

Black Marxism

The Making of the Black Radical Tradition

Cedric J. Robinson

For Leonard and Gary
for whom there was not enough time.



Zed Press, 57 Caledonian Road, London N1 9DN.

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Black Marxism was first published by Zed Press, 57 Caledonian Road, London N1 9DN in 1983.

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Copiedited by Anna Gourlay
Proofread by Mark Gourlay
Cover design by Jacque Solomons
Typeset by Jo Marsh
Printed by Biddles of Guildford

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Robinson, Cedric J.
Black Marxism
1. Communism 2. Socialism
I. Title
335.4 HX56
ISBN 0-86232-126-3
ISBN 0-86232-127-1 Pbk

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U.S. Distributor

Biblio Distribution Center, 81 Adams Drive, Totowa,
New Jersey 07512.

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1. Racial Capitalism: The Non-Objective Character of Capitalist Development

The historical development of world capitalism was influenced in a most fundamental way by the particularistic forces of racism and nationalism. This could only be true if the social, psychological and cultural origins of racism and nationalism both anticipated capitalism in time and formed a piece with those events which contributed directly to its organization of production and exchange. Feudal society is the key. More particularly, the antagonistic commitments, structures and ambitions which feudal society encompassed are better conceptualized as those of a developing civilization than as elements of a unified tradition.

The processes through which the world system emerged contained an opposition between the rationalistic thrusts of an economic world-view and the political momenta of collectivist logic. The feudal state, an instrument of signal importance to the bourgeoisie, was to prove to be as consistently antithetical to the commercial integration represented by a world system as it had to the idea of Christendom. Neither the state nor later the nation could slough off the particularistic psychologies and interests which served as contradictions to a global community. A primary consequence of the conflict between those two social tendencies was that capitalists, as the architects of this system, never achieved the coherence of structure and organization which had been the promise of capitalism as an objective system.¹ On the contrary, the history of capitalism has in no way distinguished itself from earlier eras with respect to wars, material crises and social conflicts. A secondary consequence is that the critique of capitalism, to the extent that its protagonists have based their analyses upon the presumption of a determinant economic rationality in the development and expansion of capitalism, has been characterized by an incapacity to come to terms with the world system's direction of developments. Marxism, the dominant form that the critique of capitalism has assumed in Western thought, incorporated theoretical and ideological weaknesses which stemmed from the same social forces which provided the bases of capitalist formation.

The creation of capitalism was much more than a matter of the displacement of feudal modes and relations of production by capitalist ones.² Certainly, the transformation of the economic structures of non-capitalist Europe (specifically the Mediterranean and western European market, trade

and production systems) into capitalist forms of production and exchange was a major part of this process. Still, the first appearance of capitalism in the 15th Century³ involved other dynamics as well. The social, cultural, political and ideological complexes of European feudalisms contributed more to capitalism than the social 'fetters'⁴ which precipitated the bourgeoisie into social and political revolutions. No class was its own creation. Indeed, capitalism was less a catastrophic revolution (negation) of feudalist social orders than the extension of these social relations into the larger tapestry of the modern world's political and economic relations. Historically, the civilization evolving in the western extremities of the Asian/European continent, and whose first signification is medieval Europe,⁵ passed with few disjunctions from feudalism as the dominant mode of production to capitalism as the dominant mode of production. And from its very beginnings, this European civilization, containing racial, tribal, linguistic and regional particularities, was constructed on antagonistic differences.

Europe's Formation

The social basis of European civilization was 'among those whom the Romans called the "barbarians"'.⁶ Prior to the 11th or 12th Centuries, the use of the collective sense of the term barbarian was primarily a function of exclusion rather than a reflection of any significant consolidation among those peoples. The term signified that the 'barbarians' had their historical origins beyond the civilizing reach of Roman law and the old Roman imperial social order. The 'Europe' of the 9th Century for which the Carolingian family and its minions claimed paternity was rather limited geopolitically⁷ and had a rather short and unhappy existence. Interestingly, for several centuries following the deaths of Charlemagne and his immediate heirs (the last being Arnulf, d.899), both the Emperor and Europe were more the stuff of popular legend and clerical rhetoric than manifestations of social reality.⁸ The idea of Europe, no longer a realistic project, was transferred from one of a terrestrial social order to that of a spiritual kingdom: Christendom.

In fact, those peoples to whom the Greeks and the Romans referred collectively as barbarians were of diverse races with widely differing cultures.⁹ The diversity of their languages is, perhaps, one measure of their differences. But in using this measure, we must be cautious of the schemes of classification of those languages which reduce the reality of their numbers to simple groupings like the Celtic, the Italic, the Germanic, the Balto-Slavonic and Albanian languages.¹⁰

Direct and indirect evidence indicates that a more authentic mapping of the languages of the proto-Europeans would be much more complex. For instance, H. Munro Chadwick, as late as 1945, could locate extant descendants of those several languages among the Gaelic, Welsh and Breton

languages of Great Britain and France; the Portuguese, Spanish, Catalan, Provençal, French, Italian, Sardinian, Alpine and Rumanian languages and dialects of southern and western Europe; the English, Frisian, Dutch, German, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Icelandic languages of England, Scotland the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavia; the Russian, Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, Slovenian, Slovakian, Czech, Polish and Lusitan languages and dialects of central and eastern Europe; and the Latvian and Lithuanian languages of northern Europe.¹¹ But even Chadwick's list was of merely those languages which had survived 'the millenium of Europe'. The list would lengthen considerably if one were to consider the languages which existed in this area at the beginning of this era and are no longer spoken (for example, Latin, Cornish, Prusai), along with those languages of peoples who preceded the migrations from the north and east of Rome's barbarians (for example, Basque, Etruscan, Oscan, Umbrian).¹²

The Ostrogoth, Visigoth, Vandal, Suevi, Burgundi, Alamanni, and Frank peoples — that is the barbarians — whose impact on the fortunes of the Late Roman Empire from the 5th Century was quick and dramatic,¹³ were in fact a small minority of thousands among the millions of the decaying State. Henri Pirenne, relying on the estimates of Emile-Felix Gautier and L. Schmidt, reports that the Ostrogoths and Visigoths may have numbered 100,000 each, the Vandals 80,000, and the Burgundi 25,000.¹⁴ Moreover, the warrior strata of each kingdom are consistently estimated at about 20% of their populations. On the other hand, the Empire which they invaded contained as many as 50-70 million persons.¹⁵ Pirenne cautiously concludes:

All this is conjecture. Our estimate would doubtless be in excess of the truth if, for the Western provinces beyond the *limes*, we reckoned the Germanic element as constituting 5 percent of the population.¹⁶

More importantly, the vast majority of the barbarians 'came not as conquerors, but exactly as, in our own day, North Africans, Italians, Poles cross into Metropolitan France to look for work'.¹⁷ In a relatively short time, in the southern-most European lands which were bounded by the Western Roman Empire, these peoples were entirely assimilated by the indigenous peoples as a primarily slave labour force.¹⁸ The pattern was already a familiar one within the dying civilization of the Mediterranean¹⁹ with which they desired and desperately needed to join.²⁰ It is also important to realize that with respect to the emerging European civilization whose beginnings coincide with the arrivals of these same barbarians, slave labour as a critical basis of production would continue without any significant interruption into the 20th Century.²¹ From the *familia rustica* which characterized Roman and even earlier Greek (*doulos*) rural production within vast estates, through the *manucipia* of the *colonicae* and *mansi* land-holdings of Merovingian (481-752) and Carolingian eras, the feudal villains of western medieval Europe and England, and the *sclavi* of the Genoese and Venetian merchants who dominated commercial trade in the

Mediterranean from the 13th to the 16th Century, slave labour persisted as an aspect of European agrarian production up to the modern era.²² Neither feudal serfdom, nor capitalism had as their result the elimination or curtailment of slavery.²³ At the very most (it is argued by some), their organization served to relocate it.²⁴

Despite the 'Romanization' of the southern Goths, or seen differently because of it, the Germanic tribes did establish the general administrative boundaries which were to mark the nations of modern western Europe. The kingdoms which they established, mainly under the rules of Roman *hospitalitas* and in accordance with Roman administration,²⁵ were in large measure the predecessors of France, Germany, Spain and Italy.

