.” Though this is a rather crude appropriation to another language, since Canal J is instantly evocative in French, it would make
no sense in terms of Stiegler’s point about the “sublimity” of Canal J to call it “Channel J.”

6. [Trans.] The distinction between “brain” and “mind” is central to the argument presented here. Stiegler will develop the case that only the mind is “conscious”—that the “available brain” is short-circuited and potentially, at the very least, incapable of thought and thus of will—chiefly the will to know and to learn. Given that the brain is itself a technical entity, its distinction from “mind” becomes even more central, particularly remembering—another vital point for Stiegler—that the French for “mind” is esprit, also translated as “spirit.”

7. I developed this theme of the subversion of primary identification at greater length in Mécroance et discréedit 2, 130–35. Henceforth MD2.


[Trans.] The illustration shown at the BlogAntiPub Web site, of the father and (distressed-looking) daughter, has him assuming an apelike stance and expression—with two long stalks of asparagus dangling from his nostrils. His attempt to amuse his daughter shows him as not only unfunny but subhuman, as the daughter’s facial expression clearly indicates. He is the child, not she. And these posters (ten feet by six feet) are on display for the captive audience in Paris Metro stations.

9. Preconscious: memories that can be recalled to consciousness.

10. Unconscious: repressed memories that cannot be recalled to consciousness.

11. We will return to these issues in greater detail in Chapter 3.


13. [Trans.] Stiegler is using this still much-contested term in its sense of orgiastic pleasure, orgasm.

14. In general, différence is “the spacing of time and the temporalization of space.” Différence as relation governing the links between the pleasure principle and the reality principle is what Jacques Derrida has described, chiefly in The Post Card. Henceforth PostCard.

15. This concept of the pharmakon, which is at the heart of this book, is theorized by Jacques Derrida (“Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Dissemination) through commentary on Plato’s Phaedra, in which Plato writes that writing itself is a pharmakon, at once what remedies the failures of memory and what weakens memory. Derrida does not emphasize the sense of “scapegoat” that the word pharmakon also has in ancient Greek.

16. Freud, Moses and Monotheism. Henceforth MM.

Notes

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will return to the question of the transindividual and of its transmission down the generations, and on the failure of psychoanalytic theory to think it correctly (just as it fails to think technics), in La Technique et le temps 5: La guerre des esprits, forthcoming from Galilée.

18. Pontalis, Après Freud. Henceforth AF.

19. For an explanation of epiphylogenesis, see Technics and Time 1. Henceforth TT1.


23. [Trans.] The Revised Standard Version of Matthew cited in the translated text differs from the French version, which reads:


[These are the origins of Jesus, the Christ. Mary, his mother, was promised to Joseph. They did not yet live together when the holy breath moved in her and she conceived. Joseph, her husband, was an upright man. Why compromise his wife? Better to send her back secretly.]


25. Symbol of the Christ, of which the Church will become the body after his Crucifixion and Resurrection, through the intermediary of a book that announces itself as the “new testament”: as a new legacy. This symbol, as an institution, is thus an institution of the book. We will see near the end of this inquiry (248) how it is deployed in this hypomnesic technique, which Sylvain Auroux calls a process of grammatization.

26. “The world these advertisers presents us is totally disenchanted. She will habitually ‘pig out’ on fast food: we can clearly see her obesity, which has currently begun to be a preoccupation. The heap of vegetables on the table only adds to her next depression. So why shouldn’t we just continue on from where we are now, conferring on the television this child’s protection and education? Television, the virtual world in which parents are super-nags, merchandise is queen, desires mandatory, and the system unique and liberal” (BlogAntiPub).

27. Knowledges of which the ego is the contact point with the exterior world as the system of perception/consciousness whose living knowledge, as the introductory lens for primary retentions, integrating them into secondary retentions, and thus transforming and enriching this heritage, occurs through the subject’s new experiences. See De la misère symbolique 2, 232ff.

28. For a full discussion of transindividuation, see my preface in Simondon,
Individuation psychique et collective (henceforth IPC), xiii, and RM, 122; La Télécration contre le démocratie (henceforth TCD), 33ff., 107ff., 157ff.; De la démocratie participative (henceforth DDP), 102. And as a reminder, for Jean-Bernard Pontalis the unconscious, as defined by Freud, is transindividual.


30. I explore this viewpoint in developing the concept of the adoption process in La Technique et le temps 3, 138ff.

31. Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 19. Henceforth PR.

32. For more on this idea, see note 39; and Philosopher par accident, 81. Henceforth PPA.

33. [Trans.] Télévision Française 1, or TF1, was the first nationwide television channel in France. Established as a public service in 1935, it was the sole national channel for twenty-eight years, going through a number of name changes, initially Radio-PTT Vision prior to World War II, Paris-Télévision during the German occupation, Télévision française in 1944. It was the first RTF (Radiodiffusion-télévision française) when a second channel emerged in 1963, and finally TF1 with the opening of the national bureau in 1975. TF1 was privatized in 1987.

