I. RHETORICAL TRAINING AND LITERATURE

The literature of the Tudor age, like that of earlier and immediately subsequent ages, has some of its deepest roots in the rhetorical tradition. This tradition is represented by a massive accumulation of writings and patterns of behavior which fed Western education and culture from antiquity well into the eighteenth century, but which until a generation ago had grown increasingly unfamiliar even to most scholars, following the Romantic reluctance to take rhetoric seriously as a conscious art. Recent scholarship, particularly in the United States, has re-explored the tradition, but the results and implications are not always widely known. The theory and practice of rhetoric can still be excluded from consideration in histories of Tudor literature, although by now one meets sometimes with wry acknowledgment of the central importance of what is being excluded.¹

Rhetoric is of prime literary importance. Works on rhetoric flooding Tudor book stalls are often, it is true, too businesslike, too practical in tone, too free of the touch of play necessary for aesthetic performance to qualify in themselves as belles-lettres. But this does not keep them from exerting massive influence on all genres of writing. And many of the rhetoric works have true literary merit of their own. As Louis B. Wright has shown in Middle-Class Culture in Elizabethan England, the collections of emblems, apothegms, and related material fostered by rhetorical tradition formed the staple of the ordinary man's reading. Books built around a rhetorical concern for 'invention' such as Tottel's Songs and

¹ In his English Literature in the Sixteenth Century excluding Drama, Vol. III of The Oxford History of English Literature, ed. by F. P. Wilson and Bonamy Dobrée (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 61, Professor C. S. Lewis, after an excellent statement on the sweep and depth of rhetorical tradition, with curious candor avows, 'Probably all our literary histories, certainly that on which I am engaged, are vitiated by our lack of sympathy on this point' (that is, lack of sympathy with sixteenth-century views of rhetoric and poetry).

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Sonnets (1557) or England’s Helicon (1600), preserve the best texts we have for many Tudor poems, and indeed sometimes the only texts. Other collections, such as Francis Meres’ Palladis Tamia, or Wit’s Treasury (1598), provide invaluable biographical detail on contemporary literary figures. And at least one new genre comes into existence as a metamorphosis of a rhetoric workbook: the much-touted essay, as we find Ben Jonson grumbling in his Timber, is at root simply a presentation of material garnered under one or another heading in a commonplace collection such as rhetoric encouraged writers to accumulate.

Tudor works on rhetoric and allied subjects, such as poetics and literary theory, of course cannot be understood apart from the classical heritage. More than at any other time in English literary history, in the Tudor age, the golden age of the great grammar schools such as St. Paul’s, the classical rhetorical heritage took possession of literature and of society itself. This heritage appears simultaneously as theory, as pedagogical practice, and as a determinant of the whole culture. From typographical usage to court manners, from drama to Bacon’s reform of science, the influence of rhetoric is clearly discernible not merely in style of expression but also deeply ingrained in ways of thought and world outlook.

The original Greek rhetorike refers directly not to writing but to oral performance, public speaking, skill in which had constituted the major objective of intellectual training for the elite of ancient Greece. Rhetoric is thus the ‘art’ developed by a literate culture to formalize the oral communication skills which had helped determine the structures of thought and society before literacy. Quite early, however, the term was generalized to include other than oral expression, but the fact that a term specific to oral verbalization came to be the ordinary one referring to the management of other forms of expression suggests that rhetoric may well have preserved early oral-aural cultural attitudes, as it did indeed through the Renaissance and beyond. As a teachable body of knowledge, rhetoric is defined by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (I. i. 14. 1355b) as the art of discovering the available means of persuasion for any subject matter whatsoever. Largely through Cicero’s great example and his treatises on the orator’s profession, the formal study of rhetoric became established as the focus of academic education also in imperial Rome. Cicero’s short treatise, De inventione, and the longer Rhetorica ad Herennium long ascribed to him were the backbone of rhetorical training until well along in the sixteenth century, abetted after the advent of humanism by Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria.
In the middle ages, rhetoric was the second art of the trivium, that is, of the sequence of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (strictly, an art of disputation tolerating argument from probability, but in fact more or less equated with logic, the art of strictly scientific argumentation), which together constituted the lower academic curriculum. These subjects were followed by 'philosophy' (natural philosophy chiefly, with a touch of metaphysics and some moral philosophy) to lead in English as in other universities to the degree of master of arts. In point of fact, dialectic or logic tended to be detached from the trivium and annexed to the higher curriculum of philosophy, and thus in a way to outclass rhetoric. Yet, as Richard McKeon has shown in his classic Speculum article on 'Rhetoric in the Middle Ages', despite the ascendancy of logic in medieval times, both the theory and practice of rhetoric contributed massively from the fourth through the fourteenth centuries not only to expression but also to vast areas of medieval intellectual achievement, such as to the development of the scholastic method and of scientific enquiry as well as to psychology and medicine.

In Tudor England, despite humanist endeavors to pull it into the higher ranges of the curriculum, rhetoric in general retained its medieval position in the curriculum at a level lower than logic or dialectic.2

Grammar and rhetoric, with only such elementary or 'petty' logic as was needed for rhetoric, were studied in elementary or 'middle' schools, leaving most of logic and all of philosophy to the universities. Grammar involved the study of language and literature, all but exclusively Latin of course, with gestures toward Greek, and took the form of parsing and translating and Latin prose composition, including Latin letter writing; it also included poertria, or the study of metrics and versification, which was often considered simply a specialized part of rhetoric. Rhetoric was no longer focused so dominantly as it had been in antiquity on oral performance but had become more or less continuous with advanced instruction in grammar, leading to what is still called 'theme, writing as well as to declamations or orations. Some study of rhetoric was continued into the university, but it seems to have been limited chiefly to lectures on theory and to the analysis of classical orations; for the disputation stressed in university work were logical rather than rhetorical exercises. In fact, however, rhetoric still functioned in university work, for the disputant or commentator on a text on many occasions digressed rhetorically from his straight and narrow logical path.

Merely to list these various modes of language studies does not give a full idea of their method. A glance at the texts in use, whether classical or medieval or contemporary Tudor, for all coexisted, reveals an extraordinarily strict discipline in composition. It reveals also the degree to which the oration as such tyrannized over ideas of what expression as such—literary or other—was. The usual theory acknowledged three kinds of orations: the judicial (or courtroom), the deliberative, and the occasional or epideictic or demonstrative (encomium, consolatory, etc.). Orations of any kind were composed in a sequence of parts, which varied in the manuals from a minimal two to seven. In the Rhetoric (iii. 13) Aristotle had listed four: the exordium, the narration or proposition (statement of what one is to prove), the proof, and the conclusion, indicating that the two essential parts were narration and proof. Cicero lists the parts differently in different places, and in the De inventione (i. 14—

including Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963), Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Nature of Narrative (New York, Oxford University Press, 1966), and the present author's The Presence of the Word (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967), give rhetoric still fuller meaning by relating it to larger cultural and psychological developments concerned with the evolution of the media of communication. In general, references readily traceable through the foregoing works or other basic works to which the foregoing refer are not given in detail here.
56) and De oratore (ii. 19) increases Aristotle’s four to six: exordium, narration, division (of the subject matter), proof, refutation of adversaries, and conclusion. To these, between narration and division, Thomas Wilson in The Arte of Rhetorique (1553) adds a seventh part, the ‘position’, which is ‘a pithie sentence [sententious saying] comprehending in a small roume, the some of the whole matter.’ If we add a digression just before the peroration, as Cicero (De oratore ii. 19) states some authors do, we can even have eight parts.

The art of letter writing, part of the ars dictaminis developed in the medieval schools for notaries and officials, had picked up this oratorical structure and applied it to letters. These were to have, after the proper salutatio, in succession an exordium or benevolentiae captatio (the winning of good will), a narratio or statement of the fact, a petitio or request (corresponding to the proof in the oration), and a conclusio. Moreover, even the classification of kinds of letters most often echoed the kinds of the oration: in Erasmus’ De ratione conscribendi epistolas, a common schoolbook after 1521, we find letters divided into persuasive (deliberative), laudatory (demonstrative), and judicial, plus a fourth type, which was nonoratorical, the familiar. But there were other more elaborate classifications, as will be seen.