Still, we must not forget that in historical reconstruction, a medieval age is to be intervened between these two ages. Medieval Europe, though still agricultural in economy was a much cruder existence for slave, peasant, farmer, artisan, land-owner, cleric and nobility alike than had been the circumstance for their predecessors in the Empire. Urban life declined, leaving the old cities in ruins,²⁶ long-distance trade, especially by sea routes, decayed dramatically.²⁷ Latouche summarizes:

The balance-sheet of the Merovingian economy is singularly disappointing. The now fashionable, if unpleasant, word 'rot' describes it to perfection. Whether in the sphere of town life, commerce, barter, currency, public works, shipping, we find everywhere the same policy of neglect, the same selfish refusal to initiate reform. From this disastrous, drifting *laissez-faire* which left men and things as they had always been, pursuing unchanged their traditional way of life, there sprang the illusion that the ancient world still lingered on; it was, in fact, no more than a facade.²⁸

The Carolingian Empire did little to repair the 'rot' which anticipated the restructuring of Europe in feudal terms. The Muslim conquests of the Mediterranean in the 7th and 8th Centuries had deprived the European economies of the urban, commercial, productive and cultural vitality they required for their reconstruction. Pirenne put it boldly:

The ports and the cities were deserted. The link with the Orient was severed, and there was no communication with the Saracen coasts. There was nothing but death. The Carolingian Empire presented the most striking contrast with the Byzantine. It was purely an inland power, for it had no outlets. The Mediterranean territories, formerly the most active portions of the Empire, which supported the life of the whole, were now the poorest, the most desolate, the most constantly menaced. For the first time in history the axis of Occidental civilization was displaced towards the North, and for many centuries it remained between the Seine and the Rhine. And the Germanic peoples, which had hitherto played only the negative part of destroyers, were now called

upon to play a positive part in the reconstruction of European civilization.²⁹

Latouche, though he differed with Pirenne on many of the particulars of the Carolingian response to the loss of the Mediterranean, finally concurred:

... the Empire broke up less than half a century after its creation, and Charlemagne did nothing to prevent, and did not even attempt to delay, the development of feudal institutions, so heavy with menace for the future ... a world in which there were no great business concerns, no industries, and in which agricultural activity was predominant.³⁰

Urban life, trade and market systems incorporating the goods of long-distance trade did not return to Europe until the end of the 11th Century at the earliest, and most probably during the 12th Century.³¹ By then, the depth to which the degradation of European life had fallen is perhaps best expressed by the appearance of commercialized cannibalism.³²

The First Bourgeoisie

Into this depressed land where few were free of the authority of an intellectually backward and commercially unimaginative ruling class, where famine and epidemics were the natural order of things, and where the sciences of the Ancient World had long been displaced as the basis of intellectual development by theological fables and demonology,³³ appeared the figure to which European social theorists, Liberal and Marxist, attribute the generation of Western civilization: the bourgeoisie. The merchant was as alien to feudal society as the barbarian invaders had been to the Empire. Unlike the Mediterranean tradesmen,³⁴ the origins of the western European bourgeoisie are obscured. No doubt this is largely due to the fact that historical documentation is inevitably sparse where civilization in the formal sense of urban culture has largely disappeared, and where life is recorded by an elite of land and Church largely preoccupied with its own experience while hostile to commerce.³⁵ Nevertheless, it is clear that the western European merchant class — 'a class of deracines'³⁶ — crystallized within a social order for which it was an extrinsic phenomena.

The economic organization of demesne production was characterized by Pirenne as a 'closed domestic economy one which we might call, with more exactitude, the economy of no markets'.³⁷ In fact, there were markets, local ones, but their function and existence had no part in the development of the markets of long-distance trades which were the basis of the merchant class' development. The *mercati*, whose existence predates the bourgeoisie, dealt not in trade but foodstuffs at the retail level.³⁸ The one factor 'internal' to the feudal order which did contribute to the rise of the bourgeoisie was the 11th Century's population growth. This increase had ultimately

placed significant strains on feudal production:

It had as a result the detaching from the land an increasingly important number of individuals and committing them to that roving and hazardous existence which, in every agricultural civilization, is the lot of those who no longer find themselves with their roots in the soil. It multiplied the crowd of vagabonds. . . . Energetic characters, tempered by the experience of a life full of the unexpected, must have abounded among them. Many knew foreign languages and were conversant with the customs and needs of diverse lands. Let a lucky chance present itself . . . they were remarkably well equipped to profit thereby. . . . Famines were multiplied throughout Europe, sometimes in one province and sometimes in another, by that inadequate system of communications, and increased still more the opportunities, for those who knew how to make use of them, of getting rich. A few timely sacks of wheat, transported to the right spot, sufficed for the realizing of huge profits. . . . It was certainly not long before nouveaux riches made their appearance in the midst of this miserable crowd of impoverished, bare-foot wanderers in the world.³⁹

In the beginning, before they could properly be described as bourgeoisie, these merchants travelled from region to region, their survival a matter of their mobility and their ability to capitalize on the frequent ruptures and breakdowns of the reproduction of populations sunk into the manorial soil. Their mobility may have also been occasioned by the fact that many of them were not free-born and thus sought respite from their social condition by flight from their lords: 'By virtue of the wandering existence they led, they were everywhere regarded as foreigners.'⁴⁰ For security they often travelled in small bands — a habit which would continue into their more sedentary period. It was not long before they began to establish *porti* (storehouses or transfer points for merchandise) outside the *burgs* (the fortresses of the Germanic nobles) bishoprics and towns which straddled the main routes of war, communications, and later, international trade. It was these *porti*, or merchant colonies, which founded, in the main, the medieval cities of Europe's hinterland. It was at this point that the merchants of Europe became bourgeoisie (*burgenses*). By the beginnings of the 12th Century, these bourgeoisies had already begun the transformation of European life so necessary for the emergence of capitalism as the dominant organization of European production.

The western European bourgeoisie re-established the urban centres by basing them upon exchange between the Mediterranean, the East and northern Europe:

[in the 10th Century] there appears in Anglo-Saxon texts the word 'port', employed as a synonym for the Latin words *urbs* and *civitas*, and even at the present day the term 'port' is commonly met with in

the names of cities of every land of English speech.

Nothing shows more clearly the close connection that existed between the economic revival of the Middle Ages and the beginnings of city life. They were so intimately related that the same word which designated a commercial settlement served in one of the great idioms of Europe to designate the town itself.⁴¹

Elsewhere, Pirenne puts it more succinctly: 'Europe "colonized" herself, thanks to the increase of her inhabitants.'⁴² Flanders — geographically situated to service the commerce of the northern seas, and economically critical because of the Flemish cloth industry — was the first of the major European merchant centres. Close behind Flanders came Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Lille, Douai, Arras, Tournai, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Liege, Huy, Dinant, Cologne, Mainz, Rouen, Bordeaux and Bayonne.⁴³ Cloth, which both Pirenne⁴⁴ and Karl Polanyi⁴⁵ identify as the basis of European trade, originally a rural industry, was transformed by the bourgeoisie in Flanders into an urban manufacture 'organized on the capitalistic basis of wage labour'.⁴⁶ The urban concentration of industry was thus initiated:

The increase of the population naturally favoured industrial concentration. Numbers of the poor poured into the towns where cloth-making, the activity of which trade grew proportionately with the development of commerce, guaranteed them their daily bread. . . .

The old rural industry very quickly disappeared. It could not compete with that of the town, abundantly supplied with the raw material of commerce, operating at lower prices, and enjoying more advanced methods. . . .

. . . whatever might be the nature of industry in other respects, everywhere it obeyed that law of concentration which was operative at such an early date in Flanders. Everywhere the city groups, thanks to commerce, drew rural industry to them.⁴⁷

It is also true that the bourgeoisie, in so doing, came to free some portions of the serfs⁴⁸ only to re-enslave them through wage labour. For with urban industry came the successful attack on feudal and seigniorial servitude:

Freedom, of old, used to be the monopoly of a privileged class. By means of the cities it again took its place in society as a natural attribute of the citizen. Hereafter it was enough to reside on city soil to acquire it. Every serf who had lived for a year and a day within the city limits had it by definite right: the statute of limitations abolished all rights which his lord exercised over his person and chattels. Birth meant little. Whatever might be the mark with which it had stigmatized the infant in his cradle, it vanished in the atmosphere of the city.⁴⁹

With the flourishing of long-distance trade and the development of urban

centres in western Europe came some specializations in rural production. Though open-field agriculture dominated Europe as a whole in the 13th, 14th and 15th Centuries, specialized grain production could be found in Prussia (corn), Tuscany and Lombardy (cereals), England (wheat) and north Germany (rye). By the late 15th Century, viticulture had appeared in Italy, Spain, France, and south-west Germany. In the Baltic and North Seas, fishing and salt made up a significant part of the cargoes of Hanseatic shippers. And in England and Spain, meat production for export had begun to emerge.⁵⁰

In northern Europe, these exports joined wool and woollen cloth as the major bases of international trade. In southern Europe — more precisely the Mediterranean — the long-distance trade in cloth (wool, silk, and later cotton), grains and wines came to complement a significant trade in luxury goods:

The precious stuffs from the east found their way into every rich household, and so did the specialities of various European regions: amber and furs from the countries bordering on the Baltic; *objets d'art* such as paintings from Flanders, embroidery from England, enamels from Limoges; manuscript books for church, boudoir or library; fine armour and weapons from Milan and glass from Venice.⁵¹

Still, according to Iris Origo, the most precious cargo of the Mediterranean tradesmen was slaves:

... European and Levantine traders sold Grecian wines and Ligurian figs, and the linen and woollen stuffs of Champagne and Lombardy, and purchased precious silks from China, carpets from Bokhara and Samarkand, furs from the Ural Mountains, and Indian spices, as well as the produce of the rich black fields and forests of the Crimea. But the most flourishing trade of all was that in slaves — for Caffa was the chief slave-market of the Levant.⁵²

Tartar, Greek, Armenian, Russian, Bulgarian, Turkish, Circassian, Slavonic, Cretan, Arab, African (*Mori*) and occasionally Chinese (Cathay) slaves⁵³ — two-thirds of whom were female⁵⁴ — were to be found in the households of wealthy and 'even relatively modest Catalan and Italian families'.⁵⁵

From the 13th Century to the beginnings of the 15th Century, the primary function of these predominantly European slaves in the economics of southern Europe was domestic service.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, in Spain (Catalan and Castile) and in the Italian colonies on Cyprus, Crete, and in Asia Minor (Phocaea) and Palestine, Genoese and Venetian masters used both European and African slaves in agriculture on sugar plantations, in industry, and for work in mines:

This variety of uses to which slaves were put illustrates clearly the degree to which medieval colonial slavery served as a model for Atlantic

colonial slavery. Slave man-power had been employed in the Italian colonies in the Mediterranean for all the kinds of work it would be burdened with in the Atlantic colonies. The only important change was that the white victims of slavery were replaced by a much greater number of African Negroes, captured in raids or bought by traders.⁵⁷

In an unexpected way, this trade in slaves would prove to be the salvation of the Mediterranean bourgeoisie. In the 13th and early 14th Centuries, however, it appeared that the merchants of the European hinterland would inevitably overshadow those of Italy's city-states. They, unlike the Italians, were undeterred, as Giuliano Procacci points out, by the peninsula's small but densely-packed populations; the increasingly unfavourable ratios of townsmen to countrymen (Florence could only survive on the produce of its countryside for five months of the year, Venice and Genoa had to be almost entirely supplied by sea); and the rapid deforestation of the countryside which aggravated the destruction of the autumn and spring floods.⁵⁸

However, it was the fate of this nascent bourgeoisie not to thrive. Indeed, for one historical moment, even the further development of capitalism might be said to have been in question. The events of the 14th and 15th Centuries intervened in the processes through which feudalism was ultimately displaced by the several forms of capitalism.⁵⁹ The consequence of those events were to determine the species of the modern world: the identities of the bourgeoisies which transformed capitalism into a world system; the sequences of this development; the relative vitalities of the several European economies; and the sources of labour from which each economy would draw.