34. [Trans.] In 2004, TF1 CEO Patrick Le Lay clarified the channel’s aims, announcing that there are many ways to speak about TV, but in a business perspective, let's be realistic: in the end, TF1's job is helping Coca-Cola, for example, sell its product. What we sell to Coca-Cola is available human brain time. This is where permanent change is located. Nothing is more difficult than getting access to it: we must always be on the lookout for popular programs, follow trends, surf on tendencies, all in a context in which information is speeding up, getting diversified and trivialized. [emphasis added]

35. [Trans.] The phrase “by the book” indicates, for Stiegler, that the proper understanding of x is invested in the social narrative, i.e., in the stories culture tells about itself, in various forms.


Chapter 2

1. Mendelsohn and Kant, Qu’est-ce que les Lumières? Henceforth QL. [Trans.] For citation specifics in “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” (henceforth WEK), see Kant.

2. For further discussion of this point, see Mécroissance et discrédit 1, §31. For more on culture as the transmission of collective secondary retentions, see 152ff. Henceforth MD1.

3. See TF1, 185; and PPA, 49ff.
6. See Section 22.
7. Ibid.
8. [Trans.] “Pouvoir, devoir, vouloir, et surtout savoir le croire et l’esquer sont les infinitifs de la majorité.”
9. [Trans.] It is important to note that for Kant “the Symbol” has numerous symbolic meanings and connections, in this case linking *Aufklärung* to the Catholic Church. One must ask whether this makes the notion of the Symbol more or less helpful.
10. [Trans.] Stiegler’s case regarding the pharmakon is clearly made here; unclear in the transition from French to English is the transition, alluded to in Chapter 1, from esprit to its senses in English. This slippery word is vital to Stiegler’s presentation; three short passages from *Réenchanter le monde* may help clarify things:

1. The *re-enchantment of the world* . . . is manifestly a reference to Max Weber, and to his analysis of disenchantment as an operation through which capitalism imposes itself on the world.

   But it is precisely also a reference to what Weber called the spirit [esprit] of capitalism: capitalism, according to Weber, initiates the process of disenchantment through an enchantment, through a new religions spirit [esprit] at capitalism’s very origin under the names of Protestantism, *Reformation*, and *Lutheranism*—themselves preceded in large part by the appearance of a “techno-logy” of the spirit: the printing shop, which provided access to books for all (particularly the “faithful”), which also led to the origin of the “republic of letters,” and finally to modern industrial democracy. (RM, 18)

2. We, the members of *Ars Industrialis*, think that a politics must be capable of espousing an industrial economy of the spirit [de l’esprit], without substituting it for an economic initiative but rather furnishing the framework for social regulations and public investments crystallizing a political and spiritual will—that is, elevating the level of individual and collective intelligence through the agency of a new form of public power that itself moves toward a new form of public will. (RM, 23)

3. Our age is menaced, throughout the world, by the fact that “la vie de l’esprit,” “the life of the mind/spirit” [Trans.: now it becomes impossible to distinguish them], to use Hannah Arendt’s words [Trans.: from *The Life of the Mind* (La vie de l’esprit in French), 1978], has completely succumbed to the imperatives of the market economy and of the return of investments of business concerns based on technology. . . . We will call them the “sector of technologies of the esprit” [le secteur des technologies de l’esprit] (despite the
metaphysical and theological overload weighing on this word, “esprit,” which we must also understand in its English sense, as “mind”). (RM, 27)

In other words, both “mind” and “spirit” are not only proper but vital translations of esprit, and simultaneously, since for Stiegler (and not just in the French) they are identical.

It is vital to remember that in translating esprit as “spirit,” one is attempting to be (nearly) free of that “metaphysical and theological” loading Stiegler mentions, but that one must still attempt to maintain the sense of esprit in the sense in which Derrida uses it in Specters of Marx and which echoes Stiegler’s, as a haunting (and brittle) energy all too easily lost, as either “mind” or “spirit.”

11. For a further discussion of this connection, see TCD, 259ff. See also Anthony Giddens, who defines modernity differently, as a mode of expertise. I am in fundamental disagreement with him on this point, since expertise is what accomplishes what I call the dissociation of associated milieux. I develop this theme further later on (see p. 240) and in volume 2 of Taking Care, forthcoming [in French].

12. This idea forms the very core of Ars Industrialis; see http://www.arsindustrialis.org.

13. See Le Figaro, 2 June 2007; and Section 10.

14. The course was published by the Magazine littéraire two hundred years after the appearance of Kant’s response to the investigation of the Berlinische Monatsschrift. It was then republished in Dits et écrits 2, 415ff. Henceforth DE2.

15. On the concept of an associated milieu, see RM, 52ff; TCD, 29ff; DDP, 74ff.

16. See references to A. Leroi-Gourhan in Technics and Time 2. Henceforth TT2. As we will see, Leroi-Gourhan is translating, as anthropology, what Aristotle had already said as philosophy.

17. To speak in Bachelardian terms. On this point, see also Lecourt, Pour une critique de l’épistémologie, 30. Henceforth CEL.

18. Foucault, The Order of Things, 87. Henceforth OT.

19. In the introduction to his edition of “What Is Enlightenment?” translated by Jocelyn Benoist, Dominique Lecourt emphasizes that “at the beginning of the 1730s, . . . a sense of the ‘public’ was created within an active bourgeoisie that wanted to be enlightened; this public began to extend into other levels of society that had recently become literate. Thus the wave of didactic books and dictionaries that were published, along with the publication of small literary works that fit into one’s pocket.”