The writing of school themes was governed by as strict a discipline as the writing of letters and was likewise thought of—partly by oversight—in oratorical terms. Set formulas for various thematic orations were to be found in the progymnasmata or school exercises of the Greek rhetoricians Hermogenes (fl. A.D. 161–180) and Aphthonius (fl. A.D. 315). Aphthonius’ Progymnasmata was current in a Latin version by Rudolph Agricola and Ioannes Maria Cataneus with scholia by Reinhard Lorich (despite humanists’ campaigning, few schoolmasters could really read Greek with facility), and an English paraphrase with English examples was published in 1563 by an Oxford fellow, Richard Rainolde, as The Foundation of Rhetorike. Rainolde lists Aphthonius’ fourteen ways of ‘making’ an oration as: fable (in the Aesopian sense), narration or tale, chria (praise or blame of a word or deed), sentence or gnomic saying, confutation or refutation, confirmation or proof, commonplace or amplification of a virtue or vice, praise or encomium, dispraise or vi-

5 T. W. Baldwin, op. cit., II, 251.
tuperation, comparison, ethopeia or character portrayal, visual description, thesis or generalization, and legislatio or a plea for or against a law.\textsuperscript{6} Schoolboys writing themes cast them in one or another of these molds or types. Each type had its subtypes and special formulary requirements. Thus:

This parte of Rhetorike called praise is either a particular praise of one, as of kyng Henry the fifte, Plato, Tullie, Demosthenes, Cyrus, Darius, Alexander the greate; or a generalle and universalle praise, as the praise of all the Britaines or of all the citezains of London.

The order to make this Oracion is thus declared. First, for the enteryng of the matter, you shall place a \textit{exordium}, or beginnyng. The seconde place, you shall bryng to his praise \textit{Genus eiusmod}, that is to saie, of what kinde he came of, which dooth consiste in fower poinctes: of what nacion, of what countrie, of what auncetours, of what parentes. After that you shall declare his educacion. The educacion is contained in three poinctes: in institucion, arte, lawes. Then put there to that, whiche is the chief grounde of al praise: his actes doen, which doe procede out of the giftes and excellencies of the minde, as the fortitude of the mynde, wisedome, and magnanimitee; of the bodie, as a beautifull face, amiable countenaunce, swiftnesse, the might and strength of the same; the excellencies of fortune, as his dignitee, power, aucthoritee, riches, substaunce, frendes. In the fifte place use a comparison, wherein that whiche you praise maie be advaunced to the uttermoste. Laste of all, use the \textit{Epilogus} or conclusion.\textsuperscript{7}

The other thirteen kinds of thematic orations demanded procedures of comparable complexity. Of these themes, those of praise (\textit{encomium}) and dispraise (\textit{vituperatio}) were certainly the most important, since ancient, medieval, and Renaissance literary performance in practice and even more in theory hinged on these two activities to a degree quite incredible today.

The formulas in Rainolde’s Aphthonius give some idea of what went on in actual schoolroom practice, but the Renaissance vision of rhetoric extended far beyond such schoolroom exercises. Most manuals in use present Cicero’s vision of rhetoric as consisting of five ‘parts’: \textit{inventio} or discovery of ‘arguments’ to prove a point, \textit{dispositio} or arrangement of the arguments found, \textit{elocutio} or style, \textit{memoria} or the use of memory, and \textit{pronuntiatio} or delivery. These ‘parts’, as a matter of fact, were not taught in strict sequence nor with equal emphasis by Tudor rhetoricians


\textsuperscript{7} Rainolde, \textit{op. cit.}, fol. xxxvi\textit{j} (\textit{sic} for xxxix)\textsuperscript{v}–xl\textsuperscript{r} (paragraphing and punctuation adjusted to modern usage).
any more than they had been by ancient rhetoricians. Cicero, whose work *De inventione* includes a great deal of material evidently belonging to the other parts, which he never got around to treating, suggests in his *Brutus* (vi.) that the five parts may really be five separate arts rather than divisions of a single art, coming close to the historical fact that they had originally been not 'parts' of an 'art' but more or less successive activities involved in ancient Greek liberal education.

From the beginning in antiquity, *inventio* had received the lion's share of attention. It was particularly important insofar as rhetoric affected the writing of literature as such, for *inventio* corresponded roughly to what our post-romantic world would call 'use of the creative imagination', although it was implemented chiefly by exploitation of the highly conventional 'places' or commonplaces (*loci* or *loci communes*). These were headings suggesting thoughts for any and all subjects and available in various competing lists. They are explained at greater length below. The formulas for 'praise' and the other thirteen kinds of composition discussed above can be accurately viewed as lists of suitable commonplace headings ranged in effective order for fourteen particular purposes.

Except for such formulary arrangement of headings and some remarks on the parts of the oration, *dispositio* was given less attention in the manuals and the classroom. *Elocutio* or style was commonly interpreted in terms of ornament: the writer or speaker was thought of as 'decorating' his otherwise plain thought with tropes and/or figures and/or schemes which, like the commonplaces, were classified in numerous competing lists in the various rhetorical manuals, partly overlapping and partly contradicting one another. England's earliest significant contribution to such catalogues of rhetorical ornaments had been Bede's *Liber de schematibus et tropis in Scriptura Sacra*. Medieval writers had also developed concern with style in a special sense related to Cicero's concern with decorum. They wrote of three styles, which in the sixteenth century Sherry, Wilson, and Puttenham call 'characters' of style: the 'high' style was to be used in treating of noble or epic characters, the 'middle' for middle-class characters (such as the landed gentry), the low for persons of the lowest orders, the three styles being exemplified respectively by Virgil's *Aeneid*, *Georgics*, and *Eclogues*. Sixteenth-century rhetoricians commonly concern themselves with the high style only,

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although writers self-consciously did use all three.\textsuperscript{10} Thomas Deloney's \textit{Thomas of Reading} (c. 1599) mixes tradesmen's middle style with the high-style Euphuism always employed by Margaret, daughter of the Earl of Shrewsbury, by Prince William, Prince Richard, and Duke Robert. The plain style favored by Ramism, as will be seen, is related to the middle and low styles, but is not the same as either. It consists of unadorned, flat statement. Memory, and even more \textit{pronuntiatio}, were somewhat half-heartedly retained; they were in fact chiefly relics of the more truly rhetorical age of antiquity, when expression had been more typically an oral performance and less concerned with writing than in post-Gutenberg Tudor England.

We are today struck with amazement at the variety and rigidity of Tudor training in rhetoric, the more remarkable because it was imposed in a second language, Latin, with a sprinkling of a third language, Greek, upon schoolboys of ten to fourteen years of age. Rainolde's English version of Aphthonius, cited above because it is a contemporary translation, was in fact not a typical textbook; for these in principle, and generally in actuality, were themselves in Latin. School statutes, although of course not always observed, typically imposed the speaking of Latin by boys and masters at all times on the school premises, aiming at creating the total Latin environment in which Cicero had lived when Latin was the vernacular. English appeared only indirectly and incidentally in the program: it was used, as occasion offered, simply to better the boys' Latin and Greek, as in the procedure advocated by Ascham in \textit{The Schoolmaster}, whereby the student translated a Latin passage into English so that he could translate the English back into his own Latin, thus perfecting his control of the ancient tongue. That such a rhetorical system could have helped produce the great writers of Tudor England appears strange today, but the fact that it did so is incontestable. The indelible marks of the system on Shakespeare, for example, often observable in his most effective and moving and seemingly most unaffectedly 'natural' writing, have been conclusively spelt out by Professor T. W. Baldwin in his \textit{William Shakspeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greeke}. Since Latin, with a dash of Greek, was virtually the only school subject, studied daily all day long for a period of seven to ten years, it is little wonder that skill in that language occasioned skill in the vernaculars. Perhaps never before or after was training in language skill so vigorous.

in England as in Tudor times. No apt student so relentlessly drilled in any language could fail to acquire some effectiveness in his own related vernacular.