The momentous events of which we speak were: the periodic famines which struck Europe in this period, the Black Death of the mid-14th Century and subsequent years, the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), and the rebellions of peasants and artisans.⁶⁰ Together they had a devastating impact on western Europe and the Mediterranean — decimating the populations of cities and countryside alike, disrupting trade, collapsing industry and agricultural production — levelling, as it were, the bulk of the most developed regions of western European bourgeois activity. Denys Hay has summed it up quite well:

The result of prolonged scarcity, endemic and pandemic plague, the intermittent but catastrophic invasions of ruthless armies, and the constant threat in many areas from well-organized robber bands, was seen not only in a dwindling population but in roads abandoned to brambles and briars, in arable land out of cultivation and in deserted villages. Contraction in the area of cultivation in its turn made dearth the more likely. There was in every sense a vicious circle. A sober estimate suggests that 'in 1470 the number of households was halved in most European villages compared with the start of the fourteenth

century'; the reconquest of forest and waste of the arable is 'an episode equal in importance to the drama of the earlier clearings'.⁶¹

This general economic decline in Europe of the 14th and 15th Centuries was marked in a final and visible way by social disorders much more profound than the territorial wars. Such wars, after all had been in character with feudal society. The appearance of peasant movements was not:

In the boom condition of the 13th Century there had been in rural areas a degree of over-population which made many peasants — day labourers, poor serfs — very vulnerable. Now the countryside was more sparsely occupied and a better living was possible for those who remained. . . . What was new in the slump conditions of the 14th Century was a bitterness in the lord's relations with the villagers.⁶²

As Hay indicates, the most intense of the peasant rebellions occurred in Flanders (1325–28), northern France (the Jacquerie of 1358), and England (1381). But such movements erupted over much of western Europe during the 14th, 15th and 16th Centuries. In France, and especially Normandy (precipitated surely by the final savaging of the peasants by the forces of the Hundred Years War), in Catalonia (1409–13 and later), in Jutland (1411), in Finland (1438) and in Germany (1524), peasants arose, seizing land, executing lords, clergy and even lawyers, demanding an end to manorial dues, petitioning for the establishment of wage-labour, and insisting on the dissolution of restrictions on free buying and selling.⁶³

Within the vortex of these disturbances, long-distance trade declined drastically. In England, the export of wool and cloth, and subsequently their production, fell well below 13th Century levels.⁶⁴ In France (Gascony), the export of wine was similarly affected.⁶⁵ Hay remarks that 'Florentine bankruptcies in the first half of the 14th Century are paralleled by similar troubles in Florence at the end of the 15th Century',⁶⁶ while P. Ramsey notes the precipitous fall of 'the great merchant bankers of southern Germany'.⁶⁷ Further north, the Hansa League disintegrated,⁶⁸ while to the west, the Flemish cloth industry collapsed.⁶⁹ Finally, even the northern Italian city-states found their bourgeoisie in decline. The rise of the Ottoman Empire, at first disruptive to the Italian merchant houses, would dictate new accommodations to Islam and commerce, eventually persuading some of the Italians to relocate as capitalist colonists in the Iberian peninsula.⁷⁰ For the moment, however, the foundations of the European civilization, still figuratively embryonic, appeared to be crumbling.

The Modern World Bourgeoisie

Henri Pirenne, however, provided a key to one of the mysteries of the emergence of the modern era in the 16th Century from the chaos and desperation

of the 14th and 15th Centuries: the 'survival' of the bourgeoisie. Pirenne also anticipated the somewhat rhetorical question put by K.G. Davies in the heat of the debate revolving around the historical authenticity of the phrase: the rise of the middle class. Davies queried:

What, after all, is wrong with the suggestion that the *bourgeoisie*, not steadily but by fits and starts, improved its status over many centuries, a process that began with the appearance of towns and has not yet been finally consummated?⁷¹

Forty years earlier, Pirenne had already replied:

I believe that, for each period into which our economic history may be divided, there is a distinct and separate class of capitalists. In other words, the group of capitalists of a given epoch does not spring from the capitalist group of the preceding epoch. At every change in economic organization we find a breach of continuity. It is as if the capitalists who have up to then been active recognize that they are incapable of adapting themselves to conditions which are evoked by needs hitherto unknown and which call for methods hitherto unemployed.⁷²

Both Pirenne and Davies understood that the biological metaphor of a bourgeoisie emerging out of the Middle Ages, nurturing itself on the 'mercantilisms' and administrations of the Absolute Monarchies of the traditional period between feudalism and the capitalism, and on the lands and titles of impoverished nobilities, then finally achieving political and economic maturity and thus constituting industrial capitalism, is largely unsupported by historical evidence. Rather it is an historical *impression*, a phantom representation largely constructed from the late 18th Century to the present by the notional activity of a bourgeoisie as a dominant class. This history of 'the rise of the middle class' is an amalgam of bourgeois political and economic power, the self-serving ideology of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class and thus an intellectual and political preoccupation — mediated through the constructs of evolutionary theory:

From Darwin has descended the language of error, a language that has locked up historical thinking and imposed slovenly and imprecise conclusions even upon scholarly and sensible researchers. Words like 'growth', 'decline', 'development', 'evolution', 'decay', may have started as servants but they have ended as masters: they have brought us to the edge of historical inevitability.⁷³

Hegel's dialectic of *Aufhebung*, Marx's dialectic of class struggle and the contradictions between the mode and relations of production, Darwin's evolution of the species and Spencer's survival of the fittest are all forged from the same metaphysical conventions. The declining European

bougeoisies of the 14th and 15th Centuries were not, for the most part, the lineal antecedents of those which appeared in the 16th Century. The universality of capitalism is less an historical reality than a construct of this 'language of error'.⁷⁴ These 'distant and separate class[es] of capitalists' were less the representatives of an immanent, rational, commercial order than extensions of particular historical dynamics and cultures. They were not the 'germ' of a new order dialectically posited in an increasingly confining host — feudalism — but an opportunistic strata, wilfully adaptive to the new conditions and possibilities offered by the times. Not only did different western European bourgeoisies appear in the 16th Century, but these new bourgeoisie were implicated in structures, institutions and organizations which were substantively undeveloped in the Middle Ages.

For one, the focus of long-distance trade in Europe gravitated from the Mediterranean and Scania areas to the Atlantic. The most familiar forms of this extension of trade to the south and west of the European peninsula were merchant voyages and colonization. Secondly, 'expanded bureaucratic state structures'⁷⁵ became the major conduits of capitalist expansion: determining the direction of investment, establishing political security for such investments, encouraging certain commercial networks and relations while discouraging others:

In these conditions, in fact, may be seen the matrix of modern capitalism: like nationalism, less the creator than the creation of the modern State. It had many antecedents, but its full emergence required a conjunction of political and moral as well as strictly economic factors. This emergence could take place within the intricate framework of one type of western State then evolving; it may be doubted whether it could have done so under any other circumstances that we know of in history; at any rate it never did.⁷⁶

The city, the point of departure for the earlier bourgeoisies and their networks of long-distance trade and productive organization, proved to be incapable of sustaining the economic recovery of those bourgeoisies situated where the merchant town had reached its highest development: northern Italy, western Germany, the Netherlands and the Baltic.⁷⁷ The Absolutist State, under the hegemony of western European aristocracies, brought forth a new bourgeoisie. The territories of Castile (Spain), the Ile de France, the Home Counties and London (England), the expansionist and colonial ambitions and policies of their administrations, and the structures of their political economies organized for repression and exploitation, these constituted the basis of this bourgeois' formation.

The bourgeoisies of the 16th Century accumulated in the interstices of the State. And as the State acquired the machinery of rule — bureaucracies of administrative, regulatory and extractive concerns, and armies of wars of colonial pacification, international competition, and domestic repression⁷⁸ — those who would soon constitute a class, settled into the proliferating roles

of political, economic and juridical agents for the State. And as the State necessarily expanded its fiscal and economic activities,⁷⁹ a new merchant and banking class parasitized its host: State loans, state monopolies, state business became the vital centres of its construction.