20. See Kintzler, Condorcet. Henceforth Con.

21. “These are the forces of the intelligence that will bring about and augment . . . stronger, more durable, more ethical economic and social growth,”
François Fillon declared during a visit to the Orsay astrophysics laboratory (Figar, 2 June 2007). See also my comments on E.-A. Seillière in MD2, 104–6.

22. Fillon, policy statement, 3 July 2007. The statement’s concluding sections would have benefited from inclusion of more precise details. Henceforth FF.

23. [Trans.] In English in the original.

24. On the toxicity of human media, see my comments on Freud in MD3, §19, 89ff.

25. One of the premier conceptions of stupidity as a historical form was developed by Gustave Flaubert, first laid out in Madame Bovary, in which the figure of historical stupidity is the pharmacist, M. Homais. It is duplicated in Bouvard et Pécuchet, where the two central characters with these names finish by writing a Dictionary of Received Ideas in which historical stupidity is itself the focus of thought. It is for this reason that Raymond Queneau, in Bâtons, chiffres et lettres (henceforth RQ), can write: “If Madame Bovary is Flaubert . . . it is less evident that he is also Bouvard and Pécuchet. The requirements for taking this encyclopedic expedition with them—he tells us that he read more than fifteen hundred volumes in pursuit of this goal—could but confirm this connection.” Flaubert writes in one of his letters: “Bouvard and Pécuchet invaded me to such a point that I became them. Their stupidity is mine and I am bursting with it” (RQ, 110). Bouvard and Pécuchet are copyists like him; like him they practice the pharmakon that is writing and that engenders that always-minor form of thought, literature (such as the Dictionary of Received Ideas), always minor in the eyes of philosophers—who nonetheless are writers (though such copyists hardly exist today). Who are the “pharmacists of the soul” if not doctors (if it is true that, as Kant tells us, one can be another’s doctor only by teaching that soul to care for itself; this is precisely what Kant calls adulthood. Being able to take care of oneself presumes the capability of taking care of others—of being responsible.

26. Here I must specify that all technical media, insofar as they are epiphylogenetic, are also psychotechnical media insofar as they are mnemotechnical. This is how a world is constituted through its technicity: it configures forms of thought and psychic equipment according to psychomnesic characteristics that it misreads as a medium. Even so, all technics is not, properly speaking, psychotechnics: all technics is not aimed at capturing or forming attention, even if all technics contributes to this capture and this formation (or deformation).

27. Saudi Arabia this summer (2008) announced its intention to create a great university of international studies.

28. And this stupidity, like the Hydra, is always proteiform: it takes multiple forms, and these forms are those of heads, faces, mouths. Along these historic forms, and for our own times, and here in France, there is what Braudel calls French capitalism.

29. Fillon, Déclaration de politique générale.
30. This is the subject of Réenchanter le monde and the reason for the existence of Ars Industrialis.

31. I will return to this point, which is at the heart of the politics of the Institute for Research and Innovation at the Pompidou Centre, in Le Temps des amateurs, forthcoming.

32. See De la misère symbolique i, 111–14ff.; and Section 15.

33. See TCD; RM, 41, 133; and Sections 17 and 18.

34. The problem is less one of ontological difference, which cannot think despite Heidegger’s efforts, these pharmaka forming what he calls Weltgeschichtlichkeit, than of pharmacological difference. But this is not simply a matter of an impotence of aporia and undecidability that pervades Derrida’s inframinor epigonality: it is, rather, as impotence’s différence, a retreat of this impotence, a conquest of majority that is not, here, autonomy opposed to heteronomy but an individuation within an associated symbolic milieu that is also and always already a technical milieu.

35. [Trans.] SMS is the acronym for Short Message Service, by which short text messages are sent on cell phones and other devices, including pocket PCs. It was first developed in the early 1990s to connect a cell phone to a PC, then evolved into its current form.

In certain parts of the world SMS can be utilized to send voice messages as well. It is specifically designed for very short messages. Originally developed for telephone operators’ service messages, it is now in universal use, with ever-expanding applications (such as making submissions to television programs’ polls). Many businesses have also adopted SMS for both internal and external communication.

Chapter 3

1. [Trans.] Stiegler’s word here, and throughout this section, is âme, but the English “soul” does not resonate with his sense of mind control, in Kant, Plato, etc.; I have thus in the following translated it variously as “soul,” “spirit,” or “mind” (esprit) as sense and context dictate.

2. It would be important here to pay particular attention to the psychosomatotechniques found in Asian systems of self-care in which mind and body are not separated, giving rise to therapeutic systems completely different from the symptomatic one developed in the West since Hippocrates.

3. [Trans.] Constantin Guys, born in the Netherlands in 1802, was a cartoon-ist-illustrator with a long career in nineteenth-century France. He was famous for his illustrations of the “fashionable” world of the French Second Empire (1852–70). He had been part of the famous fight for Greek independence in his youth and had reported (in illustrations) on the Crimean War (1853–56) for The
Illustrated London News. Finally settling in Paris in the 1860s, Guys continued to work for the News as an illustrator, though at the same time achieving renown for his drawings of the artificial elegance of Parisian life under Napoleon III. Guys died in Paris in 1892. Baudelaire's "The Painter of Modern Life," his elegy to Guys published in 1863, was the first work of "art criticism" in the modern sense, placing Guys' work in its historical and aesthetic context and defining "modernity" as such.