Since rhetoric was studied at what today would be the elementary school, or at best junior high school level, it appears puzzling how the young boys subject to this training could have had anything at all to say worthy of the intricate amplifications provided by the system. Steps were taken, however, to provide them with something to say. These steps were two: stocking the mind with abundance of material or 'copie' (copia) which could be drawn on by inventio, and simultaneously implementing inventio by training in the use of the 'places', already mentioned. The humanist doctrine of imitation, which encouraged careful echoing of expressions or whole passages out of the best writing of antiquity, helped stock the mind with both ideas and words. Often the ideas and words came directly from readings in the classics themselves: Aesop, Terence, Ovid, Virgil, Horace, Plautus, Cicero, and the historians, together with a very few Neo-Latin writers such as the pastoral poet Joannes Baptista Mantuanus, mentioned with warmth by Shakespeare and others. Out of such authors expressions as well as ideas could be culled and written into one's own commonplace book or 'copie' book (copybook). More conveniently, however, useful ideas and expressions could be found already collected and indexed in the countless printed commonplace books on the market, lavish handbooks of excerpted materials from the classics, of which Erasmus' are the most massive and representative. Here the schoolboy or his master could look up ways of 'varying' expressions far outnumbering those in the desk vernacular thesaurus of today. Erasmus' De duplici copia, for example, throws at the reader some two hundred different ways of saying, 'I shall remember you as long as I live' (in Latin of course). There were collections of proverbs, apotheigns, anecdotes, examples, and similes. One of the best known of these last in English (most were in Latin) is Francis Meres' Palladis Tamia: Wit's Treasury (1598), which presents 666 pages of similes following a preface in which every sentence is itself entirely composed of triple similes—a tour de force not too difficult for one trained in this rhetorical tradition.

Means of exploiting the store of material accumulated in these manuals and, it was to be hoped, in the boy's own mind, were found in the lists of commonplace headings elaborated from ancient and medieval writers. In order to 'find' something to say on a 'theme' (an idea, rela-
tively abstract, such as bravery; or concrete, such as palace) or on a 'thesis' (a statement, such as 'Emperors should be brave'), one betook oneself to an assortment of 'places' or loci or 'topics' (Greek topoi, places; adjective topikos). We would think of these today as 'headings', but the Tudor mind, like the ancient and medieval, thought of them as somehow locales or compartments or, very often, hunting grounds in which all possible things one could say about a subject were considered to be lodged. Cicero (Topics ii) had defined a locus in terms of locale as the 'seat of an argument' (sedes argumenti).

As has already been stated, lists of these 'places' or loci varied greatly in make-up and length. Generally, since antiquity, loci for rhetoric had been considered to differ in principle from those for dialectic, although the two had been more or less confounded in practice. Here the Renaissance was to witness a revolution. In his De inventione dialectica (completed c. 1479, but printed only posthumously in 1515), the Dutch humanist Rudolph Agricola (Roelof Huusman), whom Thomas Wilson followed in The Arte of Rhetorique, had grouped all the places of invention without exception under dialectic. Using his list to develop, for example, the theme of bravery, the writer should consider in order the definition of bravery, its genus, species, properties, whole, parts, conjugates or closely linked matters, adjacents or loosely associated matters, acts of bravery, subjects of bravery, the efficient cause, end, consequences, and intended effects of bravery, the places and times when bravery was to be practiced, its connections, contingents, name, pronunciation, things comparable to it, things like it, opposites, and differences. These loci or topics provided 'artificial' arguments, that is, arguments intrinsic to the subject and thus available through 'art'. In addition, there was the 'inartificial' or extrinsic locus of 'testimony' or 'witness', less esteemed because it provided as an argument only what someone had said, that is, something lying outside the analysis intrinsic to the subject itself. By running through these 'places', in whole or in part, the writer or speaker could bring to mind relevant material in the 'copie' stored up from earlier reading, either in his own mind or in his notes or in the printed collections of excerpts from ancient (and a few contemporary) authors. Following the far from clear discussion of the places in Aristotle's Topics and Rhetoric, there existed through the Renaissance a tendency to distinguish 'common' places, which provided arguments for any and all subjects (as do those just listed above), from 'special' or 'private' places, headings for arguments peculiar to a special subject such
as law or politics or ethics or physics. But in fact 'commonplace' (locus communis) was often used generally for both kinds of places. The loci were different historically and conceptually from the Aristotelian categories or predicaments, with which they were, however, occasionally confused—as by Ralph Lever in *The Art of Reason* (1573).

If we ask what effects this Tudor training in composition had upon the prospective writer, we should note first of all the obvious emphasis upon both play of the mind and word-play. The grammar-school boy should never have been at a loss to play with any word or idea or—what was much the same—to develop any word or idea systematically. Tudor exuberance of language and expression was not accidental, it was achieved. Since the student had read and imitated almost exclusively Latin authors, the style of his expression was necessarily Latinate, complex in form and vocabulary if not completely Ciceronian. (The slavish use of only Ciceronian words and expressions which Erasmus vigorously contested as pedantic in his *Ciceronianus* [1528] was rare indeed in England.) Since the student had been trained in one rhetorical (and logical) pattern after another, we should expect his speech or writing to be mannered jargon. It often is, and Shakespeare, Nashe, and others frequently poke fun at it for being so. But since the Latin models for imitation were good, the results were, at their optimum, utterly convincing and natural, and we find ourselves surprised to discover for example that Othello's 'round unvarnish'd tale' is set in a strictly patterned exordium or introduction which comes straight out of the textbook.

Furthermore, the study of rhetoric gave the most diverse literary genres a more or less oratorical cast, largely because the dominance of oratory in ancient culture had never been effectively challenged. We are not surprised that Tudor monuments to oral expression include obviously oral exhibits such as secular orations (most of the carefully wrought ones in Latin) or the great sermons of the age headed by John Colet's 1512 *Sermon . . . Made to the Convocation at Paul's* (delivered in

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11 Ralph Lever, *The Arte of Reason* (1573), p. 7. The Greek word *kategoría* (after which the Latin equivalent, *praedicamentum*, is modeled) means an accusation or charge, not a class or storehouse; in Aristotle it refers to the predicate in a proposition or assertion, thought of as a 'charge' brought against a subject. Hence Lever refers to the ten 'demauenders'. The *loci* or topics, on the other hand, are classes, subject to logical quantification. Lever, after referring to the 'demauenders', proceeds to consider them erroneously as *loci*. See Sister Joan Marie Lechner, *Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces* (New York, 1962), pp. 90-91.

12 See T. W. Baldwin, *op. cit.*, II, 198-200, and *passim*. 
Latin but printed in English in 1530) and by Hugh Latimer's 1548 English sermon commonly known as ‘The Sermon of the Plow’. It is somewhat surprising, however, to note how far oratory infiltrated genres which we consider nonoratorical. Fiction writers made their characters speak to one another in orations or quasi-orations even in private conversation, as we see in John Lyly’s Euphu: The Anatomy of Wit (1578) and Euphues and His England (1580), Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller (1594), or Sidney’s Arcadia begun 1580 (published posthumously 1590 and 1593). Plays such as Shakespeare’s Henry V feature lengthy stretches of highly oratorical declamation. Treatises such as Sidney’s Defense of Poesie, together with essays, letters, the prefaces, and dedicatory pieces with which the age abounds, as well as epic and lyric poetry are all organized in oratorical form probably more often than not. Indeed, praise and blame, the objectives of the epideictic orator, were often identified as equally the objectives of literature generally.13

The deeper effect of rhetorical teaching on the literary sensibility is connected with this omnipresence of the oratorical frame of mind. It was an effect as real and sweeping as it was doubtless unpremeditated. A rhetorically dominated education gave a boy no training whatsoever in uncommitted, ‘objective’, neutral exposition or narrative. It was not dialectic alone which gave the Tudor age its argumentative cast. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and the orator who exemplifies its training is a committed man, one who speaks for a side. The forensic orator prosecutes or defends, the deliberative orator pleads for or against the passage of the law or measure he discusses, and even the epideictic or demonstrative orator, the speaker who merely displays his master of a subject (but always, Renaissance writers resolutely maintained, to incite his hearers to virtue), does so in Tudor as in earlier theory and practice by judicious distribution of praise and blame. Rhetoric produced individuals predisposed to approach any subject by taking a side, because they were not formally trained to do anything else: any side, perhaps, but some side certainly. The polemic outlook was further intensified by the fact that the schools and the very language of the schools, Latin, were only for the boys and men. Academic aims are often formulated in the jargon of the aristocratic fighter-hero, as in Sir Thomas Elyot’s

The 'lettered' women who knew Latin, as Sir Thomas More's daughter Margaret and Lady Jane Grey and Queen Elizabeth did, had no discernible mollifying influence on the contentious academic climate: such women were very few, and they studied with tutors, away from the halls of disputation, at home, where other girls who learned some reading and writing did so almost always by working with the more peaceable vernacular.