So while the territorial states and empires acquired lands in plenty, they were unable to exploit unaided the resultant huge economic units. This incapacity again opened the door to the towns and the merchants. It was they, who, behind the facade of subordination were making their fortunes. And even where the states could most easily become masters, in their own territory with their own subjects, they were often obliged to make shifts and compromises.⁸⁰

It is still debatable whether this was a result of what Adam Smith and Eli Heckscher after him termed the 'system' of *mercantilism*,⁸¹ or the consequence of what other historians describe as the ideology of *statism*.⁸² Nevertheless, it is clear that by the 17th Century, the new bourgeoisies were identified with political attitudes and a trend in economic thought which was pure mercantilism:

... implicit in the 'tragedy of mercantilism' was the belief that what was one man's or country's gain was another's loss. . . . It was, after all, a world in which population remained remarkably static; in which trade and production usually grew only very gradually; in which the limits of the known world were expanded slowly and with great difficulty; in which economic horizons were narrowly limited; and in which man approximated more closely than today to Hobbes' vision of his natural state: for most men most of the time, life was 'poor, nasty, brutish and short'.⁸³

The parochialism of the town, which had so much characterized the perspective of the bourgeoisie of the Middle Ages, was matched in this second era of Western civilization by a parochialism of the State. Heckscher commented that:

The collective entity to [peoples of the 16th and 17th Centuries] was not a nation unified by common race, speech, and customs: the only decisive factor for them was *the state*. . . . Mercantilism was the exponent of the prevailing conception of the relationship between the state and nation in the period before the advent of romanticism. It was the state and not the nation which absorbed its attention.⁸⁴

Again, the particularistic character of the formations of these bourgeoisies⁸⁵ withheld, from what would be called capitalism, a systemic structure. The class which is so consistently identified with the appearance of industrial capitalism was inextricably associated with specific 'national' structures — a

relationship which profoundly influenced bourgeois imaginations and realizations. Political economies,⁸⁶ that is national economies, enclosed them, and thus the bourgeoisie perceived what later analysis argues in retrospect is the beginnings of a world system as something quite different: an international system.⁸⁷ The bourgeoisies of early modern capitalism were attempting to destroy or dominate each other.

The Lower Orders

Just as the western European middle classes were suspended in webs of State parochialisms, so too was that vast majority of European peoples: the lower orders. The class that ruled, the nobility, by its orchestration of the instrumentalities of the State, imprinted its character on the whole of European society. And since much of that character had to do with violence,⁸⁸ the lower orders were woven into the tapestry of a violent social order. By the nature of hierarchical societies, the integration of the lower classes — wage labourers, peasants, serfs, slaves, vagabonds and beggars — into the social, political and economic orders of the Absolute State was on the terms of the clients of the latter. The function of the labouring classes was to provide the State and its privileged classes with the material and human resources needed for their maintenance and further accumulations of power and wealth. This was not, however, a simple question of the dominance of a ruling class over the masses.

The masses did not exist as such. As earlier, Greek and Roman thinkers had created the totalizing construct of the barbarians, the feudal nobilities of western Europe had inspired and authored a similar myth: Friedrich Hertz has reported that:

In the Middle Ages and later, the nobility, as a rule, considered themselves of better blood than the common people, whom they utterly despised. The peasants were supposed to be descended from Ham, who, for lack of filial piety, was known to have been condemned by Noah to slavery. The knightly classes of many lands, on the other hand, believed themselves to be the descendants of the Trojan heroes, who after the fall of Troy were said to have settled in England, France and Germany. This theory was seriously maintained not only in numerous songs and tales of knightly deeds, but also in many scholarly works.⁸⁹

It was a form of this notion that Count Gobineau revived in the mid-19th Century, extending its conceptualization of superiority so as to include elements of the bourgeoisie.⁹⁰ The nobilities of the 16th Century, however, proved to be more circumspect about 'the masses' than their genealogical legends might imply. They did not become victims of their own mythic creations. When it came to the structures of the State, their knowledge of the social, cultural and historical compositions of the masses was exquisitely

refined. Perhaps this is no more clearly demonstrated than in one of the most critical areas of State activity: the monopolization of force.

The Absolutist State was a cause and effect of war. Its economy was a war economy, its foreign trade was combative,⁹¹ its bureaucracy administered the preparations and prosecutions of war.⁹² Such a state required standing armies (and, eventually, navies). But for certainly political and sometimes economic reasons, soldiers could not be recruited easily from, in V.G. Kiernan's phrase, 'the mass of ordinary peasants and burghers'. Kiernan puts the situation most simply for France, though it was the same all over Europe: 'Frenchmen were seldom eager to serve their king, and their king was not eager to employ Frenchmen.'⁹³ Loyalty to the state of the monarchy from the exploited ranks of the lower classes was rare. In any case, not one state of the 16th or 17th Century was reliant on such an identification between the masses and their rulers. The soldiers of the armies of France, Spain, England, Holland, Prussia, Poland, Sweden, and at first Russia, were either alien to the states for which they fought and policed or very marginal to them:

European governments . . . relied very largely on foreign mercenaries. One of the employments for which they were particularly well suited was the suppression of rebellious subjects, and in the 16th Century, that age of endemic revolution, they were often called upon for this purpose.

. . . Governments . . . had to look either to backward areas for honest, simple-minded fellows untainted by political ideas . . . or to foreigners.⁹⁴

Depending then on changing fortunes, the 'identities' of the combatants, the geo-politics of wars, and the mission, mercenaries were drawn from among the Swiss, the Scots, Picardians, Bretons, Flemings, Welsh, Basques, Mavarrese, Gallowayians, Dalmatians, Corsicans, Burgundians, Gueldrians, the Irish, Czechs, Croatians, Magyars, and from Gascony, Allgaeu, Norway and Albania. Since one function and result of the work of these mercenaries was the suppression of subject peoples, the degree of their success is directly indicated by their own absence, for the most part, from the political geography of modern Europe. The Absolute State (or its direct successors), the instrument which propelled them into prominence in the 16th and 17th Centuries (for France, into the late 18th Century), ultimately absorbed the autonomous sectors from which the mercenaries originated.

In the armies of the 16th Century, native recruits distributed among the foreign mercenaries were also chosen with an eye to minimizing the political and social risks of the monarchy and its allied nobility. In France, the army 'drew its volunteers from the least "national", most nondescript types, the dregs of the poorest classes', Kiernan informs us.⁹⁵ In Spain, the hills of Aragon and the Basque provinces served a similar function. In Britain, until the mid-18th Century, the Scottish Highlands were the most frequent sites of recruitment; and the Welsh soldier's skills became legendary.⁹⁶

Important as the formation of these armies was for the construction of the states which dominated Europe for more than 200 years, we must not be diverted from their more historical importance by the romantic richness of the social and political drama to which they contributed. Louis XI's innovation in 1474, of organizing a 'French infantry without Frenchmen'⁹⁷ was revolutionary in scale, not in character.⁹⁸ The tactic of composing armies from mercenaries and from marginal peoples and social strata extended back into the Middle Ages and earlier. Imperial armies, republican armies, bandit armies, invading armies and defending armies, the armies of rebellious slaves, of nobles and even of the chauvinist medieval cities, all laid claim to, or incorporated to some extent, souls for whom they had at best few considerations in less intense times.⁹⁹ More significantly, in reviewing this phenomenon for the 16th and later centuries, the point is not that mercenaries were recruited from the outside and from among those least secure internally; this is simply the best documented form of a more generalized pattern of structural formation and social integration.

The important meaning is that this form of enlisting human reserves was not peculiar to military apparatus but extended throughout Europe to domestic service, handicrafts, industrial labour, the ship- and dock-workers of merchant capitalism, and the field labourers of agrarian capitalism. There has never been a moment in modern European history (if before) that migratory and/or immigrant labour was not a significant aspect of European economies.¹⁰⁰ That this is not more widely understood seems to be a consequence of conceptualization and analysis: the mistaken use of the *nation* as a social, historical and economic category; a resultant and persistent reference to national labour 'pools' (e.g. 'the English working class'); and a subsequent failure of historical investigation. Wallerstein, in his otherwise quite detailed study of the origins of the capitalist world system, can devote a mere page to this phenomenon, including a single paragraph on the ethnic divisions of 16th Century immigrant labour. And though compelled to acknowledge that 'not much research seems to have been done on the ethnic distribution of the urban working class of early modern Europe', he goes on to speculate that Kazimierz Tymimecki's description of systematic ethnic distinctions of rank within the working class 'in the towns of 16th Century East Elba . . . [is] typical of the whole of the world economy'.¹⁰¹ Despite the paucity of studies there are historical records which tend to confirm this view. We discover in them Flemish cloth workers in early 16th Century London; and later in the 16th and in the 17th Century, Huguenot refugees (40-80,000 of them), many of them handloom weavers, fleeing France and settling in Spitalfields in London's East End and thus, establishing England's silk industry.¹⁰² In the 18th and 19th Centuries, Irish workers 'formed the core of the floating armies of labourers who built canals, the docks, the railways and transformed the face of England'.¹⁰³ And again on the European Continent, as German farm workers and peasants were drawn to urban and industrial sectors of central and western Germany, Polish labour was used to fill the vacuum in eastern Germany.¹⁰⁴ France and Switzerland also recruited

heavily from Poland, Italy, and Spain.¹⁰⁵ And of course, the formation of industrial cores in the U.S. before the Civil War located immigrant workers from northern Italy, Germany, Scotland and Ireland; and after the Civil War from southern Italy, and the lands of eastern, northern and central Europe: Russia, Finland, Poland, Greece, and the Balkans.¹⁰⁶ (Perhaps the only unique aspect of north American industrial recruitment was the appearance of Asian workers beginning in the late 19th Century, from China, Japan and the Philippines.)¹⁰⁷

We begin to perceive that the nation is not a unit of analysis for the social history of Europe. The State is a bureaucratic structure, and the 'nation' for which it administers is more a convenient construct than the historical, racial, cultural and linguistic entity that the term nation signifies.¹⁰⁸ The truer character of European history resides beneath the phenomenology of nation and state. With respect to the construction of modern capitalism, one must not forget the particular identities, the particular social movements and societal structures which have persisted and/or have profoundly influenced European life:

Altogether western Europe had acquired a greater richness of forms, of corporate life, a greater crystallization of habits into institutions, than any known elsewhere. It had a remarkable ability to forge societal ties, more tenacious than almost any others apart from those of the family and its extensions, clan or caste; ties that could survive from one epoch to another, and be built into more elaborate combinations. But along with fixity of particular relationships went a no less radical instability of the system as a whole.¹⁰⁹

European civilization is not the product of capitalism. On the contrary, the character of capitalism can only be understood in the social and historical context of its appearance.