4. [Trans.] The French text of Kant's short essay is radically divergent from the standard English translation used here: Kant's original and Stiegler's French are much more derisory and ironic. Stiegler:

Guardians who very amiably (through kindness) have taken it upon themselves to apply a high direction to humanity . . . after having made their cattle quite stupid, have then carefully ensured that these peaceful creatures are not permitted to dare to take the least step outside of the baby carriage in which they have been put, showing them the dangers threatening them should they try to venture out alone.

Note the echo of Plato's "guardians" in the Republic, enjoined to train the "heroes" who will govern the carefully censored polis; Kant exposes their other side, just as Stiegler does in the immediately following paragraphs.

5. Heidegger returns to this program in his account, citing Plato (Sophist, 242c), at the beginning of Being and Time (henceforth BT): "The being of beings 'is' itself not a being. The first philosophical step in understanding the problem of being consists in avoiding the mython tina diégeisthai, in not 'telling a story,' that is, not determining being as beings by tracing them back in their origins to another being—as if being had the character of a possible being" (BT, 5). But this is in order to open the question of a new mystagogy, that of the difference, called "ontological," of a [sense of] being that is not a being—that is, according to my analysis, of a being not yet finished, whom I understand to be infinite in constituting the object of desire. On this point, see chapters 5 and 6 for my inquiry into the object of attention as the object of all desires; see also Mystagogie—De l'art contemporain, forthcoming.

6. Règles pour le parc humain, 44. Henceforth PS.


8. Meno, 80a. Henceforth PM. "Since to research and to learn is nothing other than to remember oneself . . . there is no such thing as teaching, but only reminiscing."

9. On the question of identity, see Section 19.

10. On this subject, see in particular Constituer l'Europe 1 (henceforth CE1), 63, 96; Constituer l'Europe 2 (henceforth CE2), 11, 48, 90, 122; RM, 180, 240.

11. This is why, contrary to François Fillon, who imagines that "the education system no longer needs legislative reform; it needs to complete the structural
reform begun in 2005,” I believe that France’s project must be to redefine itself through an entirely different educational project, which does not simply require structural reform but a veritable revolution.

12. With the exception of the totalitarian structures of the social apparatus, contemporary with the birth of the cultural industries, whose goal is also the elimination of the psychic apparatus through psychotechnologies.

13. See MD1, 82–87.

14. On this subject, François Fillon says: “Faced with a culture of violence, I have only one order: yield to nothing! I use the word ‘culture’ intentionally, since our entire culture is implicated in its values and morals. We would have promised to act against the multi-recidivists: the legal project we will present respects our engagement. The delinquent instigators of serious acts, as recidivists, will be the object of painful reactions. We have also promised you to consider the delinquency of minors. Henceforth, minority will no longer be an official alibi for juvenile delinquents. By dint of having been released unpunished, certain young delinquents have concluded that society has neither the courage to re-try them nor the generosity to put them back on the right road. This is what must stop!”

15. If the question is one of cultural violence, i.e., the violation of culture, of which the “culture of violence,” as François Fillon calls it, is but a part, and if “it is actually our entire society that is challenged in terms of values and morality, precisely to the extent that this “culture of violence” is produced through the psychopower of capture of brain time only “available” because it is violence stripped of consciousness: properly seen, it is not simply a question of asking that audiovisual public service . . . clearly assumes its proper role,” which would moreover necessitate from the outset that the prime minister specify how he conceives of this vocation. Whatever it is, such a vocation could be assumed only through, on the one hand, defining one part of a new legislative framework for audiovisual media in general, private as well as public, and, on the other, through implementation of an industrial politics of new media, whose elements were outlined in Réenchanter le monde: La valeur esprit contre le populisme industriel.

16. [Trans.] Stiegler’s reference here is to organ-ology rather than to the standard sense of “organization”; hence the intrusive hyphen.

17. “Creation of a Ministry of Ecology, Development, and Long-Term Planning is part of the structuring of global policy we are going to implement. The ‘point-man of the environment’ to be named in the autumn will announce it.” F. Fillon.

18. Sarkozy famously declared, on the evening of 6 May 2007, that “friend-ship means to accept that friends can think differently, and that . . . a great nation like the United States needs not to be an obstacle to the struggle against
global warming, but on the contrary to take the lead against it, since what is at stake is the end of humanity.”

19. [Trans.] Throughout this section, Stiegler uses liquidation both as an echo of the liquidation of a business enterprise, the final dispersal of assets, and the Derridean “dissemination” of power, the spreading out of intensity toward not only entropy, in the sense of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, but also in Deleuze’s sense, a “liquidation” on the plan of immanence that, inhabiting the phenomenological arena, has to do with the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious, between the sociocultural and the individual.