The polemic rhetorical setting may have been bad for science, but it was good for many kinds of literature. The life of the mind was exciting because it was framed in conflict. Characters with words in their mouths put there by writers trained in rhetoric were sure to generate dramatic friction when they met together on the stage, and intellectuals engaged in any controversy were spurred on to making the most of their cause and indeed often to regrettable virulence. The combative basis of rhetorical (and dialectical) training is certainly one of the reasons for the effectiveness of the late Tudor and Jacobean drama, as well as of the great lyric poetry of the age. The polemic cast of expression continued far past Tudor times. Milton's essays on public affairs are virulent in controversy, and his *Paradise Lost* was conceived as an oration to 'justifie the wayes of God to men'.

2. ENGLISH WORKS ON RHETORIC AND THEIR SOURCES

The revival of rhetoric in Tudor England was a part of the general Renaissance revival of the art. Like most Renaissance phenomena, this revival appeared in England much later than on the continent. As on the continent, when it did appear, it took the form of an antischolastic movement. During the scholastic middle ages, in Northern Europe particularly, the ancient focus on rhetoric had yielded to a focus on logic or dialectic, largely under the influence of the scientizing propensities which developed with the universities and their scholastic philosophy from the twelfth century on. Since antiquity, the West had known an art of discourse (*ars disserendi*) which Cicero and others called *dialectica* and which the middle ages generally tended to identify more or less with logic (*logica*), although this latter was sometimes restricted to strictly 'necessary' or scientific reasoning (such as in mathematics) as against the merely more probable reasoning which might win for one side in a dialectical disputation or debate.

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Cicero’s dialectic, and, following it, medieval dialectic, was thought of as made up of *inventio* or invention and *iudicium* or judgment (also called *dispositio* or arrangement), parts which were strikingly similar to the first two parts of Ciceronian rhetoric. Although more astute thinkers tried to differentiate logical or dialectical invention and disposition from rhetorical, the middle ages often tended to reduce the province of rhetoric by assigning invention and disposition, in effect, to logic or dialectic, leaving rhetoric with only *elocutio* or style as its province—memory and delivery being, as has been seen, minor matters. The *Meta-logicon* of John of Salisbury states that rhetoric provides luster and re-splendence to the arguments of logic, and elsewhere assigns to dialectic succinct expression, generally in syllogisms, and to rhetoric induction and amplification.\(^\text{15}\)

Although rhetoric was thus often narrowed in scope in the middle ages, it was by no means completely forgotten, even in the North. We remember Chaucer’s praise of Petrarch, ‘the laureate poet ... whos rethorike sweete / Enlumyned al Ytaille of poetrie, and llis other lauda-tory reference to the ‘rethor’ who could ‘faire endite’.\(^\text{16}\) The rhetorical fires banked through the middle ages flared up with the same Petrarch’s intensified passion for Cicero and with the influx into Italy of humanist educators from Greece, led by Manuel Chrysoloras, who came to Florence as a municipally paid lecturer in 1396 and had as his most influential pupil Guarino of Verona. The method of education perfected by Guarino was to become that of humanism generally: reading and composition to assure detailed assimilation of content from classical writers and meticulous imitation of their form.\(^\text{17}\) Works from Greek antiquity were made increasingly available to the West in Latin. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* was translated into Latin during the fifteenth century by George of Trebizond (probably between 1447 and 1455) and Ermolao Barbaro (after 1480).\(^\text{18}\)


\(^\text{18}\) Bolgar, *op. cit.*, p. 434.
Englishmen visiting Italy in Guarino’s day and in contact with humanists there, such as William Grey, later Bishop of Ely, or John Free, later Bishop of Bath, brought back many of the new works, but these Englishmen were themselves drawn commonly into public life before they were able themselves to add significantly to the new learning. Continental humanists in England were responsible for the early publications there concerned with rhetoric. Lorenzo Guglielmo Traversagni OFM of Savona, lecturer in theology at various places in Europe, finished his Nova rhetorica at Cambridge University in 1478, as he tells us at the end of the work itself, which was published by Caxton around 1479 and by the St. Albans printer in 1480. This work is a large and substantial treatise (362 pages), based still on the pseudo-Ciceronian medieval favorite, the Ad Herennium, and oriented to preaching. Other Continental visitors doing some of their work on rhetoric in England include Erasmus and the Spanish lecturer in rhetoric at Oxford, Juan Luis Vives. But the influx of works published on the continent, particularly those of the German humanist educators, was greater than the local British production, even abetted by immigres. The Epitome troporum ac schematum of Iohannes Susenbrotus (Zurich, 1541) became one of the standard English school texts, together with rhetorical works by Philip Melanchthon, Petrus Mosellanus, Ioannes Caesarius, and others.19 These were, of course, Latin compositions.

School statutes uniformly mention textbooks in Latin for classroom use, but by the 1530s, and increasingly in the latter half of the century,20 some of these found their way into English translation, probably for a variety of reasons. Some teachers might ignore school statutes and do at least part of their teaching in English. Others might translate a work from Latin to guarantee their mastery of it. Some works translated or written in English might be designed for those who, like the upper-class youth prescribed for in Elyot’s Governor (1531), did not go to the university, or for law students in London.21 The first rhetoric in Eng-

20 I have found Bolgar’s lists in Appendix ii very useful: ‘The Translations of the Greek and Roman Classical Authors before 1600’, op. cit., pp. 506–541.
lish was that of the schoolmaster Leonard Cox, *The Art or Crafte of Rhetoryke* (London, c. 1530; second ed., 1532), derived from Cicero’s elementary treatises and Melanchthon’s *Institutiones rhetoricae* (1521) and treating only *inventio*. The next English treatise was by Thomas Wilson, who proceeded M. A. at Cambridge in 1549 and was to go on to the law and important public service. In *The Rule of Reason* (1551) Wilson had produced the first book on logic in English, which he complemented with *The Arte of Rhetorique* (1553), a full, five-part Ciceronian work which emphasized *inventio* and in its treatment of *elocutio* cautioned against the use of ‘strange inkehorne termes’ derived from foreign languages. Learned or academic works in English seldom went beyond one more or less experimental edition, and the extraordinary demand which produced eight editions of *The Arte of Rhetorique* by 1585 together with the fact that its numerous illustrative examples relate to the law, the pulpit, and public affairs, lends substance to the conjecture that Wilson intended it for the young gentlemen and noblemen studying law at the Inns of Court. With his logic, Wilson’s rhetoric stands out as lively and intelligent, ‘the only English-language rhetoric of the sixteenth century which goes beyond translation or close paraphrase’.