The Effects of Western Civilization on Capitalism

The development of capitalism can thus be seen as having been determined in form by the social and ideological composition of a civilization which had assumed its fundamental perspectives during feudalism. The patterns of recruitment for slave and mercenary we have reviewed held true for bourgeoisies and proletariats. According to Robert Lopez, in the Carolingian Empire long-distance trade was dominated by Jews and Italians.¹¹⁰ In medieval Europe, Lopez and Irving Raymond have documented the importance of Mediterranean traders at international fairs, and the development of foreign merchant houses in the towns of the hinterland.¹¹¹ Fernand Braudel amplifies:

. . . many financial centres, *piazze*, sprang up in Europe in towns that were of recent origin. But if we look more closely at these sudden, and

quite considerable developments, we shall find that they were in fact ramifications of Italian banking which had by then become traditional. In the days of the fairs of Champagne it was already the bankers from Sienna, Lucca, Florence, or Genoa who held the moneychanger's scales; it was they who made the fortune of Geneva in the fifteenth century and later those of Antwerp, Lyons, and Medina del Campo. . . .

In short, throughout Europe a small group of well-informed men, kept in touch by an active correspondence, controlled the entire network of exchanges in bills or specie, thus dominating the field of commercial speculation. So we should not be too taken in by the apparent spread of 'finance'.¹¹²

For Spain under Charles V (1516-56) and Philip II (1556-98), the German Fuggers, the Genoese and other 'international merchant firms' organized the state revenues, exploited mines, and administered many of the most important estates.¹¹³ And at Constantinople, Genoese, Venetian and Ragusan bankers and merchants shepherded the trade and financial relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire.¹¹⁴ For the Mediterranean towns of the 16th Century, Braudel has observed the functions of the 'indispensable immigrant'. To Salonica, Constantinople and Valona, Italian and Spanish Jews, as merchants and artisans, brought new trades to further broaden an already multi-cultured bourgeoisie.

There were other valuable immigrants, itinerant artists for instance attracted by expanding towns which were extending their public buildings; or merchants, particularly the Italian merchants and bankers, who activated and indeed created such cities as Lisbon, Seville, Medina del Campo, Lyons and Antwerp.¹¹⁵

And in Venice:

A long report by the *Cinque Savii*, in January, 1607, indicates that all 'capitalist' activity, as we should call it, was in the hands of the Florentines, who owned houses in the city, and the Genoese, who provided silver, between them controlling all exchanges.¹¹⁶

Just as Nuremberg had ravaged Bohemia, Saxony and Silesia, Braudel asserts, it was the Genoese who 'blocked the development of Spanish capitalism'.¹¹ It was, too, the 'indispensable immigrant' who complemented the urban proletariat incapable of maintaining itself 'let alone increas[ing] without the help of continuous immigration'.¹¹⁸ In Ragusa it was the *Morlachi*; in Marseilles, the Corsicans; in Seville, the Moriscos of Andalusia; in Algiers, the Aragonese and the Berbers; in Lisbon, Black slaves; and in Venice, the immigrant proletariat was augmented by *Romagnoli*, *Marchiani*, Greeks, Persians, Armenians and Portuguese Jews.¹¹⁹

The bourgeoisie which led the development of capitalism were drawn from

particular ethnic and cultural groups; the European proletariats and the mercenaries of the leading States from others; its peasants from still other cultures; and its slaves from entirely different worlds. The tendency of European civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to differentiate — to exaggerate regional, subcultural, dialectical differences into 'racial' ones. As the Slavs became the natural slaves, the racially inferior stock for domination and exploitation during the early Middle Ages, as the Tartars came to occupy a similar position in the Italian cities of the late Middle Ages, so at the systemic interlocking of capitalism in the 16th Century, the peoples of the Third World began to fill this expanding category of a civilization reproduced by capitalism.¹²⁰

As a civilization of free and equal beings, Europe was as much a fiction in the 19th Century (and later) as its very unity had been during the Merovingian and Carolingian eras. Both the Church and the more powerful nobilities of the Holy Roman Empire and its predecessor had been the source of the illusion in those earlier periods. From the 12th Century forward, it was the bourgeoisie and the administrators of State power who initiated and nurtured myths of egalitarianism while seizing every occasion to divide peoples for the purpose of their domination.¹²¹ The carnage of wars and revolutions precipitated by the bourgeoisies of Europe to sanctify their masques was enormous.

Eventually, however, the old instruments gave way to newer ones, not because they were old but because the ending of feudalism and the expansion of capitalism and its world system — that is the increasingly uneven character of development among European peoples themselves and between Europeans and the world beyond — precipitated new oppositions while providing new opportunities and demanding new 'historical' agents. The Reformations in western Europe and then England which destroyed the last practical vestiges of a transcendent, unified Christendom, were one manifestation of this process of disequilibrium.

In England, as an instance, representatives of the great landowners, and agrarian capitalism, in pursuit of their own social and financial destinies disciplined first the Church and then the monarchy and finally 'the masses' through enclosures, the Poor Laws, debtors' prisons, 'transportation' (forced emigration), and the like.¹²² The contrasts of wealth and power between labour, capital and the middle classes had become too stark to sustain the continued maintenance of privileged classes at home and the support of the engines of capitalist domination abroad. New mystifications, more appropriate to the times, were required, authorized by new lights. The delusions of medieval citizenship, which had been expanded into shared patrimony and had persisted for five centuries in western Europe as the single great levelling principle, were to be supplanted by race and (to use the German phrase) *Herrenvolk*, in the 17th and 18th Centuries.¹²³ The functions of these latter ideological constructions were related but different. Race became largely the rationalization for the domination, exploitation and/or extermination of non-'Europeans' (including Slavs and Jews). And we shall

have occasion in Part II to explore its applications beyond Europe and particularly to African peoples more closely. But while we remain on European soil, it is *Herrenvolk* that matters. In 18th Century England, Reginald Horsman sees its beginnings in the 'mythical' Anglo-Saxonism which was flown as an ideological pennant by the Whig intelligentsia.¹²⁴ In France (for examples, Paul de Rapin-Thoyras and Montesquieu, and before them Francois Hotman and Count Henri de Boulainvilliers), in Germany (Herder, Fichte, Schleiermacher and Hegel), in north America (John Adams and Thomas Jefferson), 'bourgeois' ideologists displayed the idea of the heroic Germanic race.¹²⁵ And the idea swept through 19th Century Europe, gathering momentum and artifice through such effects as Sir Walter Scott's historical novels and Friedrich von Schlegel's philological fables. Inevitably, of course, the idea was dressed in the accoutrement of 19th Century European science. *Herrenvolk* explained the inevitability and the naturalness of the domination of some Europeans by other Europeans. Though he reconstructed the pieces back to front, Louis Snyder, for one, recognized the effect.

Racialists, not satisfied with merely proclaiming the superiority of the white over the coloured race, also felt it necessary to erect a hierarchy within the white race itself. To meet this need they developed the myth of the Aryan, or Nordic, superiority. The Aryan myth in turn became the source of other secondary myths such as Teutonism (Germany), Anglo-Saxonism (England and the United States), and Celticism (France).¹²⁶

Then, in the 19th Century, modern nationalism appeared.

The emergence of nationalism¹²⁷ was again neither accidental nor unrelated to the character that European capitalism had assumed historically. Again, the bourgeoisie of particular cultures and political structures refused to acknowledge their logical and systemic identity as a class. Instead, international capitalism persisted in competitive anarchy — each national bourgeoisie opposing the others as 'natural' enemies. But as powerful as the bourgeoisie and its allies in the aristocracy and bureaucracy might be in some ways, they still required the co-optation of their 'national' proletariat in order to destroy their competitors. Nationalism mobilized the armed might they required to either destroy the productive capacities of those whom they opposed, or to secure new markets, new labour and productive resources.¹²⁸ Ultimately, the uneven developments of national capitalisms would have horrifying consequences for both Europe and the peoples under European dominations.