20. This generational confusion leads irresistibly to the discourse of “growth” and to the global malaise of which it is a symptom. François Fillon is entirely correct to emphasize the dynamism of the new industrial nations, and in particular that of their youth. But it would be wrong to underestimate their various problems, which are being revealed at such a vertiginous pace (e.g., the results of China’s growth rate). These problems are storm clouds gathering on the world’s horizon, in a sky full of future storms that will soon be weighed down with hundreds of millions of tons of carbon dioxide that contemporary culture is jetisoning there, and that the dark and inevitably destructive industrial methods are filling with toxic molecules. The destruction of intergenerational structures is now taking place in Asia and the rest of the world as well as in the older industrial countries, with the same effects: incivility and negative sublimation (cf. MD2, 74, 88–89; and MD3, 95).

21. François Fillon, who generally appeals to reason, addresses himself particularly to his more erudite representatives (to those who make public use of their rationality, in addressing a public that reads: “The national energy would produce only very imperfect accomplishments if it were deprived of its principal resource: I mean French intelligence. . . . The immense group of our academics, biologists, mathematicians, philosophers, jurists, and historians who have made us shine must not be halted at the threshold of a new century where, precisely, the power of grey matter will determine our future”). Furthermore, Fillon asserts, with regard to necessary reforms in the universities: “I will not be one of those who will sacrifice fundamental research on the pretext that it would be unproductive in the short term.”

22. On the vast question of fear and its current exploitation, see Lecourt, Contre la peur (henceforth CP); and Crepon, La Culture de la peur.

23. See Sections 32 and 50.


25. On this point in particular, see MD2, 20; and on the difference between consistence, existence, and subsistence, see MD1, 69–70, 125–27.

26. As Cyril Morana notes in Éclairer les Lumières (henceforth CM): “For Mendelssohn, there indeed exists simply ‘a danger of catastrophic diversions
from the effort of understanding, from the acquisition of knowledge,' an abuse of reason whose disastrous consequences would consist of the development of egoism and immoralism. Do Enlightenment thinkers think themselves to be the definitive progress of reason, or of decadence, systematically consecutive in the development of human knowledge?” (CM, 47).

27. On these questions, see MD1, 123.

[Trans.] The French motif translates as “reason,” in the sense of “the reason for doing x.” Stiegler’s, and Weber’s, indication here is that “reason” has become detached from causality, let alone social or cultural causality, and is thus in aid of destructive psychotechnologies.

28. See Section 39.

29. Grammatization as becoming discrete, which characterizes the development of hypomnesic systems as techniques of attention capture, as psychotechnics and then as psychotechnologies. On this process of grammatization, see TCD, 157.

30. The second volume of Prendre soin, and Le Temps des amateurs, both forthcoming.

31. Neg, 245.


33. I have analyzed a number of aspects of this in CE1, 12, 20.

34. See MD1, 92–94, 143–47.

35. On the question of design, see CE1, 59; Flamaux, Le Design, Essais sur les théories et les pratiques, and Les Entretiens du nouveau monde industriel, a conference co-organized at the Pompidou Centre (27 and 28 November 2007) by the l’Institut de recherche et d’innovation (IRI), l’École Nationale Supérieure de Création Industrielle (ENSCI), and Cap Digital. Proceedings forthcoming.

36. See Section 2.

37. On the superego and a critique of the law in general, see MD2, 53.

38. Technologies of a collective intelligence are in the process of development in a number of ways. Sadly, their conception and creation are not being accompanied by a scientific and industrial politics worthy of the name. As a result, given that such technologies are also pharmaka, they are often used to weaken individual as well as collective intelligence. Barbara Cassin has explored this problem in Google-moi (henceforth Cassin). I will return to it in Le Temps des amateurs, forthcoming.

39. This issue is what Ars Industrialis calls “technologies of the spirit” in both the technical and the symbolic context that has appeared along with numeric networks.

40. Regarding economic warfare it will be necessary to address internationally, as is the case with all wars, the question of this war’s rules and those of any possible peace treaty.
41. [Trans.] “Suffrage,” in the sense in which Condorcet uses it, was one of the central ideas of the Enlightenment. The “Condorcet method,” though specifically aimed at producing fair elections, extended to many other ideas as well, such as the adoption of a liberal economy; free and equal public education for all, regardless of race, gender, or class; constitutionalism in the form of equal legal rights for women and people of all races. Condorcet was particularly interested (within the Enlightenment context of an informed citizenry, “the literate world”) in the defense of human rights in general, and of the rights of women and blacks in particular: as an abolitionist, he became an active participant in the Society of the Friends of the Blacks in the 1780s. Somewhat ironically, given his use by Stiegler, Condorcet was very much in favor of the (Enlightenment) ideals espoused by the newly formed United States (Benjamin Franklin was a close friend) and throughout his adult life proposed numerous economic, administrative, educational, legal, and political strategies aimed at transforming France. Because of his long-term association with the monarchy, during the Revolution Condorcet first went into hiding, then, when he felt increasingly unsafe, attempted to escape. He was caught, captured, and imprisoned at Bourg-la-Reine, where he died under ambiguous circumstances in 1792 (quite possibly murdered to prevent his being brought back to Paris for execution, which, given his general popularity, might have been felt to be dangerous). He was buried in a common grave in Bourg-la-Reine. He was reinterred in the Pantheon in 1989, but since all record of his body’s location had been lost in the nineteenth century, his coffin there is empty.