Other works on rhetoric after Wilson continue to be derivative, but their increasing number indicates a growing ease in expressing in English academic thought previously cast chiefly in Latin. Some are what Howell calls ‘stylistic rhetorics’, treating only *elocutio* and limiting it to tropes and figures of speech. Richard Sherry’s *A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes* (1550) by the headmaster of the Magdalen College School at Oxford, was a large compilation, the first in English, drawing largely on Erasmus; a new 1555 edition introduced Latin alternating with the English to make the work usable as a school textbook. A later English compilation was Henry Peacham’s *The Garden of Eloquence Conteyning the Figures of Grammer and Rhetorick, from whence may bee gathered all manner of Flowers, Colours, Ornaments, Exornations, Formes and Fashions of Speech* (1577). Peacham was a clergyman, and his book for ‘studious youth’ who had not the benefit of Latin was revised in a second edition to draw especially upon the Bible for illustration.

Brief treatises on tropes, figures, and schemes were also to be found in letter-writing manuals in English, for example in the 1592 revision of

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23 Ed. (1593 revision) by William G. Crane (Gainesville, Fla., Scholars’ Facsimiles and Reprints, 1954).
Angel Day's *The English Secretorie* (1586) and in John Hoskins' *Directions for Speech and Style*, written about 1600 and much plagiarized around that time, though not published until 1935. Hoskins' work is competently and forcefully written, making skillful use of homely expressions to put into English rhetorical concepts ordinarily managed in Latin. Thus he describes metaphor as 'the friendly and neighborly borrowing of one word to express a thing with more light and better note, though not so directly and properly as the natural name of the thing meant would signify.'

Sensitivity to tropes and figures and schemes—grammatical, logical, or rhetorical—was cultivated not only in one's own writing but also for purposes of literary analysis. As we know from marginal annotations in books of the time, texts were worked over to discover and identify hyperbaton, metonymy, aphaeresis (the dropping of an initial letter or syllable), concessio (granting to an opponent a point which hurts him), and the countless other 'ornaments' treated in works on grammar and rhetoric—Peacham provided fifty-six grammatical 'schemates' or patterns to work with, fifty patterns of word and sentence, and sixty of amplification, and he by no means exhausted the possibilities. This is the setting which helps generate the style of John Lyly's *Euphues* (1578). The intensity of Tudor interest in tropes, figures, and schemes shows itself even in typography, with the development of gnomic printing as an adjunct of rhetoric. Especially between 1550 and 1660, printed texts in considerable quantity use special pointing—asterisks, daggers, variations in type face, hands, and other devices—to indicate in sidenotes the occurrence of rhetorical figures, especially sententiae, or even label figures verbally (*similitudo*, *exemplum*, etc.), as schoolmasters and schoolboys did in analyzing texts. The practice of gnomic printing shades into other kinds of emphatic printing (italics, upper case, etc.), and our present-day use of italics and exclamation and quotation marks can be seen as the fag end of this once more complicated rhetorical tradition.

Other types of rhetoric textbooks contained model examples. Rainolde's adaptation of Aphthonius has been mentioned earlier; it provided short model orations, carefully analyzed. Some of these formulary text-

books become, in effect, anthologies of very effective pieces of writing. Model speeches come close to fiction in *The Orator: Handling a Hundred Severall Discourses* (1596), Lazarus Piot's translation from the French of Alexandre van den Busche or Le Sylvain. The hundred exercises here include each an accusation and a reply, one of them discussing the pound-of-flesh contract: the translator hopes that lawyers, preachers, and others might profit by his models. In *The Defence of Contraries* (1593, reprinted 1616), a translation of Ortensio Landi's *Paradossi* (1541), the veteran hack writer Anthony Munday presents twelve of Landi's original thirty essays. These defend poverty, ignorance, foolishness, and so on, continuing the school tradition in which Erasmus' *Praise of Folly* both belongs and excels.

Models for imitation are likewise to be found in the letter-writers. The first of these was William Fulwood's *The Enimie of Idlenesse* (1568), a book of precepts and sample letters which is almost entirely a translation of *Le stile et maniere de composer, dicter, et escrire toute sorte d'epistre* (Lyons, 1566),27 one of several French letter-writers available at the time. The sample letters strike occasional notes of real pathos, but Fulwood perpetuates the rigid Latin formularies, with their division of letters into deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial. Abraham Fleming's *A Panoplie of Epistles* (1576), under the influence of the work of the ancient Greek Sophist Libanius, is even more formulaic, with twenty-one types of letters. Fleming's section on precepts is a translation from the Latin of Christoff Hegendorff (Hegendorphinus), much used in England. Angel Day's *The English Secretorie*, mentioned above, is more original as well as erudite and useful. Day believes that something more than formulas should go into 'Epistles Amatorie' but otherwise multiplies formulas, dividing Erasmus' four epistolary types into thirty-two subdivisions. Day refers to the printer's copy for a later pioneer commercial letter-writer, *The Merchants Aviso* (1607, but completed in 1587) by 'that hartie well-willer in Christ' I[ohn] B[rown], a Bristol merchant.28

The samples in these letter-writers mostly lack the charm and gusto of those provided in Nicholas Breton's *A Poste with a Madde Packet of

Letters (1602), which waives explicit concern with formularies, _exordium, narratio_, tropes, figures, and the rest of the ancient heritage while actually using consummate rhetorical skill to present letters in a 'mad' style often reminiscent of Tom Nashe at his yeasty best. The only letter-writers of comparable literary importance appear a century and a half later, when Samuel Richardson's manuals for the nonrhetorical because non-Latinate feminine set appear and burgeon into novels.

The art of preaching had been given special attention by rhetoricians from the days of St. Augustine through the middle ages and on to Erasmus' _Ecclesiastes, sive concionator evangelicus_ (1535), a five-step Ciceronian treatment known in England through continental editions. Here, too, England relied on foreign sources. By the late sixteenth century several other continental treatises were being rendered into English: _The Preacher: or Methode of Preaching_ was a translation (1574) by J[ohn] H[orsfall] of a work by a Danish classicist Niel Hemmingsen; _The Practis of Preaching, Otherwise Called the Pathway to the Pulpit_ was John Ludham's translation (1577) of the _De formandis concionibus sacris_ (1553) by the Marburg theologian Andreas Hyperius (or Gerard); and _The Art or Skill Well and Fruitfullie to Heare the Holy Sermons of the Church_ a translation (1600?) of the _Ars habendi et audiendi conciones sacras_ (Siegen, 1598) of the German Protestant theologian Wilhelm Zepper.29 The one original work by an Englishman on pulpit oratory was composed in Latin by the famous preacher of Cambridge William Perkins as _Prophetica, sive de sacra et unica ratione concionandi_ (1592), later translated as _The Art of Prophecying_ in an edition of Perkins' _Collected Works_ (1606). Perkins' treatise shows the influence of Ramist rhetoric common in the late sixteenth-century Puritan milieu, but it was more concerned with content than with form.

Also related to works on rhetoric were the treatises on mnemonics, which trace their origins often to Cicero.30 _The Art of Memory, That Otherwise is Called the Phenix_ was translated by Robert Copland (1548?) from the French version of the Latin of Pietro Tommai of Ravenna, _Foenix Domini Petri Ravennatis memoriae magistri_ (Venice, 1491), and Guglielmo Gratarolo's _De memoria_ was translated by William Fullwood


30 See Frances A. Yates, _The Art of Memory_ (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966), for a brilliant historical account of the importance of the mnemonic tradition.
as *The Castel of Memorie* (1562, republished 1563 and 1573). Formulas used in memory schemes are often related to similar formulas used for the sequences of *loci* which were standard for writing on various subjects, as in Rainolde’s thematic orations, mentioned above. A work on memory by one G. P. of Cambridge (*G. P. Cantabrigiensis*, *Libellus de memoria verissimaque bene recordandi scientia* 1584), associated memory explicitly with the second part of rhetoric, *dispositio*.