In Germany and Italy, where national bourgeoisies were relatively late in their formation, the marshalling of national social forces (peasants, farmers, workers, clerics, professional classes, the aristocracy, and the State) was accomplished by the ideological phantasmagoria of race, *Herrenvolk* and nationalism. This compost of violence, in its time, became known under the name of fascism.¹²⁹ With the creation of fascism, the bourgeoisie retained

the full range of its social, political and economic prerogatives. It had the cake of the total control of its national society, an efficient instrument for expanding its domination and expropriation to the Third World, and the ultimate means for redressing the injuries and humiliations of the past. Again, not unexpectedly, slavery as a form of labour would reappear in Europe.¹³⁰

But this goes far beyond our immediate purposes. What concerns us is that we understand that racialism and its permutations persisted, rooted not in a particular era but in the civilization itself. And though our era might seem a particularly fitting one for depositing the origins of racism, that judgement merely reflects how resistant the idea is to examination and how powerful and natural its specifications have become. Our confusions, however, are not unique. As an enduring principle of European social order, the effects of racialism were bound to appear in the social expression of every strata of every European society no matter the structures upon which they were formed. None was immune. And as we shall observe in the next two chapters, this proved to be true for the rebellious proletariat as well as the radical intelligentsias. It was again, a quite natural occurrence in both instances. But to the latter — the radical intelligentsias — it was also an unacceptable one, one subsequently denied. Nevertheless, it insinuated itself into their thought and their theories. And thus, in the quest for a radical social force, an active historical subject, it compelled certain blindnesses, bemusements which in turn systematically subverted their analytical constructions and their revolutionary project. But this is still to be shown. To that end we will now turn to the history of the English working classes. Since these workers were one of the centrepieces for the development by radical intelligentsias of the notion of the proletariat as a revolutionary class, an inquiry into the effects of racialism on their consciousness forms the next step in the demonstration of the limits of European radicalism.

Notes

1. One of the most extraordinary expressions of the expectations associated with the appearance of capitalism, was Marx's caustic appraisal of the bourgeoisie's world-historical significance: 'The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment"'. . . . The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured. . . . The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil. . . . The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. . . . The bourgeoisie has, through its exploitation of the world-market, given cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.' Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in Robert Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader*, W.W. Norton, New York 1972, pp. 337-8. A more recent version of this vision of

- capitalism – reflecting both its authors' views and those of directors of multi-national (or global) corporations – is much less poetic but still as certain. 'The power of the global corporation derives from its unique capacity to use finance, technology, and advanced marketing skills to integrate production on a worldwide scale and thus to realize the ancient capitalist dream of One Great Market.' Richard Barnett and Ronald Muller, *Global Reach*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1974, p. 18.
2. Paul Sweezy, *et al.*, *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*, New Left Books, London, 1976; and Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, International Publishers, New York, 1965.
 3. Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800*, Harper & Row, New York, 1973, pp. xiii–xv.
 4. Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, in Robert Tucker *op.cit.*, pp. 158–61.
 5. Robert Latouche, *The Birth of Western Economy*, Barnes & Noble Inc., New York, 1961, p.309.
 6. Petr Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, Extending Horizon Books, Boston undated, pp.117–18; Henri Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, Unwin University Books, London, 1968, pp.17–19, pp.184–5; and William C. Bark, *Origins of the Medieval World*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958, pp.26–7. Denys Hay reminds us: '... for neither Greeks nor Romans did Europe mean much. Fear of Persia lent colour to the Greek attitude to the continents, but the empire of Alexander the Great was in Asia, not Europe, while the remnants of this were conquered by a Rome which made its greatest advances in the north and west of Europe. What cemented together the Greek world, and after it the world of Rome, was the inland sea, which linked all but the most remote provinces, which was literally the cradle of Greek civilization and which even the Romans, averse as they were to maritime adventure, annexed as *'Mare nostrum'*. Beyond the serenity of the Mediterranean (as later ages were to call it) and the outposts of order carried outwards by the Mediterranean conquerors, Greek or Roman, lay barbarism. Barbarians, as the Romans knew well enough, were confined to no particular continent, and were particularly troublesome in Europe itself.' Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1968, p.4.
 7. Oscar Halecki, *The Millennium of Europe*, Notre Dame University Press, 1963, p.50.
 8. Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe*, MacMillan Co., New York, 1966, pp.47–9, 53; and Duncan McMillan, 'Charlemagne Legends', *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 5, William Benton, Chicago, 1965, pp.291–2.
 9. H. Monro Chadwick, *The Nationalities of Europe and the Growth of National Ideologies*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1945, pp.50–75.
 10. Along with the Italic, the Hellenic, the Indian, the Iranian and Armenian, these are said sometimes to constitute the Indo-European languages; see G.L. Brook, *A History of the English Language*, W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., New York, 1958, pp.30–60.
 11. Chadwick, *op.cit.*, pp.14–49.
 12. According to Chadwick, Basque presumably 'represents the language, or one of the languages, of the ancient Iberians', *Ibid.*, p.49. Brook argues that there is evidence going back to the 6th Century, B.C. of Etruscan, Oscan and Umbrian being spoken in Italy; Brook, *op.cit.*, pp.36–7.
 13. Henri Pirenne, *op.cit.*, pp.17–71.
 14. *Ibid.*, pp.36–7.
 15. *Ibid.*, pp.28, 32.
 16. *Ibid.*, p.37. Pirenne reports that Gautier put the number of Roman Africans at seven to eight millions in the 5th Century, and that Doren, for the same century, estimates that Italy's population ranged between five and six millions; *Ibid.*
 17. Latouche, *op.cit.*, p.70.
 18. *Ibid.*, pp.59–60, 71; Pirenne, *op.cit.*, pp.75–9.
 19. Frank Snowden, *Blacks in Antiquity*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pp.170–1.
 20. Both Pirenne and Latouche argue that long before the mounting of political pressures on the Germanic tribes by subsequent 'barbarian' peoples – the Iranians, Mongols, Slavs and Hungarians – the Goths were motivated by essentially economic reasons to integrate with the more productive peoples of the Empire. Pirenne, *op.cit.*, pp.37–9; Latouche, *op.cit.*, pp.42–5.
 21. David Brion Davis, *The Problems of Slavery in Western Civilization*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1966, pp.29–61. The break in historical and cultural continuity which took place between the disintegration of Greco-Roman civilization and the rise of Germanic civilization had at one time immense significance to western European intelligentsias. Following *Germania*, written by the 1st Century Roman historian Tacitus which contrasted the decadence of Rome to the martial virility of the Germanic tribes, they constructed myths of origin which distinguished superior cultures and races from inferior ones. At the latest, from the 16th Century and well into the 20th Century, English, German and French scholars generally distinguished 'their' own Germanic cultural, racial and philological roots from earlier (e.g. Celtic, Greco-Roman) and putatively later (the Normans) peoples. See Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp.9–42. George Mosse reminds us that excerpts from *Germania* were a part of the standard curriculum 'for the teaching of English constitutional history until well after the Second World War'. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution*, J.M. Dent & Sons, London, 1978, p.48.
 22. For Greek and Roman slavery, see William L. Westermann, *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity*, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1955, and Snowden, *op.cit.*; for the feudal period, see R. Wellton Finn, *An Introduction to Domesday Book*, Longmans, London 1963, pp.118–21 as cited by Davis, *op.cit.*, pp.38–9, and Iris Origo, 'The Domestic Enemy: the Eastern Slaves in Tuscany in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', *Speculum*, XXX, No.3, July 1955, pp.321–66, and Latouche, *op.cit.*, pp.123–5; for Genoese and Venetian trades, see Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1937, pp.16–20 Davis, *op.cit.*, pp.43, 52; and Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Harper & Row, New York, 1976, Vol.I, pp.290–3 and Vol. II pp.754–5 – both Davis and Braudel are largely based upon the work of Charles Verlinden, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe medievale*, Vol.I, Peninsule Iberique, Brugge, France, 1955; and for the modern era see Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, Capricorn Books, New York, 1966.
 23. Davis, *op.cit.*, pp.33, 37.
 24. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, Academic Press, New York, 1974, pp.86–90. Wallerstein wishes to distinguish between the economic and legal-political conditions of New World slavery and a capitalist 'serfdom' ('coerced cash-crop labour') in eastern Europe and among 'natives' of the New World (the *encomienda*) of the 16th Century. His definition of 'coerced cash-crop labour' ('a system of agricultural labour control wherein peasants are required by some legal process enforced by the state to labour at least part of the time on a large domain producing some product for sale on the world market.' p.91) would appear to serve as well as a description of slavery. The point is that alone it does not distinguish the presumably distinct forms of forced labour. David Brion Davis observes that for at least the medieval era, the distinctions were not as clear-cut in daily life as modern scholars would suggest. Davis, *op.cit.*, p.33.
 25. Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, *op.cit.*, p.140. In a note to the text, Pirenne observes: 'These things were retained: the language, the currency, writing (papyrus) weights and measures, the kinds of foodstuffs in common use, the social classes, the religion – the role of Arianism has been exaggerated – art, the law, the administration, the taxes, the economic organization.' *Ibid.*
 26. Latouche, *op.cit.*, pp.97–116; Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, *op.cit.*, pp.39–40.