42. I will explore further into this issue in La Technique et le temps, La guerre des esprits, forthcoming.

Chapter 4

1. “Consciousness,” whose initial meaning is “with knowledge” (con-scientia), within the community of a shared knowledge, also has the sense of “moral consciousness” or “conscience,” a usage that spread rapidly throughout the seventeenth century, along with the philosophy of the subject.

[Trans.] The French conscience means both “consciousness” and “conscience,” as Stiegler indirectly indicates here. Both meanings have central importance in the battle for intelligence and the formation of long circuits of psychosocial knowledge, attention, and the formation of maturity.

2. To read more on the logic of the worst, see MD2, 41, 74, 94.


7. [Trans.] Inserm, Institut nationale de la santé et de la recherche médicale (National Institute of Health and Medical Research), is the sole French organization dedicated entirely to biological and medical research and to general health. It specializes in the study of human maladies, from the most common to the rarest.

8. I have commented extensively on this subject in MD2, 130.

9. And through the systems of care that are also mechanisms of social assistance. In this regard, the current political system in Great Britain for single mothers is entirely scandalous and indicates what kinds of social and moral regressions can result from a dominant populist discourse. Under the pretext that delinquency is more frequent in these families, the mothers are now obliged to subject themselves to a system of oversight that involves putting them and their children on an “index” [of likely delinquency].

10. [Trans.] Jules Ferry (1832–93), lawyer, statesman, and politician, as an ardent republican, participated in the first republican ministry of the Third Republic, serving from 1879 to 1885 first as minister of education and then of foreign affairs. Ferry remains well known today for his work in both of the following positions: (1) his energetic support of French imperialism and (2) his reform of the French education system. In the present context these seem strange bedfellows:

1. In 1870, after France’s military defeat by Germany (and at least in part as compensation for it, given France’s economic conditions at the time) Ferry first articulated the idea of France’s building a global colonial empire. He declared that “the superior races have a right because they have a duty: it is their duty to civilize the inferior races.” He then led the negotiations that established the French “protectorate” in Tunis, the occupation of Madagascar, the exploration of the Congo and Niger, and the conquest of what was to become known as Indochina.

2. Vehemently opposed to the clerical/religious education then offered in France, Ferry was responsible for reorganizing the entire French system of public education. The “Ferry Laws” of 1881 and 1882 made primary education in France free, nonclerical (laic), and mandatory; as a republican, Ferry (somewhat schizophrenically) championed universal education as a way of unifying the French “nation” as a concept (what Stiegler might call an “ideal object”). These laws established both universal access to education and French as the Republic’s sole language; though these laws were certainly important in unifying the French nation-state under the Third Republic, they also brought about the virtual extinction of a number of regional languages that have only recently begun to be studied again.

11. See Section 19.
12. [Trans.] *La Troisième République*, an ostensibly republican parliamentary democracy that governed France for seventy years, from May 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, to July 1940, with the Nazi invasion and the country’s subsequent fall, lurching from crisis to crisis, between the Second Empire and the Vichy regime. Adolphe Thiers, *le Libérateur du Territoire* and the first leader of the Third Republic, called 1870s republicanism “the form of government that divides France least,” not a ringing endorsement. In general, France seemed to agree to being a republic again, though the Third Republic was never terribly popular. Nonetheless, it was the first genuinely stable republican government the French had ever seen, and the first to win the support of the majority of the population. Ironically, it was initially intended to be a temporary government, “filling in” until a new king could be crowned; therefore, most monarchists played a part in the republican institutions of government, thereby giving those institutions significant (though not universal) elite support (the “Legitimists” were virulently antirepublican, and *Action française*, a monarchist movement founded in 1898, was influential through the 1930s). No king was ever crowned.

The failure of the Third Republic came about not as a result of its “liberal democratic” institutions, modeled on Enlightenment ideas with which we are concerned here, but because it did not successfully resist the Nazi invasion.

13. I develop this point in TT3, 142.

14. [Trans.] Leroi-Gourhan’s 1943 work, remarkably, has not been translated from the French.

15. [Trans.] The veins of cross references here, from Rimbaud back to Pindar then forward to Nietzsche, each of which has its own set of valences, are forbiddingly dense. Briefly:

In his letter of May 1871 to Paul Demeny, following his famous declaration, Rimbaud says that “j’assiste à l’éclosion de ma pensée: je la regarde, je l’écoute” [I witness the blossoming of my thought: I look at it, I listen to it]; this is a new sense of the “making” (*poësis*) of art-as-thought. As Stiegler suggests, this is indeed “the very poetry of human being,” in a number of senses ancient and modern.

The Pindaric odes form the basis of much of Rimbaud’s poetry, i.e., his thought, and of the “Sophoclean” aspect of Nietzsche’s.

Nietzsche’s “comment deviens ce que tu es” [How to Become What You Are] is the subtitle of *Ecce Homo*, which Nietzsche wrote in October/November 1888 (one year before his “break” in Turin). The book title’s reference (John 19:5) to Pilate’s words regarding the Messiah brought low (“Behold the man”) resonates through Nietzsche’s entire sense of the subject (“a fiction”) and of the “soul” (a bundle of chaotic *treiben*) “redeemed” by art.