Perhaps the most interesting by-product of rhetoric is the steady stream of collected sayings and excerpts useful for writing and for general education. These collections, or printed commonplace books, often of vast size, result from two drives in Tudor times: the humanist desire to expedite *inventio* by having at hand massive stores of material for ‘imitation’, both in content and style, and the habit of collecting commonplace material inherited from the middle ages, when florilegia and conflated commentaries multiplied beyond anything dreamed of in antiquity. Letterpress printing gave a new outlet to the collecting drive by facilitating not only multiplication of texts but also—what was more important—relatively thorough and exact indexing. The back-breaking work of indexing became worthwhile once typography provided the same pagination in any number of copies. The resulting collections are often—but by no means always—identifiable by their titles, which exploit the gathering or hunting imagery associated with rhetorical *inventio*. Although there is no guide to these collections as such, they are legion in the Tudor literary landscape, where title after title, such as Peacham’s cited above, features terms such as flowers (*fiores* in Latin), blossoms, posies, garlands, nosegays, gardens, anthologies (Greek for ‘gatherings of flowers’); or, in another series, springs, sources, fonts, wellsprings, Helicons, Parnassuses; in another, *silvae*, woods, forests, underwoods. Some of the collections are specialized by rhetorical structure: one will consist entirely of epigrams or similes, another of aphorisms, or ‘sentences’ (sententious sayings), adages, paradoxes,apotheogms, jests, and so on. Others are specialized by subject matter and thus, as has been seen above, are technically collections not of ‘common’ places but of ‘private’ places for medicine, law, theology, or other subjects.

Associated with printed commonplace collections are dictionaries of

various sorts, heavily relied on by the writers of the best Renaissance literature,\(^{32}\) as well as grammars, which both ransack and propagate commonplace sources in providing favorite passages from ancient authors as examples of syntax. Also allied to printed commonplace collections are the courtesy books or books on education and manners, collections of ‘colloquies’ or sample conversations in Latin, such as Erasmus’ *Colloquia familiaria* (1516) or the *Colloquia scholastica* (1563, etc.) of the French Genevan teacher Mathurin Cordier, and other Latin aids such as the later *gradus ad Parnassum* or poetic phrase-book. Students of Montaigne and of Bacon have noted that many of the essays of these authors consist simply of gnomic sayings strategically assembled on a given topic, the fruit of academically encouraged note-taking: indeed, each essay is little more than a commonplace collection. Ben Jonson—as has been noted—wrily makes this point about the essay writers in his own commonplace collection, *Timber*.

In the course of the century, the printed collections develop from helps for students to something like small encyclopedias and proliferate in countless forms. Erasmus’ *Adagia* and *Apopthegmata*, the nub of collecting activity through Western Europe, grow larger and larger in successive editions through his lifetime. These Erasmian collections were made partly available in English through the translation work of Nicholas Udall and Richard Taverner. Udall’s Englishing of Erasmus’ *Apopthegmes* appeared in 1542 shortly after Taverner’s *Proverbes or Adagies with Newe Addicions Gathered Out of the Chiliades of Erasmus* (1539). Taverner provides even more mixed fare in *The Garden of Wysdom* (1539) and *The Second Booke of the Garden of Wysedome* (1539), which import further matter from mixed Greek and Latin sources into English. William Baldwin’s misleadingly titled work, *A Treatise of Morall Philosophie* (1547), is a large collection of sayings and other multifarious commonplace material which established a publishing record in Renaissance England, with twenty-three editions (one now available in facsimile, edited by Robert Hood Bowers, 1967); this is more than double the editions of Lyly’s popular *Euphues*. *A Schole of Wise Concepts Set Forth in Common Places by Order of the Alphabet* (1569) was collected by Thomas Blage from the classics. John Parinchef drew from con-

temporal continental collections An Extract of Examples, Apothegmes, and Histories (London, H. Bynneman, n.d.). Compilers often liked to advertise the great range of their wares, as in Beautiful Blossoms Gathered by John Bishop from the Best Trees of All Kyndes, Divine, Philosophical, Astronomicall, Cosmographickall, Historical, and Humane (1577). Simon Robson presented a commonplace book in triplets (conceivably echoed in Francis Meres’ Preface to his Palladis Tamia: Wit’s Treasury, mentioned above). Robson breaks down each heading into three divisions, as ‘The body containeth 3. things: Good cheare, Sleepe, Mery talke’, and gives his book a wonderful consumer-oriented title: The Choice of Change containing the Triplicitie of Divinity, Philosophie, and Poetrie, Shorte for Memorie, Profitable for Knowledge, and Necessarie for Maners: Whereby the Learned May Be Confirmed, the Ignorant Instructed, and All Men Generally Recreated (1585). The year before, William Fiston had published his translation from the Italian, The Welspring of Wittie Conceites (1583), and in 1590 Robert Hitchcock Englished the ‘conceites, maximies, and politicke devices selected and gathered together by Francisco Sansovino’ under the title of The Quintessense of Wit.

The commonplace collections perhaps most important for English literature are those promoted and sponsored at the turn of the century by John Bodenham, several of which have since been edited by various scholarly hands and otherwise carefully studied.33 Politeuphia: Wit’s Commonwealth (1597) provides a collection of some four or five thousand ‘sentences’ or aphoristic citations; Palladis Tamia: Wit’s Treasury (1598),34 just referred to, by Francis Meres, 666 pages of similitudes or comparisons; Wit’s Theater of the Little World (1599) supplies examples; and Belvedere, or, The Garden of the Muses (1600) all three, sentences, similitudes, and examples, in verse. England’s Helicon (1600), in the same Bodenham series, is not quite of a piece with the other four, being a collection of more complete ‘inventions’, that is, of some 150 English poems, including many of our best sixteenth-century lyrics with the names of the often otherwise anonymous authors appended by the compiler, apparently Nicholas Ling. But its title, and its preface as well, assimilates it to the commonplace collections: its contents are not only

33 See the Introduction to England’s Helicon, 1600, 1614, ed. by Hyder Edward Rollins (2 vols.; Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935), where, however, the commonplace-book pattern of the Bodenham series is somewhat overlooked.
34 The section on literature has been separately edited by Don Cameron Allen, Francis Meres’ Treatise, ‘Poetrie’ (‘University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature’, xvi, Nos. 3–4; Urbana, University of Illinois, 1933).
drawn from the proper ‘springs’ of invention (Helicon), but are also presented as themselves sources for other writers. They have proved invaluable sources for literary historians as well.

Bodenham’s collections appear to have inspired other more or less related compilations, especially that of William Wrednot entitled Palladis Palatium: Wisdom’s Pallace, or, The Fourth Part of Wit’s Commonwealth (1604). Robert Cawdrey’s A Treasury or Storehouse of Similes suggests Meres’ work. Cawdry’s entries are either taken from the Scripture or refer pretty directly to a religious theme.

These collections and the countless others in Latin provided building blocks for writers throughout the century to an extent which recent scholarship is only beginning to make clear. From More to Shakespeare, adult Tudor authors turned to the collections for ideas, phrases, illustrations, and even plots, just as they had done when they were schoolboys. The most resounding and most quoted passages of Shakespeare are generally his reworked versions of what anyone could find here. Like Alexander Pope a century later, Shakespeare was less an originator than a consummately expert retooler of thought and expression. The commonplace tradition would undergo no serious deterioration until Romanticism.

Related to commonplace collections and the rhetoric of invention is a special genre combining literature and the visual arts: the emblem books, which present tableau-like pictures often of gnomic or commonplace character, accompanied by appropriate mottoes, verses, and elaborate prose analyses. The Emblemata (Augsburg, 1531) of the eminent Italian lawyer Andrea Alciati began the vogue for such works, which reached England in the translation by Samuel Daniel (1585) of Paolo Giovio’s Imprese (1555).35 Geoffrey Whitney’s A Choice of Emblems and Other Devices was published at Leyden in 1586, and ‘P.S.’s’ translation of The Heroicall Devices of the French writer Claude Paradin appeared in London in 1591. The genre was particularly influential in Spenser’s circle, but the best known English emblem books, those of George Wither and Francis Quarles, belong to the Stuart period. The emblematists’ concern with iconography and all sorts of symbolism is intimately related to rhetorical and dialectical word play and to rhetorical ‘ornament’.