27. Dirk Jellema, 'Frisian Trade in the Dark Ages', *Speculum*, XXX, No.1 January 1955, pp.15-36; and Latouche, *op.cit.*, pp.120-3. The decline of trade in Merovingian Europe is an important aspect of the attempt to challenge Henri Pirenne's 'thesis' that the Muslim invasion of Europe by ending the European-Mediterranean trade with its social and cultural concomitants precipitated the beginnings of a 'new' European civilization inaugurated by Charlemagne's empire. See Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, *op.cit.*, pp.162-85; Latouche, *op.cit.*, pp.117-88; Bark, *op.cit.*, pp.6-28; and Alfred Havighurst (ed.), *The Pirenne Thesis*, D.C. Heath & Co., Boston, 1958.
28. Latouche, *op.cit.* p.139.
29. Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne*, *op.cit.*, pp.184-5; Braudel, *op.cit.*, p.222.
30. Latouche, *op.cit.*, pp.173-4.
31. *Ibid.*, pp.297-8. Even by the late 16th Century, the contrast in urban life was still great between the European hinterland and the Mediterranean, Braudel writes: '... the Mediterranean region in the 16th Century (and it must be extended to its maximum when we are talking of towns) was unique in its immensity. In the 16th Century no other region in the world had such a developed urban network. Paris and London were just on the threshold of their modern careers. The towns of the Low Countries and southern Germany (the latter bathing in the reflected glory of the Mediterranean, the former stimulated economically by merchants and sailors from the South), further north the industrious but small towns of the Hanseatic League, all of these towns, thriving and beautiful though they might be, did not make up a network as closely knit and complex as that of the Mediterranean, where town followed town in endless strings, punctuated by great cities: Venice, Genoa, Florence, Milan, Barcelona, Seville, Algiers, Naples, Constantinople, Cairo.' Braudel, *The Mediterranean ...*, *op.cit.*, pp.277-8.
32. 'Raoul Glaber has described with an insistence verging on sadism the appalling famine which preceded the year 1033. He notes for instance that at the fair at Tournus in Burgundy, a man was offering human flesh for sale, ready cooked on a butcher's stall.' Latouche, *op.cit.*, p.298.
33. Bark, *op.cit.*, pp.70-82.
34. Pirenne, *The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, *op.cit.*, pp.44-9; and Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1955, pp.87-104.
35. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities, Their Origins and the Revival of Trade*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1948, p.140.
36. Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, *op.cit.*, p.44.
37. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities ...*, *op.cit.*, p.46.
38. Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, *op.cit.*, p.40.
39. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities ...*, *op.cit.*, pp.114-15. Denys Hay, though in disagreement with Pirenne's interpretation of the origins of these merchants, does not specifically cite the evidentiary basis of his view, *Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, Longman, London, 1966, p.71.
40. *Ibid.*, p.126. Elsewhere Pirenne has explained: '... it is incontestable that commerce and industry were originally recruited from among landless men, who lived, so to speak, on the margin of a society where land alone was the basis of existence'. *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, *op.cit.*, p.45.
41. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities ...*, *op.cit.*, pp.143-4. In eastern Europe, it was a quite different story since the political and economic powers of the towns were quixotic and short lived: '... the towns were compelled to surrender their ancient rights of harbouring serfs; they were compelled to abandon leagues with other towns; and the lords were even able to avoid using the towns as markets for their grain by selling it direct to exporters.' Hay, *op.cit.*, p.41.
42. Pirenne, *op.cit.*, p.81.
43. *Ibid.*, pp.100-101.
44. *Ibid.*, p.155, and Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, *op.cit.*, pp.35-6.
45. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957, p.64.
46. *Ibid.*, and Pirenne, *The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, *op.cit.*, pp.160-66;
47. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities ...*, *op.cit.*, pp.154-6.
48. Pirenne, *The Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, *op.cit.*, pp.57-8; and Hay, *op.cit.*, p.77.
49. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities ...*, *op.cit.*, p.193. See also Michael Tigar and Madeleine Levy, *Law and the Rise of Capitalism*, Monthly Review Press, 1977, pp.80-96; elsewhere, Tigar and Levy summarize their review of the earliest thrusts of the bourgeoisie against the feudal order: 'The great achievement of the bourgeoisie in this period [1000 to 1200] was to wrest from seigneurs in hundreds of separate localities the recognition of an independent status within the feudal hierarchy. The urban movement ... demanded one major concession from the seigneur: a charter ... the status of *bourgeois*, *burgher*, or *burgess* ...' (p.111).
50. Hay, *op.cit.*, pp.39, 370.
51. *Ibid.*, pp.373-4. + Inalcik
52. Origo, *op.cit.*, p.326.
53. Origo, *op.cit.*, pp.328, 336; Davis, *op.cit.*, p.43; and Hay, *op.cit.*, pp.75-6.
54. Origo, *op.cit.*, p.336.
55. Hay, *op.cit.*, p.76. Hay observes that: 'In these slave-owning communities of the Christian Mediterranean there is not much evidence that slaves were used in agriculture.' (*Ibid.*) Charles Verlinden does not agree: 'In Spain female slaves were generally cheaper than males, although the opposite was true in most of Italy. This was because much of the slave manpower in Spain was used in agriculture and in industry, whereas in Italy the domestic slave predominated in the cities and therefore more female workers were required.' Charles Verlinden, 'The Transfer of Colonial Techniques from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic,' in *The Beginnings of Modern Colonization*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1970, p.29.
56. Charles Verlinden notes: 'The Latin word *scalvus*, the common source of the words *esclave*, *esclavo*, *escravo*, *schlavo*, *Sklave*, and *slave*, did not take root during that initial period [pre-Middle Ages] when slavery was common to the whole of Europe ... It was only when slaves were recruited from entirely new sources that other terms appeared to indicate the nonfree, and among these were *sclavus*, derived from the ethnic name of the Slav people and popularized. It appeared first in its Latin form in tenth-century Germany.' 'Medieval Slavery in Europe and Colonial Slavery in America,' Verlinden, *op.cit.*, pp.35-6.
57. Charles Verlinden, 'The Transfer of Colonial Techniques. ...' *op.cit.*, pp.31-2.
58. Giuliano Procacci, *The History of the Italian People*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1970, pp.44-5.
59. R.H. Tawney has commented on the several forms of capitalism in European history. The occasion for his remarks was the review of Maurice Dobb's *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (Routledge, London, 1946): 'Mr. Dobb's limitation of the term capitalism to a particular system of production, under which labour is employed on the basis of a wage-contract to produce surplus value for the owner of capital, might seem, at first sight, to escape some of the ambiguities inherent in less restricted interpretations; but it raises problems of its own. It is not merely that, as he would agree, financial and commercial capitalism have been highly developed in circumstances when the institution, as interpreted by him, has been a feeble plant, and that to exclude these varieties on the ground that they do not fall within the four corners of the 19th Century definition is to beg the question. It is that, as his work shows, the origins and growth of the industrial species require for their elucidation to be considered in relation to the history of other members of the family, some of which have been among its progenitors. Obviously the capitalism of our day rests predominantly on a wage-system, and the latter is so familiar that it is tempting to treat it as historically a constant.' Tawney, 'A History of Capitalism,'