*Ecce Homo* is an “autobiography,” but unlike any other ever written: it is a work of (nonnaturalistic, Dionysian) art that should be compared to Van Gogh
rather than to any other writer of Nietzsche’s day (or ours). On the one hand, it is all about style; on the other hand, that is the portrait.

For Rimbaud as for Nietzsche (and Stiegler), the chimera of identity resides both in and outside language.

16. See Section 15.
17. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization. Henceforth EC.
18. All symbolic activity is idiomatic in this sense, and all human activity is symbolic.
19. On this issue, it is possible to download the conference containing the seminar “Finding New Weapons” at www.arsindustrialis.org, in particular the session of 18 October 2006 entitled “Idiomatic Amnesia.”
20. I return to this point in Mystagogies. De l’art contemporain. Henceforth Myst.
21. See my preface to IPC, xi.
23. For more on this formation, see particularly Foucault, Discipline and Punish. Henceforth DP. I will spend a good deal of time on this question in volume 4 of Technics and Time in order to show that the founders of cities, “nomothetes,” are at once legislators and geometricians, and that it is impossible to think of political individuation, which begins with the pre-Socratics, independently of the scientific thought that also emerged from them and their movement precisely because writing constitutes the very organology that is common to both the law and all rational forms of knowledge. This is why Kant could write (wrongly, but not without reason) that “one could truly call the advent of writing the advent of the world” (Réflexions sur l’éducation, 106; henceforth RE).
24. See TCD, 158ff.
25. Already, as I have pointed out a number of times, the organological stage of literary grammatization appearing first in the seventh century BCE was transformed so as to produce either an intensification of symbolic life and the associated milieux of which it consists or the decomposition of that life through the hypomnemic and logographic dissociation of those same milieux. And it is essential to note here that the “Sophist” was originally grammatistes, the one who taught hypomnemic logographia. Equally, it should be noted that in the Gospels, the scribes are regularly contradicted by the Messiah (see, e.g., Mark 12:38). I will not comment further here on this last point; on the other hand, I have often analyzed the conflict between philosophy and sophistics, laying out the consequences for the current problems in the educational system.
26. “Dissociation” is the analytic moment of knowledge that is, however, only an effective knowledge if it is capable of engendering a moment of synthesis.
27. [Trans.] Though it is true that oitium is generally translated as “leisure,” it is useful to remember that it can also be translated as “literary study,” since the
latter was (and significantly may still be) thought to be a function of the former: no reflective literary study without the leisure time in which to do it.

28. That do not exist in the sense that they are mental constructions not to be found in what they allow to be thought, and that is a dimension of or in the world, such as “space.” The objects of reason, like the geometric point that cannot exist since it is not spatial, are thus both absolutely necessary artifacts and the infinite objects of desire, in the double sense that not being in the world, they are in a different domain from that of finite, calculable objects, and in the sense in which these objects are “unfinished” in that knowledge is only rational as comprehension of the individuation transformed by this comprehension—and thus again always already unknown.

29. See Kintzler, Condorcet. [Trans.] Refonder, “to reconstruct on new bases with new objectives.”

30. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason. Henceforth CPR.

31. See le Bailly: methodewo means “to follow closely, in a race,” derived from odos, “road.” [Trans.] Le Bailly is the great Greek/French dictionary.

32. This is the law of the process of adoption, producing unity within the nonidentical. I have developed this point further in Technics and Time 3, chapter 3, “I and We, the American Politics of Adoption.”

33. On the question of the one, see Aimer, s’aimer, nous aimer, 17, 42, 51, 53. Henceforth ASN.

34. The domain of the one is the desymbolization inherent in dissociated milieux.

35. See TCD, 221.

36. See RM, 124ff.

37. I mean three things here:

1. that the transformation of an instrumental medium that consists of hypomnemetic knowledge in general could be accomplished only through a sharing of the research and construction of its objects as well as their discourse (their critique), and of the diffusion of all methods and results (theorems, new discoveries, etc.) by which they claim to be objects of knowledge. This diffusion could not be limited to teaching;

2. that these objects are no longer merely those of regional or fundamental ontologies nor even onogeneses, but of genealogies in which gignesthai and the fictionalizing of what is, in light of the artifactual transformation of what is, is the reality of technoscientific knowledge as knowledge itself in hyperindustrial democracies;

3. that this hypomnemetic fact, which Bachelard called “phenomenotechnics,” obfuscated at the very origin of these democracies through the education system in the wake of metaphysics in general, can now no longer remain concealed and is not thinkable within the framework of an ontology: it requires
thought as a process. Simondon’s system of individuation (which is nonetheless not a dogma, which must be critiqued, which remains ontogenetic) is the departure point for any such theory.

38. See DE4, 892, and my commentary in Section 37.

Chapter 5

1. On disaffection as disaffectation, see MD2, 124ff.
2. Hayles, “Hyper and Deep Attention.” Henceforth GD.
3. [Trans.] Flux is both “flux” and “flow”; in some cases (e.g., Husserl), translations maintain “flux”; in others, Stiegler’s clear sense calls for “flow.” And because of the psychotechnologies under consideration here, “flux” can also be “stream.”