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The major revolution affecting rhetoric in Tudor England turned on the relationship of rhetoric to logic or dialectic. It was begun in Paris by the French professor of philosophy and rhetoric Petrus Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée). His new program for these arts began in his Dialecticae partitiones of 1543, which led to his later Dialectic (1555, with hundreds of subsequent editions and adoptions), and in the complementary works of his literary lieutenant Audomarus Talaeus (Omer Talon) in which Ramus himself had some hand, the Institutiones oratoriae (1545) and the Rhetorica (1548).36 For reasons basically pedagogical rather than philosophical, Ramus was particularly annoyed by the confusion arising from the fact that from antiquity inventio and iudicium or dispositio had belonged to both logic and rhetoric. His efforts at reform were to be a continuation of those by Rudolph Agricola, who, as has been seen above, had by 1479 proposed a dialectic or logic cast in Ciceronian terms of inventio and dispositio but pre-empting to itself all invention, allowing no loci to rhetoric as such. This impoverishment of rhetoric in effect set Agricola against Aristotle, although he himself made no issue of being anti-Aristotelian as Ramus was to do.

Agricola had had some effect in England before Ramus' work had matured. His influence is detectable in the Dialectica (1545) of John Seton, fellow and contemporary of Ascham and Cheke at St. John's College, Cambridge, although this work is in essence rather thoroughly Aristotelian. Seton, a Catholic, died in exile in 1567, but his doctrine was kept alive through 1639 by editions of his Dialectica equipped with the Annotationes which a later Johnian, Peter Carter, had first published in the 1560s (1563?) and which regularly accompanied Seton's text from 1572 on. Like Seton's Latin work, the first logic in English was also basically Aristotelian. This was The Rule of Reason, Conteyning the Arte of Logique (1551) by the same Thomas Wilson who was to publish the first full rhetoric in English, mentioned above. Wilson's Rule of Reason was plainly intended for the same audience as his rhetoric, probably the Inns of Court. But neither Wilson's logic nor his rhetoric was so drastically English as the work of a third Johnian, Ralph Lever, whose The

36 See the entries for these works in Walter J. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958); for an account of Ramism, see the same author's Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958), as well as Howell, op. cit. The author is compiling a supplement of editions not in the Inventory.
Arte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft (1573, though written about 1550) replaced Latinate terms with forthright Anglo-Saxon formations: witcraft (logic), speechcraft (rhetoric), saywhat (definition), saying (proposition), yeasay and naysay (affirmation and negation), and so on.

Wilson was less Aristotelian than Seton, maintaining with Agricola that dialectic and logic were synonymous. Ramus was more downright still. There was only one art of discourse, he explicitly and contentiously insisted. This was logic or dialectic, which governed all discourse whatsoever, from scientific reasoning through poetry, where the same logic used in mathematics itself was used, only spread rather thin. Logic taught (1) how to find arguments (inventio) and (2) how to arrange them (dispositio or iudicium). These two matters were never the business of rhetoric. The business of rhetoric was twofold: style, which meant for Ramus and his thousands of followers, the use of tropes and figures; and delivery, to which Ramus, like most other textbook authors, gave perfunctory acknowledgment but little explicit attention. In logic and rhetoric both, as in the many other subjects he wrote on, Ramus enforced an extreme schematic treatment: everything was divided by twos in the famous Ramist dichotomies. Logic had two parts, so did rhetoric. Each of these parts was subdivided into two further parts, each of these dichotomized again, and so on. All the tropes and figures were thus classified in groups of two.

Memory was dropped entirely. Ramus maintained that by using his analytic approach, which followed the ‘natural’ order of things, recall was automatic. The same insistence on analysis gave a special turn to Ramus’ use of the places of invention. Like a non-Ramist, to find ‘arguments’ a Ramist went to the headings furnished by dialectic—genus, species, properties, whole, parts, conjugates, and so on—but he characteristically thought of these as implementing a ‘logical analysis’ of a subject, enabling him to draw material out of the subject itself. The Ramist felt less need to rely on the collections of material culled from authors in commonplace books, for he thought of himself as securing his arguments from the ‘nature of things’, with which his mind somehow came into direct contact. Thus he felt he would find arguments against disloyalty by simply understanding disloyalty and ‘analyzing’ its genus, species, conjugates, and the rest, rather than by finding under the headings of the various ‘places’ what had been said about it.

In the second part of logic, judgment or arrangement, Ramus gave attention not only to the proposition and to the syllogism, but to a new
arrival on the logical scene, method. This was to become the great bone of contention in the battles between Ramists and ‘Aristotelians’ (Ciceronians), which are referred to ironically by Polonius in Hamlet (ii,ii, 208) and by Viola in Twelfth Night (i,v,244) and through countless Elizabethan authors besides Shakespeare. ‘Method’ for Ramus prescribes how to organize larger units of discourse, always by going from general truths to particulars or ‘specials’, except when the audience was unusually recalcitrant, in which case one could betray them into seeing truth by using ‘cryptic method’. Cryptic method moved in reverse, presenting particulars first and proceeding thence to general truths. Ramus triggered the interest in method which came to a head in Descartes. But this ‘method’ was adopted from classroom procedures and rhetorical manuals without any closely reasoned foundation in formal logic. It vaunted orderly sequence, often superficially and sometimes implausibly conceived, over every other aspect of communication and thus directly furthered development of the ‘plain style’. And in its resort to diagrams and other visual models to establish the idea of order—a procedure encouraged both by scholastic logic and by typography—it marked a significant movement away from the world of voice favored by the rhetorical tradition.

With its businesslike stress on method and analysis and its de-emphasis of rhetoric, Ramism appealed largely to the class of rising bourgeois who in England and on the continent were inclined to embrace Calvinism. It found avid backers in the British Isles. Roger Ascham (1515–1568) in The Scholemaster (1570) censures Ramus’ anti-Ciceronianism but rates Ramus and Talon apparently on a par with Quintilian. Around 1569 Ramism was espoused by Laurence Chaderton or Chatterton and Gabriel Harvey, both of Christ’s College, Cambridge. Cambridge soon became a Ramist maelstrom with Christ’s College as its center, although the earliest text of Ramus published in England, the Dialecticae libri duo (London, 1574) was edited by a Scot from the University of St. Andrews, Roland M‘Kilwain or MacIlmaine (Makylmenaeus).

Editions of Ramus’ and Talon’s works on the continent and in the British Isles number nearly 800 (some 1,100 if individual works in collected editions are counted separately); of the Dialectic alone over 260 editions have been identified, and of the Rhetoric over 160.38

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38 Ong, *Ramus and Talon Inventory*; since the publication of this work, several dozen other editions have come to the attention of the author.
tween 1574 and 1600, fifteen editions of the *Dialectic* and five of the *Rhetoric* had been published in England, but present library holdings make it clear that the Isles were heavily stocked also with copies of continental printings.

Controversy between Ramists and Aristotelians rocked the Cambridge milieu particularly in the 1580S and 1590S, with Everard Digby and the Ramist William Temple, later provost of Trinity College, Dublin, and grandfather of Jonathan Swift's benefactor, at one another's throats in one controversy, and Thomas Nashe and the Ramist Gabriel Harvey in another. Ramism, however, never became academically respectable on a large scale within the universities. It had an attraction chiefly for schoolmasters or university graduates no longer in residence, and for many of the ambitious commercial class for whom an acquaintanceship with logic was often a status symbol more than a matter of serious scholarly concern. Ramist logic, sometimes epitomized, was often used as 'petty logic' to supply the elementary notions of thought structure which training in composition demanded at the pre-university level. Dudley Fenner's condensation in English, published in 1584 and again in 1588 at Middelburg in the Low Countries, evinces even in its title the kind of *simplicite* appeal which Ramism could have: *The Artes of Logike and Rethorike Plainlie Set Forth in the Englishe Tounge, Easie to Be Learned and Practised* . . . . At a somewhat higher level Abraham Fraunce's *The Lawiers Logike* (1588) adapts Ramist doctrine in English to legal training. Fraunce was a protégé of Sidney, who himself was to die in the arms of his own Ramist secretary, the elder Temple mentioned above. Another related work of Fraunce's, *The Arcadian Rhetorike* (probably 1588), is remarkable for its examples from Sidney's *Arcadia* and from Greek, Latin, Italian, French, and Spanish authors as well. The real companion piece to this rhetoric is not, however, *The Lawiers Logike* but a further Ramist work of Fraunce's which remains in manuscript, *The Shepheardes Logike*.39 George Downham or Downname, Bishop of Derry, treated Ramus in more scholarly fashion, publishing an edition of Ramus' *Dialectic* with a commentary, *Commentarii in P. Rami . . . Dialecticam*, which appeared on the continent in six editions, beginning at Frankfort-on-the-Main in 1601, before its one belated British publication (1669).