- The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol.II, No.3, 1950, pp.310-11.
60. Marian Malowist, 'The Economic and Social Development of the Baltic Countries From the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Centuries', *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol.XII, No.2, 1959, pp.177-8, and Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, pp.21-6.
 61. Hay, *op.cit.*, p.34.
 62. *Ibid.*, pp.34-5.
 63. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970, pp.198-9; and Hay, *op.cit.*, pp.35-7; and Procacci, *op.cit.*, p.46.
 64. E.M. Carus-Wilson and Olive Coleman, *England's Export Trade, 1275-1547*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963, pp.201-207.
 65. Hay, *op.cit.*, p.387.
 66. *Ibid.*, p.389.
 67. P. Ramsey, 'The European Economy in the Sixteenth Century', *The Economic History Review*, Second Series, Vol.XII, No.3, April 1960, p.458.
 68. Hay, *op.cit.*, p.389.
 69. *Ibid.*; and Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, p.148.
 70. Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1966, pp.133-9.
 71. K.G. Davies, 'The Mess of the Middle Class,' *Past and Present*, No.22, July 1962, p.82.
 72. As quoted by Immanuel Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, p.124 note.
 73. Davies, *op.cit.*, p.79.
 74. In his important but flawed study of mercantilism, Eli Heckscher made a point on the conceptualization of capitalism related to that of Davies quoted above in the text. Heckscher commented 'that the method of treating all sorts of disconnected tendencies, paving the way to modern economic conditions, under the common name of "modern capitalism" appears to me confusing and a thing to be shunned . . .' *Mercantilism*, Vol.1, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1955, p.14.
 75. The phrase is Immanuel Wallerstein's, *op.cit.*, p.133; see also Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolute State*, New Left Books, London, 1974, pp.40-41.
 76. V.G. Kiernan, 'State and Nation in Western Europe', *Past and Present*, No.31, July 1965, p.34.
 77. *Ibid.*, pp.25-6.
 78. 'War for [the monarchy] was not an optional policy, but an organic need. . . The whole State apparatus that rulers were putting together piecemeal was largely a by-product of war. During its adolescence, the 16th and 17th Centuries, fighting was almost continuous; later on it grew rather more intermittent.' *Ibid.*, p.31.
 79. Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, pp.136-9. For an extensive discussion of the State-merchant associations see Heckscher, *op.cit.*, Vol.1, pp.340-455.
 80. Braudel, *The Mediterranean . . .*, *op.cit.*, Vol.1, p.344, and Vol.II, p.695.
 81. See D.C. Coleman, 'Eli Heckscher and the Idea of Mercantilism', *The Scandinavian Economic History Review*, Vol.V, No.1, 1957, pp.3-4.
 82. Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, pp.146-7.
 83. Coleman, *op.cit.*, pp.18-19; see also Carl Bucher, *Industrial Evolution*, August Kelley, New York, 1968, (Orio 1901) pp.136-9.
 84. Heckscher, *op.cit.*, Vol.2, pp.14-15. Wallerstein apparently has some problems with this particular attribution to 16th Century bourgeoisie. While relying on Kiernan for his own characterization - rather loosely - Wallerstein presents an interpretation which is inconsistent with respect to the distinctions to be made between statism and nationalism: 'It was only in the late 17th and 18th Centuries within the framework of mercantilism that nationalism would find its first real advocates amongst the bourgeoisie. But in the 16th Century, the interests of the bourgeoisie were not yet surely fixed on the state. Too large a number were more interested in open than in closed economies. And for state builders, premature nationalism risked its crystallization around too small an ethno-territorial entity. At an early point, statism could almost be said to be anti-nationalist, since the boundaries of 'nationalist' sentiment were often narrower than the bounds of the monarch's state.' Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, p.146; see also Kiernan, *op.cit.*, pp.29-30.
 85. See Coleman, *op.cit.*, p.21.
 86. Heckscher, *op.cit.*, Vol.2, p.18.
 87. *Ibid.*, pp.18-23; see also Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, pp.196-7.
 88. Fernand Braudel: 'Beginning in the 16th Century and with more éclat in this century of renewal, the States - at least those who would live, prosper and especially resist the exhausting expenses of land and sea warfare - the States dominate, deform economic life, subject it to a network of constraints; they capture it in their net . . . the part of economic life that was at that point most modern, that which we would readily designate as operating within the framework of largescale merchant capitalism was linked to these financial ups and downs of the State . . .' Quoted by Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, p.138 note.
 89. Friedrich Hertz, *Race and Civilization*, KTAV, (no place), 1970, p.4; see also Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Meridian Books, Cleveland, 1958, pp.161-5; and Henri Peyre, *Historical and Critical Essays*, University of Nebraska, (no place), 1968, pp.29-30 (Peyre acknowledges his debt to Jacques Barzun, see *The French Race*, Kennirrat, New York, 1966 Oris. 1432, and *Race*, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1932). One should also mention that with respect to the Ham legend and its origins as a rationalization for African slavery in North America, Winthrop Jordan in his highly regarded study *White Over Black* (North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1968), in company with most American scholars, has virtually ignored the phenomenon of racist attitudes among Europeans toward other Europeans - this despite his claim to be familiar with the relevant literature (see his appendix, 'Essay on Sources').
 90. Hertz, *op.cit.*, p.6.
 91. Heckscher, *op.cit.*, Vol.2, p.18.
 92. V.B. Kiernan, 'Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy', *Past and Present*, No.11, April 1957, pp.76-7.
 93. *Ibid.*, p.68; see also Braudel, *The Mediterranean . . .*, *op.cit.*, Vol.II, pp.739-43.
 94. *Ibid.*, p.74.
 95. *Ibid.*, p.78.
 96. *Ibid.*, p.69.
 97. *Ibid.*, p.72.
 98. That there were several other sides to the relation of the State to mercenaries is attested to by Braudel (*The Mediterranean . . .*, *op.cit.*, Vol.II): 'Sea-pirates were aided and abetted by powerful towns and cities. Pirates on land, bandits, received regular backing from nobles. Robber bands were often led, or more or less closely directed, by some genuine noblemen . . .' (p.749); ' . . . banditry had other origins besides the crisis in noble fortunes: it issued from peasantry and populace alike. This was a groundswell - "a flood tide" as an 18th Century historian called it, which stirred up a variety of waters. As a political and social (though not religious) reaction, it had both aristocratic and popular components (the "mountain kings" in the Roman Campagna and around Naples were more often than not peasants and humble folk)'. (p.751).
 99. The 19th Century armies of imperialist Europe continued the tradition of relying on substantial recruitment among ethnic minorities, 'riff-raff', outcasts, aliens and the peasantry: to the million serfs of the Russian Army were added the Asiatic Bashkirs and Kalmucks, Ingush and Ossietin; the Corsicans and Bretons of the French Army were augmented by the Legion founded on Kabyle swordsmen, Swiss and other European mercenaries, but by mid-century the Army itself had come to be dominated by West Africans; in the Philippines, the Spanish Army was native, as was the Dutch Army of the East Indies. In India, the East India Company and the Bengal army (1842) employed between them upwards of 70,000 natives in their sepoy regiments. In Britain itself, in 1832, the Irish accounted for 42% of the army. See V.G. Kiernan, *European Empires from Conquest to Collapse*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1982, pp.17-32.

100. Bucher, *op.cit.*, p.346; Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, p.117; see also Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, London, 1973, pp.15-25; Braudel says it best: 'These indispensable immigrants were not always unskilled labourers or men of little aptitude. They often brought with them new techniques that were as indispensable as their persons to urban life. The Jews, driven out by their religious beliefs not their poverty, played an exceptional role in these transfers of technology. . . . There were other valuable immigrants, itinerant artists for instance attracted by expanding towns which were extending their public buildings; or merchants, particularly the Italian merchants and bankers, who activated and indeed created such cities as Lisbon, Seville, Medina del Campo, Lyons and Antwerp. An urban community needs all sorts and conditions of men, not least rich men. Towns attracted the wealthy just as they attracted the proletariat, though for very different reasons.' *The Mediterranean . . .*, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.336-7.
101. Wallerstein, *op.cit.*, pp.118-19; Bucher makes a similar comment, *op.cit.*, p.353.
102. Chaim Bermant, *London's East End*, Macmillan Publishing, New York, 1975, pp.30-31.
103. *Ibid.*, p.43; see also E.P. Thompson, *op.cit.*, pp.469-85; and Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *op.cit.*, pp.16-17.
104. See Paul Lazarsfeld and Anthony Oberschall, 'Max Weber and Empirical Social Research', *American Sociological Review*, Vol.30, No.2, April 1965, pp.185-8.
105. See Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, 'The Function of Labour Immigration in Western European Capitalism', *New Left Review*, No.73, May-June 1972, p.6; and Bucher, *op.cit.*, pp.367-8.
106. See David Brody, *Steelworkers in America*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1969, pp.96-9.
107. See Howard Brett Melendy, *The Oriental Americans*, Twayne Publishers, New York, 1972; Mary R. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration*, Arno Press, New York, 1969 (orig. 1909); and Stuart Miller, *The Unwelcome Immigrant*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969.
108. 'A "nation" is etymologically a "birth", or a "being born", and hence a race, a kin or kind having a common origin or, more loosely, a common language and other institutions. . . . There is not only an original and individual birth for each system but a continual birth of new institutions within it, a continual transformation of old institutions, and even a rebirth of the nation after death', Max Fisch's introduction to *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1970, p.xxiii; see also Friedrich Hertz for an example of the length to which the monarchy was willing to go to produce the appropriate illusion: 'The theory already put forward by Bodin that the Franks were a people of Gallic stock who had wandered into Germany, and from there had returned later as deliverers of their brothers from the Roman yoke, came into favour under Louis XIV. Within the French people there was, therefore, no racial difference, but national unity of the kind so much desired by the absolute monarchy. This theory very conveniently lent support to the desire for the annexation of the Rhine, the restoration of which, as old Frankish territory, he affected to demand', *op.cit.*, p.5.
109. Kiernan, *op.cit.*, *Past and Present*, No.31, p.27.
110. Robert S. Lopez, *The Birth of Europe*, Phoenix House, London, 1966, pp.103-4.
111. Robert S. Lopez and Irving Raymond, eds., *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1955, pp.79-80 and 87-107.
112. Braudel, *The Mediterranean . . .*, *op.cit.*, p.321.
113. Braudel, *ibid.*, v.II, p.695.
114. Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1966, pp.133-9.
115. Braudel, *The Mediterranean . . .*, *op.cit.*, Vol.I, pp.336-7.
116. Braudel, *ibid.*, p.322.
117. Braudel, *ibid.*, p.344.
118. Braudel, *ibid.*, p.334.
119. Braudel, *ibid.*, pp.334-6.
120. See Charles Verlinden, *op.cit.*, Eric Williams, *op.cit.*, and David Brion Davis, *op.cit.*
121. See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1936, pp.121-4; and Hertz, *op.cit.*, pp.6 and 10.
122. T.K. Derry and M.G. Blakeway, *The Making of Pre-Industrial Britain*, John Murray, London, 1973, *passim*.
123. See Arendt, *op.cit.*, pp.165-7; Hertz, *op.cit.*, pp.1-19.
124. Reginald Horsman, 1981, pp.14-15.
125. *Ibid.*, Chapter 2.
126. Louis Snyder, *The Idea of Racialism*, D. Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1962, pp.39-40 (also see pp.20-23, and 39-53); see also Snyder's *Race*, Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1939, pp.93-5; Magnus Hirschfeld, *Racism*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1938. (Hirschfeld, interestingly, traces the usage of the term race from its introduction in scientific literature by Comte de Buffon in 1749, to its appearance in the prolegomena of Immanuel Kant's summer course in 1775 at Konigsberg in the form of White Race, Negro Race, Hunnish Race, Hindu Race, and mongrel races, pp.51-4.)
127. See Eric Hobsbawm, 'Some Reflections on Nationalism', in T.J. Nossiter, A.H. Hanson, Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences*, Faber & Faber, London, 1972, pp.385-406.
128. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in Robert Tucker (ed.), *The Marx-Engels Reader*, *op.cit.*, 1972, pp.342-3.
129. See Louis Snyder, *The Idea of Racialism*, *op.cit.*, pp.155-65 for excerpts from various National Socialist thinkers in Germany including Adolf Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg, Ernst Hauer, Felix Fischer-Dodeleben, Wilhelm Klessnerow, Ernst Kriek, Walter Darre, Herman Gauch, and, as well, appropriate selections from the Nuremberg Laws (1935); see also Mannheim, *op.cit.*, pp.134-46; M.N. Roy, *Fascism*, Best Books, Jijnasa, 1976, pp.33-43; and Renzo De Felice, *Interpretations of Fascism*, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1977, pp.176-8.
130. See William Styron, 'Hell Reconsidered', *New York Review of Books*, Vol.XXV, No.11, 29 June 1978, pp.10-12, 14.