4. This is an issue that Jean-Pierre Changeux, in a paragraph entitled “To Learn Is to Eliminate,” addresses in Neuronal Man: The Biology of Mind (henceforth NM) in these terms: “Epigenesis has the power of selection over preformed synaptic manifestations. To learn is to stabilize preformed synaptic combinations. It is also to eliminate all others” (304).

5. Deep attention, of which there are numerous types and give rise to both critical and rational attention, is less an attitude of conservation than of observation.

6. A domestic animal is in this sense doubtless somewhat less “vigilant,” less savage, and less sensitive to any dangers threatening it: less in a “multitasking mode,” in part because it is misled by its principal predators: humans, who have domesticated it, cared for it (i.e., taken charge of certain of its “tasks,” chiefly that of avoiding other predators—but only after having hunted the animal down and, in the end, domesticated it; we will see, in Taking Care 2, that hunting is itself, in certain conditions, a system of care), after having been a predator very close to the animal, and without doubt quite savage.

7. [Trans.] To “bootstrap” is “to pull oneself up by one’s own bootstraps,” i.e., to advance or rise with little or no assistance from others.

8. In the final analysis, hyperattention shares many traits with the solicitations of audiovisual objects, including monochrome, whose effect is the loss of a certain kind of attention, leading to surfing; on this matter, Jacques Brodeur explains that contemporary Hollywood cinema employs very tightly structured sequences, ceaselessly soliciting and stimulating attention.

9. This process gives access to the transindividual that attentive consciousness can achieve only by returning it (i.e., individuating it) according to the rules governing the simultaneous construction of anamnesis and dialectic, and thus a dianoia: an individuation of the subject and of its object (the object of observation, not simply of self-preservation). See the beginning of this section.
10. [Trans.] Stiegler’s use of littérallement, literally “literally,” which in *Technics and Time* distinguishes the written/literary from the oral, here has a slightly different meaning. Linked to Kant’s sense of “a public that reads,” it should catch the sense in which Kant/Stiegler means it: available to those who can read and write, who are literate. I have therefore translated littérallement as “literately”; thus, further on, littéralisé becomes “literatized.” Kant despised neologisms and felt we should all be speaking Greek, Latin, and of course German, but in a hypertechnological age, “ized” nicely depicts the transformative process of grammatization.


Gould’s “accident” is in certain respects comparable to what happens when one goes to the library or a bookstore to search for a book, and what one finds is a different book and is thus thrust into a dilemma that also produces a sort of accidental attention, which is often a source of invention. This also often happens on the Internet as the site of constant surfing. Quite interesting possibilities for surfing exist there, a virtue of accidental exploration and exploitation within numeric organology just as there is virtue in video games Katherine Hayles tries to learn.

12. Barbara Cassin’s book on Google’s grammatization of the world—which she does not analyze as grammatization—opens up a useful critique of Google’s entrepreneurial ideology but neglects these aspects, which greatly limits the force of a critique that is, moreover, very Platonic, which is surprising coming from a philosopher who has contributed a great deal to the reevaluation of sophistics. Aristotle recommends taking the Sophists literally at their word when they pose their problems, then turning them into questions of logic: to reverse them as psychotechnical, noetic questions. We must do the same thing today with psychotechnologies—and remember that in the Academy, Aristotle is reputed to have taught rhetoric (cf. Robin, *Platon*, 9; henceforth Robin).

13. An international program of research into these questions should be initiated, for example, in partnership with the University of Southern California and involving, in France, the Institut Universitaire de Formation des Maîtres (IUMF) as well as the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) and the Centre national de documentation pédagogique (CNDP).


15. This is a matter of what, when I was at INA, I called “multisupport editions”; it was in that framework that Jacques Derrida and I published *Ecographies of Television*, which was first a video recording for which I had envisaged a numeric edition in which the book would have been a mode of access to the recording, which in turn would give access to other Derridean resources through an index created in hypertext. I had launched such a program at the Institute
for Research and Innovation at the Pompidou Centre, where I developed the software Timelines designed for recording what are called lectures signées, regards signés, écoutes signées, objects of deep attention that are not books. See www.iri.centrepompidou.fr.

16. See Section 36.
17. See TCD, 129ff.
18. [Trans.] Both words Stiegler uses here, élément politque, obviously have multiple senses; as for the second, though, “policy” resonates with the re-creation of the central education system. Since Stiegler bases so much of his program on a Greek root, I have chosen to emphasize a resonance with polis and the political instead.
19. MD2, 74, 89.
21. See RM, 117.
24. Ibid.
28. babyfirsttv.com/fr/parents.

Chapter 6

1. I addressed this subject in MD2, 124, as a particular case of what is called a process of disaffection and disaffectation through cognitive as well as affective saturation.
2. [Trans.] “Agribusiness” generally refers to the combined elements of the “food industry,” from farming (seeds, equipment, chemicals, fertilizers) to distribution (trucking, processing) to consumption (marketing, wholesale and retail sales, regulation). It has two connotative senses: (1) descriptive: the group of activities and industries involved in food production, and (2) pejorative: the industrialized mass production of food, ranging from corporate farms to huge chains of supermarkets.
4. The Gasmi and Grolleau article shows precisely this: “This paper is also an