Other British writers on Ramist rhetoric, except for Charles Butler, the grammar-school master and spelling reformer, come after the Tudor period. Butler’s *Rameae rhetoricae libri duo* probably first appeared in 1593 (first extant printing 1597), going subsequently through many editions, which eventually drop all mention of Ramus or Talon from the title. The other English Ramist logicians also belong, like the rhetoricians, to the later seventeenth century, where the most distinguished was of course John Milton, who numbered among his works an adaptation of Ramus’ logic, published late (1672) but apparently done in his younger years.

The sequel to the Ramist ‘reform’ was the development of various compromises between Ramism and Aristotelianism or Ciceronianism, largely at the hands of the ‘Systematics’, chiefly German polymaths such as the continental theologian-encyclopedists Bartholomew Keckermann, Heizo Buscher, and later Johann Heinrich Alsted, the medical writer and occultist Andreas Libau (Libavius), and the philosophy professor Clemens Timpler. In England, where the continental Systematics were well known, the chief compromiser between Ramist and earlier logic in Tudor times was Thomas Blundeville in *The Art of Logike* (1599, but written perhaps around 1575). Similar syncretist tendencies are observable in John Sanderson’s *Institutionum dialecticarum libri quatuor* (Oxford, 1602). Ramist influence combines with other influence not only in logic but in the complementary works on stylistics as well. Here George Puttenham’s *The Art of English Poesie* and Angel Day’s letter-writing manual, *The English Secretorie* (1586), though essentially non-Ramist, show some Ramist proclivities in their handling of tropes and figures.

The Systematics did not, however, greatly deviate from the Ramist attitude toward literary performance. If they did not in every case reduce rhetoric to pure stylistics, they did, with the Ramists, consistently make logic the chief determinant of communication, and exploited the Ramist insistence on ‘method’ to produce compendious treatments of any and all subjects foreshadowing modern encyclopedias. The Tudor period, however, ends before either the Ramists or the Systematics could have their full effect. At the opening of the seventeenth century rhetoric stood polarized: Ramist, and to some extent Systematic, doctrine minimized rhetorical display and fostered the plain style favored by many Puritans, while at the other pole a still flourishing Ciceronianism com-

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40 For problems concerning dating, see Howell, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
bined with patristic and medieval love of ornateness to produce the lushness met among many writers more or less of the episcopal party.

In sum, the writings on rhetoric during the Tudor age present us with a curiously mixed-up state of affairs. They are mostly in Latin and concerned with Latin expression, only rarely and indirectly adverting to the vernacular. Yet their effect on English is massive, and they merit being looked into by all students of the language. The English-language manuals mark important steps in the development of an English vocabulary adequate for learned expression, they provide samples, often fascinating, of particular turns of expression, and they inform us on the objectives, announced and/or actual, of Tudor writers of literature. For a show of particular grace, one might single out the works of Lever, Hoskins, Rainolde, and Puttenham mentioned above. Meres’ Palladia Tamia and the other items in the Bodenham series together with Breton’s A Poste with a Madde Packet of Letters are doubtless the most colorful pieces.

Works exemplifying the effects of rhetorical training have already been mentioned in limited number. It is not feasible to enlarge the list, nor is it necessary, for to the reader acquainted with the works on rhetoric themselves, almost any literary production of Tudor times is seen to be studded with rhetorical patterns, consciously cultivated, so thickly that to remove the conscious rhetoric would be to demolish the work. Professor C. S. Lewis is quite right in suggesting that our growing knowledge of Tudor views on rhetoric and poetic enjoins the rewriting of literary history, although he himself refrained from the undertaking.

4. THE CLOSE OF THE TUDOR AGE

The death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603 marks the end of the Tudor age but not the end of the rhetorical tradition. Changes in this tradition had indeed come about during the Tudor reigns, affecting both rhetorical works themselves and the literature conditioned by the teaching of rhetoric. The highly prescriptive, academically oriented works on rhetoric of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were codified and somewhat deadened through codification, often effected by Ramists. But rhetorical practice kept its earlier vigor and gained suppleness as it was worked out in an increasingly self-sufficient vernacular tradition. The literature affected by the teaching of rhetoric—which was virtually all Tudor literature—bore everywhere the mark of rhetorical flair and rhetorical control. But there were subtle changes in the modes of rhe-
torical operation. The use of the ‘places’ or commonplaces, which fostered lushness and often profundity in style, gnomic ‘strong lines’, and weighty sententiousness, was in many quarters sapped imperceptibly in the late sixteenth century by a newly exclusive passion for ‘logical analysis’ among Ramists and others. The change would not have its full effect until Dryden and after, but the older preoccupation with logic as an instrument of discourse (rather than of private thought), with its accompanying sententious rhetoric, was giving way to interest in a logic of private inquiry and a more tenuous rhetoric (later to be supplanted by a rhetoric of sentiment, passion, and ‘feeling’).

Meanwhile, literary criticism, such as it was, remained largely subordinated to rhetoric. Writing about literature was largely a matter of defending poetry against its accusers, of raising the literary status of English (without, however, the slightest thought of lowering that of Latin and Greek), of propounding one or another more or less rhetorical principle (against stylistic excesses, for or against rhyme), or of more or less scattered remarks on individual works. The place of poetic improved: it began the sixteenth century pretty much as adjunct of rhetoric, but by the century’s close achieved a modest independence, at least outside the classroom.

Francis Bacon may serve as a figure with which to close, since he is highly representative of the state of rhetorical affairs at the end of the Tudor age, to which his most active years belong. Bacon’s program for remaking the intellectual world shows not only how the rhetorical way of life was being modified, accommodated to a designedly exploratory and experimental approach to reality, but also how ambivalent such accommodation still had to be. Bacon’s great educational work, The Advancement of Learning (1605), remains in the midstream of the rhetorical tradition, for it is organized as a classical oration and ‘proved’ by examples. In this work he makes rhetoric one of the three arts devoted to the ‘tradition’ or delivery of understanding, the other two being grammar and ‘method’. But Bacon’s ‘understanding’ itself consists, he tells us, of invention, judgment, memory, and elocution or tradition, which last includes style. Here, at the heart of Bacon’s notion of intellect itself are the five parts of Ciceronian rhetoric again! Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Bacon’s scheme to provide a new organization differ-

ent from the older rhetorical one is itself dependent for its basic construction on the older rhetorical view.

In other ways, too, Bacon is inextricably tangled in the rhetorical tradition. His *Essays*, as has been seen, are essentially collections of gnomic commonplaces. He understood poetry in much the same way as many early humanists. It is a play of fancy or imagination, not to be taken too seriously, 'feigned history' but with claims less serious than Sidney allowed. Of the 'deeper meaning' or allegorical sense of poetry, Bacon was aware, but sceptical. Logic and rhetoric are 'the gravest of sciences, being the art of arts, the one for judgment, the other for ornament', he writes in *The Advancement of Learning* (II, Ded., 12). What respect for poetry and for the fictional in general he preserves is kept alive for him by their association with rhetoric and by the common respect for rhetoric which was the heritage of his age. Bacon's voice was indeed a new one in many ways, but it spoke to the opening seventeenth century with the unmistakable—if not always unmistakable—accent of the rhetorical past.